

Extremism, Values, and Education in Policy and Practice

Summary

The relationship between extremism and schools is a seemingly contradictory one. The UK Prevent Duty's aim (to prevent and also root out extremism in schools) is often, ironically, blamed for aiding the radicalization process, but it is also identified by states and international bodies as a primary tool with which to combat it. In the early 21st century there has been a development of policies and law designed to prevent violent extremism (PVE) as a part of an international response to 9/11 in 2001 and the war on terror. Policy approaches to extremism in education were revised and reworked in the first and second decades of the 21st century in response to various events, including the 2005 London and 2017 Manchester bombings, and the increasing fear that education system had allowed homegrown terrorists raised in England to commit terrorist acts. The promotion of fundamental British values in school and teacher education contexts has been met with varied responses. Since the inception of this strategy, it has been criticized from a number of perspectives. The National Union of Teachers passed a motion at its annual conference in 2016 condemning the idea of promoting "fundamental British values" as an act of cultural supremacism and other researchers have noted that conceptually the strategy is flawed and counterproductive. In 2014 a document that was to become known as the Trojan Horse letter was leaked to Birmingham City Council, which outlined an alleged plot by hardline jihadists to take over a number of Birmingham schools. The outcome of the affair had ramifications beyond that initial cluster of schools and impacted on the way all schools engaged with the counterterrorism agenda. The furor surrounding the event acted as a catalyst for the

generation of policy that introduced an even greater meshing between education and the security agenda, resulting in the concepts of Muslims being seen as a “suspect community” and teachers being positioned as “agents of surveillance.” Research has also investigated the extent to which there has been a “chilling effect” in educational settings in the early 21st century as a result of the Prevent policy, with both teachers and learners feeling under scrutiny, and cautious about speaking freely in their educational environment.

Many researchers consider that teachers face a dilemma—to deliver governmental policy uncritically (the safe option to ensure compliance and positive outcomes in terms of Ofsted, the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills); or to challenge a perceived governmental stranglehold and take the more risky option, whereby teachers critically explore effective ways of promoting British values. Some scholars in the second decade of the 21st century have argued that teachers have subsumed counterterrorism policy into their own safeguarding practice. Extremism, values, and education is an emerging field in educational research, that is uncovering (among other things) the extent to which educational professionals from Early Years to university level challenge the prejudicial implications of the Prevent Duty legislation, are providing open spaces for critical and informed debate, and are adhering to policy to prevent violent extremism.

Keywords

Prevent, extremism, radicalization, Muslims, counterterrorism, securitization

Introduction

The Prevent Duty was developed by the UK Home Office in 2003 as part of a counterterrorism strategy that was designed to prevent radicalization from taking place (House of Commons, 2008). In the intervening years it has had a huge impact on education,

and has generated controversy and numerous guidelines as well as changes in policy (Elwick & Jerome, 2019). Prevent has prompted many debates and incidents, and two of the most controversial developments should be examined in detail: The Trojan Horse affair, in which schools in Birmingham were falsely accused of extremism (Holmwood & O'Toole, 2017) and the introduction of fundamental British values as a mechanism for detecting and preventing the spread of extremism (Farrell, 2016).

In 2016 the Council of Europe commissioned a report into the relationship between education and counterterrorism initiatives. The report *Students as Suspects?—The Challenges of Counter-Radicalisation Policies in Education in the Council of Europe Member States* (Ragazzi, 2018) identified a key challenge for the relationship between counterterrorism and education policy. It argues that policy across Europe places contradictory demands on educators. Educators are tasked with playing a role in preventing violence, yet the very measures they are obliged to use could potentially contribute to tensions and the breakdown of trust and even lead to radicalization. At the same time that counterterrorism policy may undermine key principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms, it undermines education for democratic citizenship and human rights, it challenges the objectives of building inclusive societies, and finally, it undermines the objectives of counterterrorism itself (Ragazzi, 2018).

This article explores the claims made by the Council of Europe in relation to the intersection between education policy and practice in schools and counterterrorism measures in England. It puts forth that the relationship between education and counterterrorism is contextualized by a range of factors including the “war on terror,” the perceived failure of a community cohesion agenda, and the emergence of vulnerability, risk, and resilience as key concepts in the way educationalists engage with issues of inequality and inclusion. We also identify key aspects of the current counterterrorism/education nexus that predate the current

policy. Academic literature on Prevent is dominated by negative voices (Lewis, 2018), and we seek to provide a balanced overview of Prevent policy in education from a number of perspectives.

Context

Since the attack on the World Trade Center in the United States in 2001 Western governments have implemented counterterrorism policies of increasing complexity and reach. It is widely accepted that policies designed to counter terrorism introduced by successive UK governments have been some of the most far-reaching in the world, especially in relation to the way they have focused on schools (Thomas, 2020). There has also been a corresponding securitization of education, whereby education practices and values have been reimagined and constructed through the prism of national security (Durodie, 2016). Current policy requires educators to play a dual role in relation to counterterrorism. Educators are expected to inculcate values and dispositions that promote a liberal ideology that acts as a counter-narrative to the ideology of extremism. In this way teachers' work disrupts the radicalization process and creates spaces and opportunities where teachers can support pupils who may otherwise be vulnerable to extremism. A parallel role for educators is that it is their statutory duty to survey their classes and schools and to identify pupils who may be vulnerable to radicalization. Pupils may then be referred to safeguarding officers and then, if appropriate, to the Home Office. These dual roles are embedded in a number of policies that combine to create a multilayered web of guidelines and requirements that situate teachers at the heart of UK counterterrorism strategy.

Original responses to 9/11 paid very little attention to education, and the story of how the United Kingdom came to embed the most comprehensive counterterrorism policies within

education is best understood as part of a wider process of surveillance, the retreat of teacher autonomy, and a growing belief that multicultural approaches to diversity had not only failed but contributed to the breakdown of social cohesion (Miller, 2018). As such the roots of the current relationship between counterterrorism policy and schools in the United Kingdom lies not only in 9/11 but in a perceived failure of the multicultural policies of the 1980s and 1990s (Malik, 2013). Even where the impact of those policies was superficial the language of multicultural education dominated approaches to anti-racism and the treatment of communities from black and ethnic-minority backgrounds for over 20 years (Gillborn, 1995). However, by the end of the 1990s a number of key events had contributed to the perception that multiculturalism had failed and that Muslim communities threatened social cohesion (Allen, 2010; Miller, 2018). Salman Rushdie published *The Satanic Verses* in 1988, prompting rage among many British Muslims who believed his magical-realist tale based on the life of Muhammad was blasphemous. The ensuing protests by Muslims contributed to an awareness of a distinct British Muslim voice, which many experienced as a threat (Malik, 2013), and the 2001 riots in Oldham and Bradford reinforced the view that Muslim communities did not want to integrate and that there were irresolvable differences between Muslims and other groups in society (Harris & Bright, 2001). Commissioned in the wake of the riots in 2001, the Cante Report championed integration and cohesion in the context of the perceived failure of multiculturalism (Cante, 2008) and set the scene for approaches to diversity that identified shared values and the creation of a cohesive national identity as a solution, and which identified minority groups as problematic. It is in the context of this climate of suspicion about Muslim communities and an unease about social cohesion that counterterrorism strategies in the coming period were situated.

Since the attacks of 9/11 and the ensuing war on terror, Western nations have passed numerous pieces of counterterrorism legislation. In the United Kingdom the first post-9/11

comprehensive strategy, published in 2003, was called CONTEST and consisted of four strands:

Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks

Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism

Protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack

Prepare: to mitigate the impact of terrorist attack

(HMG, 2011b)

In his review of the way counterterrorism strategy has evolved in the 9/11 period, Paul Thomas identifies three phases of Prevent (Thomas, 2020). In the first phase, in 2011, Prevent focused on engaging Muslim communities, and £60 million (the largest single investment ever made to British Muslim civil society) was allocated to the Muslim third sector in order to counter extremism. This version of Prevent was characterized by a decentralized approach that focused on establishing productive links with Muslim communities (O'Toole, DeHanas, Modood, Meer, & Jones, 2013). The second phase, Prevent 2, was developed by the coalition governments' Prevent review, which focused on identifying individuals at risk of radicalization, and the third phase that emerged with the introduction of the Prevent Duty in 2015 (HM Government, 2015).

There followed a series of revisions and reworkings of Prevent, a trajectory that was characterized by an increased focus on education and the role of ideology, that is, "nonviolent terrorism" as a component of the official definition of extremism (Bryan, 2017). Early versions of the post 9/11 U.K. counterterrorism strategy did not regard education as a significant site for radicalization and Prevent, the strand that referred to education, was essentially dormant, as policy focused on dealing with the perceived external threat to peace.

Counterterrorism initiatives have often focused on education, but there were usually initiatives that aimed to de-radicalize extremists once they had committed a crime. It was not unusual, then, for the original Home Office response to 9/11 to relegate education to a relatively minor position in the documentation and that the focus of these early versions was on preventing extremists from entering the United Kingdom. It was not until the 7/7 bombings of 2006 in London that Prevent was activated as part of a reassessment of the roots of extremism. Whereas the bombers of 9/11 had been of Middle Eastern origins, the men who perpetrated the events of 7/7 were “homegrown jihadists”; that is, they had been mostly educated and raised in the United Kingdom. All four bombers were middle class, three of them were British born, and none were known to the authorities before the 7/7 attacks ([House of Commons Report, 2008](#)). A focus of the media debates that followed was the question of how such an atrocity could be committed by people who were raised and educated in Britain. Writing in a national newspaper, the columnist William Pfaff echoed many others when he stated that “these British bombers are a consequence of a misguided and catastrophic pursuit of multiculturalism” ([Pfaff, 2005](#)). The scene was now set for a review of the role of education in cultivating a cohesive national identity and in preventing radicalization among the young.

The initial focus on education as an important area in relation to radicalization was careful to situate it as one of many factors that should be considered, and the version of CONTEST, the government’s counter-terrorism strategy, published in 2011 did not specifically identify education as the key area where radicalization could be interrupted ([HMGa, 2011](#)). It included a long list of sectors that could contribute to counterterrorism work: the third sector, church groups, religious communities, and the Internet are all listed, and education is merely one of many. The 2011 version of Prevent reminds professionals that their response to the threat of radicalization must be “proportionate to the risks we face”

(HMG, 2011). It stresses that work in schools must not start from “a misplaced assumption that there is a significant problem that needs to be resolved” and that the issue of extremists infiltrating education establishments “must be kept in perspective” (HMG, 2011b, p. 44).

Although education is not singled out for specific attention, the 2011 version of Prevent signals a focus on areas that are more directly concerned with education. The 2008 strategy sought to establish relationships between communities as a way of preventing radicalization, and included community-based approaches designed to diminish the attractiveness of extremism. The 2011 version demonstrated a break with this approach; it promised that the new strategy would be more robust and stated that its predecessor was “flawed” precisely because it had failed to confront extremism at its root: ideology (HMG, 2011b). Ideology is identified as the first challenge of terrorism, and the strategy states that “the ideology of extremism and terrorism is the problem” (2011, p. 1). Extremist ideas are defined as ideas that reject a cohesive society and undermine a sense of belonging, and whereby common values are rejected. It was 2011 Prevent, with its focus on ideas and ideology as opposed to extremist actions and behaviors that laid the groundwork for the tone of future interventions in education, including the review, *Tackling Extremism* in 2013 (HMG, 2013) in which schools are identified as the first in a list of institutions that have particular responsibility for preventing extremism. The significance of ideas, ideology, and the promotion of certain values associated with Britishness in schools was given a new impetus through the Teachers’ Standards of 2012 (Department for Education, 2012) and the Trojan Horse affair, a scandal involving a series of schools with Muslim pupils in Birmingham in 2013 (Revell & Bryan, 2018).

Teachers’ Standards and the Trojan Horse Affair

The requirements set out in the original Prevent of 2003, which was part of CONTEST, the post 9/11 counterterrorism approach, were now a legal duty for all public sector institutions. The Counterterrorism and Security Act 2015 imposed a Prevent Duty under section 26 of the new legislation, and Prevent Duty guidance published by the Home Office in 2015 outlined the steps it expected educators and other professionals to take “to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism” (Home Office, 2015). Unlike previous guidance, the steps outlined in the Prevent Duty are mandatory: This means that individuals responsible to any associated institutions affected by the Act are liable for fines or prison terms if they fail to act. As a policy trajectory, Prevent Duty 2015 continues the focus of 2011, but other factors, most notably the 2012 Teachers’ Standards, the inclusion of fundamental British values, and the Trojan Horse affair mean that its impact on schools has raised questions about the stigmatization of Muslim pupils and professional autonomy of teachers (Bryan, 2017).

In England all teachers must meet a set of standards before being awarded qualified teacher status, and they must continue to meet them throughout their careers. Although there have been several iterations of the Teachers’ Standards, they usually focus on the core skills and aptitudes that teachers should meet throughout their professional lives. The revised 2012 Teacher’s Standards are significant because they mark a qualitatively new stage in the way teachers are expected to respond to extremism. They are unique in three ways: firstly because they make specific reference to the values that teachers must hold. In the Standards of 2007, teachers had been required to “hold positive values” (Teacher Development Agency, 2007, p. 7), and of the 41 listed standards, only 1 referred to values; but the new standards are explicit and list those values— democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, mutual respect, and tolerance—that teachers must adhere to (DfE, 2012). Secondly the 2012 Teacher’s Standards are unique in that they not only require teachers not to “undermine fundamental British values,” but that they also require teachers not to do this “within and outside school” (DfE,

2012, p. 14). This means that not only does policy designed to frame the nature of teacher professionalism presume to dictate the political views of teachers, in school and outside of school, but it does so as part of a national security agenda (Winter & Mills, 2020). And lastly the 2012 Standards are unique because they reference the Prevent Strategy 2011 (DfE, 2012).

Not only do the 2020 Teachers' Standards construct teacher professionalism through explicit political values, but those values are themselves constructed through the prism of a counterterrorism strategy that many consider anti-Muslim (Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017; Gilroy, 2018; Panjwani, 2016). The second significant development that raised questions about teacher autonomy in relation to extremism in schools was the introduction of fundamental British values. The phrase "fundamental British values" appears in the Teachers' Standards 2012 in Part II, in the section "Personal and professional conduct," where it states that teachers must uphold public trust in the profession by "not undermining fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect, and tolerance of those with different faiths" (Department for Education, 2012, p. 9). The glossary informs readers that the phrase *fundamental British values* is "taken from the definition of extremism as articulated in the new Prevent Strategy" (Department for Education, 2012, p. 6) and so directly links the definition of teacher professionalism with the UK counterterrorism strategy (Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017). Since their inception as part of the standards, fundamental British values have been criticized from a number of perspectives. The National Union of Teachers passed a motion at its annual conference in 2016 condemning the reference to these values as an act of cultural supremacism (Espinoza, 2016), and others have noted that conceptually, they are flawed and counterproductive (Richardson, 2015).

As policy around extremism evolved, the focus on fundamental British values sharpened and teachers were expected to play an ever-more-active role in their execution. Until 2014

schools were required to “respect these values” and teachers were required “not to undermine them” (DfE, 2011). The Ofsted inspection handbook pre-2014 made no reference to preventing extremism in schools, but guidance published in 2014 by the Department of Education states that all schools now have a duty to “actively promote” the values, and Ofsted and the independent inspectorates now take the work of schools in this area into account (DfE, 2014). The ever-greater requirements for teachers and schools to engage in the prevention of extremism can partly be explained merely as a development of previous trends; however one event in particular, the Trojan Horse affair, accelerated and deepened these trends.

In 2014 a document that was to become known as the Trojan Horse letter was leaked to Birmingham City Council; this letter outlined an alleged plot by hardline jihadists to take over a number of Birmingham schools (Rogers, 2014). The outcome of the affair had ramifications beyond that initial cluster of schools, and impacted on the way all schools engaged with the counterterrorism agenda (Arthur, 2015). Michel Gove, then Secretary of State for Education, instructed that the 21 schools in Birmingham with a Muslim-majority cohort were to be inspected immediately even though only 6 of those schools were named in the original letter. Although evidence for extremism or radicalization was not found in any schools, 5 of the 21 schools were placed in special measures; that is, the schools were deemed to have failed to provide a satisfactory standard of teaching or educational environment. The furor surrounding the event acted as a catalyst for the generation of policy that introduced an even greater meshing between education and the security agenda (Farrell, 2016).

As a result of the Trojan Horse affair, the criteria for unannounced (HMG, 2015, p. 16, S38) inspections was broadened, and the framework for Ofsted inspections was changed so that the promotion of fundamental British values was now part of the inspection process. The government went on to identify the apparent plot to Islamize Birmingham schools as part of

its rationale for the need to criminalize extremist ideology as well as to respond to the threat of violence in its counter-extremist strategy ([Home Office, 2015](#)).

A further consequence of the Trojan Horse affair was the confirmation of a narrative that positioned Muslim communities as a group that was particularly vulnerable to radicalization within educational contexts ([Awan, 2018](#)). A House of Commons Education committee was set up to review the way the Department of Education and Ofsted had handled the investigation into schools in Birmingham. The report confirmed that apart from an isolated incident, no evidence of extremism or radicalization had been found ([House of Commons Education Committee, 2015](#), p. 2). Evidence provided by Sir Michael Wilshaw, Chair of Ofsted and the then Secretary of State Education, Nicky Morgan, confirmed that while no cases of extremism were found in the schools, examples of cultural practices had been found. Ofsted and the other inquiries had found these practices problematic; for example, one inspection report highlighted the school's links with Saudi Arabia and a school trip to the Hajj as suspicious, yet previous Ofsted reports commended this practice ([Holmwood & O'Toole, 2017](#)). Criticisms of the schools often focused on activities and practices associated with Islam that would have been unremarkable in schools which were predominantly white British. One report identified the fact that education in the school was single sex as problematic, when most schools that provide single-sex education are either grammar or private schools, and again most are predominately white British ([Miah, 2017](#)).

The Trojan Horse affair raises questions about how government distinguished between the religious beliefs of Muslim teachers, governors, and parents, and beliefs and practices which were to all intents and purposes considered to be illegal. In their analysis of the Trojan Horse Affair, John Holmwood and Therese O'Toole provide a forensic account of the investigations and media furor that surrounded the plot and its aftermath ([2017](#)). They suggest that a fusion of several trends—the complexity of governance arrangements for

schools, a suspicious public and political climate toward Muslim communities, and a securitized national agenda—culminated in a saga that increased the level of hostility toward Muslims (Holmwood & O'Toole, 2017). In some areas of the media the discussion served to promote the need of a muscular liberalism in the face of a discredited multiculturalism (Poole, 2016) and others have argued that the affair is the worst example of anti-terror excesses (Douglas, 2014).

Prevent Policy in Education—Impact on Educational Settings

Current research and theory on the ways policy on extremism and counterterrorism has impacted on educational settings, particularly schools, is relatively limited given that asking schools to play their part in challenging violent extremism is a relatively new phenomenon. In addition, researchers have found it challenging to uncover how schools are enacting the Prevent Duty, given that failure to implement that policy would result in a schools being placed in special measures after an Ofsted (Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills) inspection (Bryan, 2017).

The question of how policy is enacted in practice in schools is complex. Following Ball, Maguire, and Braun (2012), we focus on enactment rather than implementation—namely, how those on the ground (teachers, school leaders, etc.) interpret, reinterpret, and enact policy. Busher and Jerome (2020) point out that educational leaders have a challenging task, enacting hundreds of top-down policies into practice in their educational settings, from Early Years to further education. Thus, teachers rely on trainers to support an appropriate interpretation, critique, and enactment of the Prevent Duty and to promote FBV (Fundamental British Values). However, much of the teacher training in this regard has been

led by security forces trainers, not educationalists, and thus a mismatch of purpose and understanding has arisen. Despite many school leaders acknowledging that the training may be counterproductive, they are also aware that failure to comply with policy leads to an automatic substandard inspection grading. Thus, research has shown that many leaders and schoolteachers attempt to enact the Prevent Duty and promote FBV because not doing so would be detrimental to their whole school operation.

Vincent's (2019) research illustrates that FBV is not enacted similarly in all schools, although there are four observable approaches—"Representing Britain," "Repackaging the FBV," "Relocating the FBV," and "Engagement with the FBV," "with some schools exhibiting a "mixture of responses"" (2019, p. 70). There were a minority of teachers, categorized in the "Representing Britain" approach, who "reached for images representing a united and mostly White, Britain, emphasising tradition and heritage through cosy images of an imaginary past, present and future" (2019, p. 138). Repackaging Britain, the majority response, described schools which absorbed the promotion of FBV into their current practices and, while avoiding exclusionary imagery, such schools did not capitalize on the opportunities to explore issues of "belonging, citizenship and nationhood" (2019, p. 139). Vincent describes the category that focused on "Relocating the FBV" into current work on values as a related response to "Repackaging," in the form of "inward-directed character education rather than outward directed citizenship" and "teaching virtuous behaviour in relation to others," emphasizing "equal respect" with a "consistent view of 'good' citizenship" (2019, p. 139). She cites most teachers in the multiethnic case-study schools as celebrating diversity and promoting the idea of difference as "enriching rather than a threat or source of anxiety and of Britain as a multiracial society comfortable with itself" (Vincent, 2019, p. 140). The fourth approach, "Engagement," Vincent describes as citizenship education which has the correct and "appropriate body of knowledge," and arguments

facilitated through “correct pedagogy,” which should result in “tolerant and respectful attitudes in the students” (2019, p. 142).

McGhee and Zhang (2017) argue in similar vein to Vincent (2019) that many schools implemented the duty in a way that “defuses some of the securitising aspects” of the Prevent Duty through celebrating the “UK as a multi-racial, multi-faith and multi-cultural society” (2017, p. 937). McGhee and Zhang’s study shows that schools ensure “their promotion of British values is consistent with their existing value system and ethos, which includes the promotion of pupils’ “Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural Development.” Therefore, both McGhee and Zhang (2017) and Vincent (2019) seem to suggest that many schools have watered down the imposition of being agents of surveillance and “filtered out the muscularity” of the Prevent Duty, so that marginalized groups are not turned into suspect communities McGhee and Zhang (2017, p. 945).

The policy demands outlined in the preceding sections have provided a context in which to investigate teacher autonomy and agency so as to ascertain the extent to which teachers feel able to question their role in promoting Fundamental British Values and enacting the Prevent Duty.

Teacher Agency and Professionalism in Britain Since the Introduction of the Prevent Policy

Teacher agency can be constructed on a continuum of teacher professionalism in the British education system regarding “Prevent.” At one extreme, the teacher assumes full responsibility as an agent of autonomy, whereas at the other extreme the teacher is a compliant instrument of surveillance for the state (Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017; Farrell, 2016; Maylor, 2016; Sieckelinck et al. (2015) question whether current securitization policy has

drawn teachers into a villain–victim view of their students that does not allow for a genuine educational outlook on radicalization.

How teachers envisage and communicate values has long been at the center of debates about the purposes of education—pure education for education's sake, education as moral activity, to being an instrument of the state: see for example Butler (1872); Dewey (1916); Apple (1995); Noddings (2001). Religious education (RE) has been used as a key curriculum area for promoting British values, and many RE teachers have been explicitly tasked with ensuring adherence to policy. In the context of teachers enacting the Prevent Duty, Farrell (2016) investigated the extent to which RE student teachers responded. He argues that while student teachers are committed to the development of learners' moral imaginations, they are concerned that promoting FBW will alienate learners and that it is incompatible with the pluralism of RE (Farrell, 2016). Farrell argues that it is through the “development of teacher subjectivity in the alternative discourses of critical RE and research that practitioners will be able to make adjustments that can accommodate and re-appropriate the demands of policy” (Farrell, 2016). Thus, teacher autonomy and professionalism is crucial as a response to Prevent training.

Data from 345 teachers collected by Da Silva, Fontana, and Armstrong (2020, p. 104) evidenced that the Home Office WRAP (Workshop to Raise Awareness about Prevent) training, while beneficial for secondary colleagues, was not appropriate for the primary-school context. Some head teachers expressed displeasure that the training was instructional with no debate, leaving many staff, including Muslim teachers, very uncomfortable (Da Silva, Fontana, & Armstrong, 2020, p. 107). However, there is an acknowledgment that more recently, Prevent training has encompassed right-wing extremism as well as Islamist violent extremism, and this would concur with Thomas's second and third phases of Prevent (Thomas, 2020). In the main, Da Silva, Fontana, and Armstrong (2020) found that there was

positive support for the Prevent Duty among primary and secondary teachers, with a “better safe than sorry” attitude, and little attention paid to the negative consequences of referrals to the UK security services from these teachers. [Da Silva, Fontana, and Armstrong \(2020\)](#) acknowledge that teacher surveys and interviews were collected after the Christchurch mosque bombings of 2019 in New Zealand, and the resultant Home Office response was to widen the Prevent Duty to include far-right extremism. However, other scholars argue that the Prevent Duty is still causing conflict in schools by positioning teachers as instruments of surveillance ([Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017](#)).

Guidance for teachers concerning how to implement the Prevent Duty has been limited. With the financial support of the Prevention and Fight Against Crime Program of the European Commission’s Directorate General Home Affairs, [Dzhekova et al.’s \(2017\)](#) report outlines a framework for risk indicators of radicalization.

English Teachers as Tools of Surveillance and Prevent Duty Training

Many teachers in England have accepted the Prevent Duty, and yet some researchers would argue that this turns them into tools of surveillance for both Islamist and far-right violent extremism detection ([Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017](#); [Thomas, 2020](#)).

The problem of confusing prevention with detection is that the role of the teacher as researcher and reflective practitioner, with the concomitant criticality toward current practice, is pitted against their role as an instrument of the state. The teacher’s role could be framed as on a spectrum from technician through instrument of state surveillance to builder of transformative skills and concepts ([Twiselton & Elton-Chalcraft, 2018](#)) who might challenge current orthodoxy.

Teachers in England, on top of their day jobs as educator, career advisors, social workers, and carers of young people, have been tasked with the role of surveillance officer for Prevent. Many have argued (Farrell, 2016; Maylor, 2016; Thomas, 2020, p. 22) that this role has led to inappropriate referrals, such as the four-year-old girl from Luton who mispronounced “cucumber” as “cooker bomb” (Thomas, 2020, p. 22). Many Muslim referrals have not progressed within the Prevent reporting system, and in fact the safeguarding policy into which extremist reporting was placed is at odds with the rationale for safeguarding of vulnerable young people at risk from others; instead it requires teachers to report vulnerable young people themselves for being a risk to others (Thomas, 2020). There are two problems facing frontline educationalists such as teachers in schools—firstly, how do they spot radicalization and refer potential radicalized students to the security forces? This is challenging in terms of pre-crime identification. The second problem facing teachers is their confidence and competence to promote FBV in a manner which does not further alienate marginalized groups, particularly Muslims (Heath-Kelly, 2017).

Heath-Kelly (2017) discusses how in the initial iteration of the Prevent policy in the period 2006–2010, Muslim communities (of more than 2% Muslims) were viewed as “an epidemiological concern” for surrounding communities, including Muslims themselves being vulnerable to contamination of extremism. Thomas (2016) also cites radicalization in medical terms—a contamination that can be caught.

The Prevent Duty is internationally unprecedented in its legal requirement for frontline workers such as teachers many of whom feel uncomfortable and fearful at the prospect, being put into positions of responsibility to prevent radicalization to violent extremism and to identify potential violent extremists (Revell & Bryan, 2018; Thomas, 2020). Many are not willing to take up roles as instruments of surveillance (Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017). The view of schooling as an instrument of the state necessarily encompasses the idea of surveillance,

whereby schools and teachers in particular are ascribed the role of prison warder detecting pre-crime attitudes and behaviors in prisoners.

Like many critics of the Prevent policy, the Council of Europe report (Ragazzi, 2017) admitted that counterterrorism policies originally designed to “identify and prevent radicalisation” had in fact proven to be counterproductive as a result of “inadvertently” undermining the “very social cohesion they aim to preserve.” This European report admits that “counter-terrorism policies give rise to contradictory demands on educators, asking them to build social cohesion and resilience while at the same time requiring them to employ a logic of suspicion in spotting potential radicals” (Ragazzi, 2017). In this way, the report brought to light the “contradictory mission” of educators, because they were being asked to challenge “key principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms, notably education for democratic citizenship and human rights education.”

Reports such as Dzhekova et al. (2017) reveal the complexity of radicalization, a facet which some teachers claim is missing from the Prevent training. The report's monitoring framework takes as its premise that radicalization is a dynamic, multistage, and multifaceted phenomenon that occurs at the intersection of individual push and pull factors (Dzhekova et al., 2017). For example, the push factors include biographical exposure and personal trajectory, intrinsic motivations, and grievances. These must be taken into consideration alongside the pull factors, such as exposure to ideologies and recruiters. Both the push and pull factors occur within an enabling environment. Dzhekova et al.'s (2017) framework also assumed that the complex process of radicalization can take place at the individual, group/community, and society level and that often certain causal factors and drivers can resonate and work at all three levels. Dzhekova et al. (2017) explain that at the macro-level, the role of government and society at home and abroad impact on the radicalization process; this includes the lack of socio-economic opportunities for whole sectors of society. Next, they

highlight the meso-level, which includes the supportive or even complicit social surround, which serves as a rallying point and is the “missing link” with the terrorists’ broader constituency or reference group that is aggrieved and suffering injustices (Dzhekova et al., 2017). Finally, the micro-level includes the characteristics and experiences of the individual such as identity problems, failed integration, feelings of alienation, relative deprivation, and so on (Dzhekova et al., 2017). The training provided by the Home Office tends to focus on the micro-level seemingly ignoring the meso- and macro-levels. Thus the teacher is placed in the position of pre-crime detector within a safeguarding bubble, with no power to change or challenge the meso- or macro- contexts which may, in fact have brought about the very characteristics of the potential terrorist.

The Chilling Effect

Many scholars have argued that the requirement for teachers to promote fundamental British values (FBV) and assume the role of “agents of surveillance,” has resulted in a “chilling effect” in schools (Chaudhry, 2018; Lockley-Scott, 2020; McGlynn & McDaid, 2019; Miah, 2017; Ramsay, 2017; Walker, 2018). The idea of a chilling effect refers to the process whereby individuals censor their legal speech and are inhibited from exercising their legal right to speak. The chilling effect is significant because it restricts the exercise of liberty through creating an environment where individuals chose to self-censor because they fear they may break the law, even when that may not be the case.

An interesting aspect of this debate is that there is significant disagreement over the way Prevent has influenced practice in educational settings. There is disagreement not only about whether the Prevent Duty itself constitutes an attack on freedom of expression, but also the possibility that Prevent creates a chilling effect as part of the way it influences teacher and

pupil behavior in schools and universities (McGlynn & McDaid, 2019). In his analysis of the Prevent Duty, Peter Ramsay argues that Prevent should be understood as part of a wider tendency toward the surveillance and regulation of speech and of the exchange of opinion which goes beyond the counterterrorism context (Ramsay, 2017). He notes that one aim of Prevent is to make the classroom a space that is safe from radicalization, and that this happens in two ways. The first is through the separation of those students and pupils who are at risk from radicalization from others; teachers and tutors are expected to refer students and pupils who they believe to be at risk from radicalization to the Channel program (HM Government, 2015, para. 22). The second way is that Prevent also imposes a duty on teachers to challenge “and if necessary, to prohibit the expression of certain views in circumstances where their expression would result in the risk of radicalisation” (Ramsay, 2017).

For Ramsay, the chilling effect also operates in a vague way, because nonviolent extremism is defined by the government. Schools and universities must ensure that nonviolent terrorism is not allowed to create an atmosphere in which radicalization can take place. However, the definition of nonviolent extremism provided by the government, and the idea of promoting fundamental British values, are contested. For teachers and pupils who wish to avoid being referred to Channel or having to refer pupils to Channel, this means that “vagueness in the definition of the forms and content of expression that will lead to intervention will tend, therefore to have a chilling effect on the expression of certain ideas” (Ramsay, 2017, p. 150).

However, there are experts who believe that Prevent does not restrict speech or create a chilling effect in schools. Fenwick and Fenwick (2019) examine the content of Prevent and guidance to schools as well as the impact of safeguarding measures under Prevent as applied to pupils who may be considered vulnerable to radicalization. They conclude that Prevent is “neither a policy of mass surveillance of children, nor mass propaganda designed to pressure

schoolchildren to adopt any particular viewpoint” (Fenwick & Fenwick, 2019). Their argument rests on close analysis of the legal implications of Prevent and its relationship with existing legislation and they argue that rather than a draconian exercise in the curtailing of liberty, Prevent is a continuation of previous safeguarding measures and therefore complimentary to pre-existing approaches to handling controversial issues in schools.

Furthermore, Fenwick and Fenwick state that rather than signaling a narrowing down of speech, in the case of faith schools Prevent can foster a “more speech” solution to the narrowing of pupils’ perspectives because it enforces measures to promote equality and diversity in classroom (2019). They also refute the claim by many critics that Prevent criminalizes certain viewpoints; a claim that is made because schools are required to refer any pupil who demonstrates signs of radicalization to the Channel program. Their argument that the claim that Prevent criminalizes certain viewpoints is false, rests on the fact that referrals to Channel cannot lead to a criminal conviction and that nonparticipation carries no criminal penalty.

Similarly, McGlynn and McDaid (2019) argue that many of the debates about a possible chilling effect in education, as a result of the Prevent Duty, fail to account for the everyday experiences of the policy on students and teachers. They also note that there is very limited empirical research on the lived experiences of Prevent in schools and so it is difficult to know with any certainty how teachers and pupils are negotiating and interpreting Prevent in relation to freedom of expression. They state that the empirical research that does exist is often inconclusive or contradictory (McGlynn & McDaid, 2019).

The largest examination of Prevent in schools was conducted by Busher et al. (2020). They discussed the extent to which teachers in 60 schools felt the Prevent Duty exacerbated the stigmatization of Muslim students. They recorded one senior teacher in this research, who explained the dilemmas facing teachers who feared appearing to be racist by noticing a

change from non-headscarf to headscarf wearing in a Muslim student while at the same time questioning whether this change in dress identified a marker of radicalization. Thus, teachers wish not to appear racist but on the other hand are keen not to “miss something” (Busher et al., 2020, p. 47). This teacher did not blame the Prevent Duty but at the same time realized that to be “vigilant” a teacher was at risk of stigmatizing Muslim students (Busher et al., 2020, p. 47).

Busher et al. (2020) argue that many schools have begun to see the Prevent Duty in a positive light, as opening up debates rather than silencing groups—particularly Muslims. However, other research implies that Muslim pupils may experience a chilling effect, as they are constructed and framed by Prevent as being from suspect communities (Chaudhry, 2018; Lockley-Scott, 2020; McGlynn & McDaid, 2019; Miah, 2017; Ramsay, 2017; Walker, 2018). In higher education in particular there have been a number of projects that have identified a chilling effect. Re/presenting Islam on Campus, the largest project so far to examine the impact of Prevent in education, based on over 2022 interviews with students in 132 universities, found that Prevent appears to discourage free speech and that both “students and staff tend to self-censor their discussion to avoid becoming the object of suspicion” (Guest et al., 2020, p.6). We do not know if these results are mirrored in schools but a number of smaller projects suggest that Muslim pupils in schools often feel under scrutiny and are cautious about speaking freely in class or school environments (Chaudhry, 2018; Lockley-Scott, 2020; Miah, 2017; Walker, 2018).

Young People as Vulnerable and Needing Protection, and Muslims as a Suspect Community

If the Prevent policy positions teachers as agents of surveillance, then young people are positioned as vulnerable and needing protection, particularly those from Muslim communities.

Elwick et al. (2020) draw on empirical research with young people to conclude that Muslim students experience the teaching of fundamental British values (FBV) as exclusionary, discriminatory, and intimidating (Elwick et al., 2020, p. 61). They also found that “young people want to learn about terrorism and extremism to build their religious, political and critical media literacy” and counteract the brainwashing of the media (Elwick et al., 2020, p. 61).

Young people in Elwick et al.'s study (2020) emphasized the importance of the teacher providing the full story rather than one-sided view from the media. Governmental resources such as *[Educate Against Hate](https://educateagainsthate.com/)[https://educateagainsthate.com/]*, which aim to teach FBV, were criticized by Elwick et al. (2020). They claim such resources reduce the teacher to an uncritical promoter of predetermined answers rather than allowing them to develop their professionalism as a facilitator for debates about the motives of terrorists and support young people in critiquing behaviors and motives and helping them to appreciate the complexities of democracy, tolerance, and mutual respect.

Stephens et al. (2019) argue that resilience to extremism has focused predominantly on the individual with insufficient attention being paid to the role of contextual structures and institutions. Stephens et al. (2019) reviewed 73 papers, drawn from any discipline that addressed prevention of violent extremism or radicalization with an emphasis on strategy rather than mere critique. They identified four recurring themes which emerged from their in-depth analysis: first the “resilient individual”; second, “identity”; third, “dialogue and action”; and fourth, “connected or resilient communities” (Stephens et al., 2019). Together

these themes could be seen to present the individual as vulnerable and in need of resilience training, and their communities as positioned to support this.

The literature increasingly shows that Muslims in particular are viewed as a suspect community. However, many scholars emphasize the diversity of British Muslims and the dangers of viewing Muslims as a homogenous group containing “good or bad Muslims” (Kundnani, 2009; Warsi, 2017). Warsi bemoans the fact that nowadays Muslim parents have the “preacher’s cults and robes” pre-uni talk with their children rather than the traditional “sex, drugs and clubs” talks (Waris, 2017, p. 146). So Muslim communities are complicit with the security services in resilience training to ensure their “vulnerable” youth are not at risk of radicalization when leaving home to attend higher education.

Abbas’s research (2019) charts the experiences of a young Muslim’s experiences at university in the context of the stigmatization of young Muslims by their own families. One young man is reported as saying “I grew a beard and my Dad flipped out,” and Abbas cites Pantazis and Pemberton (2009) who show that the police consider certain groups, for example, Salafists and Islamists, as posing a particular threat and Wahhabis as extremists, although visual markers are interpreted not through religious but political lenses (Abbas, 2019, p. 9). A young woman whose family “[sat] her down on the couch” to check she had not been radicalized when she returned from university wearing the hijab, were fearful that her joining the Islamic society was an indication of radicalization not a religiously motivated revival of her Muslim identity (Abbas, 2019). Abbas’s research demonstrates the fear experienced by Muslim communities that in educational settings their own “young Muslims [are] being turned into extremists and culpably endangering others” (Abbas, 2019, p. 12). She discusses the tensions Muslims feel when “imposed” identities are thrust on them—for example, Mohammed is clean-shaven, yet he holds what he terms fundamentalist views; and

other interviewees told stories of their family members' fears about "new" mosque members who might infiltrate the mosque, which was viewed as a suspect site (Abbas, 2019, p. 11).

From the Early Years through to university, the positioning of Muslims as young, vulnerable, and at risk of radicalization is being documented by research. Welply's (2018) research exploring the discourses of 17 children from a Year 6 class in a culturally diverse primary school in the East of England shows how Muslim children are positioned as the "bad other." Welply shows that even the children themselves understood the stigmatization of their community and did not want to bring Islam into disrepute (Welply, 2018, p. 381). Her findings demonstrate the intersectionality of discrimination experienced by Muslim children in primary school and she reveals the limitations of uncritical discourses of tolerance in fostering an understanding of difference and Otherness. Breen-Smyth's research shows how some Muslims reacted to stigmatization by being an "ambassador, whereas others were infuriated at the need to do this and resisted exhortations to de-radicalise vulnerable young Muslims" (Breen-Smyth, 2014, p. 237).

Durodie (2016) examines the evolving relationship between security and education with reference to the Prevent Duty. Rather than seeing the process as being merely one-way, Durodie reveals "consequences of inflammatory rhetoric on the well-being of supposedly suggestible or vulnerable students" which, he claims has been in existence within education for quite some time (2016, p. 21). He argues that the "securitizing efforts of politicians and officials are pushing against an open door," and because the authorities do not support absolute freedom of expression, within academia and actually beyond it, this "tacitly encourages the very people the government would hope to detract" (Durodie, 2016, p. 21). Thus research is revealing how the Prevent Duty is not only not achieving its goal of detecting and preventing radicalization, but is counterproductive in alienating many Muslims,

portraying them as a suspect community or inciting tensions between different Muslim communities.

Research evidences how successive governments seem to have progressively fueled the stigmatization of Muslims in the United Kingdom. Mogra's date research investigated the responses of three Muslim organizations to the U.K. Department for Education's call for evidence, requiring certain out-of-school settings such as madrasahs to be registered, regulated, and inspected. He found that some Muslims welcomed this while others expressed serious concerns. Madrasah education, Mogra claims, is described as the "bedrock of Muslim communities the world over," providing the "religious, spiritual, moral and social development of Muslim children" (Mogra, 2018, p. 199). Mogra's findings reveal that Muslim organizations support and welcome measures to strengthen the safeguarding and well-being of children, but many have serious concerns about many aspects of the proposal, given the context of the Prevent Duty.

Breen (2018) applied a Critical Race Theory approach based on the construction of a counter-narrative through a critical analysis of policy and its outcomes to investigate the expansion of state-funded Muslim schools in Britain since 1998 under successive U.K. governments. He concluded that public policy narratives have created a misleading account of the extent to which Muslim communities have been enfranchised through state funding for Islamic schools (2018). Breen argues that despite a positive beginning under New Labour (late 1990s to 2010), recent Prevent policy initiatives (2015) have compromised the political and educational equity of British Muslims as stakeholders in state-funded Islamic schools (2018).

The stigmatization of the Muslim community in the United Kingdom could be seen as part of a global picture. Shiraz claims anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiments across North America and Europe have "contributed to the normalization of xenophobic—and

particularly Islamophobic—political discourse” (Shiraz, 2017, p. 2). Shiraz is critical of young people being positioned as “others” who are both vulnerable and also threatening, and as in need of being educated to counter their extremist views. However she calls for more critical spaces and reflective practice in schools to question what it means to educate against extremism and reappraise who has the power to ascribe “bodies, ideas, and acts as extremists” (Shirazi, 2017, p. 2).

The U.K. government has wielded its power to identify and prevent extremists by imposing the Prevent Duty in educational settings. Chadderton (2015) draws attention to the proliferation of surveillance techniques in secondary schools, and considers the implications for particular groups of young people such as Muslims. She argues that in the United Kingdom and the United States there has been a limiting of personal freedoms, and constant surveillance, in response to the perceived increased risk of terrorist attacks. She also claims that schools have responded to the counterterrorism agenda by investing in new technologies of surveillance such as

“closed circuit TV cameras metal detectors, alcohol and drug testing, chipped identity cards and electronic registers, biometric tools such as iris and fingerprint recognition, and cyberspace surveillance including webcams and websites hosting student data for parental access, among others. Installation of such surveillance has been justified for security, personal and health reasons” (Chadderton, 2015, p. 129).

However, Ragnedda argues that “surveillance is much more than simply monitoring, watching and recording individuals and their data . . . Surveillance is an interaction of power that creates and advances relations of domination. In practice, surveillance is a mode of governance, one that controls access and opportunities” (Ragnedda, 2010, p. 356). Therefore, surveillance may be targeting particular groups; however, Chadderton admits ‘there is a lack

of empirical data on new technologies surveillance in schools that specifically focuses on race’.

So teachers, either using technology or not, are positioned as instruments of surveillance, and this has resulted in a chilling effect on many Muslim young people in the UK education system, owing to a stigmatization of Muslims as a suspect community. Some research has evidenced a change in behavior on the part of teachers toward Muslim children. While Pearce and Lewis’s (2019) qualitative study with 8 teachers is small-scale it nevertheless adds to a growing research base which argues that “neoliberal and neoconservative schooling policies in England legitimise a long-standing neglect of cultural difference in schools, and are having a particularly damaging effect on Muslim children’s experience of schooling” (2019, p. 1). They argue that because of their busy working lives, teachers are distancing themselves from Muslim families in an avoidance response to current policy. While many teachers did not see Muslims as individuals but rather essentialized them as representatives of a different group, nonetheless Pearce and Lewis conclude by suggesting that when teachers could make connections with families, they were able to appreciate the complexities and richness in lives of Muslim children in their classes.

Conclusion

Terrorism has become a part of life in many countries in the world. Teachers have been used as tools of surveillance to root out potential terrorists. They have been asked to promote fundamental British values (FBV) and also spot radicalization, but have received minimal training for either role. Teachers have a wide-ranging role, and trying to discern whether a young person has been radicalized in such a way as to lead to violent extremism, rather than cognitive extremism, is asking them to detect a pre-crime state, which would be challenging

even if it were the only role they had. Teachers from the Early Years stage through to university level have been tasked with the Prevent Duty, and this has led to a chilling effect—the silencing of critical debate. Muslims have been stigmatized as a suspect community and the Prevent Duty has positioned young people as vulnerable and in need of protection, with little account being taken of the wider macro picture. While some research suggests that Prevent has been normalized and in some cases positively accepted, there is also an acknowledgment that the Prevent Duty and promoting FBV has brought about a toxic in- and outgroup categorization (Jerome et al., 2020). There is also evidence to show that “staff risk-assessments and referrals are shaped by unconscious bias,” prompted by the “wider context of substantial and persistent anti-Muslim racism and prejudice” (Jerome et al., 2020, p. 164).

In their roles as educators of the next generation, teachers have a duty to inspire young people to be creative, hardworking, honest, discerning, and contributing members of society. However teachers in the United Kingdom have been allocated a duty to prevent violent extremism engaging in pre-crime detection which, we argue, is practically virtually impossible (given competing demands), ideologically of dubious validity (given it has been shown to be counterproductive), and ethically morally inconsistent (given a teacher's role as educator not indoctrinator). The hope is that educational professionals from Early Years to university level will challenge the prejudicial implications of the Prevent Duty legislation and feel confident in providing open spaces for critical and informed debate about terrorism and extremism.

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