Mcphie, Jamie (2016) The accidental death of Mr. Happy: a post-
qualitative rhizoanalysis of mental health and wellbeing. 
Doctoral thesis, University of Cumbria (awarded by Lancaster 
University).

Downloaded from: http://insight.cumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/3333/
The Accidental Death of Mr. Happy: A Post-Qualitative Rhizoanalysis of Mental Health and Wellbeing

Jamie Mcphie

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Lancaster University

September 2016
Declaration by author

I hereby declare that, except where explicit attribution is made, the work presented in this thesis is entirely my own.

Signed: [Signature] (23/08/2016)

Statement of Contributions to Jointly Authored Works Contained in the Thesis

I confirm that the work submitted is my own, except where work which has formed part of jointly-authored publications has been included. My contribution and those of the other author to this work have been explicitly indicated within the thesis. I confirm that appropriate credit has been given within this thesis where reference has been made to the work of others.

‘I, Dave A. G. Clarke, can confirm that appropriate credit has been given to me within this thesis.’

Signed: [Signature] (23/08/2016)

Statement of Contributions by Others to the Thesis as a Whole

No contributions by others.

Published Works by the Author Incorporated into the Thesis


Acknowledgements

First of all, I’d like to thank Deleuze and Guattari, Tim Ingold, Elizabeth St. Pierre, Karen Barad, Ricardo Manzotti, Donna Haraway, my friend Dave Clarke and my sons Tamlin and Roan Mcphie for your liberating and inspirational impact on my life. It’s been an absolute delight thinking with you all. My life is changed dramatically because of you. You were the multiplicities who helped me become a more interesting crowd.

A special thank you to my wonderful, caring, patient and beloved Jane. I can’t imagine having to put up with my constant ramblings and excited/intense soap-box rants about the world’s inequities, yet you did… and still do. You’re brilliant, inspiring and I love you.

My supervisors and friends Chris Loynes and Liz Mallabon, you have been a comforting support throughout this process and I’ve benefitted immensely from your informal and relaxed style of supervision. I’m so sorry about the sudden onto-epistemological shift from social-constructivism to post-structuralism half way through but it was bound to go that way really wasn’t it, knowing me? Chris, thank you for Adventure in a Bun, it set me off down an intriguing tributary that has emerged into an ocean full of life. Thank you also to my third supervisor Mark Holterhoeff, I know we’ve only met a few times but they were important events.

To BBS, Dolly, Jim, Bumble, Blondie, Pandora and the Prof.; thank you for becoming co-explorers. It was quite the adventure.

I’d also like to thank my examiners as your writing and artwork makes the world a more interesting place. Thank you.

Thank you Sridhar for our debates. Thank you Lou for being a stylish and unflappable example for me to follow. Thank you dad for being an eclectic and loving father (thank you for the mountain walks, bird hides and drum kit). And thank you, my amazing mother, for showing me how to be an empathetic person.

You are all in this thesis/play.
The Accidental Death of Mr. Happy: A Post-Qualitative
Rhizoanalysis of Mental Health and Wellbeing

Jamie Mcphie

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Lancaster University in September 2016

(University of Cumbria)

Word count (exclusive of references and complimentary play): 87,896.

Abstract

There is a growing body of evidence indicating that anxiety, stress and mental ill-health are becoming more prevalent in modern Western societies. At the same time, climate change and mass extinction have now taken root in a period of the earth’s history that has been labelled, ‘the Anthropocene’ and/or ‘Capitalocene’. Some academics have related these various issues to a ‘crisis of perception’ and a general nature-culture perceptual misalignment. This thesis/play is a deconstruction and (re)construction of human-environment conceptions in relation to mental health and wellbeing. More precisely, it is an attempt to map ‘the spread mind’ in ‘environ(mental) health’ (Mcphie, 2014a). (Intra-)Act 1 is an exploration of the performativity of particular Euclidean concepts as well as post-Enlightenment environmental and psychotherapeutic paradigms, with a particular emphasis on those that purport an innate connection with nature. The act also (re)views models that measure mental health as an objectified or subjectified essence within an anthropocentrically idealised self. By taking this approach, I highlight the distinct move in Western culture from an ontology of immanence to one of transcendence. (Intra-)Act 2 invites you to think with a post-qualitative collaborative action (re)search, using psychogeography and rhizoanalysis to map the temporal assemblages of six people-environments (a multiplicity), each with a specific diagnosed mental health concern, in order to explore how mental health and wellbeing is a distributed process. (Intra-)Act 3 and the assemblages present the rhizoanalyses in the form of (re)presentational experimentation including, Brechtian
playwriting and assemblages of mental health. By thinking with a troika of emerging contemporary process-relational ontologies, I propose an alternative post-psychotherapeutic pathway for how we might conceive of mental health and wellbeing. This attempt emphasises the *intra*-relational *co-production* of material agency and is (re)presented in this study as a process distributed *of* the environment. This is not a conclusion.

**Keywords:** environ(mental) health, rhizoanalysis, assemblages, ontology of immanence, intra-relational.
## Matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title Page</td>
<td>p. i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declarations</td>
<td>p. ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>p. iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>p. v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matters</td>
<td>p. vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annotated Polaroids, Transfers, Notes &amp; Snippets</td>
<td>p. x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prologue=Epilogue</td>
<td>p. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene one: The death of the introduction: you have always already entered in the middle.</td>
<td>p. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene two: Prologue=Epilogue</td>
<td>p. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene three: Summary of the thesis/play</td>
<td>p. 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environ(Mental) Health Assemblage One:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liverpool ONE Assemblage</strong></td>
<td>p. 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene one: Liverpool ONE (initial transgressions)</td>
<td>p. 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene two: The elimination of people</td>
<td>p. 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene three: Inorganic life</td>
<td>p. 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene four: The depression of Liverpool ONE</td>
<td>p. 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Intra-)Act 1: From Participation to Observation</strong></td>
<td>p. 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene one: ‘We're all really smart and we shop but we don’t know how to do anything.’</td>
<td>p. 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene two: The Healing Power of Nature(s)</td>
<td>p. 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene three: The Aesthetics of a Teletubby Landscape:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Short History of a Romantic Gaze p. 91

Scene four: The Accidental Death of Mr. Happy and the Medical Gaze: The Fallacy of the Healthy Self p. 110

Scene five: The Birth of Mr Messy: Becoming a (re)search assemblage p. 130

Environ(Mental) Health Assemblage Two: Embodied walls and extended skins p. 143

(Intra-)Act 2: The birth of rhizoanalytic post-qualitative co-operative action (re)search p. 145

Scene one: Diffractive productions p. 145

Scene two: The birth of post-qualitative inquiry p. 147

Scene three: The death of the author p. 149

Scene four: The birth of post-qualitative co-operative action (re)search p. 150

Scene five: Rhizoanalysis: A (non)method for analysing the empirical materials p. 158

Scene six: Rhizomatic assemblages p. 162

Scene seven: Ethics? p. 176

Scene eight: ‘Method-Assemblage’: Walking in Circles (WiC) p. 184

Scene nine: Psychogeography as a mobile method p. 185

Environ(Mental) Health Assemblage Three: 😊 = 😊? p. 198

Scene one: Photos p. 200

Scene two: Emoji p. 207

---

1 Picture taken from the ‘Mr. Men Wiki website’ (2016a). Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA).
Scene three: Emoji and mental health  p. 213
Scene four: Reterritorialisation  p. 218

Interméde: (Intra-)Act 3 is available as a complimentary play script.²  p. 220

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Intra-)Act 3: Liverpool ONE – Liverpool Too: A Therapeutic Tale of Two Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programme  p. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act One  p. 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene One: <em>I think filming has a change on your mood</em>  p. 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene Two: <em>I wonder if we change a little bit while we’re filming</em>  p. 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene Three: <em>I had to er, pop a couple of pills</em>  p. 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act Two  p. 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene One: <em>That camera is looking at me</em>  p. 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epilogue  p. 107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Environ(Mental) Health Assemblage Four:

Ecology of the Oppressed  p. 221

Scene one: Affective transmission: spaces of repression and liberation  p. 222

Scene two: Inhuman agency  p. 238

Scene three: Green space=Striated space  p. 241

Scene four: The Golden Arches  p. 248

Scene five: Abstract space … Little Arnolds…and a hill…  p. 253

Epilogue=Prologue: From Observation to Participation  p. 262

² As (Intra-)Act 3 (the complimentary play script) is separate from the main thesis, the contents are presented as ‘Matters’ in the format of a boxed snippet. The boxed snippets that appear under the ‘Annotated Polaroids’, ‘Notes’ and ‘Snippets’ titles on the next few pages follow the same reasoning.
Scene one: *HAT’s and QAT’s* p. 262

Scene two: Re-searching re-search. p. 266

Scene three: ‘Environ(Mental) Health’: The immanent spatio-temporal distribution of mental health and wellbeing p. 278

Scene four: There is no such thing as mental health p. 284

Scene five: A crisis of conception p. 288

Cast p. 291

Annotated Polaroids

Annotated Polaroid 1: ‘who designs this shite?’ p. 33

Annotated Polaroid 2: ‘clean and safe’ p. 34

Annotated Polaroid 3: Liverpool ONE Nature Trail. p. 36

Annotated Polaroid 4: The view of the nature trail looking from point 2 on the ‘nature trail’ map to point 11. p. 36

Annotated Polaroid 5: Pre-packaged turf. p. 37


Annotated Polaroids 12-13: Street names. p. 205

Annotated Polaroid 14: Force of heritage. p. 225

Annotated Polaroids 15-18: Affective rooms. p. 226

Annotated Polaroid 19: BBS’s *tatau*. p. 231

Annotated Polaroids 29-31: ‘I’m still serving my sentence’  
Annotated Polaroid 32: ‘it was all polluted and everything.’  
Annotated Polaroid 33: ‘didn’t see any green, didn’t see any dirt’  
Annotated Polaroid 34: ‘I’m loving the view but it’s just too green’  
Annotated Polaroid 35: ‘too much green round here’  
Annotated Polaroid 36: ‘it was all polluted and everything’  
Annotated Polaroid 37: ‘it was very clean’  
Annotated Polaroid 38: ‘I felt that it was clean and pure’  
Annotated Polaroid 39: ‘loving cleanliness of area and new/old buildings’  
Annotated Polaroids 40-41: Repression and liberation: ‘there’s nothing. I’m always living in fear’  
Annotated Polaroid 42: The Golden Arches  
Annotated Polaroid 43: Striated space  
Annotated Polaroid 44: Striated space  
Annotated Polaroids 45-49: Striated spaces with an attempt to smooth them out, causing further striation.  
Annotated Polaroid 50: ‘The power of man-made beauty’  
Annotated Polaroid 51: ‘The great escape from the M6 to sanctuary’  
Annotated Polaroids 52-53: BBS’s marks in the sand.  
Annotated Polaroids 54-55: Haecceities at different intensities of becoming.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annotated Polaroids: (Intra-)Act 3</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annotated Polaroid 1: ‘was I once a white sheep?’</td>
<td>p. 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annotated Polaroid 2: ‘Still no release’</td>
<td>p. 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annotated Polaroid 3: ‘that’s all folks’</td>
<td>p. 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annotated Polaroid 4: Repressed Trees</td>
<td>p. 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annotated Polaroid 5: ‘ooh, it doesn’t sound like a very pleasing place’</td>
<td>p. 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annotated Polaroids 6 &amp; 7: ‘I was put under surveillance’</td>
<td>p. 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annotated Polaroid 8: ‘a <em>worky</em> bit going on’</td>
<td>p. 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annotated Polaroid 9: ‘we came through the shopping centre’</td>
<td>p. 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annotated Polaroid 10: ‘as well as the shopping centre’</td>
<td>p. 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annotated Polaroids 11 &amp; 12: ‘is he part of the defendants who I was <em>suing</em>?’</td>
<td>p. 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annotated Polaroid 13: ‘he is the Third Reich’</td>
<td>p. 97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Transfers**

Transfer 1: Liverpool Psychogeography Map. p. 31
Transfer 2: Liverpool ONE. p. 33
Transfer 3: Grosnevor’s Office Service Charge Brochure p. 40
Transfer 4: Grosnevor’s Office Service Charge Brochure p. 42
Transfer 5: ‘the elimination of anti-social elements such as vagrants and beggars’ p. 43
Transfer 6: Vagrant Act of 1824 (n.a.) p. 45
Transfer 7: ‘Spikes installed outside Selfridges in Manchester’ p. 48
Transfer 8: Green Exercise. Reducing the variables in data collection! p. 81
Transfer 9: Blue Gym. Reducing the variables in data collection! p. 81
Transfer 10: Teletubbies Landscape p. 93
Transfer 11: The Shire p. 93
Transfer 12: Suomenlinna, Finland p. 93
Transfer 13: Lake District, England p. 94
Transfer 14: Matamata, New Zealand p. 94
Transfer 15: Simple Action Research Model p. 152
Transfer 16. ‘Interaction and correspondence’ p. 168
Transfer 17: Walking in Circles (WiC). p. 184
Transfers 18-21. Society of the Spectacle. p. 189
Transfer 22: ‘The science of anthropogeography’ p. 190
Transfer 23: ‘Psychogeographic Venn diagram’ p. 194
Transfer 24: ‘Mycelium [Processing]’ p. 195
Transfer 25: Some of the lines that took us for walks. p. 197
Transfer 26: Bumble’s emoji feedback sheets p. 211
Transfer 27: Word of the Year 2015. p. 211
Transfer 29: Emoodji p. 215
Transfer 30: Emoodji iTunes p. 215
Transfer 31: ‘As validated by Sir Paul McCartney.’ p. 216
Transfer 32: The (sort of) circle we walked in Lancaster p. 224
Transfer 33: Gummers How p. 243
Transfers 34-37: Abstract, Striated green space. p. 256
Notes

Note 1: ‘Whose agenda are we following?’ p. 205
Note 2: ‘Need to take charge’ p. 205
Note 3: Emoji of taboo… p. 207
Notes 4-7: Meteorological Emoji… p. 207
Notes 8-9: Emoji of signification… p. 208
Note 10: Emoji of anger? p. 208
Notes 11-12: Haptic emoji… p. 208
Notes 13-14: Empathetic emoji… p. 208
Notes 15-17: Emoji of relief… p. 209
Notes 18-21: Synesthetic embodied emoji… p. 209
Note 22: ‘Amazing feeling’ Emoji p. 209
Note 24: Bumble’s mind map of Liverpool p. 210
Note 25: Bumble’s digital mind map of Liverpool p. 210
Note 26: Bumble’s digital mind map of Liverpool p. 213
Note 27: ‘Scrubs’ p. 227-228
Note 28: ‘bad signs all over’ p. 233
Note 29: ‘felt much more relaxed’ p. 234
Note 30: ‘Felt easier here’ p. 234
Note 31: ‘street’ p. 235
Note 32: ‘We’re from the lake district and we’ve come to gloat’ p. 253
Note 33: ‘in shock and awe’
Note 34: ‘a traffic cone 😃’
Note 35: ‘in a good mood’
Note 36: ‘Thanks’
Note 37: ‘a very positive experience’
Note 38: ‘Been good year’
Note 39: ‘I’m a lot more confident’
Note 40: ‘I like myself’
Notes 41-43: ‘I’m so happy’
Note 44: ‘I wouldn’t be able to do it on my own without all you’
Note 45: ‘till I returned home’
### Snippets

**Snippet 1:** Positive Psychology.  
*p. 114*

**Snippet 2:** Mindfulness enclassed.  
*p. 116*

**Snippet 3:** Inga and Otto.  
*p. 135*

**Snippet 4:** Intra-actions of you-snippet.  
*p. 140*

**Snippet 5:** Inorganic Skin.  
*p. 144*
Snippit 6: Affect and Intuition  p. 158
Snippit 7: ‘I’m a boy, I’m a boy, but my mamma won’t admit it’.  p. 177
Snippit 8: ‘loads of physical things’  p. 198
Snippit 9: ‘so you can put yourself back into that…’  p. 201
Snippit 10: ‘try and mirror it’  p. 218
Snippit 11: Interview transcript of BBS  p. 231
Snippit 12: ‘feeling of history’  p. 236
Snippit 13: Lancaster reflections  p. 241
Snippit 14: ‘it looked dead’  p. 242
Snippit 15: ‘its bad for your health’  p. 250
Snippit 16: ‘I’m like weeeeee’  p. 267
Snippit 17: ‘happiness words’  p. 271
Snippit 18: ‘bring the outside in’  p. 282

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Snippets: (Intra-)Act 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Snippet 1: ‘being with the group’  p. 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
‘What I write to you has no beginning: it’s a continuation.’ (Lispector, 2014, p. 41)

**Scene one**: The death of the introduction: you have always already entered in the middle.

This is no longer even conditioning, it’s anaesthesia. We sleep through our lives in a dreamless sleep. But where is our life? Where is our body? Where is our space? (Perec, 1973, cited in Highmore, 2002, p. 177).

I have a confession to make — I’m a working class academic (with a trans-classed familiarity); a proletariat (it makes a difference). Although forty-five years old and property-less, it’s a label I quite like because it affords me a certain type of power, namely resistance. And that resistance is quadrupled by the epistemological empowerment that a PhD affords. I have managed to avoid oppression to a certain degree but there was never really *a* me to me that was in control of this situation. But then neither was *I* the result of any structural determinism around *me*. My agency, mind, mental health and wellbeing are temporally distributed and co-produced by fluctuating intra-acting entanglements of physical matter. Well, that’s what seems to be my opinion at the moment anyway. It used to be different and I imagine it’ll change again. How could it not? This PhD is that story and you have now entangled yourself in the knot of it. It can only get more crowded from here. Welcome to the assemblage.

‘…all narratives tell one story in place of another story.’ (Cixous & Calle-Gruber, 1997, p. 178)

The format of this thesis/play *almost* follows the traditional PhD format and *almost* ‘gives them what they ask for’ (Honan & Bright, 2016, p. 7). It is a tense moment

---

3 *Sous rature*, literally meaning ‘under erasure’ is ‘a method that Derrida borrowed from Heidegger to denote certain concepts as inadequate, yet necessary’ (Mcphee & Clarke, 2015, p. 235); to problematise them. The lines through words and numbers remind the reader to pay attention to a variety of illusions and assumptions all of which *perform* in myriad ways.
because you may not agree with me or the style with which I have written (and the many others who I have written with but cannot always name). As you read this, now, on this page (or computer screen), you are becoming aware that I am speaking directly to you (what does it do when I call out your name?). I apologise if it’s an intrusion as I realise the many possibilities of that phenomenon called affect, even when enacted through the words on a page/screen, but I also need to emphasise your role in this play/thesis early on, as a ‘spect-actor’ (Boal, 1979), something which you may hopefully become more aware of as you read. I do this immediately so as to draw your attention to it as another practice of placing the thesis/thesis sous rature. You see the text performs with you and so ‘in the artistic sense, I cannot claim responsibility for what it does’:

Please note that ‘performative’ texts are very different from texts that claim to represent something literally. As an expression of an aesthetic force the text has a life of its own and is out of my control – in the artistic sense, I cannot claim responsibility for what it does. My experience with this force is that it intends to ‘touch’ each reader differently, in order to bring forward something that needs to surface and become visible. In this sense, I invite you to observe yourself reading the text and to hold your response before you as a gift in your hands (literally) – as something you need to be present to. That is the work of the text. (de Oliveira Andreotti, 2016, p. 80)

Whilst following the path that this PhD route has taken me, I have produced a number of peer reviewed academic publications in a variety of journals, to wet my whistle. During this process I was surprised to encounter such opposing and emotionally charged views by the reviewers, in such a way that rendered the supposedly rigorous procedure antediluvian (hence my nervous disposition handing over a deeply personal product that has become a part of my very identity, an extended self). I’ll give you an example.

For one publication I submitted to the peer review process, one critic (who we’ll call ‘peer reviewer one’) exclaimed,

---

4 Thanks for your insight Deleuze and Guattari, you were right, we were already quite a crowd!
What a great piece of scholarship. I thoroughly enjoyed reading/reviewing this paper. The author should be commended at the highest level for producing a paper that is very polished and feels finished and ready to publish. [...] convincing and engaging [...] It is dense and difficult reading, though I say this as a compliment not a criticism.

The editor commented, ‘this is a paper long overdue [...] a crucial breakthrough [...] This paper will challenge our readers. It will get them thinking [...] You have indeed created an iron fist in a silk glove!’ and so the paper was published with no amendments other than a few spelling errors (in fact they added a few).

However, another peer reviewer (‘peer reviewer two’) from a different journal submission decided to exercise their academic pageantry with jibes and advice that would apparently make me ‘sound more sophisticated and grown-up’ and anti-intellectual discourse such as, ‘they should rewrite the paper in plain English (or whatever their mother language happens to be)’ and ‘I was also bothered by his or her use of made-up terms and the constant, pseudo-clever fiddling with parentheses and hyphenation, as in the following examples: “(psycho)logical,” “DeleuzoGuattarian,” “(re)search,” “(re)freshments,” “environ(mental),” “embodied/enminded,” “onto-epistemethodological,” and “non(method).”’. I wonder what peer reviewer two would make of Donna Haraway? But of course Haraway’s ‘pseudo-clever fiddling’ has influenced thousands of people’s lives in a very positive way as attested to by the ever increasing citations in anti-enlightenment academic literature, similar to the work of Spivak, Butler, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Ahmed, Derrida and many more whose writing I find liberating, refreshing and have done more for social justice than many other scholars I can think of. This reviewer began their offensive, ‘As I start writing, a glimmer of hope still survives in me that this paper is nothing but a practical joke in the glorious tradition of the Sokal hoax.’ This is a reference to the physicist Alan Sokal’s hoax submission to the cultural studies journal, Social Text in 1996 as a critique of postmodern writing, which he saw as, ‘a particular kind of nonsense and sloppy

---

5 Isn’t this word itself also psuedo-clever fiddling with its hyphen, silent P and spaces in-between the letters?
6 Although I am also aware of the issues of Bania appropriation that the Dalits of India have brought to my attention in works such as Hatred in the Belly by the Ambedkar Age Collective (2015) that I cannot simply dismiss. Therefore, I shall focus my attention on these issues more intensely post-doctorate.
thinking: one that denies the existence of objective realities’ (interview with Sokal quoted in the magazine Lingua Franca, cited in Scott, 1996, para. 10). Of course, Sokal completely misunderstood the ideas of the people he was attempting to parody, perhaps due to reading the highly influential, *Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science* by Gross and Levitt (1994) and not having read the appropriate literature that he was supposedly critiquing thoroughly enough. The authors of this type of journal aren’t trying to deny the existence of reality, ‘they are talking about whether meaning can be derived from observation of the real world’ (interview with Professor Aronowitz for the *New York Times*, cited in Scott, 1996, para. 23).

So, whilst one of my reviewers was left ‘*in a darkened hallway, running out of air and without a viable roadmap to a viable exit or promising new terrain*’, another was ‘*… swimming, wading and backstroking their way joyfully through the theory!*’ Peer reviewer two asked, ‘*I want the author to provide a much clearer view of where—other than nihilism—any of this is heading*’, whereas peer reviewer one found themselves ‘*nodding and feeling a sense of an ’opening up’ of new assemblages in the conceptual work that [they] hadn't brought together before.*’ These extreme poles of thought and response leave me thinking that if I want to pass this examination process, the *most important* time/part of my PhD is the choice of examiner, for I know that if one of the PhD examiners were that second reviewer I would not pass the Viva whereas if it were the first, I imagine I would! A toss of the coin and flip of a hat. Little wonder I’m uneasy. Whoever you are, reading this, I do hope you’re gentle, with an openness to becoming *affirmative-critical* (Karen Barad’s concept, cited in Kaiser and Thiele, 2014, p. 166), rather than *Sokal-critical*. What a strange culture we profess and (re)distribute.

Readers will read it differently, selectively and abusively, even. Some will be offended by it, some will have something triggered by it, others will domesticate it and make it fit whatever it is that they are for or against. Just hold your response in front of you and let it be your teacher. There is no use asking me what I intended with this text: this text wrote itself into being, so my relationship with it is the same as that of a reader – what it did to me will be different from what it does to you. (de Oliveira Andreotti, 2016, p. 80)
I will attempt a slightly less territorialised and formal account of my inquiry, one that is unsure and nervous about attempting to break free, one that deterritorialises the PhD structure of hierarchical ‘set in stone-ness’ that I have been ‘taught’ since being at school from the chemistry lab to the art class. This is a minor literature, a story of oppression and resistance that travels from observation and transcendence to participation and immanence. I do hope we make good travelling companions.

So, here we go…

The inquiry

This study, a post-qualitative collaborative action (re)search, used psychogeography (in a variety of environments) and rhizoanalysis to map the assemblages of six people-environments (a multiplicity), each with specific diagnosed mental health concerns, in order to explore how mental health and wellbeing is distributed in (of) the environment. More precisely, it is an attempt to map the spread mind in environ(mental) health; a topological cartography of well-becoming. The (re)searcher lens blended various process-relational ontologies of immanence together as a product of (re)viewing relevant literature and undertaking preliminary (re)search. The practice of psychogeography was used as a practical method of undertaking most of the data collection. A bricolage of empirical materials were amassed in the form of journaling (notes, drawings, mind maps, collage), photography, observation, video interviews (individual and group), sociodemographics, and dual video feedback (an original method), which were then collectively analysed at focus group meetings, which were also recorded. The resulting data were then analysed by myself using

7 Topology ‘refers not to surfaces but to ‘relations’ and to the interaction between relations […] to go below the surface to study processes of spatial emergence. It suggests that any spatial coherence that is achieved (on the surface) serves to disguise the relational complexities that lie ‘underneath’ spatial forms.’ (Murdoch, 2006, p. 12).
8 A territorialised, positivistic way of saying ‘my’ lens.
9 I place viewing under erasure due to the occipital hegemonic prevalence in Western onto-epistemologies and relevance due to its fallibility as a concept, e.g. why would it be more relevant than some other phenomena in a flat ontology?
10 Data is under erasure and is properly discussed in Act two.
11 I realise that all things are original where time is concerned but that some things appear more original than others depending on their focus of either re-production or production.
rhizoanalysis in the form of (re)presentational experimentation including, playwriting, assemblages, annotated Polaroids, *syuzhets* and transfers, with an emphasis on the (re)search process itself, in order to juxtapose, make explicit and problematise normative Occidentalised procedures and paradigms that currently exist in the world of mental health and wellbeing. As well as deconstructing normative territorialised assemblages, the co-emergent inquiry also sought/seeks to open up new possibilities and create novel lines of flight that may be pragmatically beneficial to the co-participants/co-(re)searchers and wider society-environment. This co-emergent region of the inquiry came about as a process of group discussions *during* the research which resulted in a co-participants/co-(re)searchers collectively devised *rumination*¹² (currently stated as diffractive rumination 2).

**Why I am interested in this topic**

I began this project as a very different person…literally. Many of my atoms have now become something different, perhaps a tea cosy or a murder of crows. My initial interest was whether wilderness therapy was possible in a country which has been contested as containing no wilderness (the UK for example). This soon changed as I realised the inherent problems with the inequitable concept and performance of *wilderness* (not to mention the concept ‘contained’), especially after learning of its inevitable consequences regarding the displacement of the Shoshone Sheep Eaters and Nez Perce (see *Act one*, *scene three*). Next, I imagined a biophilic ‘re-connection to nature’, until I realised the naivety in thinking *nature* was an objective ‘thing’ that we could ever possibly be detached from (or even ‘connected’ to) in the first place (see *Act one*, scenes *two* and *three*). Edward Wilson’s (and colleagues, such as Roger Ulrich, Richard Dawkins and the Kaplan’s) *geneticised* books soon became lost in my ever growing collection of social constructivist accounts of landscape/nature(s) (Urry, Cosgrove, Daniels, Cloke, Macnaghton, Schama, etc.) and ‘health and place’ (Curtis, 2014, p. 10) for further elaboration), ruminations are fecund in helping digest information through the extra empirical materials (*saliva*) they produce.

---

¹² I use the term ‘rumination’ here in place of the more formal ‘question’, not to suggest its negative psychological association with obsessive, compulsive thinking, but to emphasise the gradual and progressive *chewing of the cud* explorations that co-emerged. Instead of a pre-ordained positivist ‘question’ (that requires an ‘answer’) that may be achieved by finding ‘the truth’ through normalized ‘humanist concepts’ (see St. Pierre (2014, p. 10) for further elaboration), ruminations are fecund in helping digest information through the extra empirical materials (*saliva*) they produce.
Gesler, Kearns, etc.), followed by phenomenological paradigms (Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty\textsuperscript{13}, Abram\textsuperscript{14}, Casey, Seamon, Relph, Tuan, Varela, Thompson, Rosch, Fuchs, etc.). Yet, these accounts over emphasised the symbolic, the social, the individual, the intersubjective and human experience as a central tenet and as such, although a crucial and fascinating stage of learning that I am heavily indebted to, I soon became weary of the subjective anthropocentricity that these notions seemed to espouse.

The psychoanalytic emphasis on the role of the symbolic—or the phallogocentric code in Derrida or the heterosexist matrix in Butler—posits a master code, or a single central grid that formats and produces the subject. This social constructivist grid leaves little room for negotiation and instills loss and melancholia at the core of the subject. (Braidotti, 2011, p. 5)

‘Individualism’, Braidotti (2013, p. 24) intimates, ‘is not an intrinsic part of ‘human nature’, as liberal thinkers are prone to believe, but rather a historically and culturally specific discursive formation’. Gregory Bateson’s and Tim Ingold’s works were the transducers that helped me to free myself from these previous paradigm shifts and transported me into a much more interesting and breath-taking realm of thinking. This was quickly followed by philosophies of mind that took me out of the human head (Noë, Manzotti, Malafouris, Clark, Chalmers, Rowlands, etc.) and distributed me around a-subjective/post-human (mostly post-structuralist) deconstructions of nature (Haraway, Latour, Barad, Morton, Braidotti, Cohen, Bennett, St. Pierre, etc.) and the medicalised body (Foucault, Mol, Fox, Duff, etc.), a place I began to settle a lot more (un)comfortably into. I have also thought with Deleuze and Guattari quite a lot as is evident throughout these pages. Some of their concepts have been particularly helpful to ruminate with, such as BwO, striated and smooth space, faciality, topological cartography, nomadism, schizoanalysis, immanent ethics, lines of flight, territorialisation, rhizomes, assemblages, multiplicities, mapping and tracing, actual and

\textsuperscript{13} Although Merleau-Ponty’s last works seemed to begin steering away from phenomenological accounts of life, especially regarding his concept of ‘flesh of the earth’ (1968).

\textsuperscript{14} Likewise, David Abram’s later work, Becoming Animal (2011), seems to depart from the staunch phenomenological perspective that he took in The Spell of the Sensuous (1996).
virtual, and perhaps many more that have now become so habitualised in my rhetoric that I have forgotten about them, although I’m sure they will appear in the script when needed. After a long philosophical struggle, at last I had found a place where I felt I truly belonged (until the post-posts come along anyway...a work in progress).

To cut a very long story short, this thesis/play is-was (one move\textsuperscript{15}) simply an unfolding exploration of a journey that caught up with current Western paradigm shifts until I reached the ontological turn. I travelled from and through positivism, all the way up to the posts and into a most comfortable troika of beautiful philosophies to think with. The complimentary play script ‘Liverpool ONE – Liverpool Too’ (Act three) is a brutal wrestling with these paradigm shifts in thinking. The three narrators are all me(s) at different times–places (one move) on my journey. The third narrator, the ecotone, may seem arrogant at times, and that is another (non-)quality I have had to wrestle with, but it is where I am currently becoming. A sort of diffractive rumination co-emerged half way through my inquiry after I had tested the waters with a pre-inquiry (see Mcphie, 2015a) and had already started exploring various environments with the Walking in Circles (WiC) group. The salival material that rumination produces aids digestion. This is what co-emerged:

**Diffractive ruminations:**

1. My ruminations: How is Mental Health and Wellbeing Spread in the Environment? (*Where* and *when* is environ(mental) health and well-becoming?)
2. Co-participants/co-(re)searchers ruminations: How can we learn from and use the experiences we have to understand ourselves better and enhance our moods?

Of course, the only real research question is, ‘what is produced’ (Clarke & Mcphie, 2015)?

**Scene two: Prologue=epilogue**

\textsuperscript{15} Borrowed from Barad’s (2012a) description of ‘intra-actions’ that are ‘entagling-differentiating (one move) in the making of phenomena’ (pp. 7-8, emphasis added).
‘a schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst's couch…’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. xvii)

Throughout this PhD I explore, disturb and ruminate how mental health and wellbeing is distributed in the environment using a troika of philosophies of immanence. By thinking with emerging contemporary process-relational paradigms such as, new materialisms (Coole & Frost, 2010), contemporary animism (Harvey, 2013) and a few externalist voices from the new science of the mind/situated aesthetics (Manzotti, 2011a; Rowlands, 2010), I attempt to create an alternative post- (psycho)logical pathway for how we might conceive of mental health and wellbeing.

And it is into these back rooms, behind the closed doors of the analyst's office, in the wings of the Oedipal theater, that Deleuze and Guattari weave their way, exclaiming as does Nietzsche that it smells bad there, and that what is needed is “a breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside world.” (Seem, 1983, p. xvii).

It is this ‘outside world’ that I attempt to explore throughout this inquiry. This is not the naïve ‘outside’ that is proffered by binary bias as the healthful natural world in opposition to an artificial sedentary ‘inside’ but an intra-relational outside that is always already both inside and outside, natural and artificial, real and conceptual, physical and psychological. By this, I mean that psychological phenomena are necessarily physical; inside is also outside depending on your contextual and relational situatedness; artificial is also always natural; and conceptual is also real, for how on earth could they not be? Throughout these pages, I will argue that these differences literally matter and it is through this mattering that a (supposedly ethical) line of flight takes place. One of my underlying reasons for this is explained, in part, by Daniel Hutto (2010):

Many, if not all, psychopathological disorders – such as clinical depression, borderline personality disorder, schizophrenia and autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) – are commonly classified as disorders of the self. […]

---

16 I say ‘supposedly’ due to the concept’s awkwardness as to whether it is even possible to have an immanent ethics as opposed to a transcendent one…I’m still not sure.
There can be no doubt that such disorders make a difference to one’s ability to form and maintain a coherent sense of oneself in various ways. However, any theoretically rigorous attempt to show that they relate to underlying problems with say, such things as minimal selves or, even, so-called narrative selves – where these latter constructions are invoked to do genuine explanatory work – would require, inter alia, philosophical clarification of what it is that one is precisely committed to talking of such things (if things they be). It would also require justification for believing in selves of these various kinds. (p. 43)

It is a turn to these ‘selves’ that I spend much time examining throughout the pages of this thesis precisely because the dominant belief in what constitutes a ‘self’ seems to me to be one of the major stumbling blocks to environ(mental) equity.

In the preface of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983) *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Foucault encourages the reader to use this book as a ‘guide to everyday life’ by developing ‘action, thought, and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition, and disjunction, and not by subdivision and pyramidal hierarchization’ and to ‘[p]refer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile arrangements over systems. Believe that what is productive is not sedentary but nomadic.’ (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). Henceforth, this is a *nomadic inquiry*17.

Use political practice as an intensifier of thought, and analysis as a multiplier of the forms and domains for the intervention of political action. The individual is the product of power. What is needed is to “de-individualize” by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse

---

17 ‘Conceptually, nomadic thought stresses the idea of embodiment and the embodied material structure of what we commonly call thinking. It is a materialism of the flesh that unifies mind and body in a new approach that blurs all boundaries. […] The space of nomadic thinking is framed by perceptions, concepts, and imaginings that cannot be reduced to human, rational consciousness. In a vitalist materialist way, nomadic thought invests all that lives, even inorganic matter, with the power of consciousness in the sense of self-affection. Not only does consciousness not coincide with mere rationality, but it is not even the prerogative of humans. This emphasis on affect and extended consciousness, however, is not the same as the Freudian unconscious. […] Thinking is about tracing lines of flight and zigzagging patterns that undo dominant representations.’ (Braidotti, 2011, p. 2)
combinations. The group must not be the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals, but a constant generator of de-individualization. (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii).

I attempt to ‘de-individualise’ the re-presentations of the co-participants/co-(re)searchers of this inquiry by creating assemblages of mental health that highlight, juxtapose, disjoin, proliferate, de-territorialise, re-territorialise, multiply, transgress, diffract and...and...and...

Concerning the literature review, methodology and analysis

In qualitative inquiries a literature review often ‘takes place throughout the qualitative research process since the process itself is iterative and new questions and concepts are arising.’ (Literature reviews, 2015, para. 1). In truth, a literature review is never prior or post a methodology and as such would be misleading to place ‘it’ in either of these locations, even for sake of (re)presentational comprehension. In a format other than rhizomatic, a literature review becomes chopped, boundaried and statisized, a point that I continually make throughout this project. Therefore, ‘my’ literature review takes place throughout this work, a warp of external influence weaving in and out of a weft of empirical data (although I would argue that everything can be perceived as empirical data and is of equal empirical depth), for this is how it ‘happened’.

A literature review can never simply just re-view ‘literature’ in the traditional sense. Words on a page (either from books, articles, studies or other PhD’s) are abstract phenomena, with supposed symbolic ‘meaning’ that relays information and knowledge that exists up to the present point. How I experience this physical phenomena is empirical, in the same way that ‘field’ research is empirical. A participant’s words spoken from their mouths carry sound waves that enter the realm of my (un)conscious mind and merge and then co-produce a similar event than that of the letters written on a page from a literature review (in fact, transcribed interviews are usually written on a

---

18 As if ‘field’ research is even possible as we are always already ‘in the field’. By this I refer to the (im)possibility of ‘going somewhere else’ to (re)enact a bunch of rules that could possibly signify or (re)present some sort of truth that is ‘normally’ expressed as an event that would always be ‘the same’ (explored further in the play script, Act three).
page and so also become abstract ‘data’ in the same format as the literature review ‘data’). It would be misleading to suggest that one were different—more important for a particular purpose—from another in terms of separating them to produce either a literature review or a results section.

[T]here is no primary empirical depth we must defer to in post analyses as there is in the ontology and empiricism of conventional humanist qualitative methodology. That is, in post ontologies it makes no sense to privilege language spoken and heard “face-to-face” as if it has some primary empirical purity or value, as if it’s the origin of science. (St. Pierre, 2014, p. 12).

The futile actions of ‘comparing’ one ‘part’ (a literature review) of this process to another ‘part’ (a transcribed interview) in order to try to expose either ‘similar findings’ or ‘different findings’ would only serve to produce ‘more of the same’ (a sort of epistemological tracing). Regurgitating the same ‘reliable’ structure to try to create new knowledge certainly ‘works’ to produce new knowledge but only within the bounds of constraint regarding what we already know. Do we not need to strive for something novel?


If I were to ask the Deleuzian inspired question of what does this ‘do’, I would say that a more traditional PhD format would perhaps not only ‘structure’ the words on the page but would also structure the thoughts of the reader-performer or ‘spect-actor’ (Boal, 1979), as they (you) ‘intra-act’ (Barad, 2007) with it. I would like very much for you, the reader, to taste the ‘actual’ process more readily than the more tried and ‘reliable’ positivist/post-positivist format of the traditional PhD. I realise that almost all formatting are attempts at re-presentation, hence the obvious digestible school-like structures of introduction, methods, results, discussion, conclusions, yet as we will see
from the journey that you are about to take with me (and the other authors of this work that I have read, thought and written with), this attempt would be quite futile as the processes that any (re)searcher travels along have already passed and therefore are impossible to re-capture. We can only ever present (not represent) a new creation based on a previous event (the ‘field’ research) through association and creative engagement with the reader.

The illusory fabula of experience would perhaps be better understood if the syuzhet of a PhD more properly (re)flected this. It would be discourteous to the reader to assume that they (you) cannot decipher for themselves which phenomena are gained from the participants of a study and which from previous studies, for example. Even so, why should we distinguish so readily the literature-results from other people’s studies and our own studies? Are they not all so-called ‘empirical data’ of some sort that get merged into the meshwork of knowledge generation, evidence to add to the richness of the particular exploration that we have embarked upon? Having said this, you, the reader-performer, who are involved and imbricated in this endeavor, must also be allowed a certain access to this exploration in a way that not only enhances readability and allows myself to be examined but also excites current knowledge production and challenges you to think differently in a way that you may not have previously. As I regard various forms of conceptual art the most analytic and inquirous of explorations, I would rather this work be judged as such, an extended poem if you like, in the form of a Brechtian play as poetry is ‘designed to contain multiple levels of meaning at once, challenge the imagination, and evoke responses that are based on something more than scientific consensus and rationale’ (Lidström, 2015, n.p.).

Chickens and eggs

What came first, the chicken or the egg? This is a transcendently grounded question that promotes a belief in linear cause and effect trajectories and essentialist arborescent19 quiddities20. Of course neither came first as they were never transcendentally bounded in clock time in the first place. Alternatively, we might ask what does it do when we ask a question such as this? In the same way, a literature review, a

19 Tree-like (as in Plato’s logos).
20 A things ‘whatness’ or an object’s ‘essence’.
methodology and an analysis do something different when chunked in this way. Similarly, theory→informed→practice and/or practice→informed→theory become intangible as unidirectional quiddities and so when I first attempted to justify which type of inquiry this was, I found it increasingly difficult to separate and order them temporally. Firstly, theory is always already practice. Secondly, my reading of literature (material semiotic empiricism) happened alongside my reading of data (material semiotic empiricism) and so a gradual multidirectional co-production emerged. For example, when in Liverpool, I recorded some of the co-participants/co-(re)searchers comments that I thought seemed to stand out at that time (just as the co-participants/co-(re)searchers did with other data). The urge to inscribe these particular comments were always already informed by literature, embodied memory, etc. In turn, the comments inspired an expedition of inquiry that took me along a particular path of investigation, also being constantly informed by myriad influences.

[W]e are obliged to acknowledge that data have their ways of making themselves intelligible to us. This can be seen, or rather felt, on occasions when one becomes especially ‘interested’ in a piece of data – such as a sarcastic comment in an interview, or a perplexing incident, or an observed event that makes you feel kind of peculiar. Or some point in the pedestrian process of ‘writing up’ a piece of research where something not-yet-articulated seems to take off and take over, effecting a kind of quantum leap that moves the writing/writer to somewhere unpredictable. On those occasions, agency feels distributed and undecidable, as if we have chosen something that has chosen us […] In a previous article, I described that kind of encounter in terms of the data beginning to ‘glow’. (MacLure, 2013, pp. 660-661, glow added)

The initial comments in Liverpool glowed a little, a sort of blush, enough for me to feel the need to record them. The focus group meetings (re)enforced the glowing of particular data, encouraging them to bloom a little. Looking back at the photos, the videos, the journals, my notes, also (re)enforced the blossoming of certain paths and events. Discussions in corridors at my university, debates at conferences, exposure to particular artworks all merged to inform what I initially thought were ‘my’ choices. All the time, I carried on reading, being swept along with whichever direction those
particular conglomerations took me. When I think back to how I could possibly justify what type of inquiry this was in terms of what influenced what (theory vs. practice) or how ‘I’ might have ‘chosen’ a particular route to take the study in, the closest I can get to an answer is that it was like listening/participating with jazz. This is how the assemblages were written. To be honest, I didn’t have much of a choice in the matter.

**Affirmative deconstruction**

In order to explore the phenomena of mental health and wellbeing in a way that fully justifies the inquiry, I must also explore the epistemology that both produces and is produced by the inquiry itself (what does the existence of the question of the chicken and the egg do?). A post-structuralist ethic of deconstruction (highlighting the contradictions evident in such questions as the chicken and the egg) is useful for this matter and I think that an ethic of construction is needed also in order to open up new possibilities to support ‘healthy’ communities (human and other-than-human). Therefore, I attempt to weave a tapestry of mental health and wellbeing using a warp of deconstruction alongside a weft of construction. This is what Derrida called ‘affirmative deconstruction’ (enabled through parody to challenge traditional concepts, structures and conditions (Oliver, 1995, p. 43)). This is not an easy task as merely attempting to re-search anything using a philosophy that illustrates the contradictions of research itself is itself a contradiction. I do not wish to simply accept interpretation as a given as if it does nothing to the ‘data’ as it does ‘do something’. I believe the only way to escape the fallibility of interpretation is to highlight the fact that it is an interpretation. There are a number of ways to do this. One way is to simply keep mentioning it throughout the text as this would keep it alive in the mind of the reader thereby actively involving the reader in the process of deconstructing it (even though the reader may ultimately get swept up in the deconstruction and integrate it into yet another contradictory story…with no escape). Derrida adopted (and adapted) the method of *sous rature* from Heidegger and this is useful for the same reason. Rather, I have decided to place the entire PhD *sous rature* by structuring it in the skeletal format of a Brechtian play (hence, traditional chapters become acts and scenes). There is another play within this play also, thus strengthening the process of *sous rature* itself and making evident Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) poke at the Western disease of *interpretosis*. 
[T]he best interpretation, the weightiest and most radical one, is an eminently significant silence. It is well known that although psychoanalysts have ceased to speak, they interpret even more, or better yet, fuel interpretation on the part of the subject, who jumps from one circle of hell to the next. In truth, significance and interpretosis are the two diseases of the earth or the skin, in other words, humankind’s fundamental neurosis. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 127, emphasis added)

**RigourMortis**

‘Stop! You’re making me tired! Experiment, don’t signify and interpret!’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 153)

Although not as communicable as Deleuze’s interpretosis, I think *RigourMortis* has set-in and happens to be fatal. I came up with this term after a conference I attended where a prominent academic retorted, “as long as it’s rigorous” in response to my question about whether producing my data analysis as a Brechtian play and a series of assemblages would be acceptable to him if he were one of my PhD examiners. After his rebuttal, I chose not to tell him that I’d placed rigour *sous rature*.

Likewise, Pattie Lather (1993) chose to place ‘validity’ under erasure ‘in order to both circulate and break with the signs that code it’ as well as wrestle with ‘all the baggage that it carries plus, in a doubled-movement, what it means to rupture validity as a regime of truth’ (Lather, 1993, p. 674). In a similar vein, Maggie Maclure (2015) problematizes ‘critique in qualitative inquiry’ as it presupposes a corrective technique authorized by the bifurcation of nature. That is, it assumes that the world is demarcated or divided into asymmetrically-valued categories: authentic and inauthentic, true and false, good and bad, and aspires to negate one side in the interests of a greater moral authority, or a smarter take on what’s really going on. (p. 5).

21 The term ‘rigor mortis’, in relation to qualitative research, has been previously coined by Sandelowski (1993) but is used to highlight how to achieve rigour appropriately rather than place it under erasure as I attempt in this thesis.
The invented concept ‘rigour’, used to judge the merits, worth and trustworthiness of modern research, has a problematic past. What we deem to be more important or valuable than something else is always embedded in the historisation of hierarchical knowledge production. It presupposes a strict disciplinary ‘adherence to the truth’ (Allende, 2012), a way of perceiving the world that germinated from the Italian renaissance and became deeply entrenched in the scientific revolution and enlightenment to legislate an ‘ethico-onto-epistemological’ (Barad, 2007) stranglehold on the Western world. Apparently, ‘Ostinato Rigore’ (constant rigour) was one of Leonardo da Vinci’s favourite mottos as he was dissatisfied ‘with uncertainty, with inaccurate answers, with unprecise measurements, with the spread between the plus and the minus.’ (Allende, 2012, para. 4). Professor Jorge Allende (2012) exclaims, ‘[r]igor is also being methodical commitment to experimental procedure, to the need of controlling all parameters that can affect the results of our tests [...] it is to disrobe ourselves of our prejudices and enthusiasm when we interpret our results’ (paras. 5-6, original grammatical layout). However, procedures, inaccuracies, controls, parameters and preciseness are already prejudiced due to their Occidental framing that subjugates other ways of knowing and being. I propose an inclusion of enthusiasm and an exploration of the spread between the plus and the minus as that is where we might find other, less dominant, minority paths to escape Cartesian binary bias and monocultural hegemony. So, one of the purposes of this thesis is to follow a line of flight away from the RigourMortis (rigour as the death of variance) of academic duplication. It is an attempt to ‘produce different knowledge and produce knowledge differently’ (Lather, 2013, p. 653; St. Pierre, 1997, p. 175).

The concept of academic ‘rigour’ is a couple of paradigms behind. It’s as if the ontological turn never happened. It doesn’t seem to have moved out of the stifling Enlightenment project as it continues to guide swathes of academics, social scientists and PhD wannabes as the one rule that can never be broken. “Creativity is fine”, they say, “as long as it's rigorous.” Seemingly set in concrete, it channels epistemological currents in one direction only. The signpost reads, ‘DUPLICATION - THIS WAY’. If one new well-spring tries to break free from the banks of concrete that the epistemological current is channelled by and through, there are the ivory tower elite that either try to appropriate or contain the rebel forces with shouts of, “how can we find
truth if not for rigour” and “we might as well award Jane Austen a PhD for writing Pride and Prejudice”. We might. Is it not ‘original’? Does it not challenge us to think diffractively about class and gender divisions (especially when read in different time periods)? Is it not empirical enough? Are there degrees of empiricism that are more truthful than others? Perhaps not. Yet these beliefs in degrees of empirical evidence certainly perform in myriad ways.

We have been criticized for overquoting literary authors. But when one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into, must be plugged into in order to work. […] Literature is an assemblage. It has nothing to do with ideology. There is no ideology and never has been. […] Writing has nothing to do with signifying. It has to do with surveying, mapping, even realms that are yet to come. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, pp. 4-5).

I have had this conversation many times now at conferences, in peer reviews and with colleagues, all of whom ‘haven't done their reading’ and ‘are paradigms behind’ (Patton, 2008, cited in St. Pierre, 2014). But it’s hard to keep up with an increasing academic workload. And anyway, it’s a political matter with political consequences that some academics with good salaries might not be too happy to dislodge in light of upheavals and ramifications to the Western onto-epistemological status quo. The same was (and still is) said about Deleuze’s Logic of Sense (2014) where he ‘turned to Lewis Carroll and Alice’s Adventures for resources to think with’ (MacLure, 2015, p. 18) and especially Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) A Thousand Plateaus as it’s not a traditionally rigorous academic text. It’s not bound by academic rules and regulations. It makes up new language, language that isn’t clear. It’s challenging to read. It uses films as citations just as readily as journal studies as it is all taken to be empirical.

My friend and writing partner, Dave Clarke, has said as much when exploring similar concerns:

---

22 Michel Foucault (2000) implied that ‘truth’ was a game, ‘a set of rules by which truth is produced’ (p. 297, emphasis added). What is conceived as true, comes to be perceived as true.

23 Both comments were responses to my critique of rigour when in discussion at a conference.
So why not look to the full spectrum that is open to us to follow the matters of concern, rather than the matters of fact? (Latour, 2004). One of the best descriptions of *A Thousand Plateaus* I have come across for instance was on the Deleuze and Guattari facebook group:

‘The way *A Thousand Plateaus* is written is very intuitive and kinetic. It's very unlike most other philosophy writing: D&G don't really try to explain in plain language what they are doing. Rather they just keep going round and round on this one concept. Improvising around a theme. It's like jazz. It's supposed to affect you more than tell you things. (Brent Lin, 2016)’ (cited in Mcphie & Clarke, under review)

**The accessibility of Jazz**

I have had many debates about the issue of academic accessibility ranging from cries of ‘dumb it down’ to ‘rewrite [it] in plain English’. Gayatri Spivak’s ‘inaccessible’ writing (see Eagleton, 1999, p. 3) seems to have received similar contestations but both Judith Butler and Terry Eagleton are keen to add that as a pioneer of feminist and post-colonial studies she has perhaps achieved more political good and changed the thinking of thousands of academics and activists around the world (Eagleton, 1999; Butler, 1999). I’ve heard the same said about Gilles Deleuze and Donna Haraway’s writing.

But the idea that language should be clear is not only deeply embedded in our anti-intellectual culture but also in positivism […] It also represents positivism’s “search for certainty” (Reichenbach, 1951) echoed in the call for clear language. Following Ayer, Maxwell (2010), for example, could dismiss Deleuze and Guattari, who introduced new language that might enable new realities, and claim they are “simply ‘running their mouths’” (p. 6), which, of course, one could say about Ayer, Carnap, Reichenbach, Husserl, Marx, Einstein, Neils Bohr, Grigori Perelman, and many other scholars, including Maxwell, if one were so inclined. (St. Pierre, 2011, p. 614)

‘The wide-ranging audience for Spivak’s work proves that spoon-feeding is less appreciated than forms of activist thinking and writing that challenge us to think the
world more radically.’ (Butler, 1999, n.p.). Reading and learning a new language is difficult (for some more than others) and takes time as all new skills do. Should we make French more accessible by forcing French people to speak English so we may ‘all’ understand it? Should we destroy that culture too? One language (and therefore one culture) every three months is either lost to the world or consumed in the Western monoculture (Wiecha, 2013). Is this the future for works of art/philosophy/science such as, Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) A Thousand Plateaus, John Cage’s (silent) 4’33”, Miles Davis’ remarkable jazz album, Kinda Blue or perhaps we should just burn Fahrenheit 451? Yet, there is also a privilege to accessibility that needs ethical attention. But this can be dealt with in another way, as I have argued previously (see Mcphie, Wingfield-Hayes & Hebbourn, 2015, p. 17).

Concerning significance

An ‘eminently significant silence’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 127) is exemplified in John Cage’s 4’33” (composed in 1952), where we (the audience) are given the ultimate time and space for signifying and interpreting. ‘Concerts and records standardize our responses, but no two people will ever hear 4’33” the same way. It’s the ultimate sing-along: the audience (and the world) becomes the performer.’ (Gutmann, 1999, para. 8). The playwright Harold Pinter knew as much. Pinteresque pauses intensify meaning making. It is a dramatic ploy. This fuelling of ‘interpretation on the part of the subject’ is exactly what we (the Walking in Circles (WiC) inquiry group) did in our focus group meetings, hence the need to highlight them as a Brechtian play ((Intra-)Act 3).

In Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) description of faciality24, 'the mask does not hide the face, it is the face. The priest administers the face of the god’ (p. 127). In a similar way, the academic administers the face of research or truth (as do all researchers). And in this way, the focus group (and indeed the (re)search itself) is a

---

24 Deleuze and Guattari (2004) use the metaphor of the face to explain their view of signification and subjectification. They describe faciality as the substance of expression, the icon proper to the signifying regime, what gives the signifier substance fuelling interpretation; ‘look, his expression changed. The signifier is always facialized’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p.127).
mask (the face of (re)search…the face of interpretation). In this play there is nothing but ‘[o]vercoding by the signifier’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 128). The only thing left to do in the face of these regimes is to highlight, place under erasure (sous rature), juxtapose, problematise, diffract, make obvious, transgress, show it up in all its (in)glorious delusion for what it is…a play (in order to take flight). All the world is indeed a (participatory and open) stage (without the frame) and we are but (co-emergent, co-agentic) players.

These theatrical terms became popular in the 15th and 16th Centuries in Europe (perhaps as a (re)emergence of the Greek tragedy), most notably during the Italian Renaissance. It is no coincidence that the scientific revolution and enlightenment co-emerged from these cultural developments. Out of these theatrical-artistic-architectural events of the Italian Renaissance (and spread ever westwards by the Spanish crown in the 16th century where public parks emerged), Westerners began to both view and see the environment as scenery and landscape, a drama-tic backdrop framed as a picture-sque spectacle, something to be gazed at as an observer but not as a participant. We began to imagine we could study the players just as we were fooled into believing we could study the scenery as inert properties on the stage as something the players used as props (properties), as a re-flection of ourselves. Anthropology emerged from studying the players on the stage and science emerged from studying the props, scenery and backdrop as objects that merely served the players to support their performances. 

_Becoming Brechtian_ helps us, the observers, to become participants more fully. This will take time and we may have to be involved in many such plays before truly realising we are always already immersed of the play. I say this because I have been attempting to become a (fully aware) participant for some time without success. I realise that I am always already immersed of the world (the play) but the ingrained nature of my actions suggest and force me to believe that I am not. Such is the nature of cultural indoctrination. Put another way, everything is a metaphor (association through (un)related similarities). A tree is only ever a metaphor for something else, something we can’t quite grasp. James Gibson’s affordance would perhaps be a better metaphor than a tree for it attends to what it does (in action) rather than what it is (as a quiddity). It’s just that some metaphors are more easily shared in social settings but not necessarily more easily understood and their products may become problematic as a result of this type of generalising. Signs are still only ever signifiers of other signs (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004).
The fact that ‘significance and interpretosis are the two diseases of the earth or the skin’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 127) is especially poignant for WiC as I struggled to find significance in the *tataus* (see assemblage *two*/Mepchie, in press). In fact, even by naming them *tataus* instead of tattoos attaches even more significance to them, or to what they might mean! Ever more interpretation leads to ever more dramatisation until society becomes nothing more than a spectacle, a parody of itself, a tragi-comedy. As I slowly came to realise, things don’t really mean anything but they do do something.

**Concerning the strand of reasoning throughout the PhD**

The narrative thread that I weave (*with you*) throughout (Intra-)Act 4 is a process of deconstruction\(^{25}\) and reconstruction\(^{26}\). It highlights how conceptual apparatus are both physical and have physical consequences in/of the world. A short history and historisisation of particular events (as knots or tubers in time) that have always already taken place (and are still taking place in constant re-imaginings/re-memberings) is needed in order to de-frame the dominant hegemonic narratives that transformed (and are constantly transforming) these conceptual tools.

**Scene three: Summary of the thesis/play**

This PhD story is an entanglement that weaves together a philosophical endeavour and research process in the (un)making. You may read the acts in the deterritorialised order I have presented them here (the *syuzhet*) or in the usual, territorialised order/tracing of a thesis (the *fabula*), in which case you will need to read Acts 1, 2 and 3 (the complimentary play script) before the Assemblages, as the assemblages are what an academic might have labelled ‘results’ or ‘findings’ *pre* post-qualitative inquiry design. This is the order they appear in:

\(^{25}\) I realise that deconstruction is also a process of construction by its very temporal nature and that the prefix ‘de’ merely creates anew.

\(^{26}\) Again, I realise the temporal futility of the prefix ‘re’ and this shall be considered in greater detail in (Intra-)Act 2.
Prologue=Epilogue
Assemblage One
(Intra-)Act 1
Assemblage Two
(Intra-)Act 2
Assemblage Three
(Intra-)Act 3 (complimentary play script)
Assemblage Four
Epilogue=Prologue

Fabula (story order) and syuzhet (plot order) have their origins in Russian Formalism and are used widely in film to aid the portrayal of two different characteristics of the timeline of events in a narrative (Torrence, 2014). The syuzhet influences the reader’s perception of cause and effect (Torrence, 2014) and disrupts the linearity of the illusion of chronology (the fabula). In Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) A Thousand Plateaus, the chronological order was ultimately left to the reader but it is constructed in this thesis/play as an outcome of forced empathy. Just as Christopher Nolan’s (2000) Memento (re)structured the fabula in order for the viewer to empathise with Leonard’s narrative, the syuzhet of this thesis/play is structured so that the reader empathises with the non-linearity of the actual writing process, my own narrative in the story of this PhD process and the WiC group’s discussions as they weaved back and forward through time and space. Many of the co-participants/co-(re)searchers narratives emphasised the syuzhet of experience as their embodied and extended memories became entangled with the ever changing present to constantly (re)construct the story of their haecceitical mental becomings. Thus, an illusory fabula is constantly being created, emerging from the syuzhet that is life.

Intermède: Memento

27 ‘The concept ‘haecceity’ is taken from the medieval philosopher Duns Scotus to mean a “nonpersonal individuation of a body” (Bonta & Protevi, 2004, 94.’ (Mcphie, 2014a, n.p.) or a things ‘thisness’.
28 Intermède is an interlude between acts in French theatre. The initial idea for this came from Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) use of Intermezzo (a musical interlude), following the betweeness (interbeing) of the philosophical positioning of the rhizome,
**Syuzhet**

The aesthetic and analytic style of this (re)search follows a variety of conceptual apparatus from the film *Memento* (Nolan, 2000), including the addition of tattoos/transfers, annotated Polaroids, notes, the non-linear storyline (mixing the *fabula* and *syuzhet*) and even the fact that it is a film *framed* by a screen. It is an aid for creating new knowledge whilst still acknowledging that it is a play, framed scenery on a theatrical screen, a presentation of events that have long since passed and with every new viewing, it morphs anew. For example, instead of figures I use ‘Transfers’ (representational tattoos) to highlight the dominant, yet limiting, *decalcomania*29 of current practice in modern Western research techniques. I also utilize ‘snippets’ (a screenshot utility on Microsoft Word) in place of *vignettes* to highlight the fallibility of chopping...to see what it *does*.

**Fabula**

The style I have chosen to present this thesis structure, like the film *Memento*, shuffles the *fabula* to create a different story (a *syuzhet*), one that changes and challenges the ‘outcomes’. By structuring the thesis/play in this way, it does a number of things. It gives you, the *spect-actor*, a bigger role to play as well as having the option of choice as to your preferable narrative. It also challenges linear narratives that have dominated more traditional approaches to how theses have been previously conceived. For example, there are passages in this thesis that are topologically distributed. In other words, you can find them elsewhere, in a different format (perhaps as a published journal article or chapter in a book). It’s not essential to the PhD for you to read these more distant accumulations but if you so choose, you will find that it highlights/frames the role of the *spect-actor*, true to a Brechtian dramaturgy, as the you-narrative assemblage weaves in and out of time and space. You may also choose a different order, to see what it does, I’ll leave that to you. And of course you have already embarked

---

29 *Decalcomania* is an artistic/decorative process of transfer from prints or engravings to pottery or glass. Deleuze and Guattari (2004) used this concept to highlight the arborescent *tracings* of representational thought/practice rather than the cartographic *mapping* of novel lines of flight (what I might call a *tatau*).
upon creating a fourth act by merely reading this far, a phenomena Petersen (2013) also mentioned in her ‘ethnographic drama in three acts’:

As a funny twist, due to this specific ethnographic drama’s subject matter
and its likely audience, any thoughts, sensations, conversations, or emotions
invoked by performing/reading it will constitute a new round of
data+analysis and form the beginnings of yet-to-be-written fourth acts.’ (p. 293)

(Intra-)Act 1 will attempt to disturb the anthropocentric lens of your eyes via the
process of (dis)entangling concepts such as, Urry’s (1990) ‘Romantic gaze’ from/with
Foucault’s (2003) ‘Clinical gaze’. By following this particular path, I hope to make
obvious the distinct move in Western culture from an ontology of immanence to
transcendence, thereby highlighting the invention of the modern conception of the
subjective self that observes rather than participates. In so doing, I hope to reveal a little
more of the Cartesian split that conceptually fractured the mind from the body and the
body from the environment. In turn, I will argue, this conceptual fracture led to the
belief that mental health is somehow trapped within a human brain rather than
distributed of a world much more than human. Scene one, begins with the problematic
anthropocene before following a particular path that highlights the ontological and
epistemological journey that proceeds from there. Scene two explores ‘the healing
power of natures’ due to the concept’s increasing importance and usage within the
relevant literature on psychological responses to environmental degradation and
inequities (ecological, social, political, etc.), highlighting some problematic
assumptions embedded within modern Western psychological paradigms. Scene three
unpacks some oft used environmental concepts (e.g. Landscape, Nature, Wilderness,
etc.). Scene four tackles the fallacy of the healthy self and the
therapeutic/psychoanalytic practices that such thinking has shaped. Scenes five and six
describe the move to an ontology of becoming, process-(intra)-relational thinking and
an extended epistemology. Other ways of knowing (animism, externalism and new
materialisms) are briefly introduced as potential paradigms to think with regarding an
exploration into mental health and wellbeing.

(Intra-)Act 2 is a (non-)methodology that elaborates on the idea of a
transgressive and/or diffractive account of the inquiry process. It is an initial attempt to
create an alternative post-qualitative pathway for how we might research and even conceive of mental health and wellbeing (or more accurately, how we might co-produceresearch ‘environ(mental) health and well-becoming’). It questions philosophical assumptions that underpin contemporary inquiry into mental phenomena, such as mental health and the conception of mental representation and introduces Elizabeth St. Pierre’s concept of post-qualitative inquiry as a suitable methodology to think with and from. Within this transgressive-diffractive post-qualitative model/agenda I utilise a variety of methods that I contend work well with this particular (post) paradigm. A variety of post-qualitative onto-epistemethodologies\(^3^0\) were/are used that combine the onto-epistemological underpinnings of ‘process-relational’ philosophies of immanence (Ivakhiv, 2013; Mcphie & Clarke, 2015); the empirical methods of ‘post-qualitative collaborative action research’ (merging Heron & Reason, 2001 and St. Pierre, 2011) and ‘psychogeography’ (Debord, 1955; Coverley, 2010; Richardson, 2014); and performed as a ‘rhizoanalysis’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004). This combination maps ‘assemblages’, captures flows and rhythms of the rhizomes and a-centres the anthropocentric self to fit a more animistic, haecceitical lens. This mode of analyses is supported and framed by a number of creative outputs partly inspired by the film Memento (Nolan, 2000), that include Brechtian playwriting, annotated Polaroids, tataus and Deleuzian assemblages in order to highlight the onto-epistemological underpinnings.

(Intra-)Act 3 is a complimentary Brechtian play within a play and acts as an intermède between the Acts and the assemblages. It is a strand of (potentially) ethical importance that creates new (bastardised\(^3^1\)) voices\(^3^2\) for the usually under-subsumed

\(^{30}\) ‘Onto-epistemethodological’ refers to the notion that theories of existence, knowledge generation and the practice of inquiry are tightly bound entanglements that cannot be separated. ‘Over the years, it has become abundantly clear to me that methodology should never be separated from epistemology and ontology (as if it can be) lest it become mechanized and instrumental and reduced to methods, process, and technique.’ (St. Pierre, 2014, p. 3).

\(^{31}\) ‘Bastardised’ only in that they are now presented/translated into a different abstract medium, thereby altering their (combined) performativity. It is important to note that I am not attempting to deliver individual subjects from some oppressive methodological regime, allowing them to have a voice but am instead attempting a prison break as a sort of diffracted alternative to interpreting and representing their voices, as if that is even possible.

\(^{32}\) St. Pierre (2014) ‘found qualitative studies that claimed to use poststructural theories of the subject but then in the methodology section included descriptions and
participants in the inquiry process. It does this by ‘allowing’ their (bastardised) voices to be fully contextualised within the WiC focus group analyses unlike the practices of thematic analysis and/or even vignettes, for example. It also plays a secondary role in exemplifying the illusion of representation in research and a third role of attempting to locate when mental health might become.

The assemblages may be read in any order of preference as they perform independently of one another whilst still intra-related to the (topologically\textsuperscript{33}) wider PhD assemblage. These assemblages wrestle and ruminate with the empirical materials that ‘glowed’ (MacLure, 2013) when exposed to the co-emergent process of the med-literature-participant-computer assemblage. What I mean by this is that I did not consciously ‘choose’ the direction of analysis, rather I underwent a process of an unconscious stream of thought by letting the abstract presentational material flow through me as a co-emergence of a multiplicity of affects (how could I not?). This is the capacity to affect and be affected. I have positioned each assemblage between the other acts to highlight the inbetweeness and rhizomatic nature of how the analysis, methodology and literature review were never linear on this journey. I have also repositioned Assemblage Two away from this script (spatially) and placed it in a differently published format (see Mcphie, in press) in topological space for you to read when/if you so choose. As already mentioned, it is not essential to this PhD but it certainly stretches it to include another refrain. It is in the tradition of the cinematic syuzhet’s to present life in phenomenal time (and space) rather than clock time (and Euclidean space), as exemplified in the film Memento (Nolan, 2000).

The epilogue=prologue sums up the journey but is never a conclusion.

In this inquiry, it is ‘the attempt’ that is the most relevant concept that I bring into contention. For in attempting to be transgressive-diffractive I change the flow of normative events. I simply cannot be transgressive-diffractive as that would be contradictory. Just as many radical ideas have been culturally commodified over time

---

\textsuperscript{33} I say topologically wider rather than holistically larger to disrupt the topographically Euclidean suggestions that may be inferred from these concepts, such as the Aristotelian reductive and boundaried notion of parts and wholes.
to become spectacles or tracings, I can only ever attempt to be transgressive-diffractive and in so doing challenge the nature of nature through a process of physical disruptions to the status quo. Of course if these disruptions ever became a norm, they would inevitably need to be transgressed-diffracted once more due to the staticising nature of representational phenomena.

To use those analyses, one must read and wrestle with texts [...] that may, at first, seem too hard to read and with ideas that may upend one’s world so that “thinking is living at a higher degree, at a faster pace, in a multidirectionary manner” (Braidotti, 1994, p. 167) that certainly can’t be captured in advance of the study in a research proposal or a timeline. If one tries to reduce those analyses to recipe, process, and systematicity, the magic of inquiry can become what MacLure (2013) called “lumpen empiricism.” (St. Pierre, 2014, pp. 10-11).

In this thesis/play, mental health and wellbeing is not conceived as bounded solely within a brain or even within a body. ‘It’ is not a thing that can be isolated, categorised or essentialised within a subjective self in order to fix, mend or normalise. It is introduced in this study as a process distributed of the environment; a trans-cranial34, trans-corporeal35, trans-enminded, emic-etic process that weaves through a permeable, haecceitic, a-centred self (similar to an ecotone36); hence the need to create a new concept, ‘environ(mental) health’ (Mcphie, 2014a). If mental health and wellbeing are conceived in this way, it begs the question, where should we look for it? Or indeed when? It also has ethical ramifications if we begin to conceive of our mental health as immanently placed of our animated environments as opposed to transcendentally placed from or in static ones.

And so, to escape lumpen empiricism, I simply wait for the data to glow (MacLure, 2013).

---

34 Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) extended mind theory sees cognition as a trans-cranial process where certain states of cognition encompass features from the external world.
35 Stacy Alaimo (2010) states that ‘the human is always inter-meshed with the more-than-human world’ and trans-corporeality ‘underlines the extent to which the substance of the human is ultimately inseparable from “the environment.”’ (p. 2).
36 An ecotone is the transitional terrain between/joining two biomes.
**Intermède**

As Deleuze and Guattari point out, “A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, social sciences, and social struggles” (1987, p. 7). This ceaselessness of the connections between rhizomes shifts attention away from the construction of a particular reading of any text towards a new careful attendance to the multiplicity of linkages that can be mapped between any text and other texts, other readings, other assemblages of meaning. Elizabeth Grosz describes rhizomatic texts as “a process of scattering thoughts, scrambling terms, concepts and practices, forging linkages, becoming a form of action” (1995, p. 126) (Honan, 2005, p. 2)

And so, in rhizomatic fashion, the *haecceity* that I think of as *me* is led to co-assemble this scene and like so many of the Greek classics, welcomes you to enter *in medias res*…
Environ(Mental) Health Assemblage One: Liverpool ONE Assemblage


Semiocapital is in a crisis of overproduction, but the form of this crisis is not only economic, but also psychopathic. […] The mental environment is saturated by signs that create a sort of continuous excitation, a permanent electrocution, which leads the individual, as well as the collective mind, to a state of collapse. (Berardi, 2011, p. 94)

Assemblage One: Liverpool ONE mycelium.

There is an ecology of bad ideas, just as there is an ecology of weeds […] You forget that the eco-mental system called Lake Erie is a part of your wider eco-mental system - and that if Lake Erie is driven insane, its insanity is incorporated in the larger system of your thought and experience. (Bateson, 2000, p. 492)

Liverpool ONE has been driven insane. Its semiocapitalist becomings have demonstrated many realisations of mental ill-health (depending on conceptual processes
such as consumer capital) and what better way to explore this madness than utilising psychogeography.

Psychogeography: a beginner’s guide. Unfold a street map of London, place a glass, rim down, anywhere on the map, and draw round its edge. Pick up the map, go out into the city, and walk the circle, keeping as close as you can to the curve. Record the experience as you go, in whatever medium you favour: film, photograph, manuscript, tape. Catch the textual run-off of the streets; the graffiti, the branded litter, the snatches of conversation. (MacFarlane, 2005, cited in Coverley, 2010, p.9)

So, we (the WiC group) found a map of Liverpool, put a beer glass on it, drew a circle around it and walked as close to the line as we could (we couldn’t very well walk through buildings), recording the urban run-off as we went (Transfer 1).

Transfer 1: Liverpool Psychogeography Map. (Photo by Jamie).

I’ll give you an example…

---

37 Liverpool was chosen by the WiC group collectively as one of the many environments we should visit.
Scene one: Liverpool ONE (initial transgressions)

Rather than describing to you, the reader, all the variables (such as, gender, size of the minibus we travelled in, what we ate for breakfast, what type of clothing we wore, what accents we had, etc.) that were part of this process (as that would be both chunking and impossible), I shall simply explain how I followed a line of inquiry that co-emerged as I went along. Like the line on the map, the inquiry took me for a walk.

Some (important?) variables of striated space:

Christian influenced Date: 09/09/13
Clock Time: 12.30pm-3.30pm
Euclidean Distance walked: 1.5 miles
Precise weather record: Occasional rain, occasional sun, occasionally overcast, occasional blue patches, warm (according to me), not-so-warm (according to Pandora).

We (BBS, Blondie, Bumble, Pandora, Jim, Dolly and I) went to Liverpool, as one of many environments, originally to find out ‘how the environment influences our mental health and well-being’ and ‘how our perceptions of the environment influence our mental health and well-being’. After almost entirely circumnavigating the large open air shopping mall known as ‘Liverpool ONE’ (Transfer 2), we (the WiC group) finally ended up in its heart as BBS asked, ‘who designs this shite?’ (BBS, Annotated Polaroid 1). Suddenly, the data began to glow (MacLure, 2013). So I found out who designed this shite, bearing in mind another co-participants reaction that it was ‘clean and safe’ (Blondie, Annotated Polaroid 2). The glow started to irradiate.

38 Later in the (re)search process (as a result of various deliberations with the co-participants/co-(re)searchers in various environments), these questions merged into exploring ‘how our mental health and well-being may be spread in the environment’ (as it was not so easy to trace either of the more linear unidirectional pathways that the initial questions pre-supposed).
Transfer 2: Liverpool ONE. (Photo by Jamie).

Annotated Polaroid 1: ‘who designs this shite?’ (BBS). (Photo by Jamie).

‘Clean and Safe’- The spatial dimensions of capitalism

‘Evolution is a messy business. Like modern capitalism, evolution is a process of creative destruction.’ (Ellison, 2013, p. 19)
So, in one form or another, we-all of us, architects, builders, planners, and financiers, who have taken part in the construction of the modern environment-have participated, willy-nilly, and for the most part with little more than mild objection to this robbing of the earth. That is what I mean by a mass psychosis. (Alexander, 2002, p. 6)

Oppenheim (2014, para. 3) informs us that ‘[i]n 2008, Liverpool City Council renounced all control over the city centre and sold off 170,000 square metres of land to a private developer called Grosvenor’. Thirty-five of Liverpool’s historic city-centre streets were privatised and replaced with one-hundred-and-seventy consumer outlets, changing the nature of its local identity (Oppenheim, 2014). Oppenheim (2014) continues, ‘the privatisation of public space has been reinforced by private security personnel and CCTV cameras which observe the movement of citizens’ who ‘can be observed from all angles’ (para. 3). This ‘development’ smarts of Foucault’s (1995) description of the ‘panopticon’ where people become an object of information rather than a subject in communication or Latour’s (2005) ‘oligopticon’ where ‘they see much too little to feed the megalomania of the inspector or the paranoia of the inspected, but what they see, they see it well’ (p. 181). Both examples highlight an Orwellian dystopia that may be too subtle for many to notice or obvious to some depending on the social, material, political, sub-cultural lens that we look through. For example, there is an

39 As ‘through’ might imply a quiddital self behind the lens, I place it under erasure. ‘With’ might be more fitting.
obvious difference between BBS’s comment about the shite design of this space and Blondie’s notions of it being clean and safe. But there is a certain contradiction and juxtaposition here that is made evident by Mike Bartlett’s (2015) BBC four radio play, A Steal. Through the words of the main character, Hanna, Bartlett (2015) explores a particular reaction to the current economic crisis and ‘how it affects the fabric of society and community’:

The department store where I work is in this bit of town called Liverpool ONE. There was all this controversy. Basically, from what I could tell, the council or the mayor or someone sold off this huge bit of the city to a private company to build this big shopping thing and now they own it, run it. So, it’s not the police on the streets, it’s their security and the roads that were like public roads are now like private so you don’t have the right to walk down them, it’s up to them. They can do what they want. If they don’t like the look of you, they can throw you out; if you’re the wrong type, colour or poor, the council or the mayor or whoever it was did it, they took these roads that belonged to us and sold them. Still, it looks nice!

Here Hanna reveals the (not so) obvious ethical dilemma introduced by Grosvenor’s impositions yet also admits to the culturally received aesthetics of place that she is clearly caught up in (with it looking ‘nice’). Both Blondie and BBS are caught up in the very same aesthetic contradictions, as are we all.

‘Still, it looks nice!’

Liverpool ONE’s Chavasse Park also has a ‘nature trail’ (Annotated Polaroid 3)! Unfortunately we didn’t spot the squirrels, bumblebees or ladybirds as depicted in this picture but ‘liverpool-one.com’ (It’s all about being green at Liverpool ONE’, 2015) states it ‘is home to more than 150 species of insects, birds and animals, transforms waste food into water, and diverts 94% of 3,266 tonnes of refuse from landfill’ (para. 2) and were awarded the ‘British Standard for environmental management’ (para. 8).

Annotated Polaroid 4: The view of the nature trail looking from point 2 on the ‘nature trail’ map (above) to point 11. (Photo by Jamie).

However, there seems to be some disparity, evident in the difference between the two pictures (Annotated Polaroid 3 and 4), in terms of what we are sold and what we actually experience.

A global assessment of urbanization, biodiversity and ecosystem services led Muller et al. (2013) to conclude that ‘gardens are developed for visual appeal and do not increase trophic diversity and often are not self-sustaining’ (p. 136). ‘Unimproved’ grasslands tend to be high in species diversity compared to the limited range of species in ‘improved’ grasslands, such as ‘recreational swards’ (Price, 2003, p. 24). The grass in Chavasse Park is made up of Perennial rye grass and fescue grass—I asked one of the landscape gardeners who was busy unrolling the pre-packaged turf (Annotated Polaroid 5)—common on golf courses and a significant contributor to hay fever. It had a shiny appearance in the sunlight, apparently caused by the high percent of rye-grass.
Although lawns in the UK generally contain native species of grass, hegemonic aesthetic practices are often exported resulting in ‘a homogenization of lawn flora around the globe as a result of globalization’ (Muller et al., 2013, p. 137), increasing the occurrence of bio-paucity.

Annotated Polaroid 5: Pre-packaged turf. (Photo by Jamie).

The company (Grosvenor) are very keen to sell the green credentials of its five acre park as part of the larger forty-two acre open air shopping mall. It has a vested interest in it. The sales pitch begins, ‘Liverpool ONE’s ‘green crusaders’ have been making a huge eco-friendly impact on the city centre complex, a new report has found.’ (It's all about being green at Liverpool ONE’, 2015, para. 1, emphasis added). Capitalism needs to be alert to current trends in the marketplace and being ‘eco-friendly’ is certainly a big sell in the current climate. Yet the ‘reasons’ for the inclusion of biodiversity may have trickle-down consequences. There is a trophic cascade\(^{40}\) of ethical intentions that may be omitted due to practices such as ‘greenwashing’. Simply following an ‘eco-friendly’ agenda based on capitalist economics seems here to omit some important strategies for securing various forms of diversity such as; creative, economic, political, aesthetic, cultural, social, material, conceptual, perceptual and affective diversities.\(^{41}\) Only the ‘bio’-diversity is sold to the consumer as of any

\(^{40}\) American zoologist Robert Paine coined the term trophic cascade in 1980 to describe reciprocal changes in food webs caused by experimental manipulations of top predators.’ (Carpenter, 2016, para. 1, sous rature added). I place ‘top’ under erasure due to the arborescent ontology it infers.

\(^{41}\) It is important to note here that modern forms of capitalism that homogenise also create diversity, yet this ‘version’ of diversity often leads to unhealthy social
relevance. But even within this supposedly eco-friendly bio-model it seems to have omitted a particular species, the non-consumer. And within the regulations of its symmetrical eco-agenda, one particular non-consumer is singled out to be weeded before all others, which we will eventually come to in this assemblage.

Oppenheim (2014) warns that in this space (Liverpool ONE), ‘imposed identities have become increasingly prescriptive and fixed. The space for non-consumer subjectivities and activities is fast diminishing’ (para. 7) and so we may become oblivious (or even apathetic) to the material-cultural terrain; we may become android to a particular societal spectacle, one that continues to show signs of a homogenous capitalist consumption (*homogenous diversity*) rather than a more healthy production of *heterogeneous diversity*.

Oppenheim (2014), complains:

> surveillance, behavioural controls and policing strategies are used to eradicate visible signs of unrest and deter unwanted visitors from town centres and shopping streets […] to discourage non-consuming activities, such as busking, skateboarding, political gatherings, musical performances or any other ungovernable, impromptu behaviour […] If you do not have a license you can be accused of trespass […] Non-consumers, such as the homeless, the unemployed, the poor, the young and the old are branded as ‘others’ to the hegemonic consumer order. In turn, cities are able to demarcate between who is welcome and who is not. (paras. 4-6).

It seems that Liverpool ONE is keen to cover this social paucity with its claims to the *biodiversity* of Chavasse park. They do, however, choose and vet their own buskers and artists, yet these have already been appropriated by the corporate machine like permitted *artistic graffiti* over apparently *anti-social* (and illegal) *tags* in other areas of the city (see Assemblage Two/Mephie, in press).

_________________________

separations such as the rise of nationalism where *difference* between groups is encouraged and protected at the same time as feared. In this model, initially, the borders between groups are deterritorialised before reterritorialising them as their impervious nature is reinforced and as such gives rise to what Vandana Shiva (1993) might call ‘monocultures of the mind’. In this model, other forms of diversity (cultural, bio, inorganic, conceptual, etc.) are subsumed, consumed or obliterated within its colonising parasitic structure.
The Victorians protested (on the streets) to get ‘the streets’ back in to public hands and it worked, until recently (as this sort of privatisation has been spreading across the UK). This dystopian construct reminds me of literary authors such as, Huxley, Orwell and Bradbury, films like Metropolis (Lang, 1927), or Logan’s Run (Anderson, 1975) and more recent novels for teenagers such as, The Hunger Games (Collins, 2008). In fact, even the architecture of Liverpool ONE was similar to that of the city in Logan’s Run, as was discussed by the WiC group when we were there. ‘I think of it as a mass psychosis of unprecedented dimension, in which the people of earth-in large numbers and in almost all contemporary societies-have created a form of architecture which is against life, insane, image-ridden, hollow.’ (Alexander, 2002, p. 6). This is the legacy of the open-air shopping mall. Panem (Collins, 2008) has already become a reality.

Anna Minton (2012) imagines:

trying to privatize a piazza. So many genuinely public places in towns and cities all over southern and northern Europe, in Italy, Spain, Greece, France, Holland, Germany and Scandinavia, are thriving. Families and groups of people stroll arm in arm taking the passegiata, children run around and old people sit together on benches. These places do not follow the American Clean and Safe agenda of the shopping mall, but they are not dirty and dangerous as a result. Far from it, they are healthier and happier. It is no coincidence that rates of mental illness in continental Europe are half those in Britain and America (p.195-196, emphases added, glow added).

So how does Blondie come to ‘love Liverpool’ and say that Liverpool ONE is ‘clean and safe’, especially if, as Minton suggests, the privatisation of space may affect our mental health? And is it simply by chance that Minton mentions the very same words to describe the American shopping mall agenda that Blondie exclaimed when standing in Liverpool ONE, clean and safe?

Transfer 3 is a screenshot taken directly from Grosnevor’s Office Service Charge Brochure (2012). Even the word ‘brochure’ is suggestive of selling the streets to customers in order to maintain the illusion of an autonomy of choice under neo-liberal capitalist economics. Notice the highlighted words that glowed for me when I first read this document.
Hanna’s comment, ‘Still, it looks nice!’ from Bartlett’s (2015) radio play is symptomatic of Grosvenor’s consumer aesthetic. Blondie’s comment of Liverpool ONE as ‘clean and safe’ seems to have somehow jumped off this brochure and into her mind (or the other way round). ‘Capitalism “launches (subjective) models the way the automobile industry launches a new line of cars.”’ (Guattari, 1977, p. 95, cited in Lazzarato, 2014, p. 8). In this way, subjectivity is produced through the articulation of ‘economic, technological and social flows’, where ‘political economy is identical with “subjective economy.”’ (Lazzarato, 2014, p. 8) as ‘everyday life is becoming increasingly consumerized’ (Žižek, 2011, cited in Bridger, 2015, p. 228) under its General; ‘privatisation’.

Guattari’s and Lazzarato’s comments here are typical examples of what is explored and often revealed through the practice of psychogeography (especially contemporary psychogeographic practices, such as Richardson’s Schizocartography (2014, 2015), Rose’s Anarcho-Flâneuse (2015) or the antipsychological psychogeographical practice of Bridger (2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015)). For example, Richardson’s Schizocartography takes Guattari’s molecular revolutions (1984), schizoanalysis (1998) and schizoanalytic cartographies (2013) and re-weaves them in
order to produce a practice that reveals a (capitalist) subject’s behaviour who takes consumption to be the norm and/or pervading form of consciousness.

For Guattari, ‘capitalist subjectivity’ (2013, 44) is a worldview that not only pervades the daily lives of people but also orients them according to a singular form of desire that predominantly involves the attainment of mass-produced consumer goods. While it might appear that capitalism is simply an economic system, even if we do choose to accept that it can influence our consciousness, what has capital got to do with the way the city is manifest; the way it is formed out of buildings, routes and spaces; and the effect it has on individuals who move about it? (Richardson, 2015, p. 184)

Just as I was about to investigate this interesting conundrum (flow of material) further (that I imagined may have revealed Blondie’s ties to Liverpool ONE’s privatised spaces), I decided to read the second page of the brochure (as a diffractive act of changing direction before I began to interpret and make meaning out of Blondie’s words) which began to reveal some very worrying language (Transfer 4).
Note that the striated Platonic/Cartesian/Newtonian concept/language of anti-social ‘elements’ comes directly from Euclidean geometry and Mendeleev’s chemistry. I wonder which element they are as I’ve searched the periodic table and cannot find them (Transfer 5)? I do not mean this metaphorically or even as a joke. I mean it literally. My objection to the use of the word ‘element’ here is not merely semantics as words literally perform and matter in their mattering (after Butler and Barad). These words (and use of words) create an opinion that forms in our shared cultural-mental space. It then gets dispersed through our media and our altered behaviour soon follows. A sort of non-linear trophic cascade is enacted.
Transfer 5: ‘the elimination of anti-social elements such as vagrants and beggars’ (Grosvenor’s Office Service Charge Brochure, 2012). (Periodic Table created by Sandbh, 2015).

As this ‘data’ (or rather rhizomatic ‘line’) seems key, from an ethical perspective, I decided to follow it, believing it to be a glowing example of empirical importance as to how the environment (in this case the topological environment of the internet as well as the physical architectural space of Liverpool ONE) influences our mental health and wellbeing (one of my initial questions) and may, therefore, provide further material to tease out what the shite designs of Liverpool ONE’s clean and safe environment does.

Scene two: The elimination of people

‘Elimination’, ‘anti-social’, ‘elements’! This language is not idle. It comes from somewhere and it does something. For example, referring to people as ‘elements’ is reductionist and dangerous. By association, this type of language infers that (consumerist) normative society, as a superior and separate group of living organisms, are different from vagrants and beggars who have been reduced to more static and essential elements on an invented periodic table. They’ve been chunked! Through the use and abuse of conceptual apparatus (such as scientised words), it essentialises and fixes certain groups of people into material properties that may now be judged and deemed unworthy of normative consumer ‘life’ and therefore must be ‘eliminated’ (in the very subtle way that Western societies eliminate, mostly by creating regulations or
media campaigns designed to remove unwanted problems...such as vagrants and beggars). Sometimes however, this language goes further. For example, in 1963 a Brazilian rubber company massacred a tribe. It was named the massacre of the 11th parallel:

The head of the company, Antonio Mascarenhas Junqueira, planned the massacre, deeming the Cinta Larga Indians to be in the way of his commercial activities. ‘These Indians are parasites, they are shameful. It’s time to finish them off, it’s time to eliminate these pests. Let’s liquidate these vagabonds.’ He hired a small plane, from which sticks of dynamite were hurled into a Cinta Larga village below. Later, some of the killers returned on foot to finish off the survivors – finding a woman breastfeeding her child, they shot the baby’s head off, and then hung her upside down and sliced her in half [...] In 1975 one of the perpetrators, José Duarte de Prado, was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, but was pardoned later that year. He declared during the trial, ‘It’s good to kill Indians – they are lazy and treacherous.’ (Survival International, n.d., n.p., emphasis added)

This type of behaviour is associated with the language we inherit from our culture. Again we see words such as ‘eliminate’, ‘pests’ and ‘vagabonds’. The indigenous population were seen as lazy parasites perhaps because they were not deemed to be useful to their version/vision of a civilised capitalist society, preventing progress, similar to vagrants and beggars. In Middle English the words vagabond and vagrant were related to a person without a settled home but became synonymous with idleness, disreputability and criminality (Harper, 2016a). After the Napoleonic wars resulted in many homeless people in the United Kingdom, the vagrant act of 1824 made it an offence to sleep rough or beg (Transfer 6):
Transfer 6: Vagrant Act of 1824 (n.a.)

This act is still in use today. In 1988, 573 people were prosecuted and convicted in England and Wales under the act (Hargreaves, 1991, column 863). In 2014, three men were arrested for ‘stealing’ discarded food (cheese, mushrooms, tomatoes and cakes) found in a skip outside the store ‘Iceland’ in London and were charged under the vagrant act of 1824, although the case was later dropped (Iceland food bin theft case dropped by CPS, 2014).

In an article for the online forum ‘Open Democracy’ entitled, The modern return of Vagrancy Law, Hermer (2014) reports:

In a jigsaw of related criminal justice amendments, the government has revitalized the ‘rough sleeping’ (s, 4) and ‘begging’ (s, 3) offences of the Vagrancy Act and crafted them into everyday tools to move on and arrest visibly poor people. To make matters even more worrisome, the empowerment of the 1824 Act has occurred in tandem with an increasing array of powers given to civilian police Community Safety Officers (CSOs) to fight anti-social behaviour. Currently, CSOs can move on or detain people who are begging or rough sleeping for delivery to the police. […] These ramped up powers, practically non-existent a decade ago, suggest that the vagrancy Act has become a major tool once again to police visibly poor
people, using the *raison d’etre* of vagrancy law – the crime of being suspicious. (paras. 9-10)

It is no accident that the words *vagrant* and *vagabond* are also linked to the word *vague* as they originated from the terms *wandering*, strolling, unsteady and undecided (Harper, 2016a). In pre-enlightenment Europe, someone who wandered from place to place was most certainly not of aristocratic social standing (as they would be carried either by horse, carriage or even other humans). It was only during the Picturesque and Romantic periods that *wandering* began to be seen as something that a gentleman could do (the urban version being termed a *flâneur*). These class-based notions of wandering and vagrancy have been distributed since the agricultural revolution (often referred to as the birthplace of capitalism42) to form a palimpsest of judgement in the modern mind. Therefore, many indigenous people, often associated with a more *primitive* form of wandering—*nomadism*—are not ‘civilised’ and may be seen as ‘other’, such as pests, vagrants and vagabonds to be reduced to *elements* and eventually *eliminated*.

In *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Foucault (1995) claimed that to the capitalist establishment, ‘the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body’ (p. 26). Reducing a human to this sort of description and labelling (elements, pests, vagrants, vagabonds, beggars) may not only render certain ‘unproductive’ bodies as unwanted but also change our conceptions and perceptions about that (or that group of) human(s).

The concept ‘elements’ also stems from a reductionist positivist epistemology that does not ‘fit’ with certain ethical considerations when discussing ‘real lives’ (*whatever* they may be argued to be). Then of course there is the rather more blatant language of ‘elimination’ and ‘anti-social’ (which often just means ‘social’ but is ‘sold’

---

42 Following the work of Marx and Engels, ‘[i]n his history of the development of social classes, Martin Empson (2014) informs us that as agriculture became centred on permanent settlements, society became divided into distinct classes (40). As agricultural surplus grew, certain individuals and their family groups began to form a social class which controlled a part of society's wealth (Empson, 2014).’ (Mcphie, 2014a, para. 14). ‘Consequently, ‘with the rise of class society, there is a corresponding development of the state’ which is ‘made up of institutions and organisations that exist to protect the interests of the ruling class’ (Empson, 2014, 41). This undoubtedly brings with it the exploitation of one class by another, even if those ruling class interests are subtly hidden away from a public consciousness within those institutions.’ (Mcphie, 2014a, para. 15).
as the opposite\(^{43}\)). What else does this language ‘do’? How does it enact in the mind of our environments (if we are of our environments)? With a little more following of lines, I found a shining historical (and historicised) example of how this type of language manifests itself physically within the mental health of our environments:

The psychological importance of a planned campaign against the nuisance of begging should not be underestimated. Beggars often force their poverty upon people in the most repulsive way for their own selfish purposes. If this sight disappears from the view of foreigners as well, the result will be a definite feeling of relief and liberation. People will feel that things are becoming more stable again, and that the economy is improving once more […] Once the land has been freed of the nuisance of beggars, we can justifiably appeal to the propertied classes to give all the more generously for the Winter Aid Programme now being set in motion by the State and the party. (Reich Ministry of Propaganda guidelines, cited in Ayass, 1988, n. p.)

Yes, I’ve used the Hitler Trump card (pun intended)! Wolfgang Ayass’ (1988) Vagrants and Beggars in Hitler’s Reich highlights the rise of the German Nazi’s where vagrants and beggars were rounded up and sent to workhouse prisons. ‘Beggars registered as inhabitants of other towns must be ruthlessly removed by the police for a lengthy period into a concentration camp as far away as possible from Hamburg.’ (cited in Ayass, 1988, n. p.). Foucault’s (1995) notion of consumers within a capitalist society as ‘docile bodies’ means that those in power can manipulate consumers more easily.

I’m sure you (the readers of this) have already formed opinions regarding these comparisons between Liverpool ONE’s brochure and the Reich Ministry of Propaganda guidelines; made links and created concepts which will all be very different depending on your socio-demographics, etc. For me, it leads to this: ‘Instead of destroying poverty, it was considered cheaper and more efficient to destroy the poor.’ (Ayass, 1988, n. p.). This is the ‘elimination of unwanted elements’. Selfridges in Manchester has recently installed metal spikes outside one of its stores (Transfer 7) to

\(^{43}\) For example, I have been told (by a German student) that in Germany ‘anti-social’ is more akin to spending time alone whereas in the UK it is advertised perhaps as a gang of lads smoking and jeering outside a local store. Yet, for the members of that group, this behaviour perhaps would be a highly social act.
reduce litter and smoking […] following customer complaints’ (Andreou, 2015). This is called ‘defensive’ or ‘disciplinary’ architecture.

Transfer 7: ‘Spikes installed outside Selfridges in Manchester’ (Andreou, 2015).
(Photo by Christopher Thomond (2015) for the Guardian\footnote{Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA).})

Nick Beake (from BBC London) gathered the reactions from various residents of a Southwark block of flats where this defensive architecture had recently been introduced:

‘The first time I saw someone lying here, a homeless couple actually, I didn’t like it because I didn’t like having to walk by them. That sounds very selfish. So when I saw those studs I thought good idea.’

‘I think it’s a perfectly reasonable thing to do to be honest and you know, we all pay a fair, decent amount of money to live in this block of flats and it’s not great when you get people coming down and asking you for change in the morning.’ (Beake, 2014, n.p.)

In a channel 4 news interview, when asked if they thought the spikes were a good idea, one of the residents of the £800,000 apartments answered:
‘I think it’s a good idea, I think that, I mean it completely affects the way that the building seems, the appearance and it’s just not very nice’ (Metal spikes – treating homeless people like pigeons?, 2014).

So, according to some, it seems that homeless people are an inconvenient and unwanted fashion accessory for the very rich. Similar to sweeping dust under a carpet, London’s homeless are moved on without focusing on how the dust got there or why some people choose to sweep it under the carpet with little to no empathy. This is a particularly unempathetic *aesthetics of place*, a place=people aesthetics.

It is the discretion of the anti-homeless paving in Southwark that chills me. *The spikes tone carefully with the architecture.* They are almost tasteful. […] The number of rough sleepers in London has doubled since Boris Johnson became Mayor. Meanwhile, the Government has criminalised squatting, removed safety nets for the unemployed and cut mental health spending. (Godwin, 2014, n.p., emphasis added)

‘Katharine Sacks-Jones from Crisis said: “For the last three years in London we've seen a 75% increase in rough sleeping because of a lack of affordable housing and cuts to benefits”’ (cited in Beake, 2014, n.p.).

There is a section in Don Mitchell’s (2003) book, *The Right To The City* entitled, ‘The Annihilation of People’ (pp. 170-173) in which he explains how there is a ‘desire to regulate the homeless out of existence’ (p. 173). He quotes segments of an essay by a legal scholar named Jeremy Waldron (1991) who described the predicament of homeless people as having ‘no place governed by a private property rule where he is allowed to be’ (p. 229) and explains that ‘in a “libertarian paradise” where all property is privately held, a homeless person simply could not be’ (cited in Mitchell, 2003, p. 170). What prevents this dystopian elimination is ‘only by virtue of the fact that some of [society’s] territory is held as collective property and made available for common use. The homeless are allowed to be – provided they are on the streets, in the parks, or under bridges’ (Waldron, 1991, p. 300, cited in Mitchell, 2003, p. 170). However, with the privatisation of *space* for hyper-consumption, as in Liverpool ONE, comes the elimination of a certain *type* of person. Perhaps this is partly down to the way we conceive of space or place in of itself. For example, if we continue to think of space as
empty or place as property, what does this do if, as I have contested, we are also of the environment? Jeremy Waldron (1991) illuminates:

What is emerging—and it is not just a matter of fantasy—is a state of affairs in which a million or more citizens have no place to perform elementary human activities like urinating, washing, sleeping, cooking, eating, and standing around. Legislators voted for by people who own private places in which they can do all these things are increasingly deciding to make public places available only for activities other than these primal human tasks. […] If I am right about this, it is one of the most callous and tyrannical exercises of power in modern times by a (comparatively) rich and complacent majority against a minority of their less fortunate fellow human beings (pp. 301-302).

Godwin’s mention of cutting mental health spending seems almost trivial if we don’t even have the right to exist. Mitchell (2003) protests that ‘we are creating a world in which a whole class of people cannot be—simply because they have no place to be’ (p. 171, emphasis added), unlike the ‘150 species of insects, birds and animals’ (It's all about being green at Liverpool ONE, 2015, para. 2) in Chavasse Park that are most welcome, as long as they continue to promote the product. But how does this behaviour manifest itself in the mental realm of our environments? If the realm of the ‘mental’ is indeed a physical process then it must be in relation with our buildings, the concrete, the pavements, the perceived space between the buildings, the conceived regulated space of parks and shopping malls, the aesthetics of a juxtaposition of place and space (‘the spikes tone carefully with the architecture’ (Godwin, 2014)), the politics of space and the spectacle of modern Western society.

Gregory Bateson suggested ‘that the primary problem is epistemological, a systemic false consciousness of our relation to nature, that is itself now a part of our ecological condition’ (Goodbun, n.d., p. 43).

Epistemological error is all right, it’s fine, up to the point at which you create around yourself a universe in which that error becomes immanent in monstrous changes of the universe that you have created and now try to live in. (Bateson, 2000, p. 493).
So, in this assemblage we move from the propaganda of ‘clean and safe’ to the ruthless removal of beggars in Nazi Germany (or is it the other way around?) simply by following a line of concepts (which you, the reader, are implicated and imbricated in).

But what does this mean? ‘I meant nothing by The Lighthouse’ (Virginia Woolf, cited in Ellmann, 2000, xvi). Or is it more important to find out what this does? ‘The symbol is not in the poem. The symbol is the poem’ (Boland, 2000, p. xv). And is it really the ‘structure’ (whether political, topographical, cultural, etc.) of the space in Liverpool ONE that determines our ‘reactions’, behaviour, mental health? Through this inquiry, I’m beginning to think that it’s a little more complex and co-created than that. After all, ‘towns and cities are assemblages of individuals’ as well as ‘social networks, organisations, and various forms of infrastructure’ (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, p. 6). For example, if we continue with our line of inquiry from Grosvenor, we come to the 6th Duke of Westminster45 who owns the company and was the third richest person in Britain in 2014.

The ‘propertied classes’

In 1998 the duke was worth an estimated one-point-seven billion pounds. In an interview with Anne Treneman (1998) of the Independent newspaper, he wouldn’t be drawn on whether the figure was accurate:

“I cannot discuss it. It's not something I dwell on,” he said. “We are rich in terms of property and the quality of property. It is not something that concerns me. Never has. Not interested in material things. Honestly. It would drive me bonkers if I thought too deeply about it.” […] one Christmas (he) took his two eldest daughters to visit the poor drug-addicts of Liverpool. “There is a whole different world out there and I want to open their eyes to it,” he said […] he remains a paternalistic (some say feudal) landlord who is not above controlling his tenants and who is adamantly

45 Unfortunately, Gerald Cavendish Grosvenor has since died of a heart attack and has passed his fortune on to his only son, Hugh Grosvenor, over his three sisters.
opposed to the right to roam. “Private” signs pepper his estates. (Treneman, 1998, n.p., emphasis added)

Obeying the laws of parody by referring to himself as ‘we’, at least he realises he is a multiplicity. Deleuze would be proud!

According to Forbes (2015) rich list, the philanthropist is now worth over eight billion pounds. The Duke is what the Reich Ministry of Propaganda would call one of the ‘propertied classes’ who, in a neoliberal Western society, would be expected to give generously to the poor in the trickle-down structure of a capitalist democracy. If so, what does this process of events do? For example, by privatising large amounts of land (space) it poses certain restrictions on the organisms that dwell there. In most cases these restrictions are controlled by the propertied classes who hold certain traits that influence the governing of their actions and therefore the organisms within the boundaries of their control. This may have the effect of reducing, diminishing or extinguishing any sort of freedom or even life that the organisms hold within their own permeable boundaries. For example, the reduction of space may influence the growth of an individual, emotionally or even in mass due to stress, as with certain fish when imprisoned within glass bowls (Ranta & Pirhonan, 2006). It could also lead to overcrowding, lack of resources, environmental fatigue, which in turn can lead to stress, anxiety and many other mental illnesses (if we wish to label them as such).

But it’s not the Duke’s fault as he is also enmeshed in a culture that frames and borders everything. It doesn’t ‘start’ or ‘end’ with him. Do his views of privatisation, property rights and land laws stem from a long line of Norman invaders (as part of this ever increasing assemblage)? If so, how might they relate to Grosvenor’s brochure which seems to have co-developed a narrative of its own (rather like an ‘It narrative’)?

Bateson (2000) noted that ‘Socrates as a bioenergetics individual is dead. But much of him still lives as a component in the contemporary ecology of ideas’ (p. 467). So then does the Duke of Westminster’s upbringing determine and structure Blondie’s

---

46 The Normans certainly introduced a more obvious class based language to England. Words such as peasant, duke, noble, authority, obedience, servant, serf, labourer (Mastin, 2011) were added to the English vocabulary as French became the language of aristocracy and English became a lower class vulgar tongue. This class-based linguistic invasion has germinated and is now evident in many perceptions and treatments of people with ‘common’ accents, specifically strong colloquial ones such as Scouse, Geordie or Brummy.
mental health (as in the determinist/structuralist assumptions) through the words and actions of Grosvenor or does she determine and structure her own (as in the possibilist/humanist assumptions)? At first (or second) glance, there seems to be some influence in both directions. Maybe there are no linear ‘directions’ at all, maybe the chaotic and complex co-emergence that gives rise to (or ‘is’) Blondie’s mental health is directionless and dimensionless or multidirectional and multidimensional (or both)!

[T]he processual character of assemblages undermines any conception of a determining social structure that shapes bodies or subjectivities. Both the exercise of power or control and the capacity to resist such power and control must be explored as socially and spatiotemporally specific occurrences within continual and continuous flows of affect in assemblages (Buchanan, 2008, pp. 16–17). (Fox & Alldred, 2014, p. 4)

Although there may be no unidirectional determining social structure that shapes Blondie’s mental health and wellbeing, it seems that the assemblages produced from the politics of a neo-liberal capitalist democracy play a rather large role when trying to locate where and when mental health and wellbeing might become. However, it would be hard to pinpoint a clear or definite linear path of cause and effect from capitalism to our mental health (due to the impossibility of chopping matter into variables), although we might ‘know’ this instinctively. But if the ‘spaces’ themselves are highlighted as territorialised, as I have exampled here through the space of Liverpool ONE, perhaps these spaces could be conceived as contracting and showing symptoms of a type of madness, an insanity all of their own that touches those haecceities that come into contact with it. If the human biome becomes ill, then so do many of what we think of as the other organisms inside us, such as the mycelium, viruses or bacteria (although some may thrive and revel in the madness for a while or even be the cause of the madness itself). Were we always already zombie-ants?

47 A parasite causing Toxoplasmosis has been found to control a mammal’s or bird’s behaviour in order to complete its life cycle (and is found in many people diagnosed with schizophrenia) just as a parasitic fungus controls ‘zombie-ants’ (and has its own ‘fungal stalker’ in turn) (Barford, 2013; Harmon, 2012).
species (another invented concept), why not extend this conception to a wider environment? After all, ‘assemblages have material dimensions or components (e.g., spaces, objects, technologies, bodies), and expressive ones (e.g., identities, signs, affects, desires).’ (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, p. 6).

The framework of Western biology and its concepts of function, structure, and performance are believed to order and constrain abilities located in or derived from the human body. Acceptance of what are assumed to be invariant and fundamental givens within the biological paradigm has created a cultural blindness, which can be the source of errors in [social scientific] analyses. (Manning & Fabrega, 1973, p. 256)

The Western biomedical model of health and more specifically mental health is straightjacketed by the very terms of its existence. If we were to challenge (through deconstruction and (re)construction) those assumptions, what riches may emerge?

**Scene three: Inorganic life**

In her description of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of inorganic life, Leslie Dema (2007) states, ‘It is not so much that organisms are not alive, but that life can be articulated in all things.’ (para. 1).

This streaming, spiralling, zigzagging, snaking, feverish line of variation liberates a power of life that human beings had rectified and organisms had confined, and which matter now expresses as the trait, flow or impulse traversing it. If everything is alive, it is not because everything is organic or organized, but, on the contrary, because the organism is a diversion of life. In short the life in question is inorganic, germinal, and intensive, a powerful life without organs, a body that is all the more alive for having no organs, everything that passes between organisms. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 550)
This chimes with Gregory Bateson’s (2000) example in *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*, where ‘the eco-mental system called Lake Erie is a part of your wider eco-mental system’ (p. 492). This conception of a mind extended in the environment has also been apparent for many animistic societies for *countless* years, obvious in Joseph Masty’s (an elder of the Whapmagoostui Cree Nation in northern Quebec) statement that ‘if the land is not healthy, how can we be’ (Adelson, 2000, p. 3). This animistic, relational notion of *environ(mental) health* (Mcphie, 2014a) was conveyed to Naomi Adelson (2000) by Masty as he highlighted that, ‘health and, more specifically, health ideals are rooted in cultural norms and values that permeate and define – *yet extend beyond* – the state of the physical body’ (p. 9, emphasis added) and that health ‘is political’ as it ‘takes on a particular, and particularly charged, meaning when understood within its historical, cultural, and social context’ (p. 9).

Indeed, among the Whapmagoostui Cree the concept of health – *miyupimaatisiwin* – ultimately transcends the individual, and as part of the realm of ‘being Cree’ is linked to a larger strategy of cultural assertion and resistance in a dynamic balancing of power between the state, the disenfranchised group, and the individual. (Adelson, 2000, p. 9)

This extension of health beyond the state of the physical body doesn’t just incorporate other *organisms* (if we were to follow Kohn’s (2013) *biocentric* rationale in his ‘anthropology beyond the human’), it also incorporates any relational material process at any time, including the *concept* of Liverpool ONE. This fully material inclusion into the *mind, agency or mental* health is properly *ecocentric* (unlike the deep ecology and *biocentrism* of Arne Naess, for example). Perhaps a better way of verbalising this idea of an extended agency or mind would be to accept that the physical body *itself* is the thing that is extended into the environment (or that the environment is extended into the *self*).

Kathleen Wilson’s (2003) study of Anishinabek (a first nations collective of Ojibwa and Odawa people living in Northern Ontario) found that the immanent philosophies of animist peoples can redirect our current perspectives in health and place research:
Geographic research has shaped our understandings of the ways in which places, monuments, and landscape features imbue identity at national, regional and local levels. Gillis (1994) draws a link between social memory, monuments and the development of national identities. Places are argued to shape identity or as Gesler states (1991, p. 8) “places influence personal identity” (emphasis added). As such, there is a sense that identity and place are separable from one another. However, […] the relationship Anishinabek have with the land cannot be captured by the simplified notion of being ‘close to nature’. The land is not just seen as shaping or influencing identity, but being an actual part of it. (Wilson, 2003, p. 88)

Thus, the category mistake/invented concept of nature being something we may ‘be close to’ or can ‘re-connect to’ is made obvious but also emphasises a crucial way forward for mental health psychology/geography.

Bateson describes *totemism* as humans in society taking metaphoric clues from the ‘natural’ world around them to apply them to the society in which they live, empathising with nature ‘as a guide for his own social organisation and his own theories of his own psychology’ (Bateson, 2000, p. 492). This view shares similarities with deep ecology, ecopsychology and ecotherapy literature (i.e. Aldo Leopold’s *thinking ‘like’ a mountain*). He goes on to describe *animism* as the ‘next step’ historically as it reversed this totemic process to ‘take clues from himself and apply these to the natural world around him […] extending the notion of personality or mind to mountains, rivers, forests, and such things’ (Bateson, 2000, p. 492). Thus, we think ‘with’ the mountain (or the mountain thinks ‘with’ us). This view is sympathetic to a flatter, more immanent ecology/ontology, such as Miranda Green’s (1997) description of the Celtic *Taranis*, who was not the god of thunder but *was* thunder itself, thus marking the difference between immanent and transcendent thought (Mephie, 2015b; Mephie & Clarke, 2015). Bateson’s liking for animism then is in sharp contrast to his description of the ‘next step’ historically as Occidentalists separated ‘the notion of mind from the natural world’ which led to ‘the notion of gods’ (Bateson, 2000, p. 493). The fundamental error in this, Bateson argues, is that ‘when you separate mind from the structure in which it is immanent, such as human relationship, the human society, or the ecosystem […] in the end [it] will surely hurt you’ (Bateson, 2000, p. 493).
Mind is a necessary, an inevitable function of the appropriate complexity, wherever that complexity occurs. But that complexity occurs in a great many other places besides the inside of my head and yours […] a redwood forest or a coral reef with its aggregate of organisms interlocking in their relationships has the necessary general structure. The energy for the responses of every organism is supplied from its metabolism, and the total system acts self-correctively in various ways. A human society is like this with closed loops of causation. Every human organization shows both the self-corrective characteristic and has the potentiality for runaway. (Bateson, 2000, pp. 490-491)

Seen in this way, the metropolis of Liverpool ONE is a mental/physical ecosystem and if ‘it’ is mentally/physically ill then so are we who participate and intertwine with it, some more than others (depending on the amount of consumer capital one has been afforded). Yet, eventually, we all consume and are consumed by physical space, as we are it.

I wonder whether the kind of knowledge that a theoretical account of the metropolis would produce - knowledge that would surely be shaped by our complex metabolic relations to nature to an extent not appreciated by Lefebvre - might take the name of ecology? I do not of course refer here to the semi-dismal bourgeois form of ecology, but rather the aesthetically re-conceived ecology proposed by Bateson. (Goodbun, n.d., p. 44)

Bateson ‘considered that ecosystems had to be considered to be communicating and informational systems, and even as mental systems, as minds, not just as material and energetic systems’ and ‘emphasised that to properly understand ecosystems, we need to find ways to think ecologically, recognising ourselves as a part of the system being observed or interacted with.’ (Goodbun, n.d., p. 41). If we convert or translate what we know of ‘natural’ ecosystems, such as forests, to the human made environment (which I contend is also ‘natural’) and convert the relational processes to the realms of agency and the mind, a sort of extended agency, how might it look?

**OCD, CCTV, GBT, CSAS, SS, VIP: Steps to a mental ecology of privatised space**
Mature ecosystems (e.g. Appalachian forests) display high organisation (i.e. minimal entropy) because they are more diverse than immature ecosystems. They have more species and more niches are filled, and they are able to capture more matter and slow down energy dissipation. (Pepper, 1984, p.p. 103-104)

Liverpool ONE is an extremely immature ecosystem and as such dissipates energy quickly, poorly and inefficiently. I don’t simply mean this because it is an urban environment lacking flora and fauna as I believe many urban environments are very diverse (not simply ‘bio’-diverse) and many (mono-cultural) rural environments are homogenised. It is the spatial dimensions of the capitalist agenda of Liverpool ONE specifically that sets about subduing and subjugating the mind to a form of mass hypnosis that I refer. This giant open air shopping mall fits the description Marc Augé (2009) would label as a ‘non-place’, along with supermarkets, airport lounges, hotels, motorways or even the endless topological space of a computer. Many of Augé’s ‘non-places’ could even be described as ‘an air-conditioned purgatory where there’s nothing to do except shop’ (Rose, 2015, para. 4). Indeed, the Ojibwa leader Winona LaDuke (2014) described herself as such a hyper-consumer before learning how to farm (after advice from her father) with the comment, ‘We’re all really smart and we shop but we don’t know how to do anything’ (emphasis added). The homogenisation and mono-cultural practice of Liverpool ONE’s space assemblages (concrete-glass-docile consumer-symmetrical tree-CCTV camera-shawn grass-logos) displays a maximal entropy due to its poor intra-relational capacities for energy efficiency. Capitalism, far from creating a healthy difference out of competitiveness, seems to create a homogenous difference and sterility as an ultimate (yet entirely ‘natural’) distortion of ecological space. Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) seems to have enveloped Liverpool ONE, partly co-produced through a specific (Western) practice of privatisation. ‘People with OCD may also be preoccupied with order and symmetry’ (National Institute of Mental Health, n.d., para. 4). As a collective, highly organised mass of consumers, concrete, trees in concrete, glass, plastic, metal, one inch grass and CCTV cameras, Liverpool ONE is certainly preoccupied with an aesthetics of order, neatness, symmetry and cleanliness. The trees and posts appear evenly distanced from one another, ordered in symmetrical lines in relation to the vertical and horizontal lines of the architecture.
(of the buildings and spaces between the buildings). Numeracy is the mediating signifier that predicates the appearance of perfect spatial homogeneity. The grass is cut to promote little resistance for walkers and is of a certain colour green that has been historically conceived (and promoted) as visibly pleasing and picturesque. There is no mud, mess, weeds, scruffiness, anarchic buddleia (unlike the backstreets we encountered outside of Liverpool ONE), out-of-place people, untidy litter, cracks in the pavement, free-floating plastic bags and the grass and concrete know exactly where they are supposed to be…separate from one another (Annotated Polaroids 6-11).

![Annotated Polaroids 6-11: ‘Clean and Safe’ Liverpool ONE. (Photos by Jamie)](image)

Even moss and lichen are not allowed to blemish the polished stone. It’s clean and safe…and so are our thoughts. Aesthetically, this space is what Deleuze may have called ‘striated’.

**POPS**

Of course this behaviour is not solely restricted to Liverpool ONE. In the UK, a growing trend of Privately Owned Public Spaces (‘POPS’) means that ‘the rights of the citizens using them are severely hemmed in’ (Garrett, 2015, n.p.). Bradley Garrett continues, ‘[a]lthough this issue might be academic while we’re eating our lunch on a private park bench, the consequences of multiplying and expanding Pops affects everything from our personal psyche to our ability to protest.’ (2015, n.p.). In POPS we may even be conned into a form of self-policing, one in which we become the principle
of our own subjection (Foucault, 1995, p. 203) as it ‘may make you wary and cause you to confine your behaviour to a narrow range so as to avoid confrontation.’ (Garrett, 2015, n.p.).

‘When space is controlled, and especially when the public is unclear about what the legal or acceptable boundaries of activity are, we tend to police ourselves, to monitor our behaviour and to limit our interactions, especially after embarrassing confrontations with security. (Garrett, 2015, n.p.)

Originally conceived by the actress Joanna Lumley, the Garden Bridge Trust (GBT) in London has proposed the development of a £175,000,000 green space that will stretch along the Thames consisting of 270 trees and thousands of plants to be enjoyed by consumers visiting that area (Walker, 2015). The project will be funded by £40,000,000 of public money (£30,000,000 given by George Osborne from Treasury funds and £10,000,000 from Transport for London (TfL)) even though the GBT ‘hoped to “maximise the opportunity provided by the status of the bridge as private land” by imposing rules to “establish expectations for behaviour and conduct”’. (Walker, 2015, p. 5). The GBT have proposed a set of thirty rules that include the prohibition of ‘any exercise other than jogging, playing a musical instrument, taking part in a “gathering of any kind”, giving a speech or address, scattering ashes, releasing a balloon or flying a kite.’ (Walker, 2015, p. 5). Walker (2015, p. 5) reports that as well as the placement of ‘enhanced’ CCTV cameras to capture anyone not obeying the rules, visitors ‘will be tracked by their mobile phone signals’ and the rules will be enforced by ‘visitor hosts’ who will be given powers under the government’s Community Safety Accreditation Scheme (CSAS) to impose fixed penalties, take personal details of transgressors and seize and dispose of any property that is deemed anti-social in relation to this park (such as kites, balloons or musical instruments). ‘Bag searches or “wand” scans of people’s clothes could be used but only, for example, if a VIP were visiting the bridge.’ (Walker, 2015, p. 5). Under the CSAS, ‘police can grant powers to civilians involved in crowd control’ (Walker, 2015, p. 5) in order to prevent demonstrations or protests and keep the garden neat, quiet and tidy, a sort of garden protective echelon (in German this would be called ‘schutzstaffel’ or SS for short). Liberal Democrat Caroline Pidgeon ‘said she feared the bridge was following “a worrying trend of the privatisation of public places'}
where the rights of private owners trump those of ordinary people’. (Walker, 2015, p. 5).

On a Channel 4 news programme, psychogeographer Will Self (2016) asked the developers of POPS to widen their aesthetic lenses rather than monetise the spaces. As seen in the OCD of Liverpool ONE, this weeded, essentialised and reduced form of nature (a more ‘picturesque’ and controlled version of ‘Nature 1’ in (Intra-)Act 4) is a rather limited and limiting perspective of the world, one which aids and abets the capitalist production of subjectivity by co-creating a desire inherent in the consumer spectacle itself (from the architecture of the buildings to the construction of the elite aesthetic derived from the Enlightenment production of Euclidean space). These supposedly picturesque aesthetised spaces are being afforded the same protective powers as certain people. But the people are always already caught up in the spaces themselves. We are of the integrated ecological co-emergence of these physical realisations (Liverpool ONE, the new King’s Cross development at Granary Square, Garden Bridge and so on) born out of capitalist conceptions (privatised spaces for public consumption). As such, capitalism also produces a particular type of subjectivity.

The production of subjectivity

Apart from the visual ecological aesthetics that capitalist economics produce, there is a ‘ubiquity of entrepreneurial subjectivation’ that attempts to ‘transform every individual into a business’:

The autonomy, initiative, and subjective commitment demanded of each of us constitute new norms of employability and, therefore, strictly speaking, a heteronomy. At the same time, the injunction imposed on the individual to act, take the initiative, and undertake risks has led to widespread depression, a maladie du siècle, the refusal to accept homogenization, and, finally, the impoverishment of existence brought on by the individual “success” of the entrepreneurial model. (Lazzarato, 2014, p. 9)

The capitalist production of subjectivity leads many of us to believe we act alone and are individually responsible for our compulsions but as Jane Bennett reminds us, ‘the locus of political responsibility is a human-nonhuman assemblage’ (2010, p. 36) which
‘presents individuals as simply incapable of bearing full responsibility for their effects’ (p. 37) and so ‘the ethical responsibility of an individual human now resides in one’s response to the assemblage in which one finds oneself participating’ (p. 37). The fashion, in the West, is to think of OCD as an individual psychological dis-order that is reserved solely for the right of humans to suffer. In order to ‘fix’ it, we must look to the idea of the autonomous genetic and/or socially constructed individual, not the collective concept of a city centre that is the production of capitalist economics built upon a palimpsest of historicised ethico-onto-epistemological (rhizomatic) growth. But if we think with assemblages and extended mind theory, for example, the Liverpool ONE assemblage does have the capacity to have OCD and it comes at a price. OCD is often ‘accompanied by severe distress, high levels of disability, and disruption of the person’s social and occupational functioning (Crino et al., 2005 and Veale & Roberts, 2014)’ and has ‘been linked with more severe and persistent OCD symptoms, more incapacitating feelings of hopelessness and/or helplessness, and the experience of suicidal thoughts and behaviors (Angst et al., 2004, Levy et al., 2013, Marcks et al., 2011, Torres et al., 2013 and Veale and Roberts, 2014).’ (cited in Angelakisa, Goodingb, Tarrierc & Panagiotia, 2015, p. 2). These behaviours are now becoming ever more evident in a world of mass suicide and Hikikomori48 (Berardi, 2015). So then does a clean and safe capitalism lead to depression or suicide? Feelings of ‘hopelessness and/or helplessness’ may certainly arise if the right to protest is confiscated. ‘Vagrants and beggars’ don’t even have the right to shit anymore if they are ‘eliminated’ and eradicated for fear of smudging the shiny new (eco) furniture and so suicidal thoughts may become commonplace.

Cleanliness and sanitisation, taken in this sense, tend to reduce differentiations of diversity (‘bio’ and ‘cultural’). Volcanic action and desertification also tend to do this, sometimes resulting in mass extinctions. The physical realms of mental health and wellbeing are not of a different nature to this. They are not of some mystical non-physical, other earthly space hauntingly residing in the pineal gland within a human brain. Nor are they solely skin-bound within the confines of a subjective individual, either genetically or mentally. The physical processes that enable a relatively healthy mental state are bound to the intra-relational capacities and affordances of (ecological)

48 Hikikomori is a growing trend in Japan that involves a social withdrawal from modern society into the rooms of the isolated individuals who often retreat there for months or even years without coming out.
concepts such as capitalism and privatisation. In his re-reading of Lefebvre’s *Right to the City*, David Harvey points out:

The city has to be viewed as a metabolic and ecological system in its own right and therefore as a vibrant and increasingly dominant part of the natural world we inhabit. While there is, in my view, nothing unnatural about New York City, the qualities of the urban environments we create are a major concern and those qualities are not confined to what humans need but also to preserving the whole life-system upon which we ultimately depend. (cited in Goodbun, n.d., p. 44)

**Scene four: The depression of Liverpool ONE**

So, the (inorganic) organism that is a city or a rural space (another ‘natural’ anthropocentrically managed/co-produced environment) or whatever/wherever we draw our boundaries around, may become mentally ill depending on its territorialising intensions. Extend this boundary even wider and we can see an illness on a much larger scale, that of the sixth mass extinction. We have now entered the mental assemblage of the ‘Capitalocene’ (Moore, 2014).

Bateson argued that it was necessary to transform not just ecological knowledge, but the very basis of science in general, with an aesthetic dimension, a recognition that ecological patterns are minds, and that this was the only way to grasp the interconnectedness of environmental entities and relations. (Goodbun, n.d., p. 44)

In order to explore how a mental disorder of a clean and safe capitalism may lead to suicidal impetus, I’d like to return to the quote from the start of this assemblage: ‘Like modern capitalism, evolution is a process of creative destruction.’ (Ellison, 2013, p. 19). The creative destruction of Liverpool city centre may well afford opportunities for change, thereby opening up new growth for some people to flourish (one of the tenets of capitalism) but we also have to examine the ‘type’ of creative destruction and (re)construction as it is not necessarily always productive for the ‘long-term’ or for the minoritarian. There’s a certain heterogeneity in (re)construction born out of cycles of
destruction yet initial *rapid growth* of this kind doesn’t always imply creativity and diversity for long term sustainability, especially regarding the mental health of many of the (invented conceptual) organisms that attempt to dwell within that newly developed space (buddleia, vagrants, buskers, nay-sayers). In this way, capitalism is a form of anthropogenic eutrophication.

After the algal blooms of branded retail outlets flourish in Liverpool ONE, we see overly competitive behaviours, eventually leading to hyper-consumer hypoxia. This leads to OCD and all the problems that develop from the addictive run-off. After homogenisation and blandification, the environment becomes worn out and the buddleia move in to start a different process of creative destruction and (re)construction, one that may be slightly more supportive of diversity (but not *simply* because it is ‘natural’ or ‘organic’). Although capitalism is indeed a natural process, it acts similarly to mass volcanic action in that it is highly unsustainable (for short term organic existence) and ultimately (and arguably) may bring/has brought about another mass extinction. On the way to this extinction, the mental health of assemblages of organisms, biomes, places, spaces, countries and ecosystems may well/have become severely jeopardised. Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi (2015) has already begun to explore the modern (post 1977) effects of capitalism on mental health:

Suicide is no longer a marginal phenomenon of isolated psychopathology, but is becoming a major agent of the political history of our time, and also the marker of an anthropological shift that planetary culture is unable to elaborate. Suicide offers, in my view, a crucial perspective on the history of the present. (p. 158).

The rapid colonisation of capitalist space (and clock time) doesn’t seem to allow *enough* time for evolutionary adaptation and so (once vibrant) places (and therefore mental health) begin to wilt, homogenise and transform into ‘non-places’ (Augé, 2009). Consciousness may be too slow to keep up with processing information from a ‘world in acceleration (info-technology multiplied by semi-capitalist exploitation)’ as ‘we are unable to translate the world into a cosmos, mental order, syntony and sympathy.’ (Barardi, 2015, p. 221). The monoculture and OCD of Liverpool ONE will undoubtedly lead to its eutrophication and depression (including many of the multiplicities that make up its temporal co-productions).
Throughout this PhD process, my own understanding of mental ill-health has changed a few times but my present understanding is that it is a physical process that extends beyond the modernised (and medicalised) conception of the human biome to/from (one move) the wider topological environment. Therefore, it makes complete sense to me that a certain area can become mentally ill, through homogenisation, privatisation, hierarchies of power and control, etc. (as exampled with Americanised shopping malls like Liverpool ONE or elitist dystopian gardens like London’s ‘Garden Bridge’). However, these environments are not mentally ill to those haecceities who/that fit snugly in to these environments, such as desulfitobacterium to certain types of pollution or propertied classes, docile bodies and hyper-consumers to Liverpool ONE. For example, if you have a certain amount of consumer capital (unlike ‘vagrants and beggars’), retail therapy may indeed have a beneficial influence on your mental health, wellbeing and happiness, at least in the short term. Yet again, it’s temporal, relational and contextual. ‘There is no question that the context and parameters of health shift with time and place.’ (Adelson, 2000, p. 9).

But I don’t want to focus too much on interpretations or finding conclusions to this last line of inquiry as if there were some inarguable truth to be found in the data. Other than my bringing to the reader’s attention some of the obvious ethical issues that have co-emerged from this particular assemblage creation by ruminating (rather than finding conclusions), I’m also interested in what’s omitted and what’s created and produced from the omissions being omitted! Martin and Kamberelis, (2013, pp. 670-671) encourage us to ask, what are ‘the dominant discursive and material forces at play…’? What are the ‘…forces that have been elided, marginalized or ignored altogether…’? What are the ‘…forces that might have the power to transform or reconfigure reality in various ways…’?

The assemblage that is Liverpool ONE, is never the same as it ever was. A better description would be Liverpool ONEing as it always becomes something different with every reading/viewing/conceiving! Therefore, in Assemblage TWO (Mcphie, in press), I veer away from the topic in this assemblage as staying on topic is impossible, because the assemblage is not a topic, totality or essence (DeLanda, 2006). It is a network of shifting, infinite relations among heterogeneous components. One cannot ‘stay on’ something that shifts and changes – becomes – as its very definition, or determine in
advance what ‘staying on topic’ means. Second, this imperative to stay on

topic is also unnecessary because privileging stasis over movement or
isolated objects over networks does not have to be the way that inquiry
proceeds, despite being the norm. Finally, ‘staying on topic’ is undesirable
within a Deleuzian frame because it stops thought, or presupposes what can
happen by requiring the process to behave like a topic, at all: something that
we, together, can ‘stay on’ where ‘staying on’ is established by attending
only to language in use. (Airton, 2014, p. 83)
‘In the participatory universe, to be a full member of it, you must participate fully; the more fully the better. We are sitting at the feast of life. Its name is participation.’ (Skolimowski, 1994, p. 157).

(Intra-)Act 4 tracks historicised ontological and epistemological changes in the perceptions and conceptions of human-environment relations regarding how these changes have influenced perceptions and conceptions of mental health and wellbeing.

Scene one: ‘We're all really smart and we shop but we don't know how to do anything.’ (LaDuke, 2014, emphasis added)

Although not about climate change and mass extinction specifically, these potentially catastrophic concepts are implicated in the nature of this PhD due to the novel approach I take by suggesting that mental health is distributed in the environment and not bound within the confines of a human skull. The planet’s health is ultimately our health and as such we may need to displace our current understanding of human-environment relations. And as this act/story needs to start somewhere, what better place to begin, regarding a mental account of the earth, than ‘the Anthropocene’.49

A Problem

There seems to be ‘a problem’. The world is being driven insane. Something has happened in the last 263 years that has led geoscientists to call this era of the planet’s

49 ‘The Anthropocene’ was originally labelled by Paul Crutzen. Although I realise the obvious anthropocentricity issue in the name of this concept, I agree with Morton (2014) when he states, ‘Anthropocene ends the concept nature: a stable, nonhuman background to (human) history. Should this not be welcome for scholars rightly wary of setting artificial boundaries around history’s reach? (p. 1). However, I also disagree with Morton’s (2014) insistence that the sixth mass extinction event is ‘caused by humans—not jellyfish, not dolphins, not coral’ (p. 2) in that humans are not a transcendent or biologically bounded entity (or ‘object’ as he might now put it) distinct from the intra-actions of other life processes. This would lead to a ‘fetishisation of difference that tends to erase other differences’ (Colebrook, 2014, seminar). In this sense, the term Anthropocene may herald problematic performative consequences but for the purposes of this scene, I will use it under erasure.
physical history, the age of Humans (Steffen, Crutzen, & McNeill, 2007, cited in Clarke & Mcphie, 2014). The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007, 2013) suggest that the effect of humanity over this time period has been significant (Clarke & Mcphie, 2014, p. 212). The ability for the Earth to self-regulate in a way that supports many/most biological species is now under threat…again. According to the Living Planet Report 2014 and the Living Blue Planet report 2015, population sizes of vertebrate species have dropped by half since 1970 (WWF, 2014; WWF, 2015), in the time that I have been alive. ‘We need 1.5 Earths to regenerate the natural resources we currently use; we cut trees faster than they mature, harvest more fish than oceans replenish, and emit more carbon into the atmosphere than forests and oceans can absorb.’ (WWF, 2014, para. 3). This has led many academics to adopt a change of name for the current geological period in Earth’s history:

We no longer live in the Holocene […] but in the Anthropocene. Chemical, physical and biological changes are dramatic and sometimes frankly alarming: atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations are now at levels last seen more than two million years ago and rising fast; invasive species have been introduced to every continent and a sixth great mass extinction event may be with us in mere centuries; landscapes are transformed. (Zalasiewics, 2013, p. 9, emphasis added)

Landscapes have transformed rapidly since the industrial revolution, along with the biosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere and troposphere (if you want to label them this way). Yet the industrial revolution wasn’t a predetermined or sporadic evolutionary event. It was born out of ideas and conceptual apparatus that had been layering over time like a palimpsest (see Mcphie, 2015b, pp. 224-225).

At an Under Western Skies conference that I attended in Calgary, Canada in 2014, keynote speaker and First Nations spokeswoman Winona LaDuke stated, ‘We're all really smart and we shop but we don't know how to do anything.’\(^\text{50}\) She was referring to the ‘enlightened’ Western consumer culture and capitalist production of subjectivity

\(^\text{50}\) As a result of her father scolding her for her lack of practical experience growing food from the earth, Winona LaDuke tended the land as a farmer for a substantial period of time until she truly understood how to ‘do’ something that gave her a more embodied and embedded tacit understanding of ecological relatedness (LaDuke, 2014).
that is becoming increasingly reliant on homogenised monoculture practices (agricultural and epistemological). Bruno Latour (1993) suggests that this Western worldview accelerated in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall:

The liberal West can hardly contain itself for joy. It has won the Cold War. But the triumph is short-lived. [...] The repressed returns, and with a vengeance: the multitudes that were supposed to be saved from death fall back into poverty by the hundreds of millions; nature, over which we were supposed to gain absolute mastery, dominates us in an equally global fashion, and threatens us all. It is a strange dialectic that turns the slave into man’s owner and master, and that suddenly informs us that we have invented ecocides as well as large-scale famine. (p. 8)

This homogenised way of thinking that eco-theorists have been so critical of since the nineteen seventies has become an increasingly dominant paradigm, spreading outwards from Europe to cover all parts of the globe. It affects thinking which in turn affects behaviour (as thinking is a physical ecological process). Fritjof Capra (1996) has previously described this problem as a ‘crisis of perception’. ‘Within this view, fragmentation and instrumental rationality are prioritized over other modes of participating in the world, directly resulting in anthropogenic environmental catastrophe’ (Abram, 1996, 2011; Bohm, 1980; Capra, 1996; Hamilton, 2002; Harding, 2009; Ingold, 2011; Merchant, 1994; Orr, 1992, 2004; Plumwood, 2002; Sterling, 2004; cited in Clarke & Mcphie, 2014, p. 201). ‘Anthropogenic environmental catastrophe’, put another way, is simply catastrophe. If we take an immanent view of the world, environment is everything and humans (including mental health and wellbeing) are of that everything and so cannot be divorced from any physical processes/environmental changes that are occurring at present. This also problematises the very possibility of an idea such as an Anthropocene due to its evident anthropocentric dissociate.

Ecocidal\textsuperscript{51} immanence

\textsuperscript{51} Ecocide is ‘the extensive destruction, damage to or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether by human agency or by other causes, to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants of that territory has been severely diminished.’ (Higgins, 2010, p. 63)
In their address to the *Critical Climate Change* series of books, editors Cohen and Colebrook (2014) posit:

The possibility of extinction has always been a latent figure in textual production and archives; but the current sense of depletion, decay, mutation and exhaustion calls for new modes of address, new styles of publishing and authoring, and new formats and speeds of distribution. As the pressures and realignments of this re-arrangement occur, so must the critical languages and conceptual templates, political premises and definitions of ‘life.’ There is a particular need to publish in timely fashion experimental monographs that redefine the boundaries of disciplinary fields, rhetorical invasions, the interface of conceptual and scientific languages, and geomorphic and geopolitical interventions. Critical Climate Change is oriented, in this general manner, toward the epistemo-political mutations that correspond to the temporalities of terrestrial mutation. (n.p., emphasis added)

What Cohen and Colebrook are asking for is nothing less than an ‘ethico-onto-epistemological’ overhaul, one that acknowledges human’s role in terrestrial mutation yet with the adage that what we might think of as human is problematic in the first place. This terrestrial mutation, then, is not the same as an anthropocene. The human is not so easily identifiable, as we shall see. If we are to ‘redefine the boundaries of disciplinary fields’ (as I will attempt to highlight with my ‘transcranial’ (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) and ‘trans-corporeal’ (Alaimo, 2010) notion of environ(mental) health) and include an ethics of immanence in our deliberations, we must explore how phenomena are intra-related (an ecological investigation). For

---

52 ‘Onto-ethico-epistemology in its hyphenated sense captures something important about new materialism, and that is that what is in the world (ontology), what we know what is in the world (epistemology) cannot be separated as two separate things that do not affect one another (van der Tuin 166). That is, things emerge in the world and they are both shaped by what we know and material simultaneously, and even more we cannot think of them as separate. Finally, for both van der Tuin and Barad, embedded within this concept is that everything that emerges is embedded in politics, and while there is no inherent way of being ethical, there are choices that people make in specific special temporal consequences by which they had a role to play and should take partial responsibility.’ (van der Tuin & Dolphijn, n. d., para. 1).
example, Empson (2014) observes, ‘[t]he existence of classes within human society has had profound impacts upon our ecological relationships as well as our responses to changing environmental circumstances’ (p. 40, cited in Mcphie, 2014a, para. 11). Or perhaps it’s the other way round, or a mutual co-existence of both. Regardless of directions, it is becoming ever more obvious that ecocide is a bedfellow of inequity.

The perfect symmetry between the dismantling of the wall of shame and the end of limitless Nature is invisible only to the rich Western democracies. The various manifestations of socialism destroyed both their peoples and their ecosystems, whereas the powers of the North and the West have been able to save their peoples and some of their countrysides by destroying the rest of the world and reducing its peoples to abject poverty. […] The West thinks it is the sole possessor of the clever trick that will allow it to keep on winning indefinitely, whereas it has perhaps already lost everything. (Latour, 1993, p. 9)

We are implicated and imbricated in a process of ecocide. If ecocide is on the current agenda within this terrestrial mutation, it is almost certainly under the rubric of mental health and wellbeing, for ‘if the land is not healthy then how can we be?’ (Mr Joseph Masty, Sr, cited in Adelson, 2000, p. 3). Or put another way, if we are not healthy, how can the land be? Ecocide, therefore, is a mental health issue that involves the wider mental human-environment assemblage, a kind of ecocidal immanence. But if this is the case, where should we begin our exploration of this wider mental health issue? Polly Higgins (2010) explains:

Ecocide is like the virulent Japanese Knotweed – it spreads out of control, sucking the life out of all that comes in its way, strangling the life out of the very air we breathe. To stop it, it has to be eliminated literally at its roots. (p. xi)

So, is the crisis of perception the root we might explore? In Vital Signs: Psychological Responses to Ecological Crisis (Rust & Totton, 2012), the 23 authors focus on humanity’s ‘psychological predicament’, believing it to be distinct from humanity’s ‘physical predicament’ and attempt to find ‘the answers’. Many of the authors purport
to reject Cartesian dualisms, anthropocentricity or positivist positions and yet they themselves fall into the positivist/Cartesian trap by the very words they use. The title of the book is also suggestive of this problem (i.e. a physical unidirectional cause with a non-physical yet linear effect). Anthropocentric anxiety about a changing climate (eco-anxiety) is perhaps more complex and non-linear than is suggested in much psychology literature. The idea that climate change, as a thing happening ‘out there’, may be affecting our psyche, as a thing happening ‘in here’ (our heads), seems rather unidirectional, deterministic and dualistic in its approach. Rather than focusing on climate change per se as some separate phenomena that may negatively affect a human psyche bound within a skull, maybe a redefinition of mental health and wellbeing is needed, one that merges conceptual boundaries and regards ‘the climate’ as of a wider mental assemblage so that mental health and wellbeing become an ecological or even geological discipline, for example.

As Naomi Oreskes and Eric Conway (2014) have argued, one of the contributing factors in the ongoing failure to act on climate change has been a conception of science as an isolated activity not bound up with systems of political action and social dynamics. What is required, Latour argues, is a sense of ourselves as earthbound – not as observers of matter, but as oriented towards matters of concern in which our own being depends upon a world (a specific world, not an open universe). (Colebrook, n.d. pp. 1-2, emphasis added)

According to Colebrook (n.d.), Latour seems to be suggesting a conceptual paradigm shift from observation to participation is needed. Although often mistranslated into spiritually holistic principles, James Lovelock’s ‘Gaia theory’ (1972, 1979, 1988, 2006) goes someway to tackle this issue, as for him, ‘planet Earth is understood as a self-sustaining whole, each aspect working in a manner (without forethought or intention) that maintains the continuity of Gaia’ (Clarke & Mcphie, 2014, p. 200) and humans are just another part of that wider ecological process.

It seems that our perceptions, conceptions and affections may be well worth unpacking if we are to attempt to map the spread mind in environ(mental) health. But in order to unpack mental ill-health or environmental degradation, we must first begin to understand why we (in the West) have come to separate these two concepts in the
first place. For example, why would we believe mental ill-health to be of a different nature to environmental ill-health? If it is as simple as a category mistake, what might this mistake ‘do’ (as well as the categorising itself)?

**The ghost in the machine**

The ‘ghost in the machine’ was coined by Gilbert Ryle in his 1949 book ‘The Concept of Mind’, which refers to Rene Descartes’ mind-body dualism. Descartes believed that our pineal gland, in our brains, held our mind (or immortal soul); a non-material, non-physical, non-spatial entity separate from our ‘body’ (which he believed to be spatial but not conscious). (Mcphee, 2015b, p. 227)

Out of this Cartesian dualism sprang the rejuvenated Greek and Latin concepts ‘psyche’, ‘mind’ and ‘mental’ as they seemed to imply a non-physical realm (spirit or soul) that gave agency to a physical human body (rather like a ghost operating a machine). These concepts took root within the head and even now are related to the brain, within the confines of the (human) skull. Type in the words ‘psychology’, ‘mind’ or ‘mental’ to any computer search engine and you’ll receive thousands of pictures of brains. So, mental health has become associated with human brains (or more likely the other way around). Now, on the same computer search engine, type in the word ‘environment’. Deciduous green trees (in the summer); green grass shawn by sheep (or lawnmowers); and undulating, aesthetically framed landscapes are the dominant pictures that appear. Simply adding the word ‘health’ on to environmental or mental doesn’t really change the pictures much. One concept is to do with human brains and the other is to do with romanticised and idealised framing of the world. Both are to do with framing subjective identities (at different scales). Within the conceptual framework of the modern Western paradigm there are inherent separations of mind-brain-body-environment.

In a Guardian newspaper review of the British scientist Stephen Emmot’s book *Ten Billion*, John Gray warned that ‘The planet does not care about the stories that humans tell themselves; it responds to what humans do, and is changing irreversibly as a result’ (2013, p. 6, cited in Zylinska, 2014, p.11). However, there is an over-assertion here when Gray says that the planet does not care about the stories. It does, as is testified to by the many humans (and quite possibly other-than-humans such as bacteria or
volcanoes) who are currently trying to (re)form the dominating story (monoculture) that is subjugating the world to environmental inequity in this supposed Anthropocene period. It cares because we care. And we are of the world. To say otherwise is conceptually separationist, pointillist and ontologically transcendent in nature. Furthermore, Zylinska (2014) contends that ‘stories have a performative nature: they can enact and not just describe things—even if there are of course limits to what they are capable of enacting’ (p. 11). This is a philosophy of immanence. As Donna Haraway (2013) revealed in a Sawyer Seminar at UC Davis, ‘It matters what thoughts think thoughts. It matters what knowledges know knowledges. It matters what relations relate relations. It matters what stories tell stories.’ This is not an anthropocentrically isolated story but rather a multiple narrative of amalgamated events.

What has this to do with mental health and wellbeing as it is currently understood? As previously asserted, a growing number of psychologists (mostly ecopsychologists) believe there is a connection between certain current mental health issues and planetary ill-health (see Rust & Totton, 2012). Throughout the 1970’s psychologists began to explore the importance of ecological-psychological connections as there seemed to be a pattern developing in society that reflected the belief that a psychological disconnection from nature could be hazardous to mental health (Roszak, 1992). Much of this belief is due to a growing body of evidence indicating that anxiety, stress and mental ill-health are becoming more prevalent in modern Western societies, despite the increase in material wealth, life expectancy, GDP, political stability, technology, healthcare and apparent quality of life (WHO, 2001; Halliwell, 2005; Spedding, 2006; Summerfield & Gill, 2005). The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that depression and depression-related illness will become the greatest source of ill-health by 2020 (WHO, 2001; Spedding, 2006). ‘Mental illness is the single largest cause of disability in the United Kingdom’ (WHO 2008, cited in Gilburt, Edwards & Murray, 2014, p. 7) and ‘it is estimated that in any one year, at least one in four people will experience a ‘significant’ mental health problem’ (ONS, 2009; Mental Health Foundation, 2013, cited in Bragg & Atkins, 2016, n.p.) with depression and anxiety disorders being the most common (Gilburt, Edwards & Murray, 2014).

It is important to note here that some mental illnesses are twice as common in deprived areas than non-deprived areas (People’s Inquiry into London’s NHS 2014, cited in Gilburt, Edwards & Murray, 2014, p. 7) as this inequity may have profound
consequences for how many people perceive and conceive of certain environments and selves due to the intra-related nature of various associations. There also seems to be a political discrepancy between support for mental ill-health compared to what is commonly perceived of as physical ill-health as well as minority communities compared to majority communities. The King’s Fund found that in London:

it is estimated that only a quarter of people with depression or anxiety are receiving treatment, compared with the vast majority of those with physical conditions such as diabetes and hypertension (Centre for Economic Performance Mental Health Group 2012). Furthermore, many people have to request psychological therapies rather than being offered them, and after being assessed, as many as 10 per cent are not offered any treatment (Mind 2013). The Mind survey also identified limited access to choice of therapy and poor rates of access for particular at-risk groups such as people from black and minority ethnic (BME) communities, older people and children. (Gilburt, Edwards & Murray, 2014, p. 18).

Regardless of these inequitable differences in treatment, there still seems to be some debate over the cause of many modern mental health conditions.

A symptom of planetary ill-health?

We want the world, which is complex, dynamic and plural to fit the pre-defined scripts we have in our heads for interpreting reality. We firmly believe we can think our way out of the problems that our thinking itself has created. No wonder there is so much anxiety, depression and conflict if our thinking has severed our sense of connection with the world, in its attempt to over-determine it. (de Oliveira Andreotti, 2016, p. 82)

It has been suggested that this decline in mental health is due to a number of factors including: environmental degradation; sedentary and indoor lifestyles; greater social exclusion; a lack of collective agreement on fundamental moral principles; the move from rural to urban landscapes; an increase in negative comparisons in lifestyles; and a breakdown in modern Westernised social structures (CDC, 1996; DCMS, 2002; DoH,
2004; Pretty, Peacock, Sellens & Griffin, 2005; Layard, 2005). Gass, Gillis and Russell (2012) believe that ‘our growing separation from the natural world in which people have evolved can cause a variety of psychological symptoms that include depression, anxiety and stress’ (p. 95, emphasis added). Yet again we see the influence of enlightenment rationality combined with genetic romanticism embedded in the conceptual apparatus used to describe the issues (separation and natural world – Cartesian duality; cause – Newtonian linearity; people have evolved – genetic romanticism). Partly due to many of these (Cartesian) deep ecological beliefs regarding separation (as opposed to de Oliveira Andreotti’s (2016) ‘sense of connection’), many people suffering from mental ill-health now prefer alternative, non-drug based forms of therapy. ‘With the prescription of anti-depressants at record levels and a huge demand for Cognitive Behaviour Therapy and other psychological therapies, health and social care commissioners are examining and commissioning different options for cost effective services for mental health’ (Bragg & Atkins, 2016, n.p.).

**Alternative ‘outdoor’ treatments**

Alternatives to medication and psychotherapy, such as exercise and outdoor therapies (including ‘green’ exercise programmes such as, ‘walking for health’ or ‘green gyms’), became more common by the end of the last century, particularly in treating clinical depression (Bandoroff, 2003; Russell & Farnum, 2004; Pryor, Carpenter & Townsend, 2005; Halliwell, 2005), following the view in medicine that ‘nature’, as well as physical health is essential to mental wellbeing (Ulrich & Parsons, 1992; Warner, 1987; Greenway, 1995). Gass, Gillis and Russell (2012) state that ‘[b]y spending time in the natural world and reconnecting with its processes, people are in essence also reconnecting to themselves and each other’ (p. 95). The current assumptions about the restorative benefits of nature by many outdoor therapy practitioners and participants seem to be consistent with this established ‘belief’. Many researchers began to explore the empirical basis behind that belief in the 1970's, 1980's and 1990's (Russell & Farnum, 2004) continuing up to the present day. Natural England recently produced a review of nature-based interventions for mental health care (NECR204) due to the ‘increasing recognition of the importance of nature and place as a determinant of individuals’ mental health’ and posit that ‘[t]hese nature-based interventions (also called
green care and ecotherapy) could be part of a new solution for mental health care’ (Bragg & Atkins, 2016, n.p.).

The evidence base for this rapidly growing trend is now oft cited and meta-studies, reviews and reports are published every year with increasing fervency for Randomised Controlled Trials (RCT’s), yet more meta-analyses and obsessive green (or blue) nature compulsions. For example, there has been a great deal of research on a variety of mental health benefits that may be gained from viewing (or being in) green spaces in ‘urban environments’, ‘countryside’ and ‘wilderness’ (Moore, 1981; Balling & Falk, 1982; Ulrich, 1984; West, 1985; Verderber, 1986; Ulrich & Simons, 1986; Orians, 1986; Hartig, Mang & Evans, 1991; de Vries, Verheij, Groenewegen & Spreeuwenberg, 2003; Grahn & Stigsdotter, 2003; Russell & Farnum, 2004; Pretty, Hine & Peacock, 2006; Pretty, Peacock, Sellens & Griffin, 2005; Pretty et al., 2007). For a rather impressive continuation of this list by Natural England see Bragg and Atkins (2016, pp. 10-11).

It is important to note here that their definition of ‘natural settings’ are: ‘from the open countryside, fields and forests, remote wilderness, parks and open spaces, to street trees, urban greenspaces, allotments and gardens.’ (Bragg & Atkins, 2016, p. 10). I scrutinised most of the studies that Bragg and Atkins cite in their work for Natural England (and many more) during the first few years of my PhD and found that all of them confine what they think of as ‘nature’ to a very narrow, romantically idealised conception. Over the next few scenes, I will argue that this perception (that I started this PhD journey with), is a naïve and potentially catastrophic interpretation of nature and the world. Although not at first obvious to the uncritical eye (it took me six years of study to (re)cognise this inherent contradictory dualism), these definitions are problematic in that they unwittingly support oppressive regimes that have potentially dire consequences for certain environments (including the people of those environments). This romanticised perception taken from a humanist paradigm doesn’t seem to be able to climb out of the Cartesian trap. The very idea of ‘humanity’s relationship to nature’ is an epistemology inscribed in transcendent ontology. We are always already of nature, therefore we simply cannot have a relationship to nature. This is not merely semantics as words—concepts—are performative. For example, if there is a generalised assumption that nature is essential to mental wellbeing, then what does this mean for those who do not have various forms of access (e.g. economic, geographical, social, epistemological, etc.) to these particular versions of nature (such
as a heavily romanticised ‘green’ nature)? Also, if there is an assumption that the concept nature is a ‘real thing’, and that thing is green rolling hills, deciduous forests, sublime mountainous terrain, Disneyfied tweety birds or even ‘wild’ dangerous felines (another romanticised ‘red in tooth and claw’ perspective), etc., what does this conception produce? These are the topics for the next scenes.

Scene two: The Healing Power of Nature(s)

A far back as Hippocrates, the belief that (some version of) ‘nature’ cures (rather than the physician, assuming the physician to be ‘other’ than nature) has influenced various health interventions of Western culture. Public baths, bathing in healing rivers and Egyptian, Persian and Chinese urban gardens have long, cultural traditions (Hongxun, 1982; Shepard, 1967; Ulrich, 1993). In Europe, from the 12th Century onwards, the belief that visual contact with plants and other biota have psychologically beneficial health effects, have influenced the provision of gardens for patients in healthcare institutions (Ulrich & Parsons, 1992; Warner, 1987). In other Western societies, these beliefs have provided part of the justification for influencing urban parks, architecture and other so called ‘natural spaces’ in cities (Parsons, 1991; Ulrich, 1993).

Before the 1800’s, a ‘Friends Hospital’ opened in Philadelphia, USA, where part of the treatment was based on the idea that the ‘natural environment’ is healing for the mentally ill (Davis-Berman & Berman, 1994).

Peaking after the 1800’s, the English romantics, such as Wordsworth and Coleridge, encouraged a socially desirable view of the English countryside, suggesting that a walk through these landscapes could achieve a sense of spiritual awareness or renewal.

One of the earliest outdoor based interventions of the modern era, in 1901, was ‘tent therapy’ which began on the hospital grounds of Manhattan State Hospital East, USA, as an intervention to stop TB from spreading from patient to patient (Davis-Berman & Berman, 1994). Eventually, the patients residing in the tents seemed to recover at a faster rate than the patients left in their hospital beds indoors. This was one of the first evidence based studies that favoured the outdoors as a place of healing and is oft cited as proof of the healing effects of ‘nature’ and the ‘outdoors’, yet the reasons for this faster rate of recovery were/are unclear.
In the Peak District National Park, the Monsal Head Viaduct opened in 1863 to widespread criticism from those (including John Ruskin) who felt it destroyed the beauty of the Wye valley but is now listed as a site of architectural and historical interest within a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI)! During the inter-war period, many within the middle classes believed that mountains and moorland specifically was better for people than other kinds of countryside (Clark, Darrall, Grove-White, Macnaghten & Urry, 1994). These examples invoke the question, ‘are these perceptions, and therefore healing responses, malleable’?

The death of nature

There still lingers a popular idea that truth can be extracted from a world separate from ourselves if we follow a set of instructions, ones that Patti Lather and Elizabeth St. Pierre (2013, p. 631) remind us ‘we made up’! For example, by reducing the variables in data collection we (pre)suppose that we can see a truth more clearly, as it really is without all the messy nature stuff around it. In other words, we must carve nature at its joints, a Platonic tradition that still holds strong in Western ontological traditions, such as, ‘the notion of nature as merely the inert scenery against which the humanist adventures of culture are played out’ (MacLure, 2013, p. 659). In relation to the theme of this paper (environ(mental) health), much environmental psychology/ecopsychology research that supports genetic and innate notions of the healing power of ‘nature’ does just this and has become increasingly popular since the nineteen-eighties.

The healing power of ‘nature’ now appears dominant in a range of interdisciplinary fields including, ecopsychology (Greenway, 1995; Kahn & Hasbach, 2012; Roszak, 1992), environmental psychology (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1982, 1989), evolutionary psychology (Wilson, 1984), therapeutic landscapes (Gesler, 1992, 2005; Gesler & Kearns, 2002), health geography (Curtis, 2010), architecture (Kellert & Calabrese, 2015), nature therapy (Burns, 1998), ecotherapy (Buzzell & Chalquist, 2009; Clinebell, 1996; Jordan, 2014; Jordan & Hinds, 2016), adventure therapy (Bandoroff & Newes, 2004; Gass, Gillis & Russell, 2012; Norton, Carpenter & Pryor, 2015), wilderness therapy (Davis-Berman & Berman, 1994), and horticultural therapy (Simson & Straus, 1998). Several researchers (Bacon, 1983; Gibson, 1979; Greenway, 1995; Johnson & Frederickson, 2000; Kimball, 1983) even go as far as to say that it is ‘nature’
that is the dominant therapeutic component in outdoor interventions, such as adventure therapy, and the leader/councillor does nothing more than ‘supplement’ its healing power (Gass, Gillis & Russell, 2012).

One of the most commonly cited studies undertaken on the health benefits of nature is Roger Ulrich’s (1984) ‘View Through a Window May Influence Recovery from Surgery’, in which 23 surgical patients who were assigned to rooms with windows that over-looked a ‘scene of nature’ had shorter postoperative hospital stays, received fewer negative evaluative comments in nurses’ notes, and took fewer potent analgesics than 23 matched patients in similar rooms with windows facing a brick wall. One of the reasons for its popularity is its publication in the famous journal, ‘Science’ and has been cited over 3000 times. However, Helman’s (2001) ‘Context Effects’ (referring to ‘unconscious’ beliefs as well as conscious ones) and more specifically his ‘macrocontext’, suggest that the ‘script’ of a person’s perception of, for example, the hospital ward or nature garden, is derived from culture itself and tells them how to behave, how to experience the event and what to expect from it which, in turn, helps validate the healer/practitioner and their methods of healing (Helman, 2001; Vallance, 2006). Also, when attending a little more closely to what a ‘scene of nature’ actually is, it becomes evident that both of these invented Occidental concepts are highly problematic in numerous ways (explored more thoroughly in (Intra-)Act 4, scene three).

More recent examples of evidence for nature based outdoor therapies are supported by colourful therapeutic concepts such as, ‘green gyms’ (Pretty, Peacock, Sellens & Griffin, 2005) or ‘blue gyms’ (White et al., 2010) to find the ‘best dose of nature’ to improve mental health (Barton & Pretty, 2010). These green and blue gym research examples (Transfers 8 and 9) purport to measure various positive effects of ‘nature’ on our mental and physical health (note the Cartesian divide) by showing ‘virtual representations’ (such as photographs or ‘sounds of the sea’ played through a speaker) of ‘nature’, whilst on a treadmill in an indoor gym (comprehensively reviewed by Curtis, 2010, pp. 35-63).
I respect the commendable ethical intentions for this type of research but I have noticed various problematic assumptions embedded within it that seem typical of how many of us in the West see the world. These range from the fallacy of measuring it by chopping it into variables and data and then transporting/transferring these disembodied parts into a more static, workable environment...a laboratory-gym (which is also nature...to think otherwise must be anthropocentric, dualistic and essentialist) to subjective Westernised romantic conceptions of an objective ‘nature’ (evident in recently popularised notions such as, ‘get out into nature’ or ‘re-connect to nature’). There now exists a ‘Connectedness to Nature Scale’ (CNS) (Mayer & Frantz, 2004), a ‘Nature Relatedness Scale’ and a ‘Connectivity to Nature Scale’ (Selhub & Logan,
2012, p. 228) for researchers to objectively measure both wellbeing and nature in order to disseminate the results at academic conferences such as, ‘Nature Connections…an interdisciplinary conference to examine routes to nature connectedness’ (Nature Connections, 2015).

Although I have critiqued these problematic concepts (Clarke & Mcphie, 2014, 2015; Mcphie, 2012, 2013, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b; Mcphie & Clarke, 2015) it is also worth mentioning that the types of colourful inquiry that support these romanticized conceptions (i.e. green and blue gym research) are still very useful in many ways. For example, they can reveal a great many conceptions of the world such as, a method to show how to evidence the placebic healing effects of a two-dimensional picture that may be perceived as a romanticized Western idyllic landscape. In other words, rather than re-presenting the effects/experiences of these outdoor environments, this type of research could suggest that a ‘picture’ of a person’s ‘perception’ of what they ‘think’ ‘nature’ is, may have an influence on their mental health and wellbeing, indicating that the perception itself (including conceptions and beliefs) may be enough to trigger a positive response, rather like an embodied placebo response (Mcphie, 2012, 2015a). If this were so, it would have powerful implications regarding the potential healing power of concepts themselves (such as a romanticized version of ‘nature’) rather than objectified percepts of empirical materials.

Psychological conceptions of a romanticized objective nature evident in environmental psychology, evolutionary psychology and ecopsychology have in turn led to alternative outdoor therapies such as, ecotherapy, wilderness therapy, adventure therapy, horticultural therapy, green therapy and nature therapy. Whilst I acknowledge that each of these psychologies/therapies may have proven beneficial for many people since their invention, surely we could also explore what stories are omitted or narratives repressed by their very existence as a matter of ethical responsibility. For example, what does the creation of new power relations that have emerged and been generated from these psychological concepts do (socially, environmentally, materially, politically, conceptually, affectively, etc.)? Also, we could look to their underpinning theoretical conceptual origins in order to highlight any possible assumptions. For example, these conceptions are partly founded on innate, genetic assumptions about a generalized fundamental human preference for certain romanticized landscapes over others, evident in theories such as, Ulrich’s (1979, 1983, 1991) ‘Psycho-Evolutionary Stress Reduction Theory’; Kellert and Wilson’s (1993) ‘Biophilia Hypothesis’; Kaplan and Kaplan’s
(1982, 1989) ‘Attention Restoration Theory’ (ART); Orians’ (1980, 1986) ‘Savannah Hypothesis’; and Appleton’s (1975) ‘Prospect-Refuge Theory’ (themselves descendants and palimpsests of post Socratic Greek conceptions of the healing power of ‘nature’). However, if we examine these genetic theories more closely it becomes apparent that there is no evidence of any specific genes identified that would evidence their inventor’s claims making many of their assertions highly improbable.

The death of Biophilia

Biophilia combines two Greek words, *life* and *love*, to form the literal translation of ‘the love of life’. Edward Wilson (1984, p.1) defined Biophilia as the ‘innate tendency to focus on life and life-like processes.’ He proclaims a genetically based human dependence on nature that developed throughout evolution and a partly genetic basis for humans’ positive responsiveness to ‘nature’, particularly to Earth’s living biota (Wilson, 1984). Kahn (1997) reviewed several critiques of the Biophilia Hypothesis purporting that:

there are severe limitations to an interpretation which relies on such deterministic socio-biology, since people are not entirely driven by genetically encoded, primitive instincts, but also influenced by their own lifetime experiences and environment and by contemporary social influences of their social group. (cited in Curtis, 2010, pp. 39-40).

There has been some supposed evidence for the genetic heritage of ‘biophobia’ in the form of arachnophobia and Ophidiophobia when compared with handguns and frayed electrical wire (Cook, Hodes & Lang, 1986; Hugdahl & Karker, 1981; Ulrich, 1993) or biologically prepared learning through repeated exposure to slides of fear-relevant, fear-irrelevant or neutral stimuli (Ohman, 1979; Ohman, Eriksson & Olofsson, 1975; Ohman, Dimberg & Ost, 1985). Both Wilson (1984) and Ulrich (1993) argue that such evidence of biophobia promotes the proof of the existence of biophilia. However, inadvertently, many of these studies support a very different hypothesis; that we learn our biophobias from each other rather than genetically inherit them. For example, many studies have shown that merely observing another person’s fearful or aversive reaction to a thing or receiving information regarding the possibility of an aversive consequence
is enough to trigger a biophobic response (Cook & Mineka, 1989, 1990; Hugdahl, 1978; Hygge & Ohman, 1978; Mineka, Davidson, Cook & Keir, 1984; Ulrich, 1993). Also, Koole and van den Berg (2005) showed how many people have biophobic reactions to (conceptually) ‘natural’ landscapes, associating ‘wilderness’ with death, for example.

Orians’ (1980; 1986) savannah theory states that the first humans lived in the African savannah where they evolved and developed an innate attraction to savannah-like trees and landscape in general. However, many paleoanthropologists now believe that these earlier humans were not optimally adapted to any environment in particular (Chamberlain, 2000) and as such would not necessarily have developed a genetic aesthetics for any one singular environment.

As always, there are philosophical, social, political and ethical issues related to these reductionist accounts of life. There are also more erudite explorations of some unquestioned assumptions evident within these theories’ paradigmatic underpinnings, such as important discussions around the polyvalent concept of ‘nature’ within ecotheory (comprehensively examined by Braidotti, 2013; Cohen, 2013; de Vega, n.d.; Iovino & Oppermann, 2014; Morton, 2007, 2010; and Zizek, 2008, for example).

The death of psychology

The Anglo-American phenomenon, evolutionary psychology, ‘claims to explain all aspects of human behaviour, and thence culture and society, on the basis of universal features of human nature that found their final evolutionary form during the infancy of our species some 100-600,000 years ago’ (Rose & Rose, 2001, p. 1). Evolutionary psychologists describe this fixed state as the ‘architecture of the mind’ (Rose & Rose, 2001, p. 1) which includes ‘everything from children’s alleged dislike of spinach to our supposed universal preferences for scenery featuring grassland and water’ that has derived ‘from this mythic human origin in the African savannah’ (ibid. p. 2) and a few of these claims even go as far as to ‘legitimise men’s ‘philandering’ and women’s ‘coyness’’ (ibid. p. 2). Of course, there is always the argument with any concept that it is not the gun that kills someone even though the gun is imbricated in the co-production of events. Rose and Rose (2001) counter the evolutionary psychological claims that, ‘living organisms must be understood not as reducible to their genes but as following a lifeline trajectory, simultaneously product and process, being and becoming’ (p. 12).
Environmental psychology, the psychology behind the green and blue gym studies (and subsequently the charity Mind’s claims), follows a similar path to the evolutionary claims. Kaplan and Kaplan’s (1982, 1989) ‘Attention Restoration Theory’ (ART) is a key hypothesis that supports many restorative claims (such as Louv’s (2006) Nature Deficit Disorder). Yet, Joye and van den Berg (2011) found ‘that neither current empirical evidence nor conceptual arguments provide any strong support for the hypothesis of restorative responses to nature as an ancient evolved adaptive trait’ (p. 261). Milligan and Bingley (2007) also found that whilst some participants found woodland restorative, others felt fearful or even repelled by it.

Even ecopsychology and its pragmatic partner ecotherapy, although allegedly bio/ecocentrically focused, still fall into a genetic and Cartesian trap. Ecopsychology partly takes its theoretical underpinning from the genetic theories evident in evolutionary and environmental psychologies and partly from the ontological claims of Arne Naess’s (1973) ‘deep ecology’ that we must re-connect to nature. I would agree with the claim that the ‘psyche’ when considered in isolation from the environment is indeed a major problem within traditional psychology. However, following the rhetoric of deep ecology (and therefore, ecopsychology and ecotherapy), to believe there is a natural environment that is transcendent and separate from an unnatural environment (or to believe that an unnatural environment even exists), is a romanticized, Cartesian and anthropocentric assumption.

In The Posthuman, Rosi Braidotti (2013) uses the case of Arne Naess’s deep ecology (which proposes ‘a return to holism and to the notion of the whole earth as a single, sacred organism’), in order to explain that although ‘[t]his holistic approach is rich in perspectives’, it is ‘also quite problematic for a vitalist, materialist posthuman thinker’ as it is ‘based on a social constructivist dualistic method’ (p. 84). She suggests that ‘its technophobic aspect is not particularly helpful […] considering the world we are living in’ as well as paradoxically reinstating ‘the very categorical divide between the natural and the manufactured which it is attempting to overcome’ (Braidotti, 2013, p. 85).

The problem with this position is that, in flagrant contradiction with its explicitly stated aims, it promotes full-scale humanization of the environment. This strikes me as a regressive move, reminiscent of the sentimentality of the Romantic phases of European culture. I concur therefore with Val Plumwood’s (1993, 2003) assessment that deep ecology
misreads the earth-cosmos nexus and merely expands the structures of possessive egoism and self-interests to include non-human agents. (Braidotti, 2013, p. 85).

Various conceptions of ecotherapy (such as the promotion of a healthy re-connection to an idealized nature) may also actively promote social and cultural inequity in certain contexts (perhaps a case of the gun not being the main culprit) if performed as a white, middle-class Euro/Amero-centric hegemonic concept, that partly arose through the romantic era in Europe. For example, a romantically conceived nature, rather like the term wilderness, may indeed be healthy for a privileged few but certainly not all, especially if your social capital is inhibited or if you happen to be a persecuted culture that has been forcibly removed from your home environment to support a national park meant for all and yet sold as, ‘untrammelled by man’ for a privileged aesthetic and semi-spiritual benefit (see Callicott, 2000 for an in-depth discussion of wilderness as an androcentric, colonial, racist and genocidal concept). It is highly contextual. It is also highly political and, as previously mentioned, if not kept under close scrutiny may become culturally bias, dualistic, essentialist and quite possibly promote social inequity for some through socio-cultural and epistemological inaccessibility (not unlike academe).

Similar to humanist/modernist conceptions of mental health and wellbeing, these environmental/ecological approaches to psychotherapeutic design typically view health as a ‘natural fact’ of a ‘normal’ body (Mol, 2002) which is ‘largely treated as a product of social, biological and individual factors’ and is ‘presented as the inevitable outcome of a propitious environment, supportive public policy or a favourable genetic endowment’ (Duff, 2014, p. 5).

The death of place

---

53 This point is becoming increasingly evident within my own research (Mcphie, 2014b) where I am finding that the conception of a green nature as beneficial to mental health is highly contextual and dependant on many complex phenomena, one of them being ‘social capital’ (see Bourdieu, 1986).
54 This conception of mental health is problematic for a number of reasons and is discussed further in (Intra-)Act 4, Scene four.
There are a number of alternatives to the environmental/ecological approaches to psychotherapeutic design from the world of health geography that explore how and why ‘social and physical environments’ impact on a person’s psychological wellbeing including, *Topophilia* (Tuan, 1990), *Therapeutic Landscapes* (Gesler, 1992, 2005; Gesler & Kearns, 2002) and various conceptions in/of *Space, Place and Mental Health* (Curtis, 2010). For example, Gesler’s (1993, p. 171) therapeutic landscapes are places with ‘an enduring reputation for achieving physical, mental, and spiritual healing’ and merge cultural geography, sense of place and symbolic landscapes, in order to research the symbolic systems within ‘locations of healing’. These various conceptions of mental wellbeing in relation to our environments add a richness to our understanding of how the environment may influence our own mental health, especially when understood in terms of relational complexity (see Cummins, Curtis, Diez-Roux & Macintyre, 2007 for a review) with an ‘increasing emphasis on exploring the interactions between individual people and the context in which they live their lives’ (Curtis, 2010, p. 11).

However, from my own reading and reviewing of these geographical inquiries, it seems that most of them still take much of their theoretical underpinning from the same genetic, innate sources as evolutionary and environmental psychology (mostly from Wilson, Ulrich and the Kaplans) as well as/or relying on generalised anthropocentric symbolic mental representations and meaning making to explain a variety of outcomes (Mcphie, 2015a).

For many of these reported therapeutic encounters, notions of place might characteristically provide a backdrop, yet the ‘specific restorative qualities of enabling places are typically neglected in favour of the analysis of “healing experiences” (Gesler, 2005), “place preferences” (Korpela, Klemettila & Hietanen, 2002) or “meaning and value” (Williams, 1998)” (Duff, 2011, p. 151).

Most of these endeavours mentioned smart of anthropocentric interpretosis and take serious the invention of psychology as somehow separate from a physical world, a world other than merely human.

In the absence of coherent theoretical accounts of the characteristic features of enabling places, much less the means of their production, existing approaches risk reifying the therapeutic effects of ‘natural’ environments without properly attending to the potentially enabling qualities of built environments. (Duff, 2011, p. 151)
Alternatively, instead of reifying the traditional healing spaces of clinical settings, following Lefebvre’s work, Law (2009) explored how a mental health group preferred a ‘transgressive landscape of counterculture and deviance, of vagrants, graffiti artists and a host of skateboarders’ (p. 1828), to promote recovery by reclaiming these spaces rather than the ‘misjudged aesthetic of comfort’ of traditional therapeutic landscapes that seem to further alienate the injured (p. 1832).

Maybe Law is right, and we should invest more research into exploring alternative spaces that would allow people to develop both an active position and their own understanding of place. Perhaps then, these people will be better able to regain control of their lives in order to build up a different and hopefully healthier position. (von Peter, 2013, p. 324)

How these spaces are conceived and perceived is perhaps, then, of paramount importance if we are to reconnoitre whether reclamations of space into place is even possible for many people. Or perhaps we need an epistemological shift ‘from places to paths’ (Clarke & Mcphie, 2015), in order to exemplify a process-(intra)-relational world becoming rather than an illusory space or static place of being.

**Intermède: Mechanos**

‘Theos’ and ‘Mechanos’ were terms used by Henryk Skolimowski (1994) to describe the last two stages out of four (the first two being ‘Mythos’ and ‘Logos’) of the history of the Western mind. Theos describes the period of Christianity that emerged from the Dark Ages and Mechanos describes the scientific revolution and later enlightenment that eventually led to treating the universe as an objective clockwork mechanism to be measured to find ‘truth’. (Mcphie, 2015b, p. 226)

In this next scene I shall illuminate how this Enlightenment ontology, Mechanos, has dominated the architecture of the Western mind and furthered the conceptual entrenchment of becoming observers of our own participation of the world. I will attempt to expose the conceptual paradigm shift that took place during the early stages
of this period and explore what that shift has done to the performance of discourse and behaviour akin to our current understanding of human-environment relations. I believe this is important to uncover how our current indulgence of a mental health trapped in an independent, subjective self (the quiddity of the human form), dominates our understanding and treatment of ‘patients’ and ‘environments’ as separate entities, something akin to Alfred North Whitehead’s (1919) notion of the bifurcation of nature.

Reading recent literature from what have been called the ontological, affective, empirical and material turns (Clough, 2007; Coole & Frost, 2010; Ivakhiv, 2013; St. Pierre, 2014), it is clear that concepts (as stories), such as ethics, aesthetics, nature, culture, environment, psyche, mental health, etc. are performative and therefore must be duly considered for issues of mental health and wellbeing, especially (re)search into mental health and wellbeing. Foucault (1972) knew this well:

> discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to the language (langue) and to speech. It is this “more” that we must reveal and describe. (p. 54)

Donna Haraway (2004, p. 70) suggests that it is more important to map where the effects of difference appear rather than where differences appear. Concepts perform in all sorts of ways with varying intensities, rhythms and forces, depending on their wielder or (perhaps more accurately) co-animator/co-producer. It is the effects of these co-

55 According to Bruno Latour (2002), Whitehead’s bifurcation of nature is ‘the strange and fully modernist divide between primary and secondary qualities’ (p. 2), ‘what happens whenever we think the world is divided into two sets of things’ (p. 3).

56 In How To Do Things with Words, Austin objected to ‘the logical positivists’ focus on the verifiability of statements’ and so ‘introduced the performative as a new category of utterance that has no truth value since it does not describe the world, but acts upon it—a way of “doing things with words.”’ (Hall, 2000, p. 184). For example, Butler’s (1990) notion of ‘performativity’ attends to the capacity of communication and speech to perform and even define identity as there is no prediscursive identity. ‘[E]ven our understanding of biological sex is discursively produced. This perspective puts more weight on the speech event itself, requiring us to examine how speakers manipulate ideologies of feminine and masculine speech in the ongoing production of gendered selves.’ (Hall, 2000, p. 186).
produced concepts that perform to reveal a *shared* agency rather than a concept in itself, as that can *do* nothing without a partner (or assemblage). But rather than just following the post-linguistic turn’s *human* relations alone (i.e. Foucault and Butler’s work), what is also needed is a ‘posthumanist performative account of the material-discursive practices of mattering (including those that get labelled “scientific” and those that get labelled “social”’) (Barad, 2007, p. 146), as

for both Butler and Foucault, agency belongs only to the human domain, and neither address the nature of technoscientific practices and their profoundly productive effects on human bodies, as well as the ways in which these practices are deeply implicated in what constitutes the human, and more generally the workings of power. (pp. 145-146).

And it is important where we draw our lines. Plato suggested we *carve nature at its joints* but Gregory Bateson (2000) warns that by doing so, we may miss or lose important information. The same is true of (supposed) representational phenomena that attempt to define concepts by labelling and then bounding them in disciplinary concrete, such as *words*:

> Indeed, there is a host of material-discursive forces— including ones that get labeled “social,” “cultural,” “psychic,” “economic,” “natural,” “physical,” “biological,” “geopolitical,” and “geological”—that may be important to particular (entangled) processes of materialization. If we follow disciplinary habits of tracing disciplinary-defined causes through to the corresponding disciplinary-defined effects, we will miss all the crucial intra-actions among these forces that fly in the face of any specific set of disciplinary concerns. (Barad, 2003, p. 810)

In other words, ‘‘[t]hings matter’ and theory never is a purely epistemological undertaking. Which cuts are made, to speak with Barad, will make a difference – and necessarily so because these cuts constitute (‘are’) the very plane from-with which everything emerges.’ (Thiele, 2014, p. 204). For example, psychological concepts, such as anxiety, stress, depression and mental ill-health in Western societies are usually attributed to humans (and more specifically to human brains) and at a push, certain
animals. Yet mental ill-health is evident in humans and the environment if viewed through a particular lens, one that doesn’t choose to isolate mental from physical processes or culture from nature (or humans from environments for that matter). This is an immanent lens (rather than a holistic one). But before attempting to explore these concepts more thoroughly throughout this PhD, it is perhaps prudent to first unpack current (Western) onto-epistemological perceptions of environmental concepts (scene three) and mental health and wellbeing (scene four), before the move to process-relational paradigms (scene five), as I believe these concepts are key to considering how mental health and wellbeing are distributed in the environment and have recently become more evident in much of the literature on this topic, from ecopsychology to therapeutic landscapes.

Scene three uncovers some of the most commonly used definitions, descriptions and deconstructions of historicized topographical concepts in order to expose some of the more relevant aspects of how we perceive and conceive ‘the environment’ and our potential therapeutic attachments to it. This is especially relevant for how we in the West have come to view and frame the world in a particular way, one that erects borders around everything including mental health and wellbeing. For once we expose and deconstruct these assumptions, we may then begin a process of creative production from the mosaic that is left behind.

As ‘the environment’ is a crucial concept to understanding how mental health and wellbeing is distributed, it is fundamental to first explore what we mean when we say (or think) ‘environment’ for ‘once we begin to be suspicious of the everyday language we take for granted – “our mother tongue” or our “language with a history” (Spivak, 1993, p. 69) – the world becomes shaky indeed’ (St. Pierre, 1997, p. 175).

**Scene three: The Aesthetics of a Teletubby Landscape: A Short History of a Romantic Gaze**

The title of this scene was born out of reasoning during research I conducted between the periods of June to July, 2012, that explored how volunteers experienced and interpreted specific outdoor environments (urban parks) within two restorative outdoor health intervention groups (see Mcphie, 2015a). In this research, there were some especially interesting comments regarding all the participants’ aesthetic perceptions of ‘wild’ nature, ‘managed’ nature and the ‘right sort’ of nature when I
interviewed them. In fact, one participant went as far as to suggest that the shape of a particular part of the landscape was ‘a bit like Teletubbies’, meaning it seemed a little too manicured. In fact, one of the reasons that the participants from one initiative took me to their ‘nature trail’ was due to their belief that it was slightly ‘more natural’ than much of the rest of the place, including the Teletubbies area. One such comment came from the Green Man (self-chosen pseudonym) saying that they “try to keep part of it natural for this nature walk, you know, so it’s not too manicured” (Mcphie, 2015a, p. 564).

It is also topological and metaphorical: topological, because of the relational value it bears on the historisized, aesthetized and highly politicized (to name a few) cultural hegemony of the white upper-middle classes and how it’s filtered through the media; metaphorical, because the Teletubby landscape is the idea of paradise found, Eden or if you like, England (or at least a new England).

The aesthetics of this ‘Teletubbies Landscape’ (Transfer 10) is of special significance for a number of reasons. The relation it bears to the themes that emerged from both the study mentioned above and a review of the literature suggest that the perception of nature is heavily influenced by historical and linguistic irrevocability and engaged via embodied associations rather than through genetic or evolutionary influence (as proposed by Edward Wilson, Roger Ulrich and Jay Appleton) and, as Oelschlaeger (1991) reaffirms, not as a product of human cognition in social context (as advocated by Lee (1972), Cosgrove and Daniels (1988)).

Of course this type of landscape propaganda that is sold to children is also similar to other televised notions of idealised places of community living. In 1937 Tolkien described Hobbiton as it is now pictured in the recent film Lord of the Rings (Transfer 11) but these places have not simply been cognitively or magically invented out of a tabula rasa of a subject’s imagination. They have been embodied through both indirect, historically influenced, cultural-natural phenomena and embodied memory and association from direct experience. This type of underground, grass covered housing already exists in the world (Transfer 12) and many authors, composers, artists and poets had envisioned this type of undulating landscape throughout history and physical manifestations of it can be seen in such idealised and highly managed/produced settings as the Lake District (Transfer 13) or parts of New Zealand (Transfer 14).
Transfer 10: Teletubbies Landscape (Teletubbies Wiki, 2016\textsuperscript{57})

Transfer 11: The Shire (Darkchylde, 2016\textsuperscript{58})

Transfer 12: Suomenlinna, Finland (WikiNed, 2014\textsuperscript{59})

\textsuperscript{57} Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA).
\textsuperscript{58} Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA).
\textsuperscript{59} Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA).
Of course these green landscapes were initially produced by grazing animals but have since become associated with an assortment of notions ranging from fertile farming resource to picturesque or romantic scenery, most of which are viewed favourably (at least by white, middle class Westerners). It may also be used as a medical resource for outdoor therapy practices, although a more romantically conceived wild landscape is often preferred.

The Teletubby landscape appeal is exemplified in William Blake’s poem *Milton* (1804), later appropriated in 1916 into a popular song *Jerusalem* by Sir Hubert Parry to rally British troops (although briefly adopted by the suffragette movement), now sold as the unofficial national anthem for England (Cox, 2012). Referring to an ancient legend that Jesus once walked England’s ‘green and pleasant land’, Blake wrote:

---

60 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA).
61 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA).
And did those feet in ancient time/Walk upon England's mountains green?/And was the holy Lamb of God/On England's pleasant pastures seen? […] I will not cease from mental fight,/Nor shall my sword sleep in my hand./Till we have built Jerusalem/In England's green and pleasant land.
(cited in Cox, 2012, n.p.).

Of course there would be an issue of biodiverse sustainability if Jerusalem really were built in England, just as there is a problem in Australia, America, Africa, etc., places where England’s green and pleasant land was (re)built in place of the native environments.

The traditional British countryside is an invented concept designed (not necessarily intentionally) to impose dominant power relations within societal and environmental structures in this country and export it to other countries whilst also instilling a sense of place for those people who would protect it, fight for it and transform other places ‘into’ it (e.g. Australia, America, etc.). Vandana Shiva (1993) put it nicely stating, ‘Emerging from a dominating and colonising culture, modern knowledge systems are themselves colonising’ (p. 2). (Mcphie, 2014b, n.p.)

Hence, this article in the Daily Mail newspaper with the headline, ‘From wartime hell of Afghanistan to rolling green hills of England: Soldier's best friend Treo the […] sniffer dog enjoys peaceful retirement after saving soldiers' lives’ (Reilly, 2012, n.p.). This title is highly suggestive, implanting an idea of Afghanistan as ‘Hell’ compared to a garden of Eden that is England (perhaps an embodied manifestation of Apollonian and Dionysian artistic presentations of landscapes such as, Bosch’s Garden of Earthly Delights and Lorenzetti’s allegory of good government). This is what we are fighting for, all that is good in the world. Hobbiton is England (now transported to New Zealand, a new England) and Mordor is Afghanistan, Iraq or Iran. Of course, there are also implications of race, religion and general cultural biases (including xenophobia) within these concepts. It is not simply a matter of dark versus light (or dark skin versus light skin/Islam versus Christianity), it is also a matter of dark versus green! Of course after the Romantic movement, the Lake District became extremely popular as a tourist destination and influenced a further wilderness ideology that was to prove fatal to
certain indigenous people around the world. This perhaps shows that our cultural landscape perceptions can indeed change over time and provides hope for the political refugees of the enforcement of the Teletubby landscape ideology.

We attach associations to landscapes. Hence, certain urban and rural environments may be perceived as welcoming due to the wealth associated with their aesthetic appeal. For example, a English garden with a freshly mown lawn and a Monkey Puzzle tree in it may seem relaxing compared to a rundown estate with ‘weeds’ in the pavement cracks, supermarket trolleys lying on their sides, broken windows and graffiti tags decorating the buildings. This is not because the Monkey Puzzle tree holds more aesthetic appeal objectively but probably because it sits in the garden of a large and wealthy house as a remnant from the Victorian age of exploration when the upper classes travelled to distant lands (Chile in this case) and brought back exotic flora to adorn their showcase gardens. Sometimes this association to social capital is felt unconsciously and passed on through each generation as a palimpsest of ever bulging embodied memory.

The definitions of the various topographical concepts themselves are worth exploring for they are both a reflection and actant of perceptual and behavioural topographical zeitgeists. In other words, the words themselves are both performative and reflective of the various historical and geographical ontological and epistemological trends. Their conceptual meanings change according to major philosophical shifts and patterns in thought. In turn, their usage alters the perceptions and behaviours of the cultures that act out the new conceptual status of the terms. For example, in 1642 James Howell thought the Alps were ‘uncouth, huge, monstrous Excrescences of Nature, bearing nothing but craggy stones’ (Thompson, 2010, p. 20). ‘In 1657 a dictionary still describes ‘forest’ as ‘awful’, ‘gloomy’, ‘desolate’, ‘inhospitable’ (Lemaire, 1988, p. 62).’ (cited in Egmond, 2007, pp. 15-16). These views changed not long after that time as more picturesque constructions of landscapes began to multiply among the upper/middle classes. Picturesque, sublime and romanticised perceptions were also heavily influenced by the 1681 book A Sacred Theory of the Earth (1681 in Latin, 1684 in English), by Thomas Burnet (MacFarlane, 2003; Nicolson, 1997; Schama, 2004) as it altered perceptions of mountainous terrain from excrescences to agreeable excrescences. Seven years later, John Dennis described the Alps as a ‘Delightful Horrour’ and ‘Terrible Joy’ and by 1705 Joseph Addison described the Alps as an ‘Agreeable kind of Horrour’ (Nicolson, 1997; Schama, 2004; Thompson, 2010). The
book was read by Addison, Dennis, Steele, Wharton, Young, Wordsworth, Coleridge and many others (Nicolson, 1997). A century after Burnet’s book was written, the mountains had transformed once more from agreeable excrescences to a new found sublime birthplace for hegemonic cultural constructs to appropriate. ‘Moreover, the wilderness, in particular the wild forest, became associated for many Romanticists with the experience of God’s Creation and as such turned out to be the centre of spiritual and religious regeneration.’ (Egmond, 2007, p. 16).

Landscape and Scenery

The concept Landscape (literally meaning shape of the land) may signify a ‘visible’ picture or painting that supposedly represents the topography; ‘a picture representing inland scenery’ (Little, Fowler, Coulson & Onion, 1957, p. 1104). Often regarded as a human-made feature of the land, or its organisation, landscape may be defined as ‘the land transformed’ (Dean & Millar, 2005, p. 13) or perhaps merely a pretty backdrop for the purpose of human activities (Brown 1995; Ellison, 2013). Antrop (2013, p. 13) claims that landscape ‘can be described and analyzed using objective scientific methods’, but ‘also refers to subjective observation and experience and thus has a perceptive, aesthetic, artistic and existential meaning (Lowenthal 1975; Cosgrove and Daniels 1988)’. These conceptions of landscape as either objective or subjective are common in the literature and expose its many delineations, including the change of perceptions of landscape from ‘within’ (emic) to ‘without’ (etic):

landscab encompassed a view of people being within [...] But by the 17th century, Dutch painters were referring to landscape as landskip, which represents natural scenery that people view from without (OED 2011).

(Ellison, 2013, p. 7, emphasis added)

According to Denis Cosgrove, the term ‘Landscape’ as a scenic backdrop originated in 15th century Italy (Cosgrove, 1985; Cosgrove & Daniels, 1988). This understanding of the term arose ‘with the invention of new perspectival techniques for representing space and depth on the canvas’ (Wylie, 2007, p. 8), mostly for the purposes of architecture and art but was also heavily influenced by Italian theatre designs and the concept of ‘scenery’.
The term ‘scenery’ is also a product of the Italian Renaissance\(^\text{62}\) and began life as the backdrop to a ‘scene’ in a staged play (the equivalent of this page you are reading right now, whether on a computer screen (pixel scenery) or a tree derivative (paper scenery), that may be styled ‘portrait’ or ‘landscape’). This particular style of theatrical scenery developed from the linear perspectives of Filippo Brunelleschi (1377-1446), Leon Battista Alberti (1404-1472), Pellegrino da San Daniele (1467-1547) and Sebastiano Serlio (1475-1554) who published the highly influential work ‘Architetura’ which detailed a court theatre (Brockett, 1977; Macgowan & Melnitz, 1955; Wild, 2006).

These changes in Occidental perception seem to mark one of the major epistemological and ontological paradigm shifts from immanence to transcendence\(^\text{63}\). It is not merely coincidence that Alberti and Brunelleschi’s linear perspectives preceded the birth of Nicholas Copernicus in 1473, René Descartes in 1596 and Isaac Newton in 1642 to begin what is known as the scientific revolution (and later Enlightenment).

According to Manzotti (2010), the Italian developments in linear perspective led to an illusory perception that an ‘image is all we need to see reality as it really is’ (n.p.). ‘When Alberti and Brunelleschi introduced the technique of perspective implicitly they suggested a theory of perception according to which we do not perceive the world as it is but rather an image of it.’ (Manzotti, 2010, n.p.). This led Kepler (1571-1630) to conclude that there was a ‘retinal internal image’ inside the eye that was projected from an ‘external image of the object getting inside the eye’ (Manzotti, 2010, n.p.). Manzotti (2010) jokes that ‘if, to see a flower, I need an image of that flower, then […] in order to see that image I would need an image of that image of that image of that flower and so on and on ad infinitum’ (n.p.). However, there is no evidence of any images or pictures along the visual perceptual chain, only physical phenomena (Manzotti, 2010),

\(^{62}\) Although according to Antrop (2013), landscape’s meaning as scenery ‘comes with Dutch painting from the seventeenth century, international renown introduced the word into English but with an emphasis on ‘scenery’ instead of territory’ (p. 12).

\(^{63}\) I say ‘one’ due to the evidence of other shifts of this kind (both epistemological and ontological) in European history. For example, one could argue that shifts from immanent to transcendent thought occurred in the agricultural revolution, post-Socratic Greek states, Romano-Christian developments, the Norman invasion of Britain, the scientific revolution and the industrial revolution (Mcpie, 2014a, 2015b). However, there has always been an underlying state of immanent thought within pockets of animist traditions throughout the world as well as within more radical philosophies.
suggesting that we experience life directly rather than any so-called representation of it. For Meinig (1979), ‘Landscape is defined by our vision and interpreted by our minds.’ (p. 2) and yet, as I argue in (Intra-)Act 2, the mind is not for interpretation or representation of any kind as it perceives directly. In other words, landscape is a directly embodied sensory process (influenced by natural-cultural material zeitgeists) and as such implies a physical process of change when we think with it.

So, it seems the perception of landscape has undergone a heavy conceptual change, from participating in the landscape to being an observer of it. From landscape as a sort of partner and way of seeing (Ellison, 2013; Taylor, 2008) to setting detached spectators at a desistance from it (Williams, 1985; Wylie, 2007), the morphogenesis is radical and life changing. It is no less than a change from an immanent perspective to a transcendent one.

Thompson, Howard and Waterton (2013) state that landscape is something which is ‘mental as well as physical, subjective as well as objective.’ (p. 1). Although a shared linguistic understanding is easier for comprehension, what might these deliberate anthropocentric representational binaries produce? ‘Representationalism is so deeply entrenched within Western culture that it has taken on a commonsense appeal. It seems inescapable, if not downright natural. But representationalism (like “nature itself,” not merely our representations of it!) has a history.’ (Barad, 2003, p. 806).

The Romantic Gaze

Urry’s ‘Romantic gaze’ mainly refers to an upper-middle class form of tourist consumption, an elitist, solitary and semi-spiritual appreciation of magnificent ‘natural’ scenery which requires substantial cultural capital (Egmond, 2007; Urry, 1990; Wessendorf, 2004; Wang, 2000), whereas ‘the collective gaze is clearly identified with the working-class tourist.’ (Wessendorf, 2004, p. 86). ‘And this gaze [the tourist gaze]

---

64 ‘A First Nation elder, that I befriended at a conference in Canada […] whispered to me after hearing the anthropologist, Tim Ingold speak. ‘That Ingold fella’, he said, ‘we would give an ‘A’ for anthropology but an ‘F’ for participation; for he is an observer, not a participant’.’ (Mcphie, 2015b, p. 229)
65 ‘[R]epresentationalism is the belief in the ontological distinction between representations and that which they purport to represent; in particular, that which is represented is held to be independent of all practices of representing. That is, there are assumed to be two distinct and independent kinds of entities—representations and entities to be represented.’ (Barad, 2003, p. 804)
is as socially organized and systematized as the gaze of the medic’ (Urry, 1990, p. 1). These gazes are like looking at the world through a *Claude Glass*, a heavily tinted and framed screen that, from a very young age, turns us into conceptual *observers* rather than *participants* of the world. Yet, unlike the Claude Glass of the eighteenth century, it is now embedded in our optic nerve, always already as a lens that we cannot remove (no matter how hard we try).

Haraway (1988) reminds us [of] the vanity of a rational, masculinist objective look that fixes that which is looked at. The portrayal as captured then becomes part of a privileged and legitimate knowledge. For example the ‘natural’ landscape captured in a Claude glass is portrayed as natural, as a picturesque that should be preserved and not used or abused. (Nettleton, 2015, p. 774)

For example, the poet William Wordsworth opposed the train reaching Ambleside in the Lake District (as it had Windermere) to protect its ‘natural beauty’ from the hordes of ‘working classes’! Wordsworth explained that ‘members of the working class would not have the capacity to appreciate the “beauty” and “character of seclusion and retirement” that the Lakes District had to offer.’ (Schwartz, n.d., para. 5). His letter to the Morning Post on December 9, 1844, stated, ‘it can be produced only by a slow and gradual process of culture’ (Wordsworth, cited in Schwartz, n.d., para.7).

So, what we’re talking about is an elite epistemological accessibility to certain landscapes, an accessibility to an elitist construction of knowledge. Hawkins (in Howard, Thompson & Waterton, 2013) explains that the paintings of ‘peaceful rural scenes, such as The Haywain’ by the Romantic artist John Constable, ‘were used to promote a timeless ideal of beauty and social order which belied exploitative labour relations, rural poverty and the political unrest that was sweeping the English countryside at the time they were painted.’ (pp. 3-4). But this Romantic gaze has not simply been confined to England’s green and pleasant land, as mentioned earlier, it has been distributed both topographically and topologically, sometimes under a pseudonym.

**Wilderness**
The World Bank estimates that between 1986 and 1996, about 3 million people were forced to move from forests, tribal land and other areas as a result of both development and conservation schemes (Vidal, 2001, cited in Mcphie, 2014b). This includes national parks, such as Yosemite and Yellowstone in the United States and Tsavo in Kenya. Corry (2011) suggests that such conservation schemes are ‘involved the destruction of the resident indigenous peoples, and the problem is now growing more acute as conservationists press harder for governments to set aside ‘natural’ areas, which in reality have been lived on for generations’ (p. 211).

By defining wilderness areas as human exclusion zones from permanent habitation or culture, then the only way to keep wilderness ‘and’ human culture would be to separate them (Gomez-Pampa & Kaus, 1992; Washington, 2007). Vidal (2001) states that this ‘wilderness concept’ is an elite European/American construction, which separates us from nature and defies evolutionary science. But many peoples do not even have a word for nature and do not see themselves in any way separate from the whole environment in which they live (Vidal, 2001). (Mcphie, 2014b).

Of course we all understand the concept slightly differently depending on our culture, historical affiliations or life experiences. The problems are inherent and become apparent as concepts become enacted into reality. The idea of wilderness, as I have previously discussed (Mcphie & Clarke, 2015), holds connotations of genocide, racism, colonialism, etc. (Callicott, 2000, p. 24). Occidental notions of indigenous peoples as ‘wild’ savages still exists (e.g. the 1963 massacre of the 11th parallel) alongside notions of them as ‘noble’ savages (from the romantic writings of Rousseau). The persecution of many indigenous peoples is still enacted whether the concept ‘wild’ is negatively imbued and embodied within ‘the tribal human’ or positively imbued and embodied within ‘the landscape’.

Nature

Nature is perhaps the most stubborn and problematic concept regarding our perceptions of the world (although Levi Bryant identifies ‘culture’ as the culprit, not nature).
The world of nature, it is often said, is what lies ‘out there’. [...] Application of this logic forces an insistent dualism, between object and subject, the material and the ideal, operational and cognized, ‘etic’ and ‘emic’. (Ingold, 2000, p. 191)

Nature has many faces. It ‘can refer to stable substrata of brute matter’, can signal ‘generativity, fecundity, Isis or Aphrodite’ (Bennett, 2010, p. 117). It is infused with bias and informed by propaganda. It can open doors to health or restrict access to livelihoods depending on a variety of cultural (in)equities.

Opportunities to engage with forests, moorlands and woodlands are constrained by gender and ‘race’ (Travlou 2006, 24) and humans respond differently to them, with pleasure, fear, awe or indifference (Milligan and Bingley 2007). In some cultures, nature is perceived as important and in others as of little significance (Travlou 2006). (Quinn, 2013, p. 740)

We must have an idea of what nature ‘is’ if ecospsychologists, deep ecologists and ecotherapists are to ask people to ‘re-connect’ to ‘it’. So, what is this ‘it’? Macnaghten and Urry (1998) claim that there is no singular ‘nature’, only a diversity of contested natures and each such nature is represented through a variety of socio-cultural processes from which such natures cannot be separated. ‘What we perceive and experience is never a direct reflection of environmental conditions but must be understood as a specific reading of these conditions’ (Willig, 2013, p. 7), as all of us have different ways of ‘seeing nature’.

8 Natures

The following list of natures is not meant to state that there are only eight such versions of nature, I’m sure there are many, many more and they can never be simplified to a bounded number. It is merely a ploy to highlight the shortcomings of reducing the concept ‘nature’ to just one definition, one thing, when it is clearly many things to many people (or nothing to some). Of course I realise the contradiction inherent in numbering
them as such, and so for the record I would like to place all of these numbered natures under erasure (surprise!).

**Nature 1:** Scary, useless or dangerous, inhabited only by wild animals, as in the *wildēornes* of the saga Beowulf.

**Nature 2:** An ordered, neat, picturesque, specifically designed (perhaps by Gilpin or Capability Brown) formal nature, framed with a hint of human culture in the scene (a typical Teletubbies landscape).

**Nature 3:** Type in the word ‘nature’ into any search engine images and you will see a plethora of Disneyfied landscapes. This is a romantically *idealised* nature: Green rolling hills, wild (but never too wild), ‘particular’ mammals, ‘particular’ flowers, a lake in front of some mountains, green leaved trees (usually deciduous, pictured in the summer), a rainbow, a waterfall, blue sky with white clouds, etc. Yes, that’s nature. Along with fresh air, bird song, stars and sweet smelling nectar, this is the sort of nature that people who say ‘we must re-connect to nature’ generally seem to mean.

Green analysis often focuses on the destabilizing encroachment of industrialized society into wild spaces, the restorative and even ecstatic powers of unblemished landscapes, and the companionless dignity of nonhuman creatures. Woodlands, serene waterscapes, sublime vistas, and charismatic megafauna feature prominently. (Cohen, 2013, pp. xix-xx)

With *Nature 3* there is a ‘utopian emphasis on homeostasis, order, and the implicit benevolence of an unexamined force labelled nature.’ (Cohen, 2013, p. xxii). Morton (2010) suggests that this ‘bright green’ view peddles nature as ‘affirmative, extraverted and masculine […] sunny, straightforward, ableist, holistic, hearty, and ‘healthy.’’ (p. 16) or as Cohen (2013) posits, ‘a purified place to which one travels rather than dwells always within: separate from the human, empty, foundationally pure’ (p. xxi). This is the nature of deep ecology, for example. Ellison (2013) indicates that since the late 19th Century ecology has been dominated by a romantically harmonious notion of landscape which is the wrong sort of nature for an ecologist to study.
Nature 4: Dog shit, slime mould, adrenal cancer, earthquakes, strychnine poison, sulphur dioxide, methane, piss, tsunamis, scorpions, rotting cabbage, snot, bile, viruses, the Black Death, phlegm, malaria, weeds, sharks, breast cancer, floods, a flower that smells of rotting meat, puke, forest fires, etc. They're all nature too. This nature is perhaps more reminiscent of nature 1, conceptually conditioned by history and socio-economic status. They are generally labelled as ‘natural’ or ‘nature’ but aren’t usually thought of when picturing scenic landscapes and cuddly mammals. Do you still wish to re-connect to nature, re-connect to shit and cancer?

Nature 5: A James Bond watch, pickled onion flavour Monster Munch, an iPhone, false teeth, a plastic lawn, a tube of toothpaste, books, computers, stilettos, scissors, electric wire, cars, a guitar, a knife, a plastic flower, etc. They're nature too, only many people in the West, perhaps especially ecotherapists and deep ecologists (and myself, as I travelled through that paradigmatic phase before escaping its romantically despotic clutch), think not, mostly because these things (what might be labelled as ‘artificial’) are the produce of humans, even though those same people might argue that humans are nature too. Somewhere along their thought patterns, somehow human produce has become separated from the existing universe. A form of transcendence has invaded the earth.

Nature 6: A tear, a frown, blindness, a whisper, a tender touch, an annoying cough, the word ‘cunt’, a wink, speech, an uncanny atmosphere, the rush of a blush, the force of an erotic encounter, emotional elation, etc. These are nature too but are harder to define or capture as they are an affective nature, one examined under the lens of the Affective Turn perhaps (see Gregg & Seigworth, 2010).

Nature 7: Free speech, 56, fascism, yellow, the alphabet, China, nature, culture, etc. These are nature too. They exist in the world, a world of (re)cycled materials, forces and energies. When 56 is written on a page it is perhaps ink (that is a material of the world) on paper (from a tree, even the romantic idealists may call this one nature!). If it is uttered from a mouth, that is breathe (full of CO2, etc.). They are percepts as they are things that we can touch or see or hear, for example, but they are not the idea of 56, nature or yellow. Alfred North Whitehead (1919) suggested that ‘[n]ature is that which
we observe in perception through the senses’ (p. 1) but ‘[t]hought about nature is
different from the sense-perception of nature.’ (p. 2). Yet thought is itself a sense, as we
can feel it, just a different kind of sense. What Whitehead is referring to here is what I
would call the difference between nature as a concept (still a kind of percept, although
less intense) and nature as a percept. The concept can influence the percept (and vice
versa). The affect may also influence and be influenced by the other two in turn. When
56 is thought but not articulated it is a concept and yet still a percept. We might say it’s
not really real (virtual?), yet still real enough to enact a physical presence of some sort
(in the actual?).

**Nature 8:** A unicorn, pixies, an Orc, fairies, God, Bambi, Shiva, ghosts, ray guns, the
USS Enterprise, etc. They're all nature too! As ideas, these ones are abstract concepts,
like the thought of 56 from Nature 7 (the not really real), only more difficult to prove.
For example, we can witness the effects of 56 when applied to atomic physics\(^66\). Now
it gets tricky as they are still percepts. A *picture* of a unicorn is a percept because it is
empirical yet can we touch the unicorn itself? Unicorns are concepts, thoughts, and
thoughts themselves are physical relational processes of the world of material, force and
energy. They are not outside it. They are empirical in some way. Therefore, the thought
of them exists as a percept in the world (a subtle real, a conceptual percept) but not the
actual unicorn. However, it has the potential to exist as an actual percept rather than a
conceptual percept. But this is similar to 56 because they all start life as conceptual
percepts. With the example of 56, we can see its impact in the world, its impression.
But then the abstract concept God has perhaps made even more of an inscription in the
fabric of the world due to its performativity.

\(^66\) Bodies represented by numbers: I suppose what numbers tell us is that there is never
a whole, never a 1. It's always a 1.1, 0.9563 or 1.246, etc. If we pretend that numbers
represent phenomena, events or processes, then we must also remember this: they can
always divide and be divided, add and be added to, multiply and be multiplied,
subtract and be subtracted. If they are ever 1 at some point, they are never 1 for very
long, a minuscule event that soon changes to a 4.71. The validity and reliability of
significance in data forgets time. Yet time has always already changed it. So, like the
term nature, 1 is a concept and as such makes a mark in the world but can always be
deterritorialised. For example, the atomic bomb had a devastating physical
consequence, but it came from a concept, a bunch of numbers. This is how nature
works. Although a representational invention, it has physical consequences. But it can
be deterritorialised and occupied!
There are *degrees* of actuality and actualising (or virtuality and virtualising if you prefer) rather than the binary actual-virtual as ‘[p]urely actual objects do not exist’ (Deleuze, cited in Deleuze & Parnet, 2002, p. 112). Their boundaries are topologically fluid and permeable as they flow and stretch interchangeably. This makes more sense to me due to the allowance of grey bits, dark matter that is perhaps more abundant than what is perceived. An affective realm may be actualised more fully and coherently if we look for ecotones rather than definite boundaries between virtual and actual planes. The unicorn is also actual in this sense and not merely virtual. It’s just not *as actual* as a horse or Narwhal which is much more *obviously* empirical and open to many more sensory apparatus than the felt presence of a unicorn depending on the particular assemblage (as I knew someone who interaced explicitly with an imaginary ‘My Little Pony’—see, hear and talk to it as one might do a dog—whereas I only ever perceive the abstract little pink pony conceptually). Don’t forget, it’s the ‘effects’ of conception that ‘matter’ in the world. So, for me, I’ve never actualised a god, it’s always been more towards the virtual end of the scale (not that there’s an end…or a scale) whereas for my auntie, a born again Christian, God has been actualised rather explicitly and has achieved a material status in its actual affects in/on/of the world.

All of the Natures presented here are also concepts and as such they ‘do’ things, they perform. *They are all ecological processes* and can indeed perform as they are enacted in the world. This leads to perceptions that force us to assume that either certain ecologically destructive actions won’t affect ‘us’ too much or that we can discard the non-romanticised nature, like pollution, in favour of a pristine wilderness ‘untrammelled by man’! But what does this perception ‘do’?

The different types of nature do different things. They work in different ways. Nature 1 destroyed the wolves and bears and created the urban. Nature 2 aesthetised (and anesthetised) productive landscapes (from food production to aesthetic production). This one *civilised* the land. Nature 3 idealised a romantic, wild nature. This is the one that has performed feats of racism, genocide, androcentrism, colonialism, etc. Nature 4 is an ill thought of nature and is often discarded, feared, killed, eradicated or ‘weeded’ out (often in response to nature 2). Nature 5 is not thought of as nature to many people, as already mentioned it is of human produce. But humans are nature too and anything we produce is of nature (the material, force and energy of the world/universe) so at what point does it become ‘not nature’? *In our heads?*
Some scholars (Morton, Zizek) disapprove of the term nature altogether and wish to eliminate it. Some scholars (Bryant) think it’s the concept ‘culture’ we must abolish rather than nature. Some (Latour, Haraway) wish to merge it to form ‘natureculture’. Cohen (2013) attributes nature with an ‘inorganic agency’ (p. xxii) where ‘[s]hadow it self is ecological’ (p. xix). He suggests that if nature was ‘refracted through the geological […] our ethical connectedness to the nonhuman would become more tangible.’ (Cohen, 2015, p. 12).

Each of these suggestions do something different, perform in diverse ways. Thinking from a flatter, immanent ontology, some scholars (Bryant, de Vega, Deleuze, Cohen, Mcphie & Clarke) wish to revolutionise it as the concept has its uses. But we must be wary of how we attempt to (re)present it. For how can we justify using a concept that has the potential to perform atrocities? And even if we do excuse the terms of possible oppression, how can we use them as a counter measure to revive or free-up alternate, less problematic meanings? ‘How then to write about young people engaging in just such ‘sacred spaces’, like woods and moorlands, without resorting to reified notions of nature?’ (Quinn, 2013, p. 738). Quinn (2013) has ‘considered coining the term ‘open nature’, which could be helpful in conveying a sense of forests and moorlands, but negatively would serve to sub-divide nature in a binary way’ and so decides to leave it to other scholars: ‘Ultimately, finding a solution to this philosophical problem of naming is not within the scope of this article’ (p. 739).

Environment

The term ‘environment’ has become a noun out of the verb ‘environ’ + ment. The Oxford International Dictionary of the English Language (Little, et al., 1957, p. 619) provides one definition of ‘environ’ as ‘to surround’, ‘envelop’ or ‘enclose’. But to surround or envelop what (and indeed when)? This definition is undeniably separationist if we assume that it is we or other organisms who are surrounded. The 1647 definition, ‘to go round in a circle’ (Little, et al., 1957, p. 619, emphasis added) is perhaps more appropriate to the condition of a thing (and is one that best applies to Ingold’s (2000, 2007, 2011) lines of living in the world, hence part of the reason for my choice in naming my cooperative action research ‘Walking in Circles’). For example, ‘to go round’ implies movement along rather than an emic-etic split (an in and an out). Ingold (2011, p. 148) states that ‘we tend to identify traces of the circumambulatory
movements that bring a place into being as boundaries that demarcate the place from its surrounding space,’ as ‘the pathways or trails along which movement proceeds are perceived as limits within which it is contained [...] turning the ‘way through’ of the trail into the containment of the place-in-space.’

[H]uman existence is not fundamentally place-bound, as Christopher Tilley (2004: 25) maintains, but place-binding. It unfolds not in places but along paths. Proceeding along a path, every inhabitant lays a trail. Where inhabitants meet, trails are entwined, as the life of each becomes bound up with the other. Every entwining is a knot, and the more that lifelines are entwined, the greater the density of the knot. (Ingold, 2011, p. 148)

In this way, and developing Ingold’s reasoning further, I would say that we are not in spaces or places, nor on or along paths, rather, we are the paths themselves in their continual environing. Therefore, the 1603 definition of ‘environment’ possibly serves my own purposes best when attempting to find a suitable term that describes what it is that we are in and/or of: ‘The action of environing’ (Little, et al., 1957, p. 619). Hence, environment is an action, something we do and are of rather than something we are encased in. Environment is something that is continually becoming and we are of that process. One might say, then, that we are living lines of environing. The 1827 version, ‘That which environs; esp. the conditions or influences under which any person or thing lives or is developed’ (Little, et al., 1957, p. 619) is also useful due to its emphasis on movement and development as opposed to stasis and separation.

Perhaps we must look to non-anthropocentric, flatter ontologies for our conceptual approaches to the nature of our environments. Perhaps this bifurcation of nature is the result of transcendent ontologies. How, then, might it look from an immanent perspective and do these perspectives still exist in the West?

**Landscaping**

‘the landscape thinks itself in me . . . and I am its consciousness.’ (Cezanne, cited in Wylie, 2007, p. 2)
So, Landscape is not fixed scene to be ‘gazed upon’ by an image capturing spectator (through a lens) that catches and then frames a representation of it. In recent literature they have started to become more mobile once again.

For Wylie in particular, this shift to ‘landscaping’, […] turns the word from a noun into a more rhythmic and mobile action verb […] Body and landscape thus become recursively intertwined, both constitutive and constituting, and always in a process of (re)formation. Indeed, they become, to borrow from Thrift and Dewsbury (2000: 415), extensions of the body and mind, and vice versa. (Waterton, 2013, p. 70)

Rather like Andy Goldsworthy’s Taking a Wall for a Walk or Paul Klee’s Taking a Line for a Walk, Cumbrian poet Norman Nicholson’s (1977) poem Wall emphasises the animacy of what are normally considered inanimate objects in the landscape, illuminating how ‘[a] wall walks slowly’ and ‘[i]s always on the move.’ Nicholson had a keen eye for movement and saw the Cumbrian landscape in ways that the Romantic poets, such as Wordsworth and Coleridge seemed to omit. For Nicholson’s artistic working class gaze, the landscape of the Lake District wasn’t merely a romanticised scenic nature for an elite clientele: ‘It is futile to assess such country in terms of views. […] it measures the landscape from the borders of an imaginary picture-frame; it reduces like to a post-card’, as for him ‘it is also the man-made screes beside the quarries; and whitewash on the Copper Mines Hostel, a stone playing ducks & drakes on Levers-Water, making the black tarn throw up waves like a magicians’ steel rings’ (Nicholson, 1977, pp. 33-34). We might call this more mobile landscape, landsceppan (Ingold, 2011), landscap-ing (Wylie, 2007), environing or just life.

Shelley’s Romantic (re)visions

In the book Romantic Revisions (Brinkley & Hanley, 1992), Brinkley (1992) examined the Romantic poet Shelley’s notebook where he drafted a copy of his poem Mont Blanc. Rather than explain the meaning of the finished and polished poem, Brinkley explored the spaces between the words, the omissions and the words placed under erasure by Shelley himself, the words that Shelley changed his mind about including in the finished product. The poem, Brinkley (1992) writes, seemed ‘to be
structured by the breaks in composition’ as ‘much of ‘Mont Blanc’ was inspired as it was composed – by intervals of thwarted writing’ (p. 243). In this poem, Shelley originally wrote ‘In daylight thoughts, bright or obscure / In day – the stream of various thoughts / [eternal] universe of things / Flows thro the mind reflecting rolls & rolls its rapid waves’ later changing it to, ‘In day – the [eternal] universe of things / Flows thro the mind & rolls its rapid waves.’ (Brinkley, 1992, p. 247). These reworkings, Brinkley writes, ‘articulate a radical epistemology in which things – and not their representations – are said to flow through the mind.’ (1992, p. 247, emphasis added). This is a non-representational philosophy, a philosophy of immanence and vital materiality. It is a radical onto-epistemology which rejects the Freudian tripartite psyche, the Cartesian soul which operates a mechanical body from within the confines of the human pineal gland or the Kantian subject as a reflective self.

As Spiro (1998) clearly points out, ‘[h]umans are not the sole authors of landscape’ (p. 17). The volcanic processes (flows of material, force and energy) that metamorphose rock from one state into another are similar processes to those that metamorphose a mountain into a shopping centre. ‘Intention’, ‘agency’ or ‘will to act’ follow the same complex co-emergences as the rest of the material fluxes that continually transform the planet. And so, for the purposes of this PhD I shall use the concept ‘environment’ due to the fact that we can place ourselves more easily within its permeable borders. Henceforth, environment and mental health are merged together at the same time as denoting temporal haecceitcal intra-dependence to become ‘environ(mental) health.’

**Scene four: The Accidental Death of Mr. Happy and the Medical Gaze: The Fallacy of the Healthy Self**

I can’t seem to find a me to me! Where would I locate it? ‘Inside’ me? In my heart (as this is the first organ to develop in the womb)? In my head (as Descartes suggested)? Or is it ‘all’ of me? Where is that? What is that? When is that? If I were to peel off my skin, is that still me? Or am I simply a vessel for bacteria? If my memory is also me, am I in my address book, iPhone or computer? Am I a complex knot of matter-energy-force like all other processes that ebb and flow throughout the universe? Am I a ‘quiddity’ (‘whatness’) or a ‘haecceity’ (‘thisness’)? As my friend Dave has queried regarding a murmuration of Starlings, ‘Where is the murmuration? Thickening
dark densities give way to sparse thin amalgamations in the shifting transience of a murmuration.’ (Clarke, 2016, n.p.). Is it better to imagine ourselves as a murmuration then? These ontological questions, including how we perceive ourselves, are important as they influence the understanding and treatment of mental health and wellbeing, whatever, wherever and whenever that may be. So it is perhaps worth unpacking what the existence of the concept mental health and wellbeing does in relation to whatever we think we are.

Health and Wellbeing

Szolosi (2012) suggests that due to the subjective nature of how we define and perceive health, it has led to the conceptualisation of health into four formal models; ‘the medical model, the World Health Organisation (WHO) model, the wellness model, and the environmental model’ (p. 139). The predominant view of health, the medical model, may be defined as the absence of disease or disability (Larson, 1999) and as such focuses on objective measures that lead to diagnosis and treatment of ailments (Szolosi, 2012). Many conceptions of health and wellbeing tend to focus on material wealth and neglect perhaps more salient issues of illbeing, including stress, depression, loneliness, accelerationism and environmentally destructive behaviour (Beradi, 2012a; Hämäläinen, 2013; Hirvilammi & Helne, 2014). The wellness model defines health as a subjective feeling or experience (Marvin & Crown, 1976) which can ‘affect even the simplest of physical processes’ and focuses on ‘perceptions such as happiness and other personal feelings’ (Szolosi, 2012, p. 139). The World Health Organisation (WHO, 2014) defines health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being’ (para. 2). Finally, ‘the environmental model asserts that health exists to the extent that an organism can grow, thrive, and function within its environment’ (Abanobi, 1986, cited in Szolosi, 2012, p. 139). Let us take each of Szolosi’s points in turn.

1. The medical model: The Clinical Gaze

David Armstrong’s (1993) From Clinical Gaze to Regime of Total Health, traces the perception of bodily illness in the late eighteenth century, a period that ‘gave birth to the modern system of clinical pathological medicine’ and left us ‘with the clear image of the triumph of truth as medical scientists uncovered the diseases previously hidden
within the human body.’ (p. 55). Due to developments in clinical technique and the
dissection of the corpse, ‘specific anatomical lesions were identified inside the body’
that ‘seemed to account for the outward appearances of illness’, a ‘clinico-pathological
correlation’ (Armstrong, 1993, p. 55). Following this, the hospital became a place where
‘bodies could be examined with proper rigour, the post-mortem as the event in which
the true nature of disease was finally revealed, and the many facets of clinical method

In The Birth of the Clinic, Michael Foucault argued that this ‘fabrication of the
body by means of the “anatomical atlas”’ directed the anatomy student’s attention to
particular structures and not others, thereby forming ‘a set of rules for reading the body’
so that the body’s reality ‘is only established by the observing eye that reads it’ (cited
in Armstrong, 1993, p. 56). ‘In effect, what the student sees is not the atlas as a
representation of the body but the body as a representation of the atlas’ (Armstrong,
1993, p. 56). Foucault posits that the modern patient, as the object of clinical practice,
is a product of this eighteenth century clinical gaze:

The clinical gaze, encompassing all the techniques, languages and
assumptions of modern medicine, establishes by its authority and
penetration an observable and analysable space in which is crystallised that
56, emphasis added).

[This solid figure, a discrete human body is starting to look decidedly inhuman,
decidedly constructed.]

Every time medicine had cause to deploy its new techniques and treat an
illness, it drew the anatomical outline of a docile body. At first the procedure
was unsure and the outline hazy but with time and with refinement the shape
became more clear. (Armstrong, 1993, p. 57, emphasis added).

[A more recognisable shape is now starting to emerge, with a round, yellow, easily
definable face.]
This became what Deleuze and Guattari (2004) might call the ‘body with organs’. ‘As the nineteenth century progressed each and every consultation of the new pathological medicine functioned to imprint, by its sheer repetition, the reality of a specific anatomy.’ (Armstrong, 1993, p. 57). By the late nineteenth century the ‘autopoietic character of the body-as-organism’ had become the perfect model of what a body is:

Because the body-as-organism is defined autopoietically as open to energy but informationally closed to the environment, thus engendering its own boundary conditions, Luciana Parisi and Tiziana Terranova have argued that the body-as-organism befits the disciplinary society of late nineteenth century industrial capitalism, “where the fluids which were circulating outside and between bodies…are folded onto themselves in order to be channelled within the solid walls of the organism/self/subject” (2000, 4). The body-as-organism is organized for “reproduction within a thermodynamic cycle of accumulation and expenditure; and trained to work” (5). (Clough, 2010, p. 207)

This was not the birth of the clinic, it was the birth of the quiddital Mr. Happy.67

But what does this product of happiness do?

Note 1: ‘Why be happy when you can be normal?’ (Bumble). (Jamie’s Duddon Valley notes).

67 The quiddital birth of Mr. Happy (Hargreaves, 1971), that just so coincides with the year I was born, is a children’s literary character that I have previously (Mchrie, 2014a) contrasted with another character, Mr. Messy (Hargreaves, 1972) who I perceive to be a more obvious example of how a haecceity might be conceived. (Picture taken from the ‘Mr. Men Wiki website’ (2016a): Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA)).
‘Why be happy when you can be normal?’ (Bumble). This statement from a member of the Walking in Circles (WiC) assemblage, Bumble, came from a book she was reading at the time by Jeanette Winterson (2012). Bumble was referring to our yearlong exploration into mental health and wellbeing in various environments regarding the second part of the co-participants/co-(re)searchers inquiry rumination, ‘How can we learn from/use the experiences we have to understand ourselves better and enhance our moods?’ Bumble was suggesting that perhaps too much focus was being forced on the ideal/concept of happiness. When something like happiness is sold to a population, it may present new challenges that produce the opposite of the desired effects.

2. The wellness model: The death of Mr. Happy

The ‘U.S. Department of Health & Human Services’ definition of mental health includes, ‘emotional, psychological, and social well-being’ that ‘affects how we think, feel, and act.’ (MentalHealth.gov, 2016, n. p.). Their examples of signs to look out for to reduce the onset of mental ill-health include, ‘Yelling or fighting with family and friends’ and ‘believing things that are not true’ (MentalHealth.gov, 2016, n. p.). This normative healthy citizen certainly seems to be quite well behaved and evidently has a particular belief system to adhere to. The same model promotes a more ‘positive’ vision of wellness that apparently allows people to ‘Realize their full potential, Cope with the stresses of life, Work productively, Make meaningful contributions to their communities’ and in order to maintain this ideal of a positive utopian model citizen they must practice ‘Connecting with others, Staying positive, Getting physically active, Helping others, Developing coping skills’ (MentalHealth.gov, 2016, n. p.). Mr. Happy is certainly well defined, perhaps more like a Stepford Mister.

Staying positive and connecting to nature

Catriona is in love with the earth, but she worries that it does not love her back. Maybe joining Friends of the Earth was a mistake. Now the earth will never see her as more than that. (Hazeley & Morris, 2015, p. 48) 😏
Many scientific theories (from objective and subjective paradigms) regarding wellbeing and happiness (for example, see Haidt, 2006 and Eid & Larsen, 2008 for overviews), stemming from disciplines such as positive psychology, purport the ‘science’ of the effects of place and nature on wellbeing and health and are still prominent in popular academic literature on the subject as well as therapeutic practice. For example, Healing Spaces: The Science of Place and Well-Being by Sternberg (2009); and Your Brain on Nature: The Science of Nature’s Influence on Your Health, Happiness, and Vitality by Selhub and Logan (2012), imply anthropocentric objective or subjective properties or truths that can in some way (whether quantitatively or qualitatively) be isolated, measured or chunked, a Platonic tradition that still holds strong in Western psychotherapeutic research and practice. Similarly, the (re)emergence of ‘alternative therapies’ in the 1970’s accentuated altered attitudes towards mental health and ‘the body’, resonating with popular consciousness. Rosalind Coward (1993) postulates that

[a]ttending to health and well-being has become a major cultural obsession and alternative therapies satisfy something of the sense that we should be ‘committed’ to our bodies and our health; they cater for the sense that even ‘the worried well’ should be doing something definite for their health. (p. 95)

In place of a hedonic approach to wellbeing (pleasure seeking, pain avoidance), deep ecological (Naess, 1973, 1995), Zen Buddhist (Fromm, 1960) and phenomenological (Fuchs, Sattel & Henningsen, 2010; Owen & Hardland, 2001; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1993) approaches to wellbeing share a more eudaimonic view, that we attain self-realisation to achieve joy, our fully functioning potentials and give meaning to our lives (see Ryan & Deci, 2001, for a comprehensive review). Even though these approaches ‘see wellbeing as an aspiration and a process of self-actualization that could more aptly be called well-becoming’ (Hirvilammi & Helne, 2014, n.p.), somatic and mental realms seem to be purposefully split in these paradigms, whilst claiming to dissolve the Cartesian binaries of the normative clinical models (through experiencing ‘oneness’, for example), thereby enforcing a problematic contradiction.
This focus on personal control over a subjective self is perhaps more easily attained (in the West) if you are of a certain social class, a class that has easier access to various forms of romanticised epistemologies and a consciousness that gives way to new moralities concerning self-care of the mindful body. In the Ladybird Books for Grown-Ups Series, Hazely and Morris (2015) deliver a parody of the modern Western practice of positive psychology and Mindfulness that emphasises this class inequity regarding the realities of life for many impoverished and/or working class people by focusing on a number of different characters:

Anna has emptied her mind and is just listening to the word around her. She can hear the neighbours arguing, two ambulances, a burglar alarm, a child crying, and the sound of dubstep coming from a Subaru Impreza. She is also concentrating on her own feelings, like her cystitis. (p. 14)

Wendell achieves a state of mindfulness by imagining he is floating in a beautiful lake until his mind empties of everyday worries. Soon he is aware of himself, but no longer worried about money, work, family or whether he left the taps on. Many home insurance policies now cover Acts of Mindfulness. (p. 12)

Mindfulness has taught Leanne to accept things as they are: rubbish, expensive, unfair and out-of-date every six months. It has also taught her to accept things like cake. Leanne likes cake. (p. 18)

Alison has been staring at this beautiful tree for five hours. She was meant to be in the office. Tomorrow she will be fired. In this way, mindfulness will have solved her work-related stress. (p. 24)

Mia has found a spiritual retreat in west London. This is a shame, as she was hoping her husband would pay for her to go to Thailand. (p. 32)


This does not mean that mindfulness does not ‘work’, as I’m sure it does, for many people who practice it or who may be undergoing mindful approaches to therapy. But examining what it ‘does’ (at least when practiced in Western cultures) seems to highlight certain socio-economic inequities as well as Cartesian divisions. From a more
academic, yet no less empirical viewpoint, Barbara Ehrenreich (2009) challenges various domains of positive psychology with a deconstruction of happiness which she purports:

is generally measured as reported satisfaction with one's life – a state of mind perhaps more accessible to those who are affluent, who conform to social norms, who suppress judgement in the service of faith, and who are not overly bothered by societal injustice (p. 169, emphasis added).

Coward (1993) sees an obvious issue with this ‘quest for natural health’:

With the emphasis on changing consciousness have come all the fantasies and projections associated with religious morality, fantasies of wholeness, of integration and of the individual as origin of everything good or bad in their life. And with these fantasies there has mushroomed the industry of ‘humanistic psychotherapies’ emphasizing the role of the individual will-power in making changes (p. 96)

Ehrenreich (2009) notes that one psychiatrist at a cancer centre in New York began to realise that ‘the failure to think positively can weigh on a cancer patient like a second disease’ (p. 43) as they experienced ‘a kind of victim blaming’:

It began to be clear to me about ten years ago that society was placing another undue and inappropriate burden on patients that seemed to come out of the popular beliefs about the mind-body connection. I would find patients coming in with stories of being told by well-meaning friends, “I’ve read all about this-if you get cancer, you must have wanted it…” Even more distressing was the person who said, “I know I have to be positive all the time and that is the only way to cope with cancer-but it’s so hard to do. I know that if I get sad, or scared or upset, I am making my tumor grow faster and I will have shortened my life” (from Holland’s ‘The Tyranny of Positive Thinking’, cited in Ehrenreich, 2009, p. 43).
As well as the obvious mind-body dualisms inherent in much humanistic and alternative psychology literature, there lies a binary bias that has also seemingly emerged out of the renaissance-scientific-revolution-enlightenment-romantic movement assemblage. That is the culture-nature binary that I contend has a profound impact on events ranging from mental health to climate change. Coward (1993) suggests that the oppositions of modern society and nature stem directly from Christian views of morality, such as good versus evil: ‘To pursue a natural life style and diet is to find yourself on the side of the ‘whole’, the integrated, balanced and healing forces of nature’ (Coward, 1993, p. 96). This is the romanticised face of ecopsychology and ecotherapy, the facade that narrows its field of vision to what I have previously called ‘nature 3’ ((Intra-)Act 4, scene three). For if this veil was lifted, it may reveal some unwanted and so-called ‘unnatural’ guests, as Coward so aptly (and sarcastically) demonstrates.

To ignore natural laws is to side with the fragmented, the inharmonious, with modern ‘mass’ society, with junk, technology and destruction. Ultimately it is an alliance with disease. The individual must choose between these forces, between the life-giving forces of nature and the destructive forces of the modern world. And the sign of the choice we make is ‘health’. (Coward, 1993, pp. 96-97)

Yet, as I have insisted throughout these acts, nature must also be Dionysian and not just Apollonian. And so must health be. This is especially true for mental health as it has been waylaid and hidden away from the reaches of environmental forces such as politics, society, climate and materiality itself.

Becoming healthy has become synonymous with finding ‘nature’ and ‘a natural life style’ and this is to be the route by which advanced industrial society will be resisted. […] The alternative health movement has become a place where the individual can play out, in a highly personal way, a sense of the corruptions of modernity and the struggle against these corruptions […] The solutions to these are rarely political. They are individual. It is up to individuals to transform themselves, to deal with the pain and suffering imposed by modern life.’ (Coward, 1993, p. 99)
In other words, through the illusion of escape from the industrial machine, certain elements of the alternative health movement seem to fall straight back into the same modernist trap that the clinical model is entrenched in. Ehrenreich (2009) asks, ‘would happiness stop being an appealing goal if it turned out to be associated with illness and failure?’, alternatively asking us to ‘imagine being gloriously contented with a life spent indulging unhealthy habits, like the proverbially happy “pigs in shit”? (p. 159). In a similar vein, Sarah Ahmed (2010a) sees happiness as a possible tool for justifying oppression ‘by privileging hegemonic groups who have access to what makes us believe we are happy’ (p. 2). For example, Ahmed (2010b, p. 30) articulates ‘how the family sustains its place as a “happy object” by identifying those who do nor reproduce its line as the cause of unhappiness.’ She calls such others, ‘affect aliens’, who include ‘feminist kill-joys, unhappy queers, and melancholic migrants.’ (Ahmed, 2010b, p. 30). This forced production of happiness may even lead to what Franco Berardi (2009) has called a ‘mass production of unhappiness’ (p. 168).

In general, unhappiness functions as a stimulus to consume: buying is a suspension of anxiety, an antidote to loneliness, but only up to a certain point. Beyond this certain point, suffering becomes a demotivating factor for purchasing. There is therefore an elaboration of conflicting strategies. (Berardi, 2012a, p. 83)

Just think of all the ‘natural’ health products for the resilient spiritualised self to be consumed by. These products also have corresponding bases of ‘evidence’ to support them, in contrast to the ‘clinical’ evidence, until eventually the consumer of happiness becomes thoroughly confused with which supporting evidence to believe. Then, a certain point is reached where the health retail therapy stops working and anxiety or apathy sets in.

Rosalind Coward’s (1993) critique of alternative therapy’s ‘polarization between the generalizations of ‘the modern’ on the one hand and ‘nature’ on the other’ (pp. 98-99) suggests this turn to nostalgia fails to ‘join up with a more thoroughgoing challenge to the structures of a capitalist society’ (p. 99). However, Franco Berardi certainly does when discussing the effects of the acceleration of capitalism on mental health which ‘opens a pathological gap and mental illness spreads as testified by the statistics and above all our everyday experience’ (Berardi, 2012a, p. 82). Berardi
(2012a) reports that ‘[i]t concerns a growing mass of existential misery that is tending more and more to explode in the center of the social system itself’ (p. 82) because ‘[t]oday capital needs mental energies, psychic energies. And these are exactly the capacities that are fucking up. It is because of this that psychopathology is exploding in the center of the social scene’ (p. 83).

For a truly alternative version of how happiness may be realised outside of the reductionist model of the medicalised body, the film Two Years at Sea (Rivers, 2011) demonstrates beautifully Jake Williams’ escape from normative society into the middle of a forest in Scotland, where he makes good use of the junk lying all around (like a Womble), including a caravan up a tree! With no ‘standardised’ model of happiness to compare to, no romanticised green and pleasant nature to be psycho-seduced by, Jake’s own version is re-invented and co-produced with the environment (including the junk) he has become of.

In the alternative health movement, nature is none of the following things: it is not technological, scientific, rationalist; not industrial; it is not fragmented, arbitrary and without meaning; it knows nothing of bad posture, bad parenting, bad diet; above all, it knows nothing of disease. Clearly the critique of modern society is a very limited one. (Coward, 1993, p. 99)

So, the message is this (must be spoken with a ‘spectacular’ smile); choose health, happiness and wellbeing, choose life!

3. The WHO model

The World Health Organisation’s (WHO, 2014) definition of health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being’ (para. 2) implies that ‘mental’ phenomena are not the same as ‘physical’ or ‘social’ phenomena. But if mental (or social) phenomena are not physical, what are they and what does this separation of percepts into concepts do? Also, the WHO’s definition of health has been criticized as embodying a ‘utopian view of health that is near impossible for anyone to truly realize, attain, or even measure’ (Larson, 1999, in Szolosi, 2012, p. 139), not that it is
measurable anyway. Their holistic and yet thoroughly bound version of mental health fares no better regarding inaccessibility. For example:

In April 2016, the World Bank Group and the World Health Organization will co-host a high-level meeting on global mental health, with a focus on depression and anxiety, to coincide with the 2016 Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group. (WHO, 2016a, para. 3, emphasis added)

By merely suggesting it as a ‘high level’ meeting (with the WBG and IMF no less), it places the concept of mental health out of reach for many, if not most people in the world. Who are these people who decide it is ‘high level’? For example, voting power within the World Bank Group (WBG) is weighted so that the US receives 16.21% of total votes out of 188 countries (WBG, 2015) but that’s not surprising given that the dominating ‘founding father’ of the WBG and IMF, Harry Dexter White, was a privileged white male from the US. Although the work that the WBG and IMF do is arguably beneficial to many people in many countries, it seems to me that they are dominated by a particular idealistic perception of the world, one that is ruled by a hegemonic elite and frames the world in the very same way that the WHO do under the umbrella of the enlightenment paradigm. This is an inaccessible version of mental health for many.

According to WHO (2016b), mental disorders ‘are generally characterized by a combination of abnormal thoughts, perceptions, emotions, behaviour and relationships with others’ (para. 1, emphasis added). So, is it simply a matter of comparison to a standard model of what ‘normal’ might be? If so, who defines this normative standard, at what evolutionary stage in history, judged by which cultures ethico-onto-epistemological conceptions? Put another way, at what stage in what culture’s history should we take for the normative descriptions of what the treatment of a ‘dis’order might entail? I imagine it performs differently with varied zeitgeists. For example, the

---

68 Voting shares are largely determined by a country’s economic weight and although there have been recent reforms to the WBG, the Bretton Woods Project, show that ‘high-income countries will cling onto almost 61 per cent of the vote, with middle-income countries getting under 35 per cent, and low-income countries on just 4.46 per cent.’ (The Bretton Woods Project, 2016).
historical oppression of numerous women under the banner of ‘hysteria’ (see Tasca, Rapetti, Carta & Fadda, 2012) is a direct result of a particular type of medicalised (and masculinised) lens, not too dissimilar (from an onto-epistemological perspective) to current conceptions of various mental disorders.

4. The environmental model

I will now argue for the case that health and wellbeing, from the perspective of what Szolosi (2012) calls the ‘wellness model’ and the ‘environmental model’ (and the resultant perception of happiness), is neither solely situated within the self as a subjective, cognitive construction (‘in here’), nor is it solely objectively situated in a realist paradigm (‘out there’) but as ‘spread’ or ‘distributed’ along a process of becoming (unlike the eudaimonic model of deep ecology, Zen Buddhism and embodied phenomenology).

Nick Totton (2012), suggests that ‘individuality is both crucial and illusory’ (p. 260) and that the ‘idea of an overarching self is in effect the idea of an outside, a place to stand which is not itself part of the complex whole, but allows us to understand and control it.’ (p. 262). I disagree, as does (‘the portable’69) Rosi Braidotti (2011):

The notion of the individual is enlarged to enclose a structural sense of interconnection between the singular self and the environment or totality in which it is embodied and embedded [...] The inward-looking individual fails to see the interconnection as part and parcel of his/her nature and is thus inhibited by an inadequate understanding of him/herself. The truth of self lies in its interrelations to others in a rhizomic manner that defies dualistic modes of opposition. Reaching out for an adequate representation of oneself includes the process of clearing up the confusion concerning one’s true nature as an affective, interconnected entity. Ultimately, this implies understanding the bodily structure of the self. Because of this bodily

---

69 “The Portable” refers to the title Rosi Braidotti (2011) gives herself in her book “Nomadic Theory” and is a notion of a “subjectivity as one in flux”, “always in the process of becoming”.' (Mcphie, 2014a, n.p.)
nature, the process of self-consciousness is forever ongoing and therefore incomplete or partial. (pp. 310-311).

Alva Noë (2009) proposes that consciousness is not just neurological connections that happen inside us but rather it is something we do, make or achieve; ‘consciousness is more like dancing than it is like digestion’ (p. xii) as ‘the locus of consciousness is the dynamic life of the whole, environmentally plugged-in person or animal’ (p. xiii). However, to understand concepts of cognition in neural terms may actually help us perceive the mind as spread if we think of the neural activity extending outside of the brain. There is neural activity in our stomachs and around our hearts (Gregg & Seigworth, 2010) and neurological decisions may equally be thought of as being made from those locations (such as ‘eat now!’), not just our brains. But we can extend this neural activity even further if we don’t simply think of consciousness or the workings of the mind as stemming from biological cells or neurons alone. ‘You can no more explain mind in terms of the cell than you can explain dance in terms of the muscle’ (Noë, 2009, p. 48). Similarly, music would be difficult to explain through the notes alone. An anecdote goes that Schumann had once played ‘a very difficult étude and one of his students asked if he could explain it. “Yes,” said Schumann, and he played it again.’ (Steiner, 2016, n.p.).

Cognitive action is distributed (although unevenly) around our environments and is not bounded by dermatological barriers. Or put more eloquently;

Human experience is a dance that unfolds in the world and with others. You are not your brain. We are not locked up in a prison of our own ideas and sensations. The phenomenon of consciousness, like that of life itself, is a world-involving dynamic process. We are already at home in the environment. We are out of our heads. (Noë, 2009, p. xiii)

If cognition and consciousness are processes that cross the divide of our skins, (our) mental health and wellbeing must also be distributed in environments. Noë (2009) suggests that perceptions of illnesses such as depression that are seen as a brain disease are comparable to the outdated reductionism of identifying consciousness only with events in the nervous system (p. xii). He goes on to state that due to neural signatures of depression, drug therapy can influence it but to understand why people get depressed
in neural terms alone is impossible as depression happens against the background of people’s individual histories as well as ‘the phylogenetic history of the species’ (Noë, 2009, p. xii).

Deleuze and Guattari (1983) suggested that it is ‘the capacities and limits of what a body can do’ that determines whether it is ‘healthy’ or ‘sick’.’ (Fox, 2016, n.p., emphasis added). This is the ‘capacity of a body to form new relations’ (Fox, 2016, n.p.). Therefore, conceptions of health such as depression, anxiety or schizophrenia may be better off treated as contextualised environmental phenomena as opposed to a disease bounded within ‘the self’.\(^7\) If we think of mental health and wellbeing from this more radical perspective it follows that we must also include environmental conditions (both Euclidean and topological) in our explorations of ‘the healthy self’.

Regarding certain definitions of psychiatric disorders, such as schizophrenia, emotional disorders, etc., Curtis (2010) argues that ‘from perspectives in health geography or sociology of health one might take a more ‘relative’ view of such diagnostic criteria, considering them not as fixed, undisputed definitions, but more as the constructions of a particular, influential social group (certain psychiatrists in western countries)’ (p. 28). Of course there are other, cross cultural differences in socially constructed ideas of mental health and wellbeing (Curtis, 2010). Curtis (2004) and Prior (1993) suggest that understandings of mental health are socially and culturally constructed, are based on value judgements and are the result of products of thought and social practices. This implies that ‘the idea of mental health is not fixed but variable between societies, cultural and social groups or individual people, creating potential for geographical variation in perceived mental health between spatially separate communities’ (Curtis, 2004, p. 193, emphasis added).

Curtis (2010, pp. 32-33) provides a discussion of a variety of different ’quality of life’ measures, concluding that there are cultural differences in understanding of wellbeing, which may contribute to international differences in wellbeing of people as measured on these scales. For example, for the Matsigenka (a Peruvian Amazonian tribe), notions of health and wellbeing are linked to ideals about happiness, productivity and goodness, ‘as well as’ to biomedical health (Izquierdo, 2004). For the Matsigenka, increases in acculturation and permanent settlement result in a decrease in their health

\(^7\) However, there may only be a limited range/window of tolerable ideas about mental health conceptions that the public will find acceptable (I believe this is commonly called the Overton window).
and wellbeing (Izquierdo, 2004). Izquierdo (2004) found that although biomedical indicators of the Matsigenka’s physical health had significantly improved over the past 20-30 years, they ‘perceived’ their health and wellbeing to have severely declined during this period. This indicates fundamental problems with definitions such as ‘health’ and ‘well-being’, including issues with the hyphen. The International Journal of Wellbeing (2011) states:

The decision to close the hyphenated gap between ‘well’ and ‘being’ is intentionally forward looking. […] A cursory glance over journals from other disciplines demonstrates that many of them are already making the transition to dropping the hyphen. […] ‘Wellbeing’ should to refer to the topic of what makes a life go well for someone and ‘well-being’ should refer to the more specific concept – the opposite of ill-being.

I always shiver when the word ‘should’ is imposed (especially when I do it unconsciously). Perhaps for a more erudite understanding of wellbeing we may have to look outside of our Western culture. For example, Adelson (2000) informs us that there is no direct translation of mental health and wellbeing for the animist Cree. The closest description is, ‘being alive well’, a concept ‘less determined by bodily functions’ but rather spread out among political, social and ecological relationships (Adelson, 2000, p. 3). Should we use this?

**The death of the ‘true self’**

‘Parambolic as I am. I can’t sum myself up because you can’t add a chair and two apples. I am a chair and two apples. And I cannot be added up.’ (Lispector, 2014, p. 67).

Of course, all of these definitions of mental health and wellbeing are (and must be) diffracted when the subject or object under scrutiny is placed *sous rature*. Carol Taylor (2013a) explains,

in Deleuze’s view, the individual does not possess a ‘self’ which exists as a separable entity with a stable ego, people are not divisible into interior and
exterior components, and neither do they possess internal will or agency to motivate external action. To think so is an illusion derived from Enlightenment rationality. Instead, Deleuze proposes, subjectivities are multiplicities, subjects are characterised by flows of forces, intensities and desires, and individuals are continually being formed through a process of ‘dynamic individuation’ (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 93) from which the changing ‘self’ as an assemblage, a connective multiplicity, emerges. Deleuze uses the term ‘becoming’ to refer to this process of dynamic individuation. For him, becoming is first and foremost a material, sensible, intensive and embodied process, enabling us to experience life as a radically immanent fleshe existence motivated by desires and flows (Braidotti, 2002). Deleuze sees becoming as immanent to all of life, human and nonhuman, and becoming, difference, change and variation as the hallmarks of life. (pp. 46-47)

In this sense, concepts such as, mental health and wellbeing become something different when we consider our selves as multiplicities or haecceities. Many objective and subjective measurements of certain concepts such as, happiness, wellbeing, nature and mental health seem to treat these concepts as isolated quiddities that supposedly reveal to the transcendent researcher a knowable truth. Yet Karen Barad (2007) asserts, ‘We do not obtain knowledge by standing outside the world; we know because “we” are of the world. We are part of the world in its differential becoming.’ (p. 185). As mentioned previously, Gregory Bateson (2000) saw the problems inherent in the Platonic ‘nature carving’ frenzy and posited that by doing so, we may omit important information as ‘the mental world - the mind - the world of information processing - is not limited by the skin’ (p. 460).

Walther and Carey (2009) point out that modernist thought in traditional psychiatric, psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic practice, postulates the notion of a ‘true self’, implying that beneath our experiences lie a core set of structures that drive our sense of self. Yet, the mental world cannot be separated from the environment that it is ultimately of (not a part of). Therefore, we could conceive of our mental health as our environment’s (mental) health (not just a part of it).
It means, you see, that I now localize something which I am calling “Mind” immanent in the large biological system-the ecosystem. Or, if I draw the system boundaries at a different level, then mind is immanent in the total evolutionary structure. (Bateson, 2000, p. 466)

If, as I am advancing, mental health is indeed a transcranial/transcorporeal process, rather than a bounded objective or subjective phenomena that we can measure (objectively) in an isolated vacuum (for example, as a malformation or malfunction within an individually insulated self), what does this understanding mean, or rather do, for mental health research that in turn informs various therapeutic practices?

**The death of therapy?**

The therapy world has also more recently been preoccupied with reproducing itself and with the intensification of what get referred to as ‘professional standards’ and with restraining new developments in the name of ‘evidence-based’ orthodoxies in the therapeutic professions. (Winslade, 2009, p. 333)

If *evidence* for psychological/psychiatric treatment (in the form of a variety of therapies from cognitive behavioural therapy to humanistic therapy) is repeatedly taken from research that is underpinned by modernist onto-epistemological conceptions of the world, what might this practice do in terms of *Being Alive Well* (Adelson, 2000, p. 3)? Could it create various forms of oppression and binary bias?

With reference to government policy documents, Hui and Stickley (2007) explain that ‘If service users are at all perceived as partners within these documents, they seem to be a very silent partner.’ (p. 422). Fisher and Freshwater (2013) emphasize, ‘people with mental health problems are invariably referred to as ‘patients’, ‘service users’, ‘users’, but rarely as ‘people’’ (p. 3). I have previously (and provocatively) mentioned that this imbalance is usually dealt with by submitting to an economic structure that always subjugates certain social and cultural groups to create a binary bias of oppression (Mcphie, 2014a, para. 40), especially regarding involuntary psychiatric ‘treatment’. ‘Brown and Tucker (2010) point out that medical power (enmeshed in economic and political power), in the guise of the professional psychiatrist, may be
exercised with oppressive consequences’ (Mcphie, 2014a, para. 42). They argue that when certain medical ‘conditions’ are diagnosed (such as schizophrenia), the ‘patient’s’ legal and moral rights are overruled and as a consequence, the ‘service user’ is marginalised and ‘excluded from full participation in mainstream society and subject to the ultimate sanction of being deprived of [their] liberty on the say-so of [their] psychiatrist’ (Brown & Tucker, 2010, p. 230). ‘Rather than affirming what a body can do, the meeting seeks to render the service user as a passive collection of dysfunctional affects that stand in need of careful management’ (Brown & Tucker, 2010, p. 243).

These meetings may also enhance the belief that this management can only be properly deciphered and completed by the mental health ‘professional’, even though it is the psychiatric patient who ‘knows’ their own body best (Brown & Tucker, 2010).

Following Fraser (1989), Fisher and Freshwater (2013) point out that if ‘individuals are simply ‘docile bodies’ constituted through the effects of power, this leaves no room for resistance to power’ (pp. 3-4) or, put another way, ‘Once you have been conned into becoming Mr. Happy, the cruelty really begins’ (Mcphie, 2014a, para. 52). Freshwater (2006) proposes that ‘definitions of mental illness […] are spoken into existence according to the values and beliefs that shape the discourse about what is ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’, or ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’’ (p. 56) and as such ‘the labels that define people as mentally ill arguably have no reality independent of the discourse of the society in which they occur’ (Fisher & Freshwater, 2013, p. 8). The ontologies of these definitions are co-produced through practice. Viewed this way, therapy becomes part of a performance that generates illusions of normativity as a standardised model by which to measure mental health and identity, one that has the potential to exclude, dominate or oppress certain people (and indeed other environments). For example, Tilsen and Nylund (2010) assert that ‘[p]eople who perform fluid identities that are relationally constituted – identities that some people would call queer – are not accounted for by modernist notions of the essential self’ (p. 66). In light of these pathology-orientated perspectives, Adelson (2000) urges us to ‘rethink – rather than be constrained by – the framework of Western biology’ (p. 6). I would also include rethinking Western psychotherapy as in my mind it is no less biological.

I do not propose that we abandon the study of subjectivity, but would like to argue for a concept of subjectivity that is based on relationality with others and with things. That means paying attention to feelings as well as
ideas, and viewing feelings, not as properties of the self, but as produced through the interaction between self and world. And it means seeing that interaction, not as the coming together of two separate entities, but as a process of entanglement in which boundaries do not hold. (Labanyi, 2010, p. 223)

Deleuze and Guattari conceived of the ‘Body without Organs’ (BwO) not in opposition to organs but as a resistance ‘to the organization of the organs insofar as it composes an organism’ (2004, p. 34). ‘It is the organism that imposes form, that provides hierarchized organization, and that sediments and signifies a subject.’ (Mazzei, 2016, p. 153). And so we may want a change of scenery, from the suppression of Mr. Happy to the entanglements of Mr. Messy. The mycologist, Alan Rayner (1997) suggested ‘the whole of biology would be different if it had taken the mycelium as the prototypical exemplar of the living organism’ as ‘it could not, then, have been built upon the presumption that life is contained within the absolute bounds of fixed forms’ (cited in Ingold, 2011, p. 86). ‘Instead of thinking of organisms as entangled in relations, we should regard every living thing as itself an entanglement’ (Ingold, 2011, p. 87). The artist Ryan Alexander (2010) demonstrates this mycelium well, available by following this link:
http://www.creativeapplications.net/processing/mycelium-processing/. ‘Personally, I prefer the concept of the children's character Mr. Messy as I identify more strongly with him...and if you Google Mr. Messy, there he is, you don’t even have to use your imagination!’ (Mcphie, 2014a, para. 28).

Agency, materiality and mental illness

‘To be is to be related’ (Mol, 2006, p. 54) points to the fact that the condition of any human is predicated on its embedding social and material relations. A therapeutic culture that values only self-governance, autonomy and rationality when it comes to explaining agency might therefore overlook the potentials for change that exist in our material environment. (von Peter, 2013, p. 322)
Walther and Carey (2009) insist that Foucault's operation of modern power shows how dominant discourses and normative expectations gain a truth status by which people measure themselves (and others), which privileges the interests of those whose lives *fit in* with their own narrow confines, yet marginalise those who live their lives differently (Mcphie, 2014a, para. 21). This leads to an illusion of a certain kind of agency that can be especially problematic in the world of psychotherapy as ‘the various ‘psyciences’ have been especially inclined to using and disseminating this notion of agency (Illouz, 2008).’ (von Peter, 2013, p. 318). Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari (2004) opposed the authoritarian role of the psychoanalyst’s relationship to their patient (or Sigmund Freud’s Oedipus Complex as a symbolistic analytical account/method) as ‘it bases its own dictatorial power upon a dictatorial conception of the unconscious’ (p. 19). Schizoanalysis, (‘the study of bodies politic from a materialist, anti-Oedipal perspective’), ‘on the other hand, treats the unconscious as an acentred system, in other words, as a machinic network of finite automata (a rhizome), and thus arrives at an entirely different state of the unconscious’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 19). This acentred version of the unconscious body, may now include the materiality of the world rather than distance it. So, it is to the intra-relational, rhizomatic *haecceity* that we must turn.

**Scene five: The Birth of Mr Messy: Becoming a (re)search assemblage**

remember the sense of fusion  
of liquefying into  
an infinite melt of oneness  
(feel it when your flesh crosses the  
skin to entangle with another’s)

(de Oliveira Andreotti, 2016, p. 87)

**Interméde: A topological Syuzhet**

‘I don’t like points’ (Deleuze, 1995, p. 161)
I initially wrote about ‘relational ontologies’ in 2012-2013 for the MPhil/PhD transfer process and elements of it were later merged into a published paper that I co-authored with my friend Dave Clarke (Clarke & Mcphie, 2014). Please read this (faraway?) paper if you’d like to discover how I travelled from ‘points’ to ‘lines’ as it will add another flavour to this scene.

**Becoming Ecological Entanglements**

After reading Thoreau’s work, Jane Bennett (2004) asks if sensitivity to a focus on materiality, which she terms ‘thing-power’, can induce a stronger ecological sense (p. 348). Her notion of an ‘onto-story’ is a depiction of ‘the nonhumanity that flows around but also through humans…it emphasises those occasions in ordinary life when the us and the it slipslide into each other’ (p. 349). She sees her work as a continuous journey to try to untangle our relations to/in a world of materiality and describes her methods for enhancing her receptivity to thing-power (‘the agential powers of natural and artifactual things’) by writing about it as ‘an account of the thingness of things’ so that she is able to ‘feel it more intensely’ and gain a ‘greater awareness of the dense web of their connections with each other’ (Bennett, 2004, p. 349). A research focus on the ‘thingness of things’ is enticing and may certainly be fruitful.

As an example of how this might play out in contemporary research practice, Carol Taylor (2013b) explored how ‘materialities of classrooms do crucial but often unnoticed performative work in enacting gendered power’ (p. 688) and ‘reveals educational practices to be a constellation of human–nonhuman agencies, forces and events’ (p. 689). Observing a chair-teacher assemblage in a typical classroom, Taylor (2013b) noticed the chair as ‘an object with thing-power’ which ‘took its place as a material-discursive agency within a classroom space saturated with gendered meanings’ as the ‘chair and his body formed a human–nonhuman assemblage which freed him up to glide, slide, spin, twirl, tilt, lean, roll and spring.’ (p. 693), unlike the (crucially) stationary chairs that the students were immobilised with. In Taylor’s (2013b, p. 694) notes, she observes that the ‘power clearly resides with him. He is totally relaxed and expansive in his body language, leaning back in his chair and controlling the space at a distance.’ Yet the ‘control’, I imagine, was partly produced and enacted by the chair itself as a crucial co-star in the entanglement of agential distribution. The design and mobility of the chair itself could indeed be said to *co-create* the power that Taylor
noticed emanating from the assemblage, not as a Gibsonian affordance, but as a worldly material emergence in-of-itself. I’m not even sure that ‘control’ was ever present within the teacher in the first place (what do you think?).

The possibility of an increased intensity and awareness of the lines of becoming within this meshwork, may help researchers and practitioners understand how the processes involved in the production of perception may influence mental health and wellbeing by focusing on the temporal fluidity of the lines themselves. It may also encourage participants’ awareness of their own web-like relations with the environments they are ultimately of, potentially helping them to become (re-)embodied if (for example) there is an issue of disembodiment or hyperembodiment.

Steps to an Ontology of Lines

Inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) quest to find ‘the consciousness or thought of the matter-flow’ (p. 454), Ingold (2007, 2011, 2012) suggests we think ‘from’ materials rather than ‘about’ them. He reflects that we ‘should no longer speak of relations between people and things, because people are things too’ (Ingold, 2012, pp. 437-438). Merleau-Ponty suggested that ‘since the living body is primordially and irrevocably stitched into the fabric of the world, our perception of the world is no more, and no less, than the world’s perception of itself – in and through us’ (Ingold, 2011, p. 12).

So, in order to understand the material composition of inhabited environments, Ingold (2011) proposes that we engage ‘directly with the stuff we hope to understand’ (p. 20). This includes ‘its tensions and elasticities, lines of flow and resistances […] guided by intuition in action’ (Ingold, 2012, p. 433) and to study the entangled lines of this meshwork, ‘is to adumbrate an ecology of materials’ (p. 435). It is this ‘ecology of materials’ that I wish to grow and develop as an ‘ontology of lines’ (see Ingold, 2007, 2015) in order to further explore how we leak and spill into our environments (and vice versa). And as our perceptions are the result of this flow of materials, it will hopefully lead to a better insight into how mental health and wellbeing is distributed in the environment.

Alfred-North Whitehead’s process metaphysics is a suitable introduction to the next section as it is
entirely about process and transformation; it values becoming over being, relation over substance, and continual novelty over the perpetuation of the same. It rejects the “bifurcation of nature” (Whitehead 1920/2004, 30-31), or the separation of reality from appearance (1929/1978, 72). It holds that there is nothing besides “the experiences of subjects” (167); and it grants to all subjects—including inhuman and nonsentient ones—and to all their experiences-conscious or not—the same ontological status. (Shaviro, 2012, p. 99)

A Troika of ontologies of immanence

Interméde: A topological Syuzhet

This next section is a conversation with a paper I published in 2015, entitled, ‘A Walk in the Park’ (Mcphie & Clarke, 2015), for which I have cited the relevant pages under the title Syuzhet as it follows the non-linear path of this topologically distributed play. My added critical responses to these published sections are labelled here as Fabula. The pages from my joint paper with Dave that I emphasise here highlight most of the new literature from contemporary animism, new materialisms and new science of the mind that I have come to recognise as particularly salient to my PhD inquiry.

Syuzhet

Please read Mcphie and Clarke (2015, pp. 231-233) for an overview of contemporary animism and its relevance to environ(mental) thinking, a worldview that runs counter to the majority of current unsustainable conceptual processes and practices that stem from the Western mind/worldview (Ingold, 2011).

Fabula

An issue with contemporary animist writing is that it is still ‘mostly’ written by Western anthropologists and/or ethnographers: this is a matter of appropriation, just as Dalit writing is suppressed through appropriation by Brahmin scholars. Similar to the protestations of Foucault and Deleuze regarding the historisisation of certain
hegemonies, Ambedkar stressed, ‘one finds so little that is original in the field of historical research by Brahmin scholars unless it be a matter of fixing dates or tracing genealogies’ (cited in Ambedkar Age Collective, p. 8). ‘We must shape our course ourselves and by ourselves’ (Babasaheb Ambedkar, 1930, cited in Ambedkar Age Collective, p. ix).

Where a person positions oneself has an effect. It is impossible to remove the ingrained lens that we look at the world through, no matter how reflexive we might have become. I believe this is also true of the modern Western paradigm. In fact, I now find myself on the verge of appropriating Ambedkar’s words. But I don’t. I diffract instead. I do this by highlighting where this appropriation may take place and interrogate it. Patrick, a Cree elder, once told me that I must look to my own cultural heritage to become a participant, so as not to become merely an observer of the world. In this way, I appropriate from my past. I become an archaeologist rather than an anthropologist.

_Syuzhet_

Please read Mcphie and Clarke (2015, pp. 233-234) for an overview of process-relational thought, externalist philosophy and the new science of the mind.

_Fabula_

Clark and Chalmers (1998) landmark paper, ‘The Extended Mind’ used the story of Inga and Otto to exemplify their point:
Inga hears from a friend that there is an exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, and decides to go see it. She thinks for a moment and recalls that the museum is on 53rd Street, so she walks to 53rd Street and goes into the museum. It seems clear that Inga believes that the museum is on 53rd Street, and that she believed this even before she consulted her memory. It was not previously an *occurrent* belief, but then neither are most of our beliefs. Rather, the belief was sitting somewhere in memory, waiting to be accessed.

Now consider Otto. Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s disease, and like many Alzheimer’s patients, he relies on information in the environment to help structure his life. In particular, Otto carries a notebook around with him everywhere he goes. When he learns new information, he writes it down in his notebook. When he needs some old information, he looks it up. For Otto, his notebook plays the role usually played by a biological memory. Today, Otto hears about the exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, and decides to go see it. He consults the notebook, which says that the museum is on 53rd Street, so he walks to 53rd Street and goes into the museum.

Clearly, Otto walked to 53rd Street because he wanted to go to the museum and he believed the museum was on 53rd Street. And just as Inga had her belief even before she consulted her memory, it seems reasonable to say that Otto believed the museum was on 53rd Street even before consulting his notebook. For in relevant respects the cases are entirely analogous: the notebook plays for Otto the same role that memory plays for Inga. The information in the notebook functions just like the information that constitutes an ordinary non-*occurent* belief; it just happens that this information inheres in a physical state located beyond the skin. (Clark & Chalmers, 2010, pp. 33-34)

**Snippet 3: Inga and Otto.**

As ever, there are critiques of externalism (see Rupert, 2004, 2009), the most vocal voices coming from Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2008, 2010) who claim that the extended mind has not provided a ‘plausible theory of what distinguishes the cognitive from the non-cognitive’ (2010, p. 78). Eva Perez de Vega retorts:

In light of the terms provided by assemblage theory, it seems that A&A believe that cognition is a state, describable through relations of interiority, or, what is the same, they conceive of cognition as a whole with properties that can be reduced to the properties of its parts. Furthermore they assume that the way these parts function sometimes, determines how they function all of the time, thus committing a fallacy themselves. A&A work within a world of fixed and definite categories, which is hardly consistent with the complexity of cognition. (n.d., p. 12).

*Syuzhet*
By 2015, I had already developed a reasonable understanding of both contemporary animism and new science of the mind. Please read Mcphie and Clarke (2015, p. 234) for the link that introduces where I first started to acquire a *new materialist* comprehension of the world that in many cases takes an *intra* over an *inter* understanding of reality (hence, my light bulb moment of linking the three philosophies of immanence together). The next Fabula takes this understanding further to explore its rich labyrinths.

**Fabula**

‘Matter is agentive and intra-active […] Bodies do not simply take their place in the world. They are not simply situated in, or located in particular environments. Rather ‘environments’ and ‘bodies’ are intra-actively constituted.’ (Barad, 2007, p. 170). With this comment, Barad ‘shows that space is not simply a physical container; objects and things are not inert, fixed or passive matter awaiting ‘use’ by human intervention; nor is the body a mere corporeal vehicle to be moved by the mind.’ (Taylor, 2013b, p. 688). Barad (2007) coined the term ‘agential realism’ to denote her ‘posthumanist performative account of material bodies (both human and nonhuman)’ (p. 139) as it ‘allows matter its due as an active participant in the world’s becoming, in its ongoing intra-activity.’(p. 136).

Agential realism is an account of technoscientific and other practices that takes feminist, antiracist, poststructuralist, queer, Marxist, science studies, and scientific insights seriously, building specifically on important insights from Niels Bohr, Judith Butler, Michel Foucault, Donna Haraway, Vicki Kirby, Joseph Rouse, and others […] This entails a reworking of the familiar notions of discursive practices, materialization, agency, and causality, among others. (Barad, 2003, pp. 810-811).

As Iovino (2012) points out, ‘the true dimension of matter is not that of astatic being, but of a generative becoming’ (p. 53). Discourses of ‘agential realism bring matter and the nonhuman to the centre of the discussion’ (Quinn, 2013, p. 742) where ‘matter and meaning are not separate entities’ (Barad, 2007, p. 3). Barad’s agential realist accounts of life have now become a central tenet of the growing new materialisms movement.
“New materialism” as a term was coined by Manuel DeLanda and Rosi Braidotti in the second half of the 1990’s. New materialism shows how the mind is always already material (the mind is an idea of the body), how matter is necessarily something of the mind (the mind has the body as its object), and how nature and culture are always already “naturecultures” (Donna Haraway’s term). (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 48)

Post-structuralism71 regards meanings of texts as not in the texts but rather emerges and is produced ‘as the reader interacts with the texts’ (Grenz, 1996; Sarup, 1993; Tarragona, 2008). However, if we were to add new materialist theories to the post-structuralist paradigm, the previous sentence could read, ‘co-emerges and is co-produced as the reader intra-acts with the texts’. ‘If language really does construct meaning (as opposed to revealing an objective meaning already present in the world), then the work of the scholar is to take apart (“deconstruct”) this meaning constructing process.’ (Grenz, 1996, p. 43, cited in Tarragona, 2008, p. 170) in order to reconstruct more healthy futures (from an ‘ecological’ perspective, if that is indeed possible considering its (logocentric) Platonic Occidental origins of hegemonic control that can create colonialist assumptions of intellectual power, binary bias and hierarchy). Yet language itself doesn’t construct meaning, it is a co-producer of meaning.

The material turn sides with Donna Haraway’s introduction of the concept ‘naturecultures’ (Haraway, 2003) to ‘breach the categorical schism between nature and culture’ (Oppermann, 2013, p. 60) as well as Bruno Latour’s ‘nature-culture’ (Latour, 1993, p. 7), both heavily influenced by Deleuze and Guattari’s writing:

---

71 Maggie MacLure (2013) defines poststructuralism as ‘an opposition to the rationalist, humanist worldview that is the (continuing) legacy of the seventeenth-century ‘Enlightenment’ […] asserting that truths are always partial, and knowledge always ‘situated’ – in other words, produced by and for particular interests, in particular circumstances, at particular times.’ (p. 167). ‘Poststructuralism is also associated with the ‘crisis of representation’, in which language is no longer held to represent or reflect a pre-existing reality, but is inextricably implicated in the fabrication of realities. Finally, poststructuralism decentres and dis-assembles the humanist subject – the thinking, self-aware, truth-seeking individual (‘man’), who is able to master both ‘his’ own internal passions, and the physical world around him, through the exercise of reason.’ (MacLure, 2013, p. 167).
We make no distinction between man and nature: the human essence of nature and the natural essence of man become one within nature in the form of production of industry, just as they do within the life of man as a species ... man and nature are not like two opposite terms confronting one another ... rather, they are one and the same essential reality, the producer-product. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, pp. 4-5).

After reviewing thirty recent empirical new materialist social inquiries, Fox and Alldred (2014) point out that a Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology has played a significant role in the emergence of new materialism,

because of its empirical focus on processes and interactions (Deleuze & Guattari, 1984, p. 3), its nomadic politics and ethics of becoming rather than being (Braidotti, 2006, p. 14; Conley, 1990), and its methodological capacity to move beyond structure/agency and culture/nature dualisms (DeLanda, 2006; van der Tuin & Dolphijn, 2010, p. 154). (Fox & Alldred, 2014, P.3)

‘[T]o become animate and mobile, for Deleuze and Guattari it is clear that materiality needs no animating accessory. It is figured as itself the “active principle.”’” (Bennett, 2010, p. 61). In the wake of Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) ‘transcendental empiricism’, Latour’s (2005) ‘Actor Network Theory’ and Barad’s (2007) ‘agential realism’, Jane Bennett’s (2010) ‘vital materialism’ explores ‘the vitality of matter and the lively powers of material formations’ (p. vii) in which she relates Baruch Spinoza’s *natura naturans* ‘to the so-called élan vital or creative force described in the later work of Henri Bergson’ (Hale, 2015, p. 174) without the mysticism this often evokes nor the mechanism of the opposing views.
The material turn (including OOO\textsuperscript{72}, material ecocriticism\textsuperscript{73} and feminist new materialisms\textsuperscript{74}) has attempted to forge a path between the confines of scientific naturalism (‘the aggregation of ever smaller bits’) and social relativism (‘constructions of human behaviour and society’) (Bogost, 2012, p. 6) in order to seek those ever elusive lines of flight away from hierarchical binary logics, humanistic cultural constructions and oppressive essentialisms of enlightenment rationality. Maggie MacLure (2015) reveals:

\textsuperscript{72} ‘Object Oriented Ontology’ (OOO) was born on the back of Bogost, Harman, Bryant, Meillassoux and Morton. The worry I have for OOO is that by not examining the multiple lenses that one examines the world with, the unexamined assumptions that slip through the net have the potential to enact inequitable effects.

\textsuperscript{73} Following Iovino and Oppermann’s recent work, ‘Material ecocriticism is the study of the expressive dynamics of nature’s constituents, or narrative agencies of storied matter at every scale of being in their mutual entanglements. It seeks to explore the narrative dimension of the material world in terms of the stories embodied in material formations.’ (Oppermann, 2013, p. 57). Material ecocriticism is interested in the narrative potentiality of matter through \textit{significance} and \textit{innate meaning making} and in this sense deviates from feminist new materialisms and OOO, for example. The impact of omitting the matter of concepts in the cogitations of material ecocriticism leaves open the performance of the neglected cogitations themselves (i.e. what do they do?).

\textsuperscript{74} Feminist new materialisms focuses on ‘how the forces of matter and the processes of organic life contribute to the play of power or provide elements or modes of resistance to it.’ (Frost, 2011, p. 70). It is neither anti-biological nor does it turn to biology as \textit{the} master plan, dismissive of other onto-epistemologies (Ahmed 2008; Hinton & van der Tuin, 2014; Sullivan 2012). Taylor and Ivinson (2013) point out that ‘“new” material feminisms displace the human as the principal ground for knowledge […] and accepts that matter is alive.’ (p. 666). There is a ‘priority given to difference, entanglement and undecidability’ as it challenges ‘the distance, separation and categorical assurance that shores up the self-mastery of the oedipal (male) subject of humanism. (Maclure, 2015, p. 5). The similarities between all three modes of thought have immense potential for (re)configuring \textit{life} whilst at the same time have their own sets of issues within their distinct trajectories. The most important differences, for myself, are the conceptual, ethical and political implications that feminist new materialisms engage with compared to the other two. For example, Graham Harman has yet to choose a political ‘side’ (almost deeming himself to be objectively politically neutral, which in my mind is an impossibility) as well as being a bit of a ‘boys club’ and Iovino and Oppermann seem to omit \textit{conceptual matter} in their theoretical musings. Iovino (2012) states, ‘matter is everything but a conceptual abstraction.’ (p. 51). Yet matter is indeed a conceptual abstraction. Even this question \textit{matters}. 
Materially-informed work is going on under a variety of names: material feminism, new materialism, new empiricism, posthuman studies, actor network theory, affect theory, process philosophy, the ontological turn. It has been mobilised by theorists such as Karen Barad (2007), Gilles Deleuze (2004), Patricia Clough (2009), Donna Haraway (2007), Myra Hird (2009), Brian Massumi (2002), Rosi Braidotti (2013), Vicki Kirby (2011), Bruno Latour (2004), Jane Bennett (2010) and Isabelle Stengers (2011). All of these scholars, in their different ways, insist on the significance of matter in social and cultural practices. There are also connections with indigenous philosophies, which are vitally attuned to matter. In such philosophies, ways of knowing and being rest on a fundamental acknowledgement of the agency of place and land, and relationality across human and non-human entities (Jones & Hoskins, 2013; Turk, 2014). (pp. 3-4).

Likewise, language performs because it is physical and alive. As such, the scholarship that follows it ‘is ‘material-semiotic’ or ‘material-discursive’ (Haraway 1988, Barad 2007).’ (New Materialism, 2016, n.p.). Language isn’t inert matter controlled by human agency, it enacts through the intra-relational capacities of extended bodies. Whereas a ‘framework of representation [...] treats research topics from the outside, [...] new materialism demonstrates how scholars (from all disciplinary and interdisciplinary fields) are in fact part of the phenomena that they study’ (New Materialism, 2016, n.p.) because ‘the agencies of observation are inseparable from that which is observed’ (Barad, 2012a, p. 6). Steering clear of Kantian representationalism and Cartesian thinking, new materialist researchers frame themselves as part of the ethical entanglement of how matter comes to matter (Barad, 2007), creating ‘a more ethical research practice’ (Quinn, 2013, p. 740).

The aliveness and performativity of matter can be exampled by the physical (ex)changes that are occurring right now between you and these words. For example, if you happen to be one of the authors that I cite or quote here, in this thesis/play, note how your physicality alters as I discuss your work (do you smile, frown, blush as I might or are you habitualised to this sort of staging?).

**Snippet 4:** Intra-actions of you-snippet.
If we employ an ‘externalist’ view of cognition and mind (both ‘embodied’ and ‘extended’), one that is an ‘extracranial’ and a ‘transcranial process’ (see Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Malafouris, 2013, pp. 57-58; Manzotti, 2011a, pp. 15-36; and Rowlands, 2010, pp. 51-84, for overviews); a New Materialist view that ‘decentres the human and emphasises the co-constitutive power of matter’ (Taylor & Ivinson, 2013, p. 666) and how the mind is material and embodied (see Coole & Frost, 2010, pp. 1-43; and Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, pp. 13-16, for overviews); and a contemporary animist view of ‘bringing things back to life’ (Ingold, 2013a, p. 225), where animated relations come to life in a world much more than human (see Harvey, 2013, for an overview), it must change our understanding and practice regarding mental health and wellbeing (for example, see Adelson (2000) for a unique description of the ‘Health and Politics of Cree Well-Being’). It also becomes a very pressing ethical issue as it implicates and imbricates physical processes outside of our own head (or organic skin) regarding our personal mental health. These processes are spread topologically75 to include political decisions, architecture, land management, societal consumption, noise, institutional parity, monoculture practices, mobile phones, etc. I use this troika of philosophies of immanence to ‘think with’ (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012), as a sort of contact lens to explore the empirical materials. However, as I am limited in space to explain these philosophies in more detail, I hope their influence seeps through this thesis’ pours as I think and write with them and attempt to wrestle with the bricolage that co-emerges.

So, I look to (and think with) philosophies of immanence as an attempt to break free from the Cartesian trap of self-other or nature-culture dichotomies that reify transcendent and static modes of thought and practice regarding notions of self, agency and mental health, ontologies that conceive of agency as distributed rather than bound within a subjective, isolated and essentialised self for a superego to determine his76 own destiny.

---

75 ‘Topology focuses on the […] inherent connectivity of objects while ignoring their detailed form. Because of this abstraction from the detailed form, it is possible to define the “objects” of topology as “topological spaces”’. (Braungardt, 2016, para. 3)

76 I say ‘his’ on purpose due to the ‘humanistic arrogance of continuing to place Man at the centre of world history’ (Braidotti, 2013, p. 23)
What is needed is a robust account of the materialization of all bodies—“human” and “nonhuman”—and the material-discursive practices by which their differential constitutions are marked. This will require an understanding of the nature of the relationship between discursive practices and material phenomena, an accounting of “nonhuman” as well as “human” forms of agency, and an understanding of the precise causal nature of productive practices that takes account of the fullness of matter’s implication in its ongoing historicity. (Barad, 2003, p. 810)
Environ(Mental) Health Assemblage Two: Embodied walls and extended skins

Interméde: A topological Syuzhet

This distant assemblage follows the non-linear path of this topologically distributed play and appears as a chapter in the forthcoming book Street Art of Resistance, edited by Sarah Awad and Brady Wagoner (Mcphie, in press). It explores tataus77 and graffiti as they came up in conversation quite a few times within the ‘Walking in Circles’ (WiC) research group and two tattoos in particular caught my attention as they were spoken about by the owners of them with more emotional elation than conversations surrounding them. So I chose to follow this line of affect. It is an important assemblage in that it helped me to formulate a deeper understanding of Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) notion of the ‘Body without Organs’ (BwO) as a move away from Merleau-Ponty’s ‘flesh’:

We have to reject the age-old assumptions that put the body in the world and the seer in the body, or, conversely, the world and the body in the seer as in a box. Where are we to put the limit between the body and the world, since the world is flesh? Where in the body are we to put the seer, since evidently there is in the body only “shadows stuffed with organs,” that is, more of the visible? (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 138)

I’ve included this quote due to the insight Merleau-Ponty gleaned with his concept ‘flesh of the earth’ but swiftly depart from it as he believed this extended flesh to be non-material. I believe it is material. At this point, I jump on board with Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) notion of the ‘body without organs’ (BwO). ‘The BwO is an assemblage of forces, desires, and intensities that attempts to conceive the relations between subjectivity, society and environment differently, to see what the forces acting through life do rather than describe what life is’ (Goodchild, 1996, cited in Mazzei, 2016, p. 153).

77 Tattoo comes from ‘tatau’, a Samoan/Tahitian word for mark.
This particular assemblage also helped me conceive ‘Inorganic skin’ and an ‘Extended Body Hypothesis’ (EBH). A snippet taken directly from this chapter/assemblage briefly explains these ideas and hopefully teases you, the spectator, to read the rest of this topological refrain away from the more static production of the thesis that you are currently engaging with.

Our visual organic skin creates an illusory belief that that is where we end and the rest of the environment begins. Yet inorganic skin is permeable. The verisimilitude of Western conceptions of organic skin tampers with the state’s empathy and ethical judgements when it comes to perceptions of graffiti or tags. It does this by imagining or projecting the idea that certain graffiti and (especially) tags are simple anti-social acts of vandalism or absent minded disobedience to authority that are completely disembodied and detached from the ‘perpetrator’ or discounting any notion that our mental health may be related, in some way, to the inscriptions (as mental is not even conceived as physical and so not as vital as the organic body). Also, if it is ‘sold’ as this, it means that it is much easier to control, remove or even assimilate under the capitalist, corporate and/or state appropriation of space and subjectivity (bodies). Some graffiti are whitewashed over—yet another, homogenised type of graffiti (although I’m positive that the whitewasher would disagree)—whilst other forms of graffiti are approved, funded and assimilated into the state machine by adopting them in order to control them and the ideas they may encourage, a branded form of art that tames rather than questions, traces rather than maps and is linear rather than diffractive. However, this is nothing less than a form of dermabrasion (forcibly removing a tatau), a violation of our extended inorganic, topological skin; our body.

Snippet 5: Inorganic Skin (Mcphie, in press).
(Intra-)Act 2: The birth of rhizoanalytic post-qualitative co-operative action (re)search

It was like living in a time warp as we responded to those who were “paradigms behind” (Patton, 2008, p. 269), those who had missed all the turns—e.g., the social turn, the cultural turn, the linguistic turn, the postmodern turn, and so on. (St. Pierre, 2014, p. 2).

The dominant paradigms that have forced their hand in the world of academia need an overhaul to find better stories than the current one being traced repeatedly, on a tape loop, as we attempt to ‘produce different knowledge and produce knowledge differently.’ (St. Pierre, 1997, p. 175). This becomes an ethical imperative of what we can do.

This act describes a non-methodology. It intra-acts with some of the posts and (dis)re-gards most of the re’s, as it weaves in and out of the underpinning ontology of immanence that I have chosen to think with (or has chosen to think with me). It explains how I chanced upon (and merged) post-qualitative co-operative action (re)search to inquire with, along with the analytical devices of ‘rhizoanalysis’ and ‘environ(mental) health assemblages’78. It also gives a little background to ‘psychogeography’ as a useful political-psychological tool to walk/explore with.

When we speak about “presentation” or “presenting,” one has to consider that presenting itself is a performance (Denzin, 1997), a new construction, a way of “framing reality” (Denzin, 1997, pp. 224-225) and not a pure representation of an outside reality. […] Just like in the speaking, in the writing we give birth to our selves and the selves of others (also those of our participants!). (Sermijn, Devlieger & Loots, 2008, p. 15)

Scene one: Diffractive productions

---

78 The reasoning for the production of the Brechtian play assemblage, Liverpool ONE-Liverpool Too’ is explained in the ‘programme’ as a complimentary play script to accompany this PhD thesis/play.
‘Art does not reproduce the visible but makes visible.’ (Klee, 1961, p. 76)

The ‘places’ we inhabit or visit also become our embodied and/or extended selves as we experience them and our (un)consciousness’ integrate and merge with their unique spatio-temporal characteristics to form unique rhizomes, events, assemblages or becomings (after Deleuze and Guattari). For many animists the ‘land is not just seen as shaping or influencing identity, but being an actual part of it’ (Wilson, 2003, p. 88) and as it is constantly morphing into something new, research into environ(mental) health and well-becoming may have to be contextualised with each new presentation.

Inquiries that are supported by an ontology of immanence, such as Deleuze’s ‘transcendental empiricism’79, communicate the need to experiment with life not as a subject, but as a haecceity (Colebrook, 2002; Waterhouse, 2011). Therefore, the corresponding epistemology is very different from positivist (or post-positivist) paradigms of empiricism which place the thinking subject as the basis of experience (Waterhouse, 2011). Transcendental empiricism is ‘a creative endeavour that focuses on the thoughts and ideas that may be produced by experiences, by an event’ (Waterhouse, 2011, p. 125). It is a diffractive endeavour (after Haraway and Barad).

A diffractive methodology, then, encourages new ways of thinking about and relating to data and meaning-making. It offers a critical practice of interference which pays attention to what we don’t normally see, to what is excluded (Taylor, 2013b, p. 692)

So how does this diffractive ontology of immanence influence my own research epistemology? In agreement with Alvermann (2000), St. Pierre (2004, 2011), Masny (2006) and Waterhouse (2011), I have experienced an almost complete breakdown of the structure of conventional interpretative qualitative inquiry within my own research journey as I have tried to overcome ‘the pervasiveness of received understandings of

---

79 Transcendental empiricism is not ‘an abstract, supplementary framework into which immanence can be fitted; it is not ‘the transcendent’ (Deleuze 2001a: 26)’ (Coleman & Ringrose, 2013, p. 10). Instead, Deleuze (2001) describes it as ‘a haecceity no longer of individuation but of singularisation: a life of pure immanence’ (p. 29), allowing for the possibility of an ethics of immanence regarding the construction of a self.
key research terms: method, data, analysis, reporting of findings, knowledge’ (Waterhouse, 2011, pp. 125-126), variables, coding, categorising, participants, etc. The belief in re-presentational empirical phenomena as ways of finding the truth for best practice are engrained in our culture.

**Scene two: The birth of post-qualitative inquiry**

Qualitative inquiry was born out of a positivistic paradigm, and as such has failed to escape it at the ontological level. For example, both validity and credibility are judged against a set of rules and voices that came into use in England during the 1550’s for validity—from middle French validité (Harper, 2016c)—and during the 1590’s for credibility—from the medieval Latin credibilitas (Harper, 2016d). By assuming that research is credible, we are also assuming that the ideals of the institutional paradigm we are measuring that credibility by are set or fixed and true. When this credibility is challenged, perhaps by a different culture, it often performs with oppressive consequences, as recorded in the annals of anthropological imperialism.

*Post-qualitative inquiry* (see St. Pierre, 2011, 2014 and Lather & St. Pierre, 2013 for a full description) seeks to destabilise this oppressive representational trend of knowledge re-production. These emerging novel methodologies challenge the researcher to produce knowledge differently by ‘refusing a closed system for fixed meaning’ in order to ‘keep meaning on the move’ (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012, p. i). These problematic fixed meanings could involve ‘mechanistic coding’, which St. Pierre (2011, p. 622) infers ‘is a positivist social science of the 1920’s and 1930’s’), or ‘reducing data to themes’, which Jackson and Mazzei (2012) suggest ‘do little to critique the complexities of social life’ as ‘such simplistic approaches preclude dense and multi-layered treatment of data’ (p. i). ‘But to convert what we owe to the world into ‘data’ that we have extracted from it is to expunge knowing from being.’ (Ingold, 2013b, p. 5).

Even Norman Denzin (of Denzin and Lincoln fame) has jumped on the post-qualitative bandwagon by performing a critique of the concept ‘data’ in his paper entitled, *The Death of Data?* (2013): ‘Data are Dead. Data died a long time ago, but few noticed.’ (p. 353). The ‘reader is asked to imagine a world without data, a world without method, a world without a hegemonic politics of evidence’ (Denzin, 2013, p. 353). He suggests that data have agency, are not passive and concludes that ‘the word data should
be outlawed; replaced by William James term empirical materials’ (Denzin, 2013, p. 355), even though that term is ‘almost’ as problematic if taken to mean the ‘empirical’ of the enlightenment project. ‘If a word is data, isn’t a code (a word) data as well? Do we code codes?’ (St. Pierre, 2011, p. 622).

Lather and St. Pierre (2013) endorse post-qualitative research pointing out that ‘we have become so attached to our invention - qualitative research - that we have come to think it is real’, asking, ‘have we forgotten that we made it up?’ (Lather & St. Pierre, 2013, p. 631). ‘The argument is basically that a new form of research is needed to engage meaningfully with the world philosophized as an assemblage or a mangle.’ (Greene, 2013, p. 755). Honan (2014) and MacLure (2013) advocate moving beyond a focus on language towards a materially engaged discourse that is ‘non-representational, non-interpretive, a-signifying [and] a-subjective’ (MacLure, 2013, p. 663). A growing number of discontented researchers do provide alternative non-, post- or anti-representational methodologies that could potentially be nominated to fit under the post-qualitative umbrella (for example, see Davies et al., 2013; Dewsbury, 2003; Doel & Clarke, 2007; Honan, 2014; Jackson, 2013; Latham, 2003; Law, 2004: Lefebvre, 2004; Lenz Taguchi, 2013; Lorimer, 2008; Martin & Kamberelis, 2013; Patchet, 2010; Pickering, 1993; Thrift, 2008; Whatmore, 2006). Additionally, following this unruly trend, Laws (forthcoming) calls for a ‘magical realist human geography’ as a disruptive tool, to enchant research with mental health users and as a (re)action to her scepticism of ‘evidence based’ discourse (e.g. what makes ‘best evidence’ best?).

Post-qualitative inquiry is now gaining ground in qualitative research handbooks and journals (see Honan & Bright, 2016; Jackson & Mazzei, 2012; St. Pierre, 2011; St. Pierre & Lather, 2013; St. Pierre, Jackson & Mazzei, 2016). However, critiquing post-qualitative inquiry, Jennifer Greene ‘expresses concerns: first, about whether post-qualitative research can still be considered research; second, where it is going; and third, what is being lost in the new inquiry’ (Lather & St. Pierre, 2013, p. 632). Greene (2013) imagines post-qualitative inquiry ‘as a kind of retreat into the mind’ (p. 753, emphasis added). I think the Cartesian ghost still haunts Greene’s (2013) onto-epistemological position as she perceives post-qualitative inquiries as challenging her mind, but not engaging her body (p. 754). But thinking with extended minds or new materialisms, for example, flips this understanding around to encompass a mental wideware of the environment (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), highlighting Spinoza’s point of the mind as an idea of the body (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012). Therefore, I would counter Greene’s
stance with an affirmation that post-qualitative inquiries are more like a transgressive, diffractive and ethico-political advance out of the non-physical mind and into a physical world other than merely human. This physical world involves intra-acting with other materials. ‘Different sensor modalities have different sizes. Furthermore, due to the use of devices and tools, we can artificially modify the size of our conscious experience’ (Manzotti, 2008, n. p.). Therefore, the devices and tools of the research process itself become our extended selves.

If the measurement intra-action plays a constitutive role in what is measured, then it matters how something is explored. In fact, this is born out empirically in experiments with matter (and energy): when electrons (or light) are measured using one kind of apparatus, they are waves; if they are measured in a complementary way, they are particles. Notice that what we’re talking about here is not simply some object reacting differently to different probings but being differently. What is at issue is the very nature of nature. (Barad, 2012a, pp. 6-7)

For me, good research would involve attending to that imperceptible point that we can’t quite focus on; we know it’s there because we can see it momentarily, fleetingly, peripherally out of the corner of our vision but when we move to view it full on, fovially, it disappears and we soon forget about it. As soon as we try to put it into words, it changes its physicality and morphs into something new, something mythological.

If we cease to privilege knowing over being; if we refuse positivist and phenomenological assumptions about the nature of lived experience and the world; if we give up representational and binary logics; if we see language, the human, and the material not as separate entities mixed together but as completely imbricated “on the surface” – if we do all that and the “more” it will open up – will qualitative inquiry as we know it be possible? Perhaps not. (Lather & St. Pierre, 2013, pp. 629-630)

Scene three: The death of the author
‘Nomads are always in the middle . . . Nomads have no history, they only have geography.’ (Deleuze & Parnet, 2007, p. 31)

For the reader, appearances can be deceptive, for the author ‘appears’ without a history, yet history has written ‘through’ the author. The agent does not write the document alone. Nor does a structure (societal, psychological, political, etc.) determine the agential intent alone. But moving forward from Deleuze’s (1995) comment that we always write ‘with someone else you can’t always name’ (p. 141), I will assert that writing is an act (act one) that is co-produced by many ‘things’/events/phenomena/materials/processes; the writer, other people, events, the pen, the paper, the temperature of the room (at the time of writing as well as at the time that the writer was (re)membering), the computer, the keyboard, the walls, the background noises, the flow of blood around the writer’s body, the flow (or lack of) of air in the environment at the time of writing (and at the time of (re)membering), the chair, the toothache, the indigestion, the elation of a certain memory, the odour of perfume, the feel of plastic, plastic, and even the reader. In a similar way, reading is also an act (act two) that is co-produced by many ‘things’.

William Faulkner’s (1936) American civil war novel, Absalom, Absalom, highlighted and played with the idea of multiple viewpoints/narratives that are constantly revised through time and are not necessarily sequential so that one truthful historical objective account is thus rendered irrecoverable. The implication here is that although re-constructions of the past are irretrievable and inventive as ‘no one individual can look at truth’, Faulkner suggests there is ‘a’ truth and a reader can ultimately know it (Hobson, 2003, p. 290). Thus, in one sense the author dies and the reader is born (although the author is still alive in another sense as they (literally) merge with the reader). For me, this novel speaks volumes regarding a critique of almost all research paradigms. Thus, ‘the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author’ (Barthes, 1977, pp. 147-148).

**Scene four: The birth of post-qualitative co-operative action (re)search**

Looking back now, I know that I read Deleuze so early in my doctoral program that the ontology of humanist qualitative methodology could never
make sense. For me and others like me, that methodology was ruined from
the start, though we didn’t quite know it at the time. (St. Pierre, 2014, p. 3)

Although I came to co-operative action research before I stumbled upon post-qualitative
inquiry (non)methods, I found that they merged together rather well, once I decided to
throw the methodological, cyclical and reflective co-operative action research rule book
out of the window and began to work a little more intuitively, diffractively and
rhizomatically.

The original aims of the co-operative action research inquiry were to gain insight
into how perceptions of environments may influence health and well-being and to
explore an alternative to mainstream approaches to understanding therapeutic landscape
research and practice. The intention was to inform health professionals on the nature of
effective interventions in a variety of environments and to help co-participants gain a
deeper insight into how the concept of health and wellbeing is understood when it is
thought of as ‘distributed’ in the environment. I realised that ‘the researcher’ could
never position themselves outside of the research and so becoming a co-participant
seemed like the obvious choice to make, just as the volunteers became co-(re)searchers.

I began: “This is an intersubjective/interobjective inquiry, within and of
organisms-environments in order to explore how perceptions of environments influence
health and well-being (well-becoming)!” I needed a method that suited the
intersubjective/interobjective nature and emergent process of exploratory experiential
investigation. I also wanted it to be transformative to help inform participants of the
most suitable actions to take (for themselves) considering their engagements with
environments (whether assumed to be ‘restorative’ or not). The most obvious direction
to take at the time was the Action Turn.

Reason and Torbert (2001) state that the purpose of the Action Turn in action
research is, ‘to forge a more direct link between intellectual knowledge and moment-
to-moment personal and social action, so that inquiry contributes directly to the
flourishing of human persons, their communities, and the ecosystems of which they are
part’ (p. 4-5). This model cycles between action and reflection (Transfer 15).
Heron and Reason (2001) took action research down a more participatory path with their ‘co-operative inquiry’ (see p. 180 for a detailed description), that is conducted with rather than on or for other people. This ethic seemed to sit better with me than Kurt Lewin’s (1946) original action research structure, even though there were/are still evident issues of facilitative power relations between academic researchers and non-academic co-researchers (discussed later). This approach was also more fitting with relation to complexity theory (Reason & Goodwin, 1999), which appears throughout more recent and relevant work regarding Deleuzian inspired psychoanalytic research (for example, see Dodds, 2011) as well as therapeutic landscapes research with a relational focus on place and complexity (for example, see Cummins, Curtis, Diez-Roux & Macintyre, 2007, for an overview of this literature).

**Initial transgressions**

I initially intended to follow the inquiry skills and validity guidelines as suggested in Heron and Reason’s (2001) *The Practice of Co-Operative Inquiry* (p.184) in order to ensure authenticity during the research. I applied a Dionysian and informative inquiry structure to my co-operative action research and asked ‘critical friends’ to help with managing divergence and convergence within and between cycles, balancing reflection.
and action, challenging uncritical subjectivity and intersubjectivity, managing unaware projections (and displaced anxiety), maintaining/making clear my different roles (as researcher and facilitator) and resolving any conflicts that might arise between them (Heron & Reason, 2001). I attempted not to ‘set up’ the inquiry but to ‘facilitate its emergence’ (Reason & Goodwin, 1999). However, I found this to be increasingly problematic as I progressed. There were a few reasons for this. The first was the obvious inaccessible language I was tracing from this template. In the first meeting (02-05-13), I witnessed stunned faces as I reeled off the methodological instructions. I think this put a few people off. The only reason I imagine many of the co-participants/co-(re)searchers stayed with the project was due to this quote from Heron and Reason (2001) owing to its inspiring and empowering co-operative approach:

> We believe that good research is research conducted with people rather than on people. We believe that ordinary people are quite capable of developing their own ideas and can work together in a co-operative inquiry group to see if these ideas make sense of their world and work in practice. (p. 179)

Of course it’s never entirely with people. There are issues of facilitative power that cannot simply be ignored or placed under erasure (as in the ‘bracketing’ method of phenomenology or IPA). Although collaborative action research attempts to disrupt this power imbalance by sharing the research, it may still subject the co-participants/co-(re)searchers to the ‘us-and-them’ binary in a multitude of ways. For example, in my research I held power through material legitimacy (minibus, cameras, laptop) and social hierarchy through my words (at first, the academic inaccessibility of the language of co-operative action research that I spoke to them and secondly by the fact that it is ‘me’ writing it up as academic journal articles, ‘me’ who gets the funding to go to epistemologically inaccessible conferences and by the very fact that it was I who introduced the research to them). This does not mean that they did not hold power over

---

80 Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) was the method I had originally used in my practice inquiry (see Mcphie, 2015a). This was useful as I learned a great deal about the futility of attempting to be objective in research and naively imagining that the meanings I had gathered through my coded interpretations were perhaps more trustworthy or rigorous that ignoring the rules of chopping and hierarchizing and just ‘going with the flow’.
me also. However, it is a different form of power, one that may not repress me in the same way that repression exists for some of the co-participants.

In critiquing Foucault and Deleuze, Spivak writes that Foucault’s followers follow him, ‘[b]ecause of the power of the word ‘power’…’ (Spivak, 1988, p. 69), something which she accuses him of not attending to (even though the same could easily be said about Spivak, especially regarding her appropriation of the plight of the Dalit caste in India). Members of the WiC group may have no access to the cultural imperialism of much of modern English society. But by saying a words name (Spivak’s ‘subaltern’, Foucault’s ‘power’ or Freire’s ‘oppressed’), it gives it power and with that power, to misquote Spiderman (or even Winston Churchill), comes great responsibility! By placing a person in such a group, by calling them subaltern, oppressed, disempowered, it can suppress or increase their power, yet in very different ways. For example, I initially attempted to explain and interpret Blondie’s tattoo but found her voice missing from the interpretation (see assemblage 2). So my story is weighed down by my historiography and as such may well rob Blondie’s own voice and treat her as dispossessed. Fortunately, due to the nature of the co-operative method of inquiry (I constantly reinforced my assumptions by discussing them with the co-participants/co-(re)searchers) as well as highlighting this power (and not bracketing it), it helped me to notice when I slipped into this role more easily. It helped me to be reflexive with my own academic performance, but I needed to become much more diffractive if I was to attempt transgression.

Transgressive diffractions

A representational issue with the action-reflection model (Transfer 15) is the fallacy of the ‘intermediate entity’ (Manzotti, 2010) within the ‘distinct person’ that we imagine we experience life through as opposed to experiencing life directly (as a haecceity). Haraway (1997) problematized reflexivity in a similar fashion:

Reflexivity has been recommended as a critical practice, but my suspicion is that reflexivity, like reflection, only displaces the same elsewhere, setting up worries about copy and original and the search for the authentic and really real (p. 16).
Haraway clarifies that reflexivity ‘reproduces a situation that automatically seeks one dominant perspective’ and ‘this reflection or displacement of the same hides the interests and position of the viewer behind a veil of objectivity’ (Busch, 2015, n.p.). As suitable alternatives, Donna Haraway (1997, 2000) suggests ‘diffraction’ and ‘interference’ rather than reflection or reflexivity:

Diffraction patterns record the history of interaction, interference, reinforcement, difference. Diffraction is about heterogeneous history, not about originals. Unlike reflections, diffractions do not displace the same elsewhere […] Rather, diffraction can be a metaphor for another kind of critical consciousness, […] one committed to making a difference and not to repeating the Sacred Image of Same. (Haraway, 1997, p. 273).

Although both are accepted as optical phenomena, Karen Barad (2007) also prefers diffraction over reflection as it is ‘marked by patterns of difference’ rather than reflecting ‘the themes of mirroring and sameness’ and it attends and responds to ‘the details and specificities of relations of difference and how they matter’ (p. 71). Both Haraway (1997, 2000) and Barad (2007) point out that thinking with a diffraction pattern is not an attempt to map the appearance of differences but rather the effects of where differences appear.

I prefer the concept ‘transgression’81! Similar to diffraction, this practice disturbs historicity rather than follows history, inscribes mapping rather than traces copies, produces rather than represents, generates variance rather than shadows replication and creates rather than interprets. ‘We push the edges of academic acceptability not because we want to be accepted within the academy but in order to transform it.’ (Brown & Strega, 2005, p. 2). I accept Foucault and Deleuze’s critique of the ‘transgressive subject’ as holding the potential to be reactive rather than creative (MacCormack, 2009, p. 138) but the difference (that makes a difference) is how transgression works for ‘me’ (differently). I conceive transgression as providing more

81 Transgression is an act that disrupts traditional codes of conduct and overlaps boundaries uncomfortably. St. Pierre (1997) has previously used ‘transgressive data’ (emotional, dream, sensual and response data) to ‘shift the epistemologies that define the possibilities of qualitative research’ (St. Pierre, 1997, p. 175) and Eagleton (1981) highlighted its radical potential to counter, criticise, disrupt and denaturalise the existing social order (cited in O’Neill & Seal, 2012).
of an anarchic political push on the road to ‘becoming an anti-oppressive researcher’ (Potts & Brown, 2005, pp. 255-286) than the more erudite diffraction. So, perhaps a continuous attempt to think with them both may produce affirmative rather than reactive disruptions. Either way, I’ll continue to let it stew and see what happens whilst keeping a close eye on what it might do.

Thinking with diffractive methodologies (see van der Tuin, 2014) and transgressive (post-structural) methodologies (see Brown & Strega, 2005; Strega, 2005; St. Pierre, 1997), my inquiry attempts to disruptively map ‘the relationship between discursive practices and the material world’ (Barad, 2007, p. 94). Barad’s agential realism, Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism, Bennett’s vital materiality, Thrift’s non-representational theory all support diffractive or transgressive analytical techniques and have all influenced my thinking to some extent during this inquiry process.

I also diverted from the recommended practice of co-operative inquiry due to the ill-fitting concepts of validity, authenticity, cyclical reflections, interpretations, analysis and theming/categorizing of the data within the project. None of this language seemed to ‘fit’. Whenever I started to use any of these concepts, I became increasingly uncomfortable with their implications concerning what they did to the inquiry itself: tracing well-worn Occidental traditions in research, chopping, chunking, hierarchizing, giving them ‘what they ask for’ (Honan & Bright, 2016, p. 7) and sucking up to the esteemed concept of rigour that Leonardo imagined would find a truth that surpassed other truths.

**Letting go of the ‘I’**

Eventually, I found myself letting go of that academic tension. I relaxed, limbered up, threw away my parachute and (in the tradition of psychogeography) let the empirical materials take me for a walk.

‘In short, we will all begin to create stories’ (Ingold, 2011, p. 153).

---

82 Although Barad’s and Deleuze’s ontologies have been criticised as being incompatible and incommensurable due to fundamental differences between Deleuze’s immanent and Barad’s transcendent thinking (see Hein, 2015), I find them both extremely useful in their performativity.
St. Pierre (2011) tells us that even the post-structuralists would find it difficult to take the ‘I’ out of the research. But in post-structural accounts, ‘the participants are not an “epistemological dead-end” (Sommer, 1994, p. 532)—an object of knowledge—but rather a line of flight that takes us elsewhere—participants as provocateurs’ (St. Pierre, 2011, p. 620). In this type of (re)search, each (re)searcher will undoubteldly create their own ‘remix, mash-up, assemblage, a becoming of inquiry that is not a priori, inevitable, necessary, stable, or repeatable but is, rather, created spontaneously in the middle of the task at hand, which is always already and, and, and….’ (St. Pierre, 2011, p. 620).

Elizabeth St. Pierre (2011) believes that ‘this has always been the case but that researchers have been trained to believe in and thus are constrained by the pre-given concepts/categories of the invented but normalized structure of “qualitative methodology”, its “designs” and “methods”, that are as positivist as they are interpretive, often more so’ (p. 620). This is how I came to rhizoanalysis…created spontaneously in the middle of my research! I hadn’t ‘planned’ it beforehand; I hadn’t prepared it so that the research would take this path. I simply couldn’t find a suitable method of ‘analysis’ until ‘it’ came to me as I came to it simultaneously. This was a reciprocal affair.

*Interméde: A Snippit from Monica Waterhouse’s PhD*
My affective responses to data—actualized as surprise, discomfort, anger, empathy, joy, confusion—were immediate and immanent; sometimes happening before data were transcribed, sometimes even as they were being collected. These first reactions to data suggested moments that were—interesting, remarkable, or important. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991/1994, p.82), yet at the same time ineffable. Thus began the rhizoanalytic process with what may be called a gut-feeling, a hunch, or intuition. Semetsky (2004) elaborates the essential role of intuition in Deleuzian nomadic inquiry drawing on Peirce’s triadic semiotics stating, “The Firstness of intuition … is always already present within the Thirdness of cognition” (p.433). Thus intuition is a precognitive way of knowing. It is an affect, a feeling belonging to the —immediacy of experience’ (Semetsky, 2004, p.434) and which necessarily underpins all subsequent cognitive processes: thinking, connections, analysis, synthesis. Marks (2006) has also written about why intuition is absolutely vital to a Deleuzian - Guattarian nomad science, this time citing Bergson whose work much influenced Deleuze. “For Bergson, [conventional] analysis ‘focuses on the immobile dimensions of the world, whereas intuition ‘offers a route into a richer understanding of the mobility that characterizes the … world’ (Marks, 2006, p.8); paths that may be opened by rhizoanalysis. (Waterhouse, 2011, pp. 130-131).

Snippit 6: Affect and Intuition

Scene five: Rhizoanalysis: A (non)method83 for analysing the empirical materials

Interméde: A topological Syuzhet

Rhizoanalysis is explained in my published paper written with my friend Dave Clarke and as such I will only introduce it briefly here. However, I politely urge you to read the description (see Clarke & Mcphie, 2015, pp. 11-13) as an extended inorganic limb to this more intense thesis body that you are currently reading.

83 ‘I use the term — (non)method because method could suggest a set of fixed procedures while the rhizome, on the contrary, is —open and connectable in all its dimensions; … susceptible to constant modification (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 12).’ (Waterhouse, 2011, p. 128)
Fabula

As I became more interested in the nomadic tentacles of rhizomatic inquiry (in 2013), I found other scholars who had also attempted similar transgressions away from re-search. ‘[W]e form a rhizome with our viruses, or rather our viruses cause us to form a rhizome with other animals.’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 11). It is now a growing trend:

What is rhizoanalysis? Rhizoanalysis is not a method; in other words, there is no one way to do rhizoanalysis. There are a number of approaches to rhizoanalysis in the literature (Clarke & McPhie, 2015; Cole, 2013; Dufresne, 2002; Fox & Alldred, 2015; Olsson, 2009; Sellers, 2013; Waterhouse, 2011). However, while there may be different approaches to rhizoanalysis, the ontology remains the same: subject decentered, immanence, and difference. (Masny, 2016, p. 4)

Putting it more succinctly (although I recognise the dangers in doing that), and drawing from Deleuze and Guattari (2004), Waterhouse (2011) asks researchers to:

• Produce knowledge as a creation rather than discover knowledge as an endpoint
• Pose questions rather than make claims
• Produce thinking rather than knowledge
• Palpate rather than understand
• Map (narrations) rather than trace (reality)
• Create rather than represent or interpret

A researcher could use vignettes, or in my case, ‘Snippets’, rather than categories so that the data are contextualised as opposed to coded and chunked through a process of indoctrinated interpretation. Also, the analysis is ‘post-humanist’ (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012) in that it doesn’t privilege the humanist self of the enlightenment project and as

84 Although vignettes and snippets are still guilty of chunking yet they perform in a very different way, especially if placed sous rature.
such we must acknowledge that we, as inquirers, are implicated and imbricated in the assemblage of the research itself, just as you are now.

The map does not reproduce [...] it constructs [...] it fosters connections [...] The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. [...] It can be drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of art, constructed as a political action, or as meditation. [...] A map has multiple entryways, as opposed to the tracing, which always comes back “to the same”. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, pp. 13-14)

**Thinking rhizomatically about action research**

‘If you know exactly what you are going to do, what is the point in doing it? (Picasso, undated)’ (cited in Amorim & Ryan, 2005, p. 589)

In their pedagogical study, *Deleuze, Action Research and Rhizomatic Growth*, Amorim and Ryan (2005) disrupted the field of traditional action research, ‘imagining a new epistemology (in which the concepts work rather than represent) and how the rhizome demands experimental forms of writing ourselves in action research’ (p. 588). They (2005) concentrated on a teacher, ‘Lucy, an allegedly weak evaluator, identifying the growth in the children in a range of ways, more rhizomatic than linear’ (p. 591) to reveal ‘[a] new cartography for action research, a new way of constructing space [...] that is nomadic in quality, unlike the striated space of action research cycles that is ‘coded, defined, bounded and limited.’ (p. 588).

In contrast to the control and power that was co-created within the masculinised chair-teacher assemblage in Taylor’s (2013b) observations, Amorim and Ryan (2005) found that through a ‘process of interactions, between teacher, birds, pupils, materials’, Lucy was ‘skilled in the cultivation of rhizomes’, who charted ‘lines of flight’ and allowed escape ‘for all involved’ (p. 591).

While she accepted the striated judgements of the academy, Lucy had also devised for herself and her pupils a better way, by occupying smooth space, charting her own territories, identifying her own lines of flight, in her
actions and her writing. In this way, she offers up similar possibilities for her pupils, for us as learners and, for the communities of action research: a richer possibility; a future growing at the edges; a richer way to view action research […] it is possible to resist forces and create the smooth space. (Amorim & Ryan, 2005, p. 591)

Ken Gale (2014) also engaged with a Deleuzian pedagogy in his ‘reworking of the theory and practice of action research’ that challenged ‘antecedent positions’ and helped generate ‘a more plural, reflexive and methodologically relevant pedagogy/research praxis.’ (Gale, 2014, p. 667). In these examples, Deleuzian rhizomes and assemblages were employed to think with and possess powers of deterritorialisation (Amorim & Ryan, 2005).

**Thinking rhizomatically about co-operative action research**

How does an inquirer think rhizomatically about co-operative action research? This was a challenge, when it came to me, because of all the inequities already inherent in the academic research machine. Co-operative action research was always inherently *striated* due to the oppressive forces of academia, evident in epistemological and socio-economic access issues I came across ranging from conferences to publications. During the inquiry process, I always had *in the back of my mind*, the ghostly echo of ‘research with, rather than on, people’. How could they possibly be an *equal* partner in this hierarchical process? I put this to the WiC group and the resounding response was, ‘you get what you want from this and we get what we want’ (Dolly). Okay, this made sense, to a certain degree\(^{85}\), but how could I reveal ‘their’ voices without subjecting them to my own interpretations and supposed representations? How could I present the point that this was not *the truth*, a re-presentation or even *re*-search without contracting *interpretosis* or *RigourMortis*? My way out was to place the entire PhD under erasure, not by placing a line through it, as that would make it a little too difficult to consume, but by constructing the skeletal structure of it as a play (hence acts and scenes) and adding another play within that play. This reasoning is fully discussed in the

---

\(^{85}\) I say ‘to a certain degree’ because, as Berlant points out, ‘[e]ven when you get what you want, you can’t *have* what you want’ (Berlant, 2011, p. 266, emphasis added).
‘Programme’ for the play, *Liverpool ONE – Liverpool Too: A Therapeutic Tale of Two Cities*, which is provided for you as a complimentary play script alongside this PhD. ‘A rhizome can take the most diverse forms: from splitting and spreading in all directions on the surface to the form of bulbs and tubers.’ (Sermijn, Devlieger & Loots, 2008, p.6). The Brechtian play, is such a tuber. It is one of many *assemblages*, albeit an extravagant one.

**Scene six: Rhizomatic assemblages**

What is an assemblage? It is a multiplicity which is made up of many heterogeneous terms and which establishes liaisons, relations between them, across ages, sexes and reigns-different natures. Thus, the assemblage’s only unity is that of co-functioning (Deleuze & Parnet, 2002, p. 69)

Assemblages are ‘a temporary grouping of relations’, *lines of becoming* that are ‘always in process, changing, moving’ (Coleman & Ringrose, 2013, p. 9) and underscore emergence, multiplicity, indeterminacy, heterogeneity (Anderson & Mcfarlane, 2011) and immanence. Assemblages blur spatio-temporal binary divisions of structure-agency, organic-inorganic, artificial-natural, social-material, human-nonhuman, in-out and near-far (Anderson & Mcfarlane, 2011; DeLanda 2006). Anderson and Mcfarlane (2011) state ‘we could understand the contemporary enthusiasm for assemblage theory as a response to ambivalence toward the a priori reduction of social-spatial relations and processes to any fixed form or set of fixed forms’ (p. 124), including a move from the linguistic turn.

There are also important non-linguistic practices that make up society, as well as of course non-human elements that also shape society (viruses, bacteria, weeds or non-organic energy and material flows like wind and

---

86 ‘Assemblage’ is a somewhat uncomfortable translation of the original French agencement, which has the sense of ‘fitting out’ (Phillips 2006: 108) or of creating a collage of different elements. Both these aspects of agencement emphasise the act of making connections between disparate components.’ (Fox, 2011, p. 374)
ocean currents). In this model language itself becomes just another component part of a much larger system. (de Vega, n.d.b, p. 13)

According to Deleuze and Guattari, an assemblage is ‘an intensive network or rhizome displaying ‘consistancy’ or emergent effects by tapping into the ability of the self-ordering forces of heterogeneous material to mesh together (‘entrainment’ in complexity theory terms), as in the ‘man-horse-bow assemblage of the nomads’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987 [1980], p. 404, cited in Bonta & Protevi, 2004, p. 54). This man-horse-bow assemblage has many similarities with Gregory Bateson’s (2000) example of the blind man-stick-street87 (assemblage), as well as externalist examples such as, Malafouris’ (2008) potter-clay-wheel (assemblage) or Manzotti’s (2011c, p. 28) pencil-paper-mathematician (assemblage) and also animist examples such as, the Koyukon of Alaska’s name for the boreal owl, ‘perches in the lower part of spruce trees’ (Ingold, 2011, p. 169), which is an assemblage of (verbal) action-plus-environment—what Deleuze might call a haecceity of singularisation—rather than a static noun as subjective essentialised individuation. Before discussing these multiple assemblages in more depth, it is perhaps wise to explain what they are not.

**Assemblages are not ‘parts’ or ‘wholes’**.

A rhizome is an underground root system, a dynamic, open, decentralized network that branches out to all sides unpredictably and horizontally. A view of the whole is therefore impossible. […] With the principle of multiplicity, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the existence of a multiplicity that does not get reduced to a whole on subject or object level but rather only consists of definitions or dimensions. (Sermijn, Devlieger & Loots, 2008, p. 6)

Assemblages reconceptualise the Aristotelian whole-part relation. ‘No individual level of instance of the assemblage, whether individual, group, network, region, space, or

---

87 ‘If what you are trying to explain is a given piece of behavior, such as the locomotion of the blind man, then for this purpose, you will need the street, the stick, the man, the street, the stick, and so on, round and round.’ (Bateson, 2000, p. 459).
organisational entity, can be reduced to the sum of its parts’ (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, p. 6).

Assemblages should not be understood as a composite of forces that may somehow be disassembled to reveal each constituent element. On the contrary, assemblages are “intensive multiplicities” whereby each assembled element is transformed in its relations with other elements such that it no longer makes sense to speak of constituent parts (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 132). (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, pp. 4-5)

Assemblages are the mutually constitutive becoming of intra-relations. They are never parts or wholes as that would still imply ‘carving nature at its joints’. Instead, we focus on the intra-relations between the joints (joints which are more like conjoining, flowing tributaries than fixed points). Although DeLanda’s (2006) assemblage theory indicates that entities are ‘wholes whose properties emerge from the interactions between parts’ (p. 5), the focus of assemblages is not on notions of stabilised wholes or parts (as points or nodes) but on the interactions themselves (even though this word is problematic due to the obvious dissection that ‘inter’ infers, hence Barad’s preference for ‘intra’). These intra-actions are more like lines than points and as such are irreducible to each other.

For example, exploring Law and Hetherington’s (2000) point that ‘knowledge is a relational effect’ (p. 38, original emphasis), Camilla Hald’s (2011) study of criminal investigation in the Danish police used a theory of assemblages to conclude that epistemic webs do not emerge from a ‘weaver’, rather knowledge in this sense ‘becomes’ and is co-produced (and not simply ‘by’ humans). ‘Thus ‘actors’ are treated in the sense of ‘assemblages’’ (Hald, 2011, p. 25). In A Voice without Organs: Interviewing in Posthumanist Research, Mazzei (2013) explains:

For Deleuze and Guattari, that kind of human being is an assemblage, an entanglement, a knot of forces and intensities that operate on a plane of immanence and that produce a voice that does not emanate from a singular subject but is produced [...] in an enactment among researcher-data-participants-theory-analysis. (p. 733)
As a consequence, ‘individuals may be regarded as assemblages of sub-personal components’ (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, p. 5). Doolin, Lamprou, Mitev and McLeod (2014) propose that assemblages help ‘to conceptualize the contingent interactions of different components […] in a more continually dynamic perspective’ where the ‘constant dynamic interaction continuously shapes and re-shapes the […] structure’ and ‘allows for the possibility of open configuration, continuous connections, not in an inextricable combination of interrelated parts…’ (p. 97, emphasis added, sous rature added). And so assemblages are not ‘parts’ or ‘wholes’, they are the conjunctions between. They are intra-relations. In this way, the parts are conceived as fluid and intra-relational rather than static and circumscribed. Assemblages also include materiality in their forces of encounter. They emphasise the interplay and importance of what Jane Bennett calls the thinginess of things. Therefore, working with assemblages in research processes (and with an emphasis on the research assemblage itself) ‘may allow for new ways of approaching unresolved problems in psychological inquiry, such as the realism-constructivism impasse’ (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, p. 3). Masny (2013, p. 341) states:

An assemblage can be constituted by teachers, classmates, researcher, computers, classrooms, and more [sic]. The subject is in the assemblage no more, no less important than the other elements in the assemblage. The elements in the assemblage construct relationships to each other once they come together in the actual. There is no a priori or pre-given relationship among elements in the assemblage.

‘Masny’s (2013) description of a rhizomatic map as an assemblage make the practicalities of engaging in rhizoanalysis more apparent’ as ‘any elements can be brought together’ (Clarke & Mcphie, 2015, p. 13). Anything and everything becomes empirical. Following Strom (2013), immanence is central to this approach and as such there is nothing in the data to be ‘found.’ Instead, ‘findings are produced through a mapping activity – drawing lines that connect the multiple acts, actions, activities, events, and artifacts that constitute the data-set’ (Martin & Kamberelis, 2013, p. 676, emphasis added). This way of working with the empirical materials ‘opens the researcher up to risk, embraces uncertainty, expresses something of the fragility of composition’ (Anderson & McFarlane, 2011, p. 126). ‘The assemblage thus articulates
the real in new ways, it tells a story in the manner after Ingold (2011), crossing the boundaries that classification and categorisation create.’ (Clarke & Mephie, 2015, p. 13). What is produced are ‘new assemblages of desire, of machines, and of statements, that insert themselves into the old assemblages and break with them’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1986, p. 83, cited in Anderson & McFarlane, 2011, p. 126). What is described-created (one move) is a story.

So, what do these multiple assemblages look like and how might they be constructed?

**Assemblage/Externalism**

‘the mind as an assemblage means that relations between components of the mind are only contingent, not constitutive.’ (de Vega, n.d.b p. 11). Eva Perez de Vega (n.d.b) makes the link between assemblages and Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH) by asserting that:

> what they are claiming is consistent with the idea of a coupled system being an assemblage not a totality: it is a new emergent whole which cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts. In the same way that brain-bound cognition cannot be reduced to the sum of all the different neural connections, the properties of the coupled system Otto+notebook cannot be reduced to the addition of the properties of the notebook and the properties of Otto. (pp. 11-12).

de Vega (n.d.b) believes the ‘mind-as-an-assemblage model’, fits perfectly with Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) EMH as it ‘provides a way of understanding the complexity of the whole mind without reducing it to its micro-level parts’ (p. 12). ‘Under this view cognition is a capacity, and as such is relational: it can affect and be affected by something external to itself.’ (de Vega, n.d.b, p. 12). de Vega (n.d.b) compared assemblage theory with connectionism and neural network theory to ‘conclude that what is important in a new conception of the mind is the connections between the parts,

---

88 ‘The central principle of connectionism is that mental phenomena can be described as emergent processes of interconnected networks made up of simple units. Neural networks are the most common model used to illustrate this.’ (de Vega, n.d.b, p. 16)
not the parts themselves.’ (de Vega, n.d.b, p. 16, emphasis added). Although the parts themselves are always already connections between.

The new model of cognition as an assemblage is consistent with the extended mind hypothesis [ … ] In this model, the mind emerges from components characterized by relations of exteriority; where the whole is emergent and as such cannot be explained by looking at its component parts. (de Vega, n.d.b, p. 16)

Assemblage/Animism

Tim Ingold’s (1993) research into the Lapland Reindeer herders takes a similar divergence away from independent entities (parts) as objects or subjects that ‘interact’ and places the Reindeers within the same assemblage as the herder’s. In effect, they become ‘an’ assemblage of (at least) Reindeer-herders or herder-Reindeers. However, in his later work, Ingold (2013a) introduced the toggle as also playing an equal role in this assemblage. This ‘dance of animacy’⁸⁹ is more ‘correspondance’ than ‘interaction’ (Ingold, 2013a, p. 101) as the latter would infer a network of nodes that represented linear connections as opposed to a meshwork of lines⁹⁰ that intra-acted in an entangled choreography through time (Transfer 16).

⁸⁹ Ingold advanced this concept from Pickering’s (2010) ‘Dance of Agency’, which Ingold sees as problematic because ‘how can air possibly be regarded as an agent?’ (Ingold, 2013a, p. 100). ‘The very idea of agency, as we have seen, is the corollary of a logic of embodiment, of closing things up in themselves. But air cannot be closed. More than any other element, as the philosopher Luce Irigaray reminds us, air is ‘opening itself ’ (Irigaray 1999: 8). The flow of air – the wind (anemos), the breath of life – is the very antithesis of embodied agency. But if the air cannot be closed upon itself, then no more, as we have seen, can the organism–person that lives and breathes. Thus even if we allow that in flying a kite, the flyer dances with the air, it cannot be a dance of agency. It can only be a dance of animacy.’ (Ingold, 2013b, pp. 100-101). Similar to Morton abandoning ‘nature’, Ingold abandons ‘agency’. Personally, I think agency is a useful concept, as long as we enlist materiality into the assemblages of agential distribution and don’t reserve it purely for linear anthropocentric intentionality. Jane Bennett asserts, ‘There is no agency proper to assemblages, only the effervescence of the agency of individuals acting alone or in concert with each other’ (2010, p. 29, emphasis added). Again, I disagree, as there is no alone, only the concert.

‘Humanity and nonhumanity have always performed an intricate dance with each other. There was never a time when human agency was anything other than an interfolding network of humanity and nonhumanity; today this mingling has become harder to ignore.’ (Bennett, 2010, p. 31).

**Assemblages of Assemblages**

Pre Deleuze and Guattari, Allan Kaprow’s version of assemblages ‘used found material from the surrounding environment […] creating Environments and Happenings, the latter of which were described by Michael Kirby as ‘non-matrixed performances’’ (Kaprow, 1956, p. 269). The trend has grown. Research utilising assemblages include, ‘terrorist assemblages’ (Puar, 2007), ‘global assemblages’ (Ong & Collier, 2005), ‘political science assemblages’ (Buchanan & Thoburn, 2008), ‘assemblage ethnographies’ (Gale & Wyatt, 2013), ‘sociological assemblages’ (Marcus & Saka, 2006) and perhaps more specific to this PhD, ‘assemblages and geography’ (Anderson, Kearnes, McFarlane, & Swanton, 2012) ‘urban assemblages’ (Farias & Bender, 2010), ‘assemblages of health’ (Duff, 2014), ‘ill-health assemblages’ (Fox, 2011) and ‘agentic assemblages’ (Bennett, 2010).

Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) anti-essentialist notion of assemblages ‘has inspired a number of new approaches to social science that emphasise heterogeneity, fluidity, and processes of becoming’ (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, p. 5) as opposed to ‘taxonomic essentialism’ (for example, see Mcphie & Clarke, 2015, p. 236) which
reifies ‘the general categories produced by their classifications’ (DeLanda, 2006, p. 26). ‘Thus, in assemblage theory, analysis based on logical differentiation is replaced by analysis of the historical differentiation of entities.’ (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, p. 11).

**Assemblage/Ethnography**

Assemblages are composed of other assemblages and it is only a matter of ‘plugging in and out’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004) that distinguishes which ones are in play at any time. With an *exteriority of relations*[^92], component parts of the assemblage can be detached from it and plugged into a different assemblage in which the interactions are different (DeLanda, 2006; de Vega, n.d.b; Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015). Therefore, I myself am an assemblage already and when I write or think with another, I plug in to a different assemblage that has the capacity to affect (and be affected) in myriad other ways (for example, see Gale & Wyatt, 2009; 2010).

Sermijn, Devlieger and Loots (2008, p. 7) state that the ‘traditional story’ has only one entry and exit point whereas ‘selfhood as a rhizomatic story’ has multiple entryways, which ‘lead to a temporary rendering of selfhood’, implying that the ‘fixed authentic, prediscursive self that exists independent of the speaking’ is illusory. Therefore, Gale and Wyatt’s (2010) escape from ‘incessant nowng’ in their assemblage ethnography makes sense as ‘[t]he self as a noun (stable and relatively fixed) is moved to the self as a verb, always in process, taking its shape in and through the speaking (Davies et al., 2004).’ (Sermijn, Devlieger & Loots, 2008, p. 7).

Can *thinking with assemblages* offer potential diffractions from the striated space of institutional regimes? There are some openings now starting to emerge. In the arena of (Western) assemblages of health and wellbeing, Duff, Fox and Wyatt are pioneering nomads, trying to create a smooth space from the striations of enlightenment chunking. Of course, Foucault, Guattari and Mol had already started the ontological project of deterritorialising the medicalised body, paving the way for others to reassemble the ‘body multiple’ (Mol, 2002).

[^91]: Never one, always 1.032 or 0.389.
[^92]: “[R]elations of exteriority imply that the properties of the component parts can never explain the relations which constitute the whole.” (de Vega, n.d.b, p. 10)
Assemblages of Health

In his *assemblages of health*, Cameron Duff (2014) explores ‘the prospects and values of a posthuman account of health and illness, advocating the need for research innovation to be more alert to the multiple, overlapping and endemic imbrications of biology and technology, the human and the nonhuman in contemporary life.’ (p. 2). Using Deleuze’s concept of assemblages, he argues that mental health (and health in general) cannot be onto-episte-methodologically ‘distinguished from particular experiential, social, political, economic or cultural factors, processes or ‘determinants’.’ (Duff, 2014, p. 4). ‘In what Deleuze (1994) calls “actual” or “real experience”, biological, material, affective, social, semiotic, political and economic forces necessarily cohere in the articulation of an assemblage of health.’ (Duff, 2014, p. 4). Duff (2014) advocates the need for a *minor science* of health and illness that is ‘concerned to trace the affects, relations and events of a body’s becomings, rather than the stable identities, the substances, laws and axioms, which stand as natural objects for all “royal sciences”’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 364-369).’ (p. 6).

Assemblages of health, ‘ventures to explain how health may be reframed in the absence of conventional ontological distinctions such as human/nonhuman, nature/culture and body/society’ (pp. ix-x) and asks what might health look like, ‘in the context of a posthuman, more-than-human, assemblage of spaces, forces and bodies.’ (Duff, 2014, p. x). He suggests that ‘recovery may be construed as a process of learning to manipulate the affects, signs, territories and events of one’s ‘becoming well’’:

The always unfinished event of recovery links diverse human and nonhuman signs, bodies, territories and relations in the joint expression of an enhanced capacity to affect (and be affected by) other bodies. One of the most important of these capacities in the promotion of recovery from mental illness is the means of reterritorialising place in the expression of belonging to, or feeling included in, the socius (Protevi 2009: 33–42). (Duff, 2014, p. 93)

Duff (2014) elaborates that ‘this insight may inspire novel ways of understanding the role of social inclusion, place and community in promoting recovery from mental illness.’ (p. 93).
Rather than regard recovery as a process or phenomenon that happens to individuals living with mental health problems, I wish to refocus recovery in terms of the broad assemblages of health which sustain recovery in particular territories or milieus. This more ethological perspective suggests that recovery occurs in and among an assemblage of human and nonhuman forces, as that assemblage’s capacity to affect the varied forces it encounters grows or expands. It is, properly speaking, the assemblage which recovers, rather than individual bodies or forces within it. I would stress that the advantage of such a formulation lies in the attention it draws to the variety of nonhuman entities, forces, affects and relations active in any event of recovery. (Duff, 2014, p. 94)

This *minor science of becoming well* holds much potential for co-generating lines of flight, especially when juxtaposed with assemblages of ill-health.

**Ill-Health Assemblages**

Nick Fox’s (2011) *ill-health assemblage* ‘comprises the networks of biological, psychological and sociocultural relations that surround bodies during ill-health’ and ‘argues for health sociology to reject an organic body-with-organs as its unit of analysis of health and illness, and replace it with an approach to embodiment deriving from Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology.’ (p. 359).

Ill-health will tend to produce ‘sickening-bodies’, in which the capacities of the body will reflect differing patterns of biological and social engagements from that of a body in ‘health’. However these capabilities will depend upon the assemblages that produce them. [...] Ontologically, ill-health does not act on a prior body. Rather the body (or BwO) emerges and is shaped by the ill-health assemblage. Bodies are not the locus at which forces act, they are the production of the interactions of forces. (Fox, 2011, p. 368)
Following Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) rejection of the body with organs\(^93\), instead conceiving of the body without organs (BwO)\(^94\), Fox (2011) explains that health and illness assemblages are not properties of an ‘organic body’, ‘but emergent features of relationships between bodies and other elements (Buchanan 1997, Duff 2010, Fox 2002, Fox and Ward 2008a).’ (Fox, 2011, p. 361):

For instance, there is an ‘eating assemblage’, comprising (in no particular order), at least: mouth – food – energy – appetite; there is a working assemblage comprising, at least: body – task – money – career; a sexuality assemblage comprising, at least: sex organ – arousal – object of desire, a health-care assemblage comprising, at least: pathology – health professional – therapy and so forth. (p. 363)

I wholeheartedly agree with Fox’s (2011, p. 373) geological statement that ‘ill-health and health are located beyond the physical body of biomedicine’ but not that they are located in a conceptual spatial realm that is ‘any less physical’ than ‘the body’. Because of this the biomedical model may also benefit from ecological studies, philosophy of mind, physics, art, etc. in order to release the restrictive notion that psychological, sociological or indeed conceptual phenomena that exist ‘outside’ the body are non-physical. Externalism can certainly fill this conceptual gap. Although versions of externalism, such as, enactivism, embodied cognition and situated cognition reject the notion of internal representations, they do not claim that ‘all phenomenal content is the result of the interaction with environment’ (Manzotti, 2011c, p. 29, emphasis added) but the more radical versions of externalism (such as Honderich, 2004a, 2004b, 2006; Manzotti, 2006; Rockwell, 2005; Noë, 2009), to some degree, do. As I am putting forward the idea that ‘interaction with environment’ must be replaced with ‘intra-action’ (Barad, 2007) or ‘correspondence’ (Ingold, 2013), for example, then ‘all’ phenomenal, cognitive and neural content must be a result of intra-actions of the

\(^93\) ‘The body-with-organs is the focus for economic and political activity, for the disciplines of modernity and for the stratification of society by gender, ethnicity and age.’ (Fox, 2011, n. p., emphasis added)

\(^94\) ‘The body-without-organs emerges from a sea of relations that may be physical, psychological or cultural. This approach decentres the biological aspects of embodiment, while retaining biology and physicality as a (necessary but not privileged) component of the body.’ (Fox, 2011, n. p., emphasis added)
environment, a dance of animacy. This isn’t just ‘leaking’ (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) in and out of a body as *in* and *out* become a porous non-divide. The ingenious phrase ‘trans-cranial’ (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) also becomes trans-embodied/trans-enminded (or ‘trans-corporeal’ as Stacy Alaimo (2010) has put it) and necessarily processual and *physical*.

Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983) ‘schizoanalysis’ (p. 273) ‘rejected the territorialisation of the BwO into the organism, arguing for a line of flight into a new embodiment’ (Fox, 2011, p. 372), whereas ‘Nomadology’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 25) was their response to this as a ‘political strategy for living’, both of which suggest:

an ontology in which the body is no longer individual and organic; in which health and ill-health are marked not by aspects of an individual body but by connectivities and relations between bodies, objects and ideas; in which healthcare is re-focused upon these nexi of relations (Fox, 2011, p. 372)

But how might this new position for the assemblage play out in practice? How might therapists or counsellors ruminate with these ineffable articulations to become nomads of environ(mental) health? Fortunately, there are some examples of these ruminations as narratives deployed in academic contexts.

**Becoming-(non-)counsellor Assemblage**

Jonathan Wyatt’s (2013) autoethnography of *becoming-(non-)counsellor* is a search for the plural ‘I’, a wrestle with the ‘I’ of subjective autoethnography to produce a ‘performative I’ (Jackson & Mazzei, 2008, p. 314), ‘as he moves through and away from NHS procedural bureaucracy towards becoming a non-counsellor.’ (Grant, Short & Turner, 2013, p.13).

The delightful, liberating poststructural view of the fragmented, de-centred subject has stuck like a boiled sweet in the throat of the reflexive writer and therapist. I sign up to Deleuzian conceptualisations of subjectivity whilst I continue to write, both alone and with others, in the first person. I write about ‘my’ experience while I purport to disrupt the unified subject. How can a poststructuralist writing about personal experience be anything but
ironic, and how can a therapist write about their clients ironically? It is ‘my’ body that sits – that sat – with clients and registered their rage and pain; ‘my’ stomach that growled indelicately. The ‘I’ that will die and be mourned and missed (or not) is not just some postmodern blob of subjectivity; it has palpable edges, a perimeter of permeable skin within which this writing happens. (Wyatt, 2013, p. 132)

This is the permeable skin of a haecceity, an extended, embodied and distributed self, an assemblage that plugs in and out (storying), unconsciously following the drive of least resistance, to form other temporal assemblages (re-storying).

Moreover, in so far as the Cogito refers to a fractured I, an I split from end to end by the form of time which runs through it, it must be said that Ideas swarm in the fracture, constantly emerging on its edges, ceaselessly coming out and going back, being composed in a thousand different manners. (Deleuze, 2014, p. 225)

Perhaps this is what’s needed, a non-therapy (rather than an ‘anti-therapy’) to place it under erasure, diffractively, without destroying it completely and denying its potentiality for creating lines of flight. Could we instead attend to the fracture, the ecotone, the conjunction, the and...and...and...? Sermijn, Devlieger and Loots (2008) see this type of rhizomatic writing as tackling the problem of subjectivity in reflexive research and writing:

By considering selfhood as a rhizomatic story, researchers and participants are conceived as discursive processes, taking continuously their shapes in and through speaking and writing narratives about the narratives they have just told or written, always from the continuously changing perspective of narrating after the just told. In rhizomatic thinking and writing, a fixed or meta-linguistic subject is absent. The subject—whether participant or researcher—is continuously (re)born in the perspective of the narrating after the just narrated, always turning language back on itself in a horizontally moving way, that is characterized by multiple entryways, multiple connections and asignifying ruptures. (p. 17)
‘When one views selfhood as a rhizomatic story, as a researcher one knows that one is not presenting the participant’s true self but merely one of the many possible context-bound, co-constructed presentations of the self.’ (Sermijn, Devlieger & Loots, 2008, p. 14). It opens up multiple possibilities, lines of flight that explore what the body can do as opposed to what it ought to do, following an ethics of immanence rather than transcendence. I imagine that the ‘I’ that Jonathan Wyatt had trouble leaving behind may be characterised by a move from what Deleuze calls a ‘principle of interiority’ to one of ‘exteriority’:

According to the principle of interiority, while a component’s interactions may differ as it forms new relations, these interactions are determined by that component’s innate properties, whereas the principle of exteriority maintains that such interactions are a function of a component’s encounters or associations. Interactions and capacities are emergent properties of relations and associations between component parts, rather than mere expressions of their properties. In this way, assemblage theory is able to explain emergence without sacrificing the autonomy, or uniqueness, of discrete objects. (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, pp. 10-11).

‘Thus the component parts of an assemblage are self-subsistent and have a certain autonomy to form relations that can change.’ (de Vega, n.d., p. 10, emphasis added), not ought to change. So, the subject becomes undone, travels from interiority to exteriority and yet remains ethical in its new autonomy as a permeable, a-subjective, haecceitical singularisation.

[T]he subject of this ethics has nothing to do with the individualism and self-possession of normative moral theories: instead, it is decisively posthuman. Such a subject can be defined, after Braidotti, as relational, “constituted in and by multiplicity”; it is a subject “that works across

---

95 ‘any place in the universe I temporally occupy, and from which I build, consume, love and destroy, is never originally and duly mine: I am just a wayfarer through mater’s planetary unfoldings and thickenings. There is therefore a story-telling aspect to ethics.’ (Zylinska, 2014, p. 93)
differences and is also internally differentiated, but still grounded and accountable” (2013: 49). (Zylinska, 2014, p. 99)

**Scene seven: Ethics?**

I suppose the ‘norm’ is to write about ethics as if it were a transcendent subject that I carefully attended to during my research involving ‘participants’. Yes, I applied to the university’s ethics panel to confirm that I was properly attending to norms of research, such as participant pseudonyms, protecting the vulnerable people from exposure to the potentially harmful effects of academic inquiry. Yes, I followed ‘the rules’. Yet, ethics becomes problematic when separated in this epistemological fashion. It is always already bound up in whatever projects we undertake at the ontological level. Karen Barad (2007) said as much, coining the term, ‘ethico-onto-epistemology’ (p. 381) in order to denote ‘the intertwining of ethics, knowing, and being’ (not necessarily in that order).

Being is threaded through with mattering. Epistemology, ontology, and ethics are inseparable. Matters of fact, matters of concern, and matters of care are shot through with one another. Or to put it in yet another way: matter and meaning cannot be severed. […] *Agential separability is not individuation.* Ethics is therefore not about right responses to a radically exteriorized other, but about responsibility and accountability for the lively relationalities of becoming, of which we are a part. […] This way of thinking ontology, epistemology, and ethics together makes for a world that is always already an ethical matter.’ (Barad, 2012b, p. 69, emphasis added)

Apart from the ethics of the university ethics panel, there is an underlying ethical strand that is already woven into the PhD’s fabric from my childhood (and before) to now. For example:
My mother brought me up as a feminist, left-wing radical thinker, dragging me along to whatever rally or movement she deemed worthy of joining for ethical causes. I still remember all the words from the songs and chants whilst I stayed at Greenham Common, the women only anti-nuclear camp: ‘We are women, we are strong, we are singing, Bella ciao Bella ciao Bella ciao ciao ciao’. In fact, as I also looked and acted rather feminine (perhaps the normative stereotypical ‘feminine’?) as a child (Annotated Polaroids A-D: what do you think?), many people mistook me for a girl, something for which my mother was extremely proud and I embarrassed of. She used to tease me with the lyrics, ‘I’m a boy, I’m a boy but my mamma won’t admit it’ by ‘The Who’. No one questioned my gender status at Greenham. At least I fitted in.

Annotated Polaroids A-D: ‘Ethico-onto-epistemology’

I remember my mother’s tales when she came back from helping the Sandinistas against the Contras in Nicaragua and feeling extremely proud but jealous at the same time. I too wanted to help right the inequities that were so screamingly obvious, without the appropriation that Westerners ultimately enact.

Snippet 7: ‘I’m a boy, I’m a boy, but my mamma won’t admit it’.

So, with that baggage ultimately sewn into my very core, I cannot help but let it gently seep into the very pores of this thesis. It is woven in to its performativity. The words ‘oppression’ and ‘resistance’ have been with my thoughts since I can remember. I imagine that’s the reason they appear as underlying concepts in this play/thesis. However, I have thought about ethics anew during this process and that too will now become woven in as a weft of immanence to the warp of transcendence that keeps trying to gain a stranglehold on the structure.
A move from morality to ethics

Strictly speaking, we do not disapprove the action because it is vicious; instead, it is vicious because we disapprove it. Since morality is grounded in human sentiments, the normative question cannot be whether its dictates are true. Instead, it is whether we have reason to be glad that we have such sentiments, and to allow ourselves to be governed by them. (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 50)

The concept, ethics, seems at first transcendent, a cultural construction, especially when thought about as morality. But there is an immanence at play when thought about under a Deleuzian approach, ‘where ethics is no longer concerned with the formulation of norms or principles preceding situations that would allow us to judge those situations’ (Bryant, 2011, p. 30).

It is quite likely that what we conventionally refer to as moral behavior—actions that are compliant with a given group’s customs and social codes and that are aimed to produce beneficial outcomes for this group, on a material or spiritual level—is just a set of reactions to external and internal stimuli, reactions that then become a form of learned behavior and that, in the human language, get elevated to the status of “goodness”. It is primarily the linguistic labelling of certain types of behavior as “good”, “noble” and “honorable” that differentiates human acts towards other human and nonhuman entities and processes as “moral”. (Zylinska, 2014, pp. 91-92)

Ethics ‘cannot be reduced to, or thought in terms of, any determinate, identifiable cause or condition.’ (Bell, 2011, p. 9) as ‘the abstract does not explain, but must itself be explained’ (Deleuze & Parnet, 2007, p. vii) and so by thinking an immanent ethics with Deleuze, ‘the aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find the conditions under which something new is produced (creativity).’ (Deleuze & Parnet, 2007, p. vii). ‘Rather than rushing to answer the question of what ethics is, or how we distinguish right from wrong, we should first ask the strange question of when ethical problematics arise.’ (Bryant, 2011, pp. 25-26). This temporal inquiry is a nomadic one as it keeps it always on the move.
Ethics of immanence?

Ethics, which is to say, a typology of immanent modes of existence, replaces Morality, which always refers existence to transcendent values. Morality is the judgment of God, the system of Judgment. But Ethics overthrows the system of judgment. The opposition of values (Good–Evil) is supplanted by the qualitative difference of modes of existence (good–bad). (Deleuze, 1988, p. 23)

Deleuze picked up on Spinoza’s and Nietzsche’s ethics of immanence—as a form of empowerment, not to judge but to act (Smith, 2011)—after being omitted from philosophy for some time. Although Deleuze does not directly discuss the concept of ethics in great depth, he eluded to it throughout his work as it was always entangled in his writing. For example, Foucault (1983) stated, ‘Anti-Oedipus […] is a book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time’ (xiii) as ‘for Deleuze, problems are not a psychological or epistemological category, but rather an ontological category’ (Bryant, 2011, p. 36). Therefore, for Deleuze, ethics is buried in his work at the ontological level. Deleuze posited that ethics need not be about what ought or must we do (questions of morality and the implementation of socially accepted rules and regulations) but rather what might, can or could we do, what are we capable of doing? (Braidotti & Dolphijn, 2015; Jun, 2011a; Smith, 2011). This is a change from a normative ethics of transcendence (one that precedes ontology, for example, as in Levinas’ (1969) thought96) to an ethics of immanence. Instead of ‘oughts’ and ‘shoulds’ (ethics of transcendence) we can ask, after Spinoza, ‘what can a body do?’ (ethics of immanence) in order to deal with the power relations that may govern our intra-actions (Braidotti & Dolphijn, 2015). ‘What an ethics of immanence will criticize, then, is anything that separates a mode of existence from its power of acting – and what separates us from our power of acting is, ultimately, the illusions of transcendence.’

96 ‘Levinas’ ethics also does not go all the way in recognizing the mutual entanglement of “us” and “the world”: the boundaries of Levinas’ “other”, even if not fully knowable, are nevertheless transcendentally posited, rather than seen as immanent, as differentiation-from-within’ (Zylinska, 2014, pp. 94-95)
All being is immanent; there is no transcendence, thus there are no self-contained identities outside the world (gods, values, subjectivities, etc.) that determine or constitute it (Deleuze 1983: 147). Furthermore, substance is at root a difference that exists virtually in the past and is actualized in various modes in the present. These modes are not stable identities but multiplicities, differences, complicated intersections of forces. As Daniel Smith notes: “There is no universal or transcendental subject, which could function as the bearer of universal human rights, but only variable and historically diverse ‘processes of subjectivation’” (Smith 2003: 307). (Jun, 2011b, p. 93)

If there was such a transcendental subject that functioned as the bearer of universal human rights (and there are many candidates), it might just appear in the form of Occidental hegemony or Faciality97 (see Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, pp. 185-211). ‘Problems are not in the mind, but rather belong to the world.’ (Deleuze, 1994, p. 280, cited in Bryant, 2011, p. 36).

From the viewpoint of immanence, in other words, transcendence, far from being our salvation, represents our slavery and impotence reduced to its lowest point: the demand to do the impossible is nothing other than the concept of impotence raised to infinity. […] How can people reach a point where they actually desire their servitude and slavery as if it were their salvation – for those in power have an obvious interest in separating us from our capacity to act? How can we desire to be separated from our power, from our capacity to act? (Smith, 2011, p. 126)

‘Rather than judging acts, the question will be one of exploring the generative field in which acts are produced. And this is a painstaking and laborious task that requires

97 Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) concept of faciality highlights the imposition of significance and subjectification that the (European) white man’s promotion of (their version of) the ‘face’-typically derived from the image of Jesus Christ.
constant engagement with the milieu.’ (Bryant, 2011, p. 41). This is the question of ethics that is unearthed and exposed in sporadic pockets throughout this PhD. Just as Dolly didn’t ask for or want the protection (oppression?) of the boxing ethic that prevented her from competing professionally (see Assemblage Two/Mcphie, in press), many participants involved in research don’t really get to make that choice, even though it is sold as such. The transcendent ethic that was supposed to benefit ‘people like Dolly’ prevented Dolly’s more healthy desire lines from becoming realised. The same was true for Blondie regarding the estrangement from her daughter. Blondie has been forced to accept her impotence in this outcome, yet we, as a society, constantly (re)enforce these transcendent ethics; we are complicit. In these examples and throughout these assemblages, taken as an assemblage in itself (the PhD assemblage and machine), it is almost clear that we desire our own repression by the very separations (of capacities to act and powers to change) that we instil in our society-natures.

As Deleuze and Guattari write, following Reich: “The astonishing thing is not that some people steal or that others occasionally go out on strike, but rather that all those who are starving do not steal as a regular practice, and all those who are exploited are not continually out on strike” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 29). (Smith, 2011, p. 126)

These ‘unconscious drives‘ that lead us toward certain actions vie with each other and often the one that wins is not to our benefit, not what we might call a healthy choice. The ingrained transcendent ontology of the enlightenment built the foundations of a particularly cruel palimpsest that governs almost everything that we think we are driven to do. ‘Even when you get what you want, you can't have what you want’ (Berlant, 2011, p. 266). The OCD of Liverpool ONE (and the other POPS, popping up around the country) is a shining example of the desire for transcendence (see mental health Assemblage ONE). Its spectacle is the co-driver of your bus (another co-Author), where

98 Although, in many cases, these transcendent ethics may prevent certain atrocities in the short term.
99 ‘It is not that I have a different perspective on the world than you; it is rather that each of us has multiple perspectives on the world because of the multiplicity of our drives – drives that are often contradictory among themselves.’ (Smith, 2011, p. 127)
transcendent separations are acted out in full view of the coarseness of its implications: *hyper-consumers welcome, vagrants eliminated.*

Nomadic theory foregrounds the force of affirmation as the empowering mode for both critical theory and political praxis […] Each relation is therefore an ethical project indexed on affirmation and mutual specification, not on the dialectics of recognition and lack. (Braidotti, 2011, p. 3)

**Non-human Ethics?**

Price-Robertson and Duff (2015, p. 2) state that due to the ‘emphasis on the forces (or “stuff”) of the material world’ by the affective and material turns, they have had ‘some influence among contemporary psychologists (see Brown & Stenner, 2009; Duff, 2014; Gregg & Seigworth, 2010; Rose, 2007)’’. This is a crucial point to make, especially in a philosophy where the subject is undone and *what a body can do* is opened up or restricted to the materiality of the topological environment at hand. We have to look to the physical processes that take place from the *virtual* to the *actual*. ‘Ethical theory has suffered tremendously as a result of treating ethics exclusively as the domain of the human divorced from all relations to the nonhuman.’ (Bryant, 2011, p. 28). For example, Latour (2005, p. 77) asks, ‘[w]ould I have become a couch potato, switching endlessly from channel to channel […] if I did not have a remote?’ (cited in Bryant, 2011, p. 28). ‘The point here is not that the remote *determines* me to become a couch potato, but rather the far more disturbing consequence that we cannot firmly draw the distinction between actors (humans) and mere behaviors (objects).’ (Bryant, 2011, p. 28).

For Deleuze, ethics aren’t a set of pre-existing morals reserved purely for human *quiddities*, they lie in wait on a virtual plane. They are *to come*. *Ought* is replaced by *can*. The actual ethic is yet to be brought forth from the virtual possibilities which are not pre-ordained (as that is another type of ethics), they are made in the moment of the event. Each event is materially contextual to itself, so ethics must become anew as the event unfolds. If the actual ethics are *traced* or *represented* on mass, a transcendent normative ethic is born and thus, problems are likely to ensue.
Our human responsibility can therefore be described as a form of experiential, corporeal and affective “worlding” in which we produce (knowledge about) the world, seen as a set of relations and tasks. This may involve relating responsibly to other humans, but also to nonhuman beings and processes, including some extremely tiny and extremely complex or even abstract ones (microbes, clouds, climate, global warming). […] However, an act of taking responsibility is not just a passive reaction to pre-existing reality: it involves actively making cuts into the ongoing unfolding of matter in order to stabilize it. Ethical de-cisions can thus be best understood as material in-cisions. (Zylinska, 2014, pp. 97-98)

Ethics is always already immanent. How can it not be? As a rebuttal to Dawkins’ ‘selfish gene’, Timothy Morton posits that it is rather altruism that is hardwired into reality as ‘we are made of others: we’ve literally got them under our skin’ (2010, p. 119, cited in Zylinska, 2014, p. 95). It is the concept of a transcendent ethics that is problematic (yet still immanent in its corporeality). But as we have discussed in (Intra-)Act 4, concepts are never passive, they perform. And as it seems to have become lodged within the ethico-onto-epistemological framework of the Western paradigm, we must find novel resources for dislodging it due to the oppression and repression it unleashes. But it’s difficult because this transcendent ethic is the ethic that we know. This thesis/play is saturated with it. It makes it strange to imagine an ethics that is not based on normative cultural constructions. So, we might say that we are still in Plato’s cave of transcendent ethics and simply need to escape to think from another plane, a flatter one, a flat ecological ontology. Yet, it’s not simple at all. The only way I can think of to do this is how I’ve tackled the problems of interpretation and anthropocentrism. By placing it sous rature, juxtaposing it, highlighting and exposing its weaknesses, turning it into a Brechtian play. Ethics may not be possible, at least in its current guise of morality, but the ‘attempt’ to dislodge it will do something, perhaps even enough to open new channels for lines of flight to take off. The attempt will be diffractive and transgressive.

And so, with my ethics section suitably chunked, put in its proper place and now placed sous rature (well, what did you expect?), I imagine you’re wondering what we actually did?
I undertook an initial study (what some might call a ‘pilot’) from June to July in 2012 in order to gain a deeper understanding of any therapeutic benefits to perceived notions of ‘nature’ before undertaking the main inquiry (see Mcphie, 2015a for a full account of this study). Thus, my thinking was already tainted. Then, in 2013, I put up posters (Transfer 17) to recruit co-participants/co-(re)researchers from two already established therapeutic groups (a horticultural therapy community garden and an art therapy group) as well as two health clinics (an NHS health clinic and an alternative/natural health clinic), all based in Cumbria in order to get a range of diverse volunteers who may have been interested in this project as well as the practicality of the geographical proximity for me to travel to and from in the minibus. As you can tell, there are already provocateurs in the poster (picture and words chosen) and regarding the choice of location to place the posters. I wanted volunteers who wished to explore

---

100 A ‘method assemblage’ is an “adhoc contingency of a collage” (Law, 2004, p. 41).
how their perceptions of a variety of environments might alter or influence their moods, stress levels, mental health and wellbeing.

A few people from the art therapy group and NHS clinic responded to the posters but none joined the group. After an initial meeting on 02-05-13, it turned out that seven respondents were from the horticultural therapy community garden and two responded from the alternative/natural health clinic. After the first few meetings and outings, the core group consisted of six co-participants/co-(re)searchers, myself and a critical friend (the prof.) who only came to the focus group meetings and eventually left half way through the year. The inquiry consisted of a series of trips to a variety of environments (almost one every month), democratically chosen by the WiC group, followed a couple of weeks later by focus group meetings, giving me enough time to layer and edit the empirical materials (dual video feedback, photos, journals, notes) so that we could analyse them together. We had initial meetings in May and June, 2013, followed by a series of outings and meetings once a month until it officially came to rest in June, 2014. During that time, we visited Langdale (17-06-13), Coniston (29-07-13), Liverpool (09-09-13), Lancaster (14-10-13), Gummers How (25-11-13), Ulverston estuary (13-01-14), Birkriagg (22-02-14), Rydal (14/04/14), Grange-Over-Sands (26/05/14), and Duddon Valley (30/06/14). A risk assessment was produced for each trip and a critical friend notified. I gave all the co-participants/co-(re)searchers journals and cameras to work with to record their experiences.

I chose psychogeography as a suitable tool to walk with due to my fascination with it as a fun, politically transgressive lens to explore environmental intra-relations with. I also regularly employ psychogeography within many of my lessons for under and post-graduates reading outdoor studies and so it seemed like an obvious choice as a mobile method. I put this to the newly formed group and all agreed to its use.

**Scene nine: Psychogeography as a mobile method**

‘if there is no method, this is also a type of method for carrying out psychogeography’ (Richardson, 2015a, pp. 3-4)

I won’t give a history of psychogeography as that’s already been done (see Merlin Coverley’s *Psychogeography* (2010) and Tina Richardson’s *Walking Inside Out* (2015a, pp. 1-30; 2015b, pp. 241-250)). Instead, I will discuss a few important
events/dates that **glowed** and have led to the reasons why psychogeography *came* to me over time.

‘Walking is the best way to explore and exploit the city.’ (Sinclair, 1997, p. 4).

**1968**

We still consider May ’68 the moment at which transversal thinking, i.e. the kind of thinking that refuses to accept modern dualisms such as the subject-object divide, was given a strong voice. The focus on difference, on emancipatory processes, on life, liberated a new materialism that needs to be mapped now more than ever. After all, the problems of the “now” are many: ranging from environmental crises to financial crises, from privacy issues to social movements such as the Arab revolutions or the Occupy movement, and perpetual war. (van der Tuin & Dolphijn, 2015, p. 25)

It is perhaps best that I begin this brief discussion on psychogeography *in* 1968, as that was a momentous and radically era defining, paradigm shifting moment in Western thought. If a line were to be drawn (*heaven forbid*) between modernity and postmodernity, it would be at *that* juncture in Paris (although it’s always changing, as is the nature of spatio-temporality).

In Deleuze and Guattari’s view, ‘fascism did not disappear’ after the Second World War,

even if the gas chambers did, it simply migrated to a deeper, and more recessed quarter of the psychosocial matrix of Western society. The flashpoint that brought this into focus for Deleuze and Guattari was May 1968 because it marked the dawning of a new era (Buchanan 2008a: 7-12)” (Buchanan, Matts & Tynan, 2015, pp. 7-8).

‘May 1968 gave form to new institutions, to a new university structure, to a new political program, a new philosophy’ (Braidotti & Dolphijn, 2015, p. 14). There were many events that led up to the urban revolution in Paris that year, such as ‘worldwide challenges to capitalism, war, racism, patriarchy, imperialism, and the alienation of
modern urban life’ (Smith, 2003, p. vii) and the revolutionary spirit didn’t simply stay put in Paris, it quickly spread in a rhizomatic fashion to many other cities around the globe (Tokyo, Mexico City, Detroit, for example) who held political/social empathies. The general consensus is that it failed, as capitalism just grew stronger from the attempted coup. I, however, think the revolution succeeded. Think of all the intense scrutiny’s, deconstructions and intellectual/creative productions it influenced, including Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Butler, Haraway, Verso publications, and…and…and…(the rhizomatic palimpsest that followed). These productions have, do and will influence as many transgressions as any of the major revolutions that have occurred previously. The ontological turn is indeed a revolution and is, as we speak, growing as fungal mycelium’s do. Henri Lefebvre’s *Urban Revolution* (1970/2003) was perhaps a testament to 1968 as he recorded the temporal and spatial activities that flowed through structural decision making in the urban organism of that era. Other political discussions and critique about urbanisation followed in similar fashion, such as de Certeau’s essay ‘Walking in the City’ from *The Practice of Everyday Life* (1984), Davis’ *City of Quartz* (1990), Augé’s *Non-Places* (2009), Mitchell’s *The Right to the City* (2003), Edensor and Jayne’s (eds.) *Urban Theory Beyond the West* (2012), Harvey’s *Rebel Cities* (2012) and Amin and Thrift’s *Cities: Reimagining the Urban* (2002).

For me, 1968 and the few years that followed were also a high point in the arts, especially film, theatre and music. I was born in 1971 and benefitted from the swell that was created during that small window of time, until Spielberg produced *Jaws* and Thatcher came to power. It was then only a matter of time before *Hauntology*¹⁰¹ became a possibility. We are now stuck in 1984. We are living in the dystopian future of the past 30 years. Orwell’s *1984* has already happened but we seem to have become numb to it, baffled by the shiny lights of neoliberal capitalism and its henchman, globalisation. Marc Auge’s *Non-Places*, Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi’s *After the Future*, Patrick Keiller’s *Robinson in Ruins* and Mark Fisher’s *Lost Futures* all point to this. Fisher (2014) states, ‘there’s an increasing sense that culture has lost the ability to grasp and articulate the present. Or could it be that, in one very important sense, there is no present to grasp and articulate any more.’ (p. 9). Fisher (2014) uses the example of genres in music to highlight the extent to which we have become stuck in the 1980’s and 90’s as no new

¹⁰¹ ‘Hauntology’ is a Derridean (1994) term denoting the *lost futures of modernity* (Fisher, 2014) and an ontological spatio-temporal disjunction: a time out of joint (Derrida, 1994).
genre has been realised since that time. I believe this is due to the suppression of the spirit of 1968. But an underground movement kept a thread of 1968 alive. That rhizomatic thread ran under the pavement, many of us didn’t notice it as it secretly weaved its way into the present, slowly picking up momentum until a tipping point was declared: we have reached the ontological turn and there’s no turning back.

1967

Guy Debord published *Society of the Spectacle* in 1967. Debord’s ‘Situationist’ movement was partly held as the intellectual catalyst for the uprising in 1968, along with many artists (such as director Jean-Luc Godard), who spurred the students on to attempt change (Anthony & Henry, 2005, p. 22).

What the situationists had added to their tactics after the 1950s was a grammatically conscientious and elegant prose account of their foundational critique of social relations, the spectacle: a re-territorializing of capital in which ideology, in the Marxist sense of images and ideas in the last instance serving and reproducing the interests of a capital-owning class, became itself the very substance and mechanics of the production of surplus value. (Smith, 2009, p. 2)

It was one of the first critiques of ‘advanced capitalism’ that suggested ‘the spectacle’ had replaced healthful social interaction, inducing further isolation and loneliness. ‘The spectacle is the nightmare of imprisoned modern society which ultimately expresses nothing more than its desire to sleep. The spectacle is the guardian of that sleep.’ (Debord, 1983, para. 21). I believe Transfers 18-21 speak *for themselves.*
Transfers 18-21. *Society of the Spectacle*. Pictures from top left: A teacher cutting a square shaped bubble (SkittleBomb, 2013); X Factor Wiki (*X Factor*, 2016); Charles Graner and Sabrina Harman, happily posing with naked and hooded prisoners who were forced to form a human pyramid (Abu Ghraib, 2006); *Society of the Spectacle* (Black & Red, 1983).

1958


The Situationists feared that cities were losing their unique character and human dimensions, and that human life was becoming increasingly commodified through urbanism, mass media and the modern structure of working life that divided an individual’s personality into polarised opposites of work and play. The Situationists’ dérivé (drift) – an

---

102 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA).
103 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA).
104 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA).
unorganised and aimless yet significant walk – was central to their philosophy of using the city, and was a key influence on the psychogeographers of today.’ (Anthony & Henry, 2005, p. 21)


**1905**

According to evidence gathered by the ‘Fife Psychogeography Association’ (2014) (Transfer 22), J. Walter Fewkes, from the Bureau of American Ethnology, was the first to coin the term ‘psychogeography’ in 1905 as: ‘The science of anthropogeography, or more properly speaking, psychogeography, deals with the influence of geographical environment on the human mind.’

---

**CLIMATE AND CULT**

By J. WALTER FEWKES, Bureau of American Ethnology

The science of anthropogeography, or, more properly speaking, psychogeography, deals with the influence of geographical environment on the human mind. The effect appears in that responsive expression of mind which is known as culture. Evolution of culture

---

**Transfer 22:** ‘The science of anthropogeography’ (Fife Psychogeography Association, 2014)

**1987**

This year is worth mentioning so as not to confuse you with Howard Stein’s version of psychogeography which is very different to Debord’s socio-political stance. Stein’s Freudian version in *Maps from the Mind: Readings in Psychogeography* (Stein & Niederland, 1987/1989), states that, ‘Psychogeography is the study of how issues, experiences, and processes that result from growing up in a human body are symbolized
and played out in the wider social and natural worlds’ (p. xvii) and takes a signifying psychoanalytic (and sometimes anthropological) perspective with which to interpret the world. As you can tell from my italics, it’s not the kind of psychogeography that appeals to me under my current influence of Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis.

2016

According to Debord, psychogeography is, ‘the study of the specific effects of the geographical environment, consciously organized or not, on the emotions and behavior of individuals’ (Andreotti & Costa, 1996, p. 69).

There is no one psychogeography but there is a general theme that runs through contemporary British psychogeographic practice, underlying its (non)structure: transgression. Mischief-making, disorientation, anarchic wayfaring, breaking habit, seeing the unseeable: ‘You don’t take a walk, the walk takes you’ (Hanson, 2004, p. 6).

‘Psychogeography investigates the intersection of time and space, and hence attacks science at its point of weakness - the replicability of results. Psychogeography is the universalism of the specific, of the particular, i.e. at its point of dissolution.’ (Why Psychogeography, 2013).

I see psychogeography as a playful, diffractive protest against what Deleuze and Guattari (2004) would call striated space, faciality and bodies with organs. It has an immense potential to create lines of flight away from the taboos and clinical pathology of mental ill-health.

Walking involves the articulation of spaces and experiences through movement, escapism, and (dis)attention. […] Walking can constitute a physical grammar that stitches places in the city together. Journeys provide opportunities for experiencing particular spaces differently (Hodgetts et al. 2010 p.288)

Contemporary British psychogeography writing ranges from Papadimitriou’s (2012) Deep Topography; Bennett’s (2015) Legal Psychogeography; Garratt’s (2013) Urban Exploration; to Smith’s (2015) Mythogeography (coined from ‘a misremembering’ of ‘psychogeography’ which later proved useful as Smith and colleagues ‘sought to distinguish [them]selves from certain hegemonic aspects of the SI’ (p. 166)) and Zombie
Walking, which are useful concepts to think-walk with as a fantastical/dystopian critique of hyperconsumption and the capitalist production of subjectivity.

Within the rich and growing British psychogeography movement, Alexander John Bridger has suggested using ‘walking as a ‘Radicalized’ critical psychological method’ in his ‘review of academic, artistic and activist contributions to the study of social environments’ (2010, p. 131).

The study of how walking can confer particular types of experiences and how it can be a political practice is a neglected site of study not only in psychology, but across academic disciplines such as human geography and cultural studies. (Bridger, 2010, p. 131)

He argues ‘that disorientating walking practices can be used as a means to reflect on experiences of places in order to begin to think how social environments could be radically changed’ (Bridger, 2010, p. 131). He goes on to assert that, ‘psychogeographic practice can be used to extend qualitative epistemologies and methods to argue for a ‘turn to place’ in psychology and to open up new methods and approaches in critical psychology’ in response to the ‘apathetic vision of radicalism and criticality’ which he contends is the ‘current status of critical psychology’ (Bridger, 2010, p. 131).

However empowering psychogeography may be, it continues to explore the effects of the geographical environment on the human psyche. In this way, it may be branded as being slightly deterministic, linear and unidirectional. Conversely, ‘schizocartography’, Tina Richardson (2015) explains, offers a method of cartography that questions dominant power structures and at the same time enables subjective voices to appear from underlying postmodern topography. Schizocartography is the process and output of a psychogeography of particular spaces that have been co-opted by various capitalist-oriented operations, routines or procedures. It attempts to reveal the aesthetic and ideological contradictions that appear in urban space while simultaneously reclaiming the subjectivity of individuals by enabling new modes of creative expression. Schizocartography challenges anti-production, the homogenizing character of overriding forms that work towards silencing heterogeneous voices. (p. 182)
In this way, schizocartography offers a more multidirectional approach to topological mapping that includes a subject whilst at the same time still allowing for an acentering of the self. Richardson’s schizocartography adds more colour to Bridger’s ‘radical’ suggestions by including Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘schizoanalysis’ into the fray, which was based on ‘neither triadic structures (such as Oedipal relations) nor dyadic ones (such as hierarchical binary oppositions)’; rather ‘it is concerned with ‘the other’ to dominant voices and explores the heterogeneity that is often sidelined in arrangements of hierarchical power.’ (Richardson, 2015, p. 183)

Morag Rose’s *Anarcho-Flaneuse* (2015) is also worth a mention here due to the lines of flight she is currently creating. Rose was a founding member of the ‘Loiterers Resistance Movement’ (LRM) and describes her psychogeographic self thus:

I am not a flâneur in the pure sense because a working-class, queer, disabled woman does not have the affordances of Benjamin’s privileged subject, but I have adopted some of his habits, perhaps because at the birth of the LRM I had read very few key texts and was unaware they were not designed for the likes of me. (Rose, 2015, p. 149).

The LRM facilitate dérives using a variety of methods such as, ‘CCTV Bingo’, ‘algorithmic walks’, ‘throwing dice’ and ‘transposing maps’, not to solve issues, but to ‘ask questions and provoke debate’ as ‘[c]ontrasting issues of spatial justice are raised as we play together’ (Rose, 2015, p. 152). Morag has also attempted to ‘subvert heritage walks’ to ‘make clear that history is permeable, plural and open to contestation’, such as her ‘Manchester Modernist Heroines project’ which rose out of ‘frustration about the lack of women in public narratives of Manchester’ (Rose, 2015, p. 154).

---

105 The concept schizoanalysis ‘does not promote mental illness; rather, it is used as a way of offering up the possibility of multiple voices and alternative worldviews, among other factors.’ (Richardson, 2015, p. 192)
In all of this modern psychogeographic practice (including the more literary practices of Ian Sinclair (2002) or Patrick Keiller (2013), for example), there is an obvious anthropocentric strand\textsuperscript{107} that neglects a fruitful and arguably richer exploration of various environments by thinking with more current paradigm shifts to the ontological turn, such as a non-anthropocentric (posthuman), new materialist psychogeographic approach. What is needed is a ‘psychogeographical turn’, to quote Tina Richardson (2015), but not as a ‘gentle bend in the road’ (p. 245), rather as a transgressive diffraction at the ontological level. Perhaps if the human-urban assemblage were considered as a fungal mycelium (Transfer 24) as Ingold (2011) suggests, we might enter this rich meshwork more successfully. Similarly, we might think of ourselves as a haecceity or ‘line of becoming’, rather than, as Richardson suggests, a quiddity, to disrupt the anthropocentric notion of linear relationality between points (such as intentionality), what Marcus Doel (2000) calls ‘pointillism.’

\textsuperscript{106} Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA).

\textsuperscript{107} I.e. By presuming ‘social’ environments to be the sole domain of humans.
There is a move on the horizon towards these lines of flight, as is evident in Cameron Duff’s work.

**Duff’s Ethological City**

In his ‘ethology of bodies, cities, affects, relations, encounters and events’, Cameron Duff (2013) examines a handstand against a wall in an urban environment and asks ‘[h]ow should the movements implicated in these bodies be identified and attributed?’:

A handstand. In this handstand, there is the body, there is the city and there is (a) life (Deleuze 2001: 27–32). Yet, there is also a call to abandon the convenience of a subject and its objects; the familiar taxonomy of a body willing its movements in the midst of passive objects, surfaces and contexts. Such conventions inevitably ignore most of the bodies assembled in the event of the handstand (Bennett 2010: 4–6). So, how might the body-

---

108 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA).
becoming- city- becoming- body instantiated in this event be observed, theorised, cared for? (Duff, 2013, p. 215)

These are the sorts of questions that are important to support a healthy community (of everything) are they not? So you can see the associations I place on these varieties of urban exploration/psychogeography as being ‘relevant’ and a ‘good fit’ to my own inquiry. Duff (2013) adds to this relevance, the association of Deleuze’s ethology to health and wellbeing:

Applied to the study of the ‘modern’ city, Deleuze’s ethology highlights the body- becoming- city, becoming- place, becoming- collective characteristic of the everyday experience of urban life. This logic applies as much to the body of the (post)human subject as it does to the bodies (material, relational and affective) of the built environment (Dovey 2010). The quality of urban life, its concrete richness, is enhanced in the provision of new affective sensibilities and new relational capacities, which extend the spatial and temporal range of the body- becoming- city- becoming-subject (Awan et al. 2011). Such an ethology has important implications for the ongoing development of a participatory architectural theory and practice, more alert to questions of sustainability, health, well-being and democracy in urban settings (Blundell-Jones et al. 2005; Brott 2011). (Duff, 2013, p. 218)

What might this look like if we apply Duff’s comments here to my notion of environ(mental) health? ‘Will a different democracy become necessary? A democracy extended to things?’ (Latour, 1993, p. 12). I think so. The online journal, Rhizomes.net, ‘oppose the idea that knowledge must grow in a tree structure from previously accepted ideas. New thinking need not follow established patterns […] unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point’ (The Rhizomes Manifesto, n.d.). So that’s what I did with my research…

A small assemblage responded to the poster I put up, with each multiplicity admitting to some mental health issue that they wished to explore in relation to their environments (see the prologue to the play, Liverpool ONE-Liverpool Too for a description of this labelling). We used a number of methods under the umbrella of post-
qualitative collaborative action research to explore varied environments, one of which was psychogeography: a method where a line took ‘us’ for a walk.

Transfer 25: Some of the lines that took us for walks.

A bricolage of data were amassed in the form of journaling (notes, drawings, mind maps, collage), photography, observation, video interviews (individual and group), sociodemographics, and dual video feedback (an original method), which were then collectively analysed through group (re)flections/focus group meetings. These were recorded, later transcribed and then formed into a Brechtian play to both highlight Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of interpretosis as well as resolve the ethical issue of participant redundancy at the write up stage (voices that are usually omitted in most research). I waded through the rest of the empirical materials, waiting for any particular events to glow, and they did.
Environ(Mental) Health Assemblage Three:

😊 = 😊

Prof: What was your question again?

Jamie: Well, my frame is ‘how is mental health and wellbeing spread in the environment?’

(silence)

Jamie: I did initially put health and wellbeing but then I thought that could be, loads of physical things, you know…

Dolly: Yeah

Jamie: …like pollution, things like that, so I’ve changed it to ‘mental’ health and wellbeing which is more of a …using the mind a bit more I suppose, how our mind affects our health from the environment, you know, the links, a circular link there somewhere…But the initial question, you know, is there as well, ‘how do perceptions of environments influence health and wellbeing?’ So if we think about those questions and how we can take these things away whilst looking at the video it might give us more of an idea, and if you want to make notes, please do, it might help as well, and then we can talk about it after. So, shall we look at the videos?

Pandora: Yeah.

Snippet 8: ‘loads of physical things’

Snippet 8 highlights an example of the classic Cartesian trap that I fell into in that discussion. Of course at that time, I didn’t (re)cognise the mind or mental as physical or as co-produced (rather than linear and uni-directional from cause→to→effect). I hadn’t yet figured out Spinoza’s point of the mind as an idea of the body. Of course pollution is entangled with ‘mental’ health. How can it not be? Had I realised, I probably would have kept it as ‘health’, as that’s just what it is. I suppose this is what the process of diffractive rumination does—induces paradigm shifts—if you happen to follow those particular paths that lead in those multiple directions.

109 Picture taken from the ‘Mr. Men Wiki website’ (2016a). Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA).
This assemblage is another attempt to stray from that linear anthropocentric path by *playing* and *thinking with* indiscretions from the ontological turn in order to diffract the modernist causal mechanisms of thought. It explores the WiC co-participants/co-(re)searchers rumination: ‘how can we learn from/use the experiences we have to understand ourselves better and enhance our moods?’ This cogitation co-emerged over a couple of group meetings where I asked the question of what they were hoping to get from these outings and meetings. Every answer was different but they eventually came to a collective agreement on this particular musing by the third (02-09-13) and fourth (07-10-13) meetings. It turns out that their responses to this rumination ‘mainly’ focused on the material-semiotic actors we enlisted into our lines of flight and as such it also stepped in the realm of my own interest of how mental health and wellbeing is distributed.

The central term in Haraway’s elaboration is the material-semiotic actor. This actor may be human or non-human, machine or non-machine. What is critical to her position is that the material-semiotic actor actively contributes to the production. Thus an “object of knowledge” is no longer a resource, ground, matrix, object, material or instrument to be used by humans as a means to an end. Rather an object of knowledge is an ‘active, meaning-generating axis of the apparatus of bodily production’ (Haraway 1991: 200).

As time went on, we all began to think *with* stone, graffiti, photo, video and emoji and they revealed their roles in the production of our mental health in rather explicit ways. Hodgetts et al. (2010) stressed the importance of objects (such as MP3 players and books) in modelling recovery trajectories during their inquiry following a homeless man. Other research has found similar support that people come to know themselves and take form as ‘materially and socially located beings’ (Hodgetts et al. 2010 p. 300) through inter-objective relations (Cooley, 1902; Cuba & Hummon, 1993; Jovchelovitch, 2007). Tucker (2010) and Duff, Murray, Loo and Jacobs (2013) reasoned that ‘places’ hold similar value for mediating recovery (such as attachments to homes), as ‘a person’s sense of self both leaks into and out from the places they inhabit and the things they use in everyday life.’ (Hodgetts et al., 2010, p. 286). Hodgetts et al. (2010) state that ‘[s]uch objects extend the places [one] can go beyond [their] physical
environments to the imaginary’ (p. 300), yet the imaginary is also physical and so it becomes a topological extension that is granted by such objects. They also infer that ‘[a]n MP3 player actually feels like part of us. It sounds as if the music is inside our heads.’ (Hodgetts et al. 2010 p. 300, emphasis added), yet following Noë (2009), it is we who experience the music ‘out of our heads’ as we ourselves are ‘patterns of active engagement with fluid boundaries and changing components’ (p. 183). In other words, we are spread.

**Scene one: Photos**

‘Ansel Adams urges that we say we “make” a picture, not “take” one.’
(Sontag, 1977, pp. 122-123)
So you can put yourself back into that… and then you get the experience back.

Jamie: So why did you, erm, did you find that useful when you looked back at the photo’s when you were in, where was it, when you were at home or something?

Blondie: Erm, just when I’m at home or… yeah, just when I’m at home when I feel a bit down or there’s nothing to do I just look at the pictures, then I look at that and the memory comes back.

Jamie: Oh right, what, Liverpool as well?

Blondie: Yeah, Liverpool, I looked at all of them and it’s like, it takes you back to where you were.

Jamie: Does anyone else find that useful?

Dolly and Jim together: Yeah.

Jamie: Yeah, look at the photos from the outing if you want to take the positive bits from it if you’re feeling, I mean why, did you look originally at the photos? Why would you want to, take that positive from the photo’s?

Blondie: It’s, I don’t know, it’s sometimes when I look at photo’s it helps me to like, like if I get bored or depressed or anything like that, it just helps me to like, you know, look at that place, you go back to it, it helps you to cheer up, you know, erm, think happy thoughts, you know, like...

Jamie: So, the pictures, the photos of the association?

Blondie: Yeah, so it’s just like a reminder of when you were there and then what it looked like and felt like and… heard like, so you can put yourself back into that…

Snippet 9: ‘so you can put yourself back into that…’

Looked, felt and heard! ‘All photographs are memento mori. To take a photograph is to participate in another person’s (or thing’s) mortality, vulnerability, mutability. Precisely by slicing out this moment and freezing it, all photographs testify to time’s relentless melt.’ (Sontag, 1977, p. 15). Hodgetts et al. (2010) suggest that photographs ‘provide insights into the practices through which’ people construct themselves as ‘socio-geographically located and mobile human being[s] across time and space (Hodgetts et al., 2006, cited in Hodgetts et al., 2010, p. 290). So Blondie is able to jump back in time synaesthetically with the aid of a photo (traditionally thought of as a visual stimulation) to conjure other sensory memories, perceptual qualities such as sight and sound that are associated and merged with proprioceptive, haptic and affective qualities.
such as feeling. In the film *Memento*, Leonard does the same (although for very different reasons) using annotated Polaroids as a part of his memory bank *but not merely as a stimulus*. Leonard *intra-acts* with them (not over-and-against them), as does Blondie. For example,

telephone numbers stored on a mobile phone may serve as an extra-cranial memory, an extension of our own memory that we don’t simply ‘use’ as a source of memory stimulation. Rather, the phone is actually imbricated as part of our cognitive processing. (Mcphie, 2016, p. 49).

Any sense of *agency* (if we want to call it that) co-emerges and is co-produced out of the intra-relations between what we would traditionally consider to be objects (the passive *inanimate* photos) and subjects (the organised *organic* human). Yet photos are never static, humans are never just organic and agency doesn’t necessarily require humans to *become*.

‘[L]ike every mass art form, photography is not practiced by most people as an art. It is mainly a social rite, a defense against anxiety, and a tool of power.’ (Sontag, 1977, p. 8). For example, ‘PhotoTherapy’ has been a popular technique since the late nineteen-seventies (see Krauss, 1979) that utilises ‘clients’ personal photos (family photos, personal snapshots) as a catalyst for therapeutic healing when words alone aren’t always sufficient, as photos ‘always contain stories’ (Weiser, 2004, p. 23). Referring to her photos of the WiC adventures, Blondie stated, ‘I wish I’d just looked at those photos before I decided to cut my hair and have a baby’. After she had her baby taken away, she cut her hair and attempted to change her gender from a female identity to a male one, adopting a masculinised name to go by. This is when I met *him*. *His* first pseudonym was Spike before *she* adopted Blondie. The photos seem powerful indeed if, as Blondie’s infer, they hold the capacity to (re-)story (yet never re-store) an identity.

But rather than imagining that the photos are simple catalysts or tools to be *used* by the therapist or *patient* in order to promote healing (and the subtle power relations this (re)enforces), I imagine that the photos were an integral extension of Blondie’s memory, an extended spatio-temporal limb for her to physically travel *with* (as a topological and mobile corporeal apparatus) in order to ‘cheer up’ and ‘think happy thoughts’. ‘In other words, the mind does not inhabit the body; rather, the body inhabits
the mind’ (Malafouris, 2013, p. 60). The photos were like the TARDIS\textsuperscript{110}, temporal co-agents in the production of mental health. It is the \textit{haecceitical} intra-relational quality ‘between’ Blondie (including her embodied memories of the original events) and the photos that co-produce the feelings she discusses rather than Blondie as a discrete and subjective agentic entity acting upon an object as if it were a passive and inert \textit{quiddital} non-entity, static in time and space. They have the capacity to affect and be affected. ‘The BwO is a component of passage’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 175). A rainbow (a process or assemblage, not an object) wouldn’t exist as ‘a rainbow’ without a perceiver\textsuperscript{111} to co-produce/co-constitute it in myriad ways\textsuperscript{112}. Nietzsche (1967/1887) stated, ‘[i]f we were to remove all the relationships and actions of a thing, the thing does not remain.’ (p. 302). Take away any of these processes—\textit{photons, water, human}—and the rainbow (as \textit{we}\textsuperscript{113} understand it) does not remain. In the same way, the photo is not a discrete object, it is an intra-relational process and as such lends itself to becoming \textit{plugged in} (following Deleuze and Guattari) to other intra-relational processes, including humans. ‘To photograph is to appropriate the thing photographed. It means putting oneself into a certain relation to the world that feels like knowledge -- and, therefore, like power’ (Sontag, 1977, p. 4).

A different way of conceiving photography is of the relationship between the camera, the depressor of the button and eye of the beholder. The camera itself is an extended or bionic eye (like a bat monitor\textsuperscript{114}). It allows us to see more clearly and more

\textsuperscript{110} TARDIS stands for ‘Time and Relative Dimension in Space’ from the BBC series \textit{Doctor Who}. Susan Foreman, the actor who played the Doctors granddaughter, coined the term in \textit{An Unearthly Child} in 1963.

\textsuperscript{111} The \textit{perceiver} could just as easily be a rock as a human, as the spectrum of colours produce varying temperatures on the surface, creating shifting ecological diversities and mutable energetic intensities: perception is the conglomeration of multiple forces of encounter. However, to the rock, the rainbow is still not \textit{a rainbow} as it is for a human (or even between humans).

\textsuperscript{112} ‘[A] rainbow is a process that requires a further physical system in order to take place. Where is the rainbow? Where is the experience of the rainbow? Is there a rainbow without an observer? Is there a rainbow-observer without a rainbow in the cloud? [...] it is impossible, from a physical perspective, to disentangle the rainbow from its observer [...] Processes are necessarily private and yet physical. Secondarily, the rainbow is something that takes place. It is not a static entity. The rainbow takes place and it is extended in time and in space.’ (Manzotti, 2011b, para. 8).

\textsuperscript{113} I place ‘we’ under erasure due to varied cultural conceptions of rainbows over time and so ‘we’ are never ‘we’ for very long (if ever we were ‘we’ to begin with).

\textsuperscript{114} We wouldn’t be able to ‘hear’ the bat’s echo location without the extended bodily apparatus that is the monitor. The air is bulging with \textit{stuff}, most of which we cannot
closely without the rest of our body moving any closer to the subject of scrutiny (like Bateson’s blind person with the stick). As an extension, we literally learn to become the camera, using it skilfully to enact our culture’s habit of framing the world. Our internal framing, the constantly changing lens that we carry around with us (*also created in that moment*), thus becomes externalised. We begin to think ‘with’ this tool, this extended self.

Recollecting memories of salvaged photographs, Glorianna Davenport (2011) documents that ‘photographs led me to cameras, and over the years the camera became an object I could think *with*. I could think about light and shadow, about composing the frame, and about what it meant to live in a certain way, to make decisions at many levels, and to document the world’ (p. 219, emphasis added). Therefore, the action of photographing something is different from discussing the resulting photograph itself. Again, the photograph is not the action or event that happened at the time. Yet the photograph, here on the page, still does something ‘with’ us. It intra-acts with us and depending on our differently embodied memories and experiences, it will enact different intensities to co-produce different affective relations. Each of the co-participants/co-(re)searchers took very different photos. Even the photos that looked the same, were taken for very different reasons. The cameras themselves played a part in the style of the photos and what photos were taken. The tension of the button, the weight of the camera, the width and texture of the camera as it’s being held all alter, no matter how slightly, the action of taking the photo as well as the photo itself. Then, there’s the fact that two of the cameras were deployed by me. They belonged to the university and so had associated institutional properties, yet it was I who provided them and so the power relations exerted from/with the camera may have had an influence on which particular photos were taken, as well as how they were taken. For example, Bumble imagined that I had wanted a particular type of photo taken along with writing down all the street names and so her photos all example a power relation between herself, myself, the University of Cumbria, Liverpool and the camera.

perceive. Space is erroneous…and tangible…at the same time. It is a necessary contradiction.
Annotated Polaroids 12-13: Street names. (Photos by Bumble).

This assemblage is also articulated in Bumble’s journal.

![Image of street signs]

Note 1: ‘Whose agenda are we following?’ (Bumble).

Although I hadn’t actually requested street names to be photographed or written down, Bumble logically imagined I had as I suggested to ‘record the textual run off’ from the streets (after MacFarlane’s description of psychogeography). However, Bumble soon ‘takes charge’ of the situation herself.

![Image of handwritten notes]

Note 2: ‘Need to take charge’ (Bumble).

So, rather than exert a determining agency of their own, the journals and cameras seem to be co-conspirators in what appears to be a kind of agential assemblage. This is not to say that humans cannot exert agency by themselves as they were/are never ‘by themselves’ to begin with.
There is not a body ‘in recovery’ passively accessing and deploying equally passive material objects in the instrumental service of recovery. Recovery is a function of the entire assemblage, human and nonhuman. Remove one element and the assemblage morphs again, transforming the experience of recovery. Material forces thus provide the immanent conditions for recovery. They are not the ‘tools’ of recovery, they embody recovery. (Duff, 2014, p. 115)

Karen Barad (2007) insists that objects do not precede their ‘interaction’ but emerge through specific intra-actions. ‘Apparatuses are not merely about us.’ (Barad, 2007, p. 142). So they are about human-nonhuman assemblages? ‘[A]pparatuses are specific material reconfigurings of the world that do not merely emerge in time but iteratively reconfigure space-timematter as part of the ongoing dynamism of becoming.’ (Barad, 2007, p. 142). So, a sort of dynamic, performative assemblage of becoming agential? Although similar to Judith Butler’s notion of performative agency, for both Butler and Foucault, agency belongs only to the human domain, and neither address the nature of technoscientific practices and their profoundly productive effects on human bodies, as well as the ways in which these practices are deeply implicated in what constitutes the human, and more generally the workings of power. That is, both accounts honor the nature-culture binary (to different degrees), thereby deferring a thoroughgoing genealogy of its production. (Barad, 2007, pp. 145-146)

I think Barad is suggesting that what is needed is a ‘posthumanist performative account of the material-discursive practices of mattering (including those that get labelled “scientific” and those that get labelled “social”)’ (Barad, 2007, p. 146). Yet this performative account of mattering does already exist:

In Indigenous ontologies, all beings and things have particular qualities and capabilities by virtue of their taking form always and only in a relational context. The identity of ‘things’ in the world is not understood as discrete or independent, but emerges through, and as, relations with everything else.
It is the relation, or connection, not the thing itself, that is ontologically privileged in Indigenous Maori thought. […] This ontology […] produces a necessarily mutually constituting relationship between all things, including human beings (see also Henare, et al., 2006). (Jones & Hoskins, 2016, p. 80)

This includes stones, graffiti and Emoji.

**Scene two: Emoji**

Emoji played a slightly different role in our inquiry…as *tataus of the face*. Yet even a *tatau* of the face can become a transfer, a mask, under the imposition of significance and subjectification. ‘Paintings, tattoos, or marks on the skin embrace the multidimensionality of bodies.’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 195). So what happens if that abstract machine turns from alphabetised to hieroglyph or pictograph? For the WiC group, mental health was also spread in emoticons and emoji. BBS drew emoji throughout his journal (just as they drew him). They presented a variety of emotions (hence, emoji as a derivative of ‘emoticon’):

**Note 3**: Emoji of taboo, embarrassment, shame, disempowerment? Or resistance, empowerment and transgression?

**Notes 4-7**: Meteorological Emoji. Is the face the sun?
Notes 8-9: Emoji of signification: of speeds and rhythms, signs of negativity?

Note 10: Emoji of anger? Paranoia, Panopticon/Oligopticon, Big Brother, disempowerment?

Notes 11-12: Haptic emoji: contact, friendship, affective encounters?

Notes 13-14: Empathetic emoji: sadness, anger, injustice?
Notes 15-17: Emoji of relief: Survival, physiological needs?

Notes 18-21: Synesthetic embodied emoji: Auditory, olfactory and visual?

These emoji became very popular with the WiC group. They spread rapidly, like a fungal mycelium or rhizome.

Note 22: ‘Amazing feeling’ Emoji (Blondie)

Note 23: ‘Ace. Fantastic’ Emoji (Blondie)
Bumble regularly used emoji in her journal. In fact, Bumble decided to produce some feedback sheets for the WiC group to use that utilised the popularity of the emoji.
Transfer 26: Bumble’s emoji feedback sheets

Each of the faces (as an *accompaniment* to alphabetised language) on Bumble’s sheets could be ticked or circled depending on your choice of association with how the environment made you feel/you felt in that environment.

Transfer 27: Word of the Year 2015. (Onwuemezi, 2015)

This emoji, *Face with Tears of Joy* (Transfer 27) was the Oxford Dictionaries’ Word of the Year 2015 (Onwuemezi, 2015). Yet again, the data (*emoji*) begins to *glow*. But what do these emoji *do*?

Intra-acting emoji 😊
Emoticons ;-) and emoji 😊 interrupt spaces (in place of an ellipsis) and mediate between people (and things) to denote a mental state. Yet they also have a history (like a map) that always already influences our intra-actions with them. This history gets in the cracks to add to our associations.

The WiC group’s mental health was/is bound up in these small round expressional faces. Faces in their simplest form, recognisable and immediate in their connotations. They may very simply present our affective mental state yet are powerful signifiers. Arguably more than words, they contain traces of our mental health, externally preserved in the technological mediating form (iPhone, etc.) that also adds to its impact (depending on who it belongs to, the company who made it, etc.). The force of encounter with an emoji is a simple one as we get an immediate indication of what feelings are conveyed.

They are generally yellow. This is important for parity and homogenisation. The Classic yellow face of have a nice day holds associations with nuclear power, pinned as badges on the lapels of protesters (I have one), also as a symbol of resistance. Yet, yellow is the face of Mr. Happy 😊, a face we must all attempt to attain under the hegemonic signification/subjectification regime, made even more evident through the introduction of Little Miss Sunshine 😊 (not too dissimilar to Sarah Ahmed’s description of the happy housewife), in a dystopic Misterland where clearly identifiable Westernised cultural stereotypes and bounded anthropocentric forms are redeployed in little yellow avatar bodies. Facialisation (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004) now has another colour, other than green.

Of course, the associations we have with emoji are culturally mediated yet are powerful in their impacts. They are the (re)placement of the 1-10 scale for BBS: ‘I use a smiley thing on it, and I scale it, I number it. You know, one to ten about how I’m feeling, one meaning [inaudible] and the higher up the scale, the happier I am’, yet are far more nuanced than numbers. There are hundreds of emoji that supposedly signify a variety of emotions, but are they complex enough to ‘know’ what another person is really ‘feeling’ and do they really encourage empathy in this way? As is evident in

115 Picture taken from the ‘Mr. Men Wiki website’ (2016a)
116 Ibid. (2016b)
Bumble’s journal entry, the variety of emoji not only compliment the words, they actually add considerable nuance (also dependent on the translator/spect-actor).

**Note 26:** Bumble’s digital mind map of Liverpool

**Scene three: Emoji and mental health**

Edom (2016, n.p.) goes as far as to say that ‘Emojis might be one of the most effective forms of emotional communication we use today’. Evans (2015a), found that ‘72% of 18-25 year olds in the UK believe that emoji make them better at expressing their feelings’ (para. 8). Various psychological programmes have now begun using emoji as a form of therapy, such as the Swedish Children’s Rights Society, BRIS, ‘which helps victims of domestic abuse’ and educational therapy such as the Emotes project, ‘which makes use of emoji-like images to help children explore and better develop their ability to express emotions’ (Evans, 2015a, para. 9). Emoji ‘can convey ideas, and be used to influence the mental states, emotions, and even behaviours of others.’ (Evans, 2015b, n.p.).

With the ‘Emergence of e-therapy in mental health care’, emoticons and emoji are starting to emerge as useful communicators for many people (e.g. Mood diary, Moodlens, Online therapy, Internet counselling). For example, ‘Emoodji’ is an app specifically designed to help students express their feelings in order to tackle issues of mental ill-health. The charity Mind devised Emoodji’s and they are now available as apps for iPhones and Android phones. ‘Expressing how you’re feeling can be one of the hardest things we do, but with Emoodji you can do it in an instant.’ (Edom, 2016, n.p.). It seems mental health and wellbeing is now offered *in a bun*. If not careful, this
could spiral into a time-saving strategy (a *McDonaldisation*) for a cash-strapped mental health service.

Transfer 28: ‘Are emojis the future of mental health?’ (Edom, 2016, n.p.)

---

Emoodji by Mind is a free app for the ups & downs of university life, from exam stress & homesickness to the joy of exams done! Take a selfie, choose an emoji for your mood, maybe send it to friends - and track your mood over time.

Transfer 29: Emoodji (2016)

Having been made by mental health charity Mind, Emoodji is going to have a great impact on the wellbeing of students so we need your help to spread the word and get the app into people’s hands. Tell “all the students” about it!

Transfer 30: Emoodji iTunes (2016) app for iPhones.
**Transfer 31**: ‘As validated by Sir Paul McCartney.’ (Edom, 2016, n.p.)

(Illustration by Gazin, 2016)

Is it serious too? Yep. As validated by Sir Paul McCartney himself, emojis are a powerful communication tool. Making it just that bit easier to express how they’re feeling could be a game-changer for student mental health. Emoodji tracks your mood too, showing where your fluctuations are and is filled with little tips and info to help students along the way. (Edom, 2016, n.p.)

So that’s it then, Sir Paul McCartney has validated it! This does seem useful as a method of easier, faster communication regarding that extra little information that could make all the difference between someone understanding what you are trying to communicate or getting frustrated because they’re just *not on the same wavelength*. After all, they are usually used as a *supplement* to the alphabetised word and not on their own (Hwang,
‘Users reading text messages with emoticons are significantly better at interpreting the precise meaning of the author than those reading messages without emoticons’ (Lo, 2008; Gajadhar & Green, 2005, cited in Park, Fink, Barash & Cha, 2013). Surely, this is helpful for many people who may have difficulty with literacy, especially if they happen to be depressed partly due to nobody understanding them? But what might be lost in translation? Surely an emotion is never simply an emotion. This would be chunking.

What do the emoji do? Chunk?

The co-participants/co-(re)searchers use of emoji/emoticons comes as no surprise then, especially regarding the conveyance of feelings and the potential to affect and be affected. Their journals and text messages are bursting with other languages, such as emoji, mind maps, mental maps, drawings, photos, etc. Where words fail (due to their more abstract presentational nature (apart from onomatopoeia perhaps)), emoji’s communicate at a much more nuanced and basic level. They are superb relational communicators as a part of our mental processing and agential make-up. They are external and yet seemingly example a more sincere cognitive process than written words or speech. But is there a danger of creating more objective boundaries through diversification of emoji? ‘You can make any list of part-objects you want: hand, breast, mouth, eyes…it’s still Frankenstein. […] The question of the body is not one of part-objects but of differential speeds.’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 190).

The emoji wrote themselves through BBS and BBS wrote himself through the emoji. Thus, the emoji are another form of mapping in/of the flesh, more tatau than transfer (unlike words and numbers). They are the graffiti of mapping rather than the graffiti of aesthetic representation, the transfer.

Emoticons and emoji were another example of how the co-participants/co-(re)searchers were generating their own ways of tackling their research question along with photos, journals, etc. All of these different materials were much more than external tools to utilise though, they were co-producing agency and intricately woven through their mental health, as a part of their very being (becoming).

Before the appearance of the mirror, the person didn’t know his own face except reflected in the waters of a lake. After a certain point everyone is
responsible for the face he has. I’ll now look at mine. It is a naked face. And when I think that no other like it exists in the world, I get a happy shock. (Lispector, 2014, p. 29)

**Scene four: Reterritorialisation**

Jamie: Has anybody else erm, got any other ideas for how we can take positive experiences away from the erm, from the experiences that we have?

Dolly: Just to try and mirror it, in your own environment. Find a similar spot to go to. See... It might make you feel the same or not.

BBS: That’s a good point, I think our environments quite a good thing isn’t it, it’s quite a safe thing isn’t it? You think ‘Oh, I recognise all this’, whereas if you go to somewhere new there always maybe a bit of anxiety isn’t there?

Jamie: Could you, can you find that though, I mean, in, in [Dolly’s home town] for example?

Dolly: I think you could.

Jamie: Go and find a spot that’s similar and then ...

Dolly: Yeah, it depends how, where you went first, I mean some of us, you know, if the hill were covered in snow and it was beautiful you couldn’t match that could you? If it wasn’t the same where you were, but say like, if you went to the Priory, brilliant, went to another, a church near you, you never know.

(silence)

**Snippet 10: ‘try and mirror it’ (Dolly)**

This is rather like writing over a past event. You may never delete the original event entirely but writing an inscription over it produces a palimpsest where the underlying archaeology of the embodied mind (embodied memory) is historicised by the new topsoil that you overlay it with. This is done with graffiti. It’s also sometimes done with tattoos to hide previous scarring. As a group, we attempted this positive form of dermabrasion with Dolly as she had particularly stressful scars in a specific place in her home town. The memories she associated with a previous partner were inscribed in a certain walk along an estuary, by the docks, now a forbidden zone to Dolly. She asked
the WiC group if we could walk with her along those same lines of memory, along the path that stretched out beside the water’s edge in her home town. So, after the project had supposedly come to an end, on the 21st of July, 2014, we walked with her to (re)inscribe over those painful memories, rather like her tatau, don’t you think?

As Cameron Duff (2014) has inferred, studies that tease out the agential capacities of human-object/place relations ‘hint at the prospect of manipulating or affecting select nonhuman entities in an effort to promote recovery in diverse settings.’ (Duff, 2014, p. 94). This manipulation may not come from us but there is no reason why we cannot be involved in some sort of assemblage manipulation, perhaps more of an affective nudge than a ‘free won’t’118 (Libet, 2006), in order to promote healthy trajectories. Perhaps we must deterritorialise before we can attempt to (re)territorialise though. It took a year and the supposed finilisation of the WiC project before Dolly was able to trust our group enough to ask us to help her forge a new path. After a year and its formal closure, the WiC assemblage became a heterogeneous swarm that had the power to create lines of flight away from prescribed trajectories. Like the popular story of the protagonist dying and being reborn to become something more-than-human, perhaps this is what the WiC inquiry had to do. Perhaps only when the research is no longer under the pretence of being research can there be possibilities for (re)territorialisations to be born. Like the phoenix from the flames, haecceities are born from quiddities.

‘We must die as egos and be born again in the swarm, not separate and self-hypnotized, but individual and related.’ (Henry Miller, Sexus, cited in Seem, 1983, p. xv).

118 ‘Free won’t’ is a concept introduced by Benjamin Libet (2006) where volition or agency is enacted in the form of veto. However, Libet (2006) goes on to describe his ‘Conscious Mental Field’ theory (CMF) as ‘a non-physical phenomenon, like the subjective experience that it represents. The process by which the CMF arises from its contributing elements is not describable. It must simply be regarded as a new fundamental ‘given’ phenomenon in nature, which is different from other fundamental ‘givens,’ like gravity or electromagnetism.’ (p. 324). Although Libet denies the Cartesian dualism inherent in his statement, it is, never-the-less, obviously a Cartesian dualism and, like Descartes’ rationale, argued by way of ‘faith’ that it exists due to its invented non-physical nature.
*Interméde:* (Intra-)Act 3 is available as a complimentary play script. Read it now if you like!
Environ(Mental) Health Assemblage Four: Ecology of the Oppressed

Once we were happy in our own country and we were seldom hungry, for then the two-leggeds and the four-leggeds lived together like relatives, and there was plenty for them and for us. But the Wasichus [white men] came, and they have made little islands for us and other little islands for the four leggeds, and always these islands are becoming smaller (Black Elk, cited in Neihardt, 1991, p. 157)

Space the final frontier: Physical space is temporarily occupied and appropriated by hegemonic power relations. During this time, it becomes controlled, ordered, taxonomised, gendered (sexed, even), classed, racialised, bounded, etc. Space becomes place and all that that encompasses. It becomes encultured. Of course, these are all ‘natural’ processes as is evident when observing other ecological events, such as how spaces of fear created by wolves enact trophic cascades, changing topographies and topologies of physical space. These spaces have atmospheres and are felt, a physical process. How else do deer or elk know to stay away from a space where wolves hunt? Traces of chemicals permeate the senses, sound waves are numbed and/or excited to the presence of wolves through muted silences and/or alarm calls, and impressions in the snow are visually disclosed and distributed haptically around the body, all to create an affective register that becomes a felt atmosphere, an ecological force of encounter. Gregory Bateson criticised the epistemological fallacy of Western thinking, that the unit of survival in the bio-taxonomy, is “organism plus environment.” The choice of the wrong unit leads to an epistemological error that propagates itself, multiplying and mutating, as a basic characteristic of the thought-system of which it is a part. The hierarchy of taxa leads to a conception of species against species, Man against Nature—a view that has been reinforced by various ideologies and movements, including Romanticism. (cited in Peters, 2003, p. 280).

‘This is a destructive thesis insofar as it suggests that culture is outside nature’ (Bryant, 2013, p. 294). Guattari was heavily influenced by Bateson’s ecology of mind, enough
to produce a tripartite theory of ecology that consists of ‘the environmental, the social, and the mental (the complex, environment-social-mental) where mental ecology transcends the psychology of the individual.’ (Peters, 2003, p. 280).

Gregory Bateson has clearly shown that what he calls the ‘ecology of ideas’ cannot be contained within the domain of the psychology of the individual, but organizes itself into systems or ‘minds’, the boundaries of which no longer coincide with the participant individuals. (Guattari, 2000, p. 54).

Although parting company with Bateson’s ideas due to his hierarchical ‘systemic’ view of ‘context’ (see Guattari, 2000, p. 54), Guattari’s ‘three ecologies’ attempts to entangle these concepts together, which he calls ‘ecosophy’. Similarly, I part company with Guattari here as he reinforces the conceptual boundaries by the very distinguishing words he uses. Hence, Haraway’s ‘naturecultures’ or my ‘environ(mental) health’. It matters. However, I believe both Bateson’s and Guattari’s epistemological intensions behind their attempts are ethically sound as Guattari states, ‘only an ethico-political articulation […] between the three ecological registers (the environment, social relations, and human subjectivity) would be likely to clarify [the ecological dangers that confront us]’ (Guattari, 2000, p. 27). Guattari blames ‘integrated world capitalism’ for these ecological dangers by suggesting that it is now orientated to the production of signs and a passive subjectivity, which only serves to accentuate these issues (Peters, 2003).

Bateson (2000, p. 491) suggested that ‘[e]cology, in the widest sense, turns out to be the study of the interaction and survival of ideas and programs […] in circuits’, such as ‘complexes of differences’. Thus, there must be an ecology of the oppressed. This particular ecology, like weeds, often goes unnoticed, unchallenged or is simply accepted and appropriated into the dominant culture. Within this assemblage, I explore and highlight it.

**Scene one: Affective transmission: spaces of repression and liberation**

---

119 This is a different ecosophy to Arne Naess’s deep ecology version.
'Is there anyone who has not, at least once, walked into a room and “felt the atmosphere”? ’ (Brennan, 2004, p. 1)

‘In a preparatory note to Ulysses, Joyce wrote, ‘places remember events’, and in this we can recognize how deeply time has become embedded within place, and might be said to have become one of its dominant characteristics.’ (Dean & Millar, 2005, p. 14). When I was in Phnom Pen, Cambodia, I visited a former Khmer Rouge detention centre/security prison where the people who were kept inside were tortured and slaughtered in their ten’s of thousands. It was a high school before a prison, now called Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, a museum that archives the atrocities enacted during Pol Pot’s reign of terror in the 1970’s. The seemingly inoffensive and tranquil outer skin of the school was a deception. Here, every darkened room in the building, every sprouting plant in the cracks of the concrete, every angle within the architecture of the place gave itself over, overwhelmingly, to the (past) events of torture and unsympathetic cruelty. I remember that visit as a deep cut in my affective haecceity. It got under my skin. As I walked around, I was emotionally overwhelmed by the atmosphere as the weight of the atrocities that happened there made me break down in tears. The affective force of the atmosphere penetrated my flesh from without (the buildings embodied scars) and within (my embodied memories), co-producing a saline solution into existence. The affects of the embodied mind (or enminded body) are evidently physical, processual and multi-directional.

I am using the term “transmission of affect” to capture a process that is social in origin but biological and physical in effect. The origin of transmitted affects is social in that these affects do not only arise within a particular person but also come from without. They come via an interaction with other people and an environment. But they have a physiological impact. By the transmission of affect, I mean simply that the emotions or affects of one person, and the enhancing or depressing energies these affects entail, can enter into another. (Brennan, 2004, p. 3)

But this transmission in Tuol Sleng wasn’t just a social phenomenon, transmitted from human to human. The transmission of affect co-emerges from the intra-actions of
particular assemblages (of which some of its composition are other than human). For example, the building itself contains the memory that still haunts the ‘tourists’ who experience it. This memory is etched into the concrete walls and irradiates a disquiet though the tourists walk in whispered awkwardness and solemnity. Affective memory is embodied even within the name, Tuol Sleng, which means ‘Hill of the Poisonous Trees’ as the shadows in the former classrooms exude brutality and shame. ‘First, affect references those impulses and nerve-firings that sit within bodies, just below mindful consciousness. Second, it hints at the relational interactions between bodies and places.’ (Waterton, 2014, p. 9).

Our WiC group arrived by minibus in Lancaster and immediately walked to the castle, the start of our psychogeography ramble. We walked into a pub, reached for our map of Lancaster and drew around a pint glass. First stop, the castle. Immediately, the force of heritage emanated from the building and pulled us in, as tourists, to experience its power of historisation and commodification.

Transfer 32: The (sort of) circle we walked in Lancaster. (Photo by Jamie)
Lancaster castle exudes an air of posterity. It is a palimpsest of many layers. It reads as defence, attack, protection, panopticon, community, wealth, capital, (in)civility, aggression, hierarchy, etc. It was once a castle (*to keep them out*), then a prison (*to keep them in*), now a tourist site (*to bring them in*). ‘The castle has been the scene of notable trials, scores of executions and has housed prisoners of various categories until as recently as 2011.’ (A Dark History, 2014, n.p.). The guided walks and talks sell it as a ‘macabre heritage’ that is ‘historically significant’ (A Dark History, 2014, n.p.) as an appropriation and commodification of its ‘dark’ history.

Whilst investigating people’s affective responses to certain heritage sites of atmospheric appeal (such as Pearl Harbor Visitor Center in Honolulu), Waterton (2014) found that:

spaces of heritage are often designed to evoke affective responses. […] visitors I spoke to hinted at processes of encountering their surroundings through their bodies. These are all multi-sensual sites, alive with intense and often lingering sounds, smells and sights. In them, the body and its reactions are central, with visitors frequently remarking upon the rush of emerging goose-pimples, hair standing taut, jerked surprise, a hollowing stomach or the painful fight to hold back tears. These are examples that reflect both internal and external responses, ricocheting between individual bodies, groups and the very parameters of a heritage space. (p. 15)
When interviewing Blondie, she declared, ‘First time I’ve been to the castle; that is awesome’ (Blondie) yet her photos (Annotated Polaroids 15-18) seem to declare a very different narrative from typical touristic pictures, something resonant of my experience in the Tuol Sleng museum in Cambodia. Annotated Polaroid 18 is particularly disturbing, especially if you let yourself get pulled in to the darker space on the left…

Maybe it was the university camera that exerted this force of attraction, this power. Did the feel of the camera in her hands add to the assumption that these were the kind of pictures the research required? If it was her own camera, maybe they would be different.

![Image of desolate rooms]

**Annotated Polaroids 15-18:** Affective rooms. (Photos by Blondie).

The desolate rooms (that Blondie’s photos present here) seemed to produce a synaesthetic narrative that was embodied and enstoriied by Dolly as evidenced in her journal (Note 27). She ‘visioned’ a prisoner, ‘imagined’ how it could make you insane as she (mentally) ‘heard’ the communication of prisoners (‘loudly’) as well as cell doors slamming shut.
Mon, 14 Oct, Lancaster Visit, 

Going to the prison made me realize how powerful the mind can be, for instance, pro.
although the prison was no longer in use as I walked around it looking into different rooms/doors my brain came up with what the rooms could of been used for i.e. I could vision a prisoner being placed in Solitary and could only imagine how insane it could make you. I could also mentally hear how the prisoners would communicate (loudly) with each other and the sound of Cell Doors Slamming shut - very much in a way of the British Movie Scrubs was portrayed. I also kept saying in my head, (NORRAN STANLEY from) line was often said in the TV programme -(Porridge) so I would describe the prison.

Visit as great fun as it got my brain too - (imagine) what it was like or could of been like.

Note 27: ‘Scrubs’ (Dolly)
However, if we follow Manzotti’s (2010) line of thought here, the ‘images’ in Dolly’s ‘mind’ are not ‘images’ and are not ‘in’ her mind, especially if we take mind to mean brain, even though Dolly states that her ‘brain came up with what the rooms could have been used for’, could ‘vision a prisoner being placed in solitary’ and ‘could only imagine how insane it could make you’ (emphasis added). Therefore, we might ask, what and where are these thoughts located? Where did they originate, if at all? This is an ecological query. These photos give us a clue, not as representations of the rooms the photos are of (as that would be impossible due to the omission of an assortment of sensory stimulation that the rooms co-produced when actually there) but as presentations themselves, in their own right (as they have their own unique two-dimensional performativity and way of intra-acting with you, the spect-actor). The pictures engage in a temporal ecological dialogue with us which we may co-produce an association that tells a story.

In other words, the transmission of affect, if only for an instant, alters the biochemistry and neurology of the subject. The “atmosphere” or the environment literally gets into the individual. Physically and biologically, something is present that was not there before, but it did not originate sui generis: it was not generated solely or sometimes even in part by the individual organism or its genes. (Brennan, 2004, p. 1)

Initially, the building itself co-produced various stories with us (the WiC group) but now these photos produce something similar, yet different for you, the reader. These other than human materials are co-producers of these narrations, something that in part forms what we think of as agency.

As the notion of the individual gained in strength, it was assumed more and more that emotions and energies are naturally contained, going no farther than the skin. But while it is recognized freely that individualism is a historical and cultural product, the idea that affective self-containment is also a production is resisted […] But if we accept with comparatively ready acquiescence that our thoughts are not entirely independent, we are, nonetheless, peculiarly resistant to the idea that our emotions are not altogether our own. (Brennan, 2004, p. 2)
Thus, agency can be said to be co-produced by human and other than human assemblages (although the now blurred boundaries of separation may not even allow us to define the term ‘other than human’ in the first place). Waterton (2014, p. 4) explains that the shifts in practice from ‘static ‘site’ or ‘artefact’ to questions of engagement, experience and performance (see Harvey 2001; Smith 2006; Harrison 2013’) have travelled through ‘phenomenological styles of thinking’ (involving embodied processes of meaning-making), to ‘the more recent injunction to take up an interest in the ‘more-than-human’, through which we might recognise the spaces of heritage as agents or co-participants/ producers of a heritage experience (see Harrison 2013.’ She adds that these recent changes in thought and practice, ‘reset the theoretical lenses onto not only what heritage might mean, but what it might do, which simultaneously means foregrounding notions of ‘becoming’ and ‘embodiment’ (Waterton, 2014, p. 4, emphasis added).

What might spaces/architecture of heritage ‘do’ is perhaps the most apt question here. For BBS the visit to Lancaster castle provided the opportunity for the event to become an affordance. It became a site of protest, revelation, storytelling, storymaking, resistance, mourning and escape. The bars of the prison seem to lurk under BBS’s skin and skull. He takes this place around with him yet it occasionally emerges as a tātāu that we can all share the narrative of. He seems to be attempting a prison break by utilising a variety of methods (including the membership of this group). In the video interview in Lancaster, BBS admitted that he was vocal in persuading the group to go to Lancaster after the Liverpool visit, although I didn’t realise this at the time as I thought it was a ‘group’ decision. The castle/prison emitted a magnetic field that ensnared BBS’s particular mental health story. It pulled him in and in turn, he pulled us with him. BBS told his story with cardboard, words, a face (emoji?) and photos.
Lancaster castle is the first outing I came to after my head injury and I said then this is the start of me erm, properly rehabilitating and it’s quite strange coming back again to the prison and erm, and the castle and don’t feel that I have come far enough at all because I’ve done a little sign which says, ‘still a prisoner to my head injury, still no release or parole’, yet all the guys that were here, they’ve all been released or are on parole or serving their sentence somewhere else and I’m still serving my sentence and I still haven’t got my parole or a release date so I thought it was quite apt coming here today so I just thought I would share that with the group. (BBS, 14-10-13)

**Snippet 11:** Interview transcript of BBS

![Annotated Polaroid 19: BBS’s tatau. (Photo by Blondie)](image)

After noticing BBS’s positioning of his cardboard sign to pose for the photo (on the bars, under the no-entry sign), I had a trawl through some of the other photos he’d taken and realised a melancholic refrain emerging.
Annotated Polaroids 20-28: Liverpool prisons (Photos by BBS)
Annotated Polaroids 29-31: ‘I’m still serving my sentence’ (BBS). Lancaster prisons. (Photos by BBS)

Note 28: ‘bad signs all over’ (BBS)

These photos tell a story, but not on their own. They need you to co-create it. Also, one of them on their own would tell a very different story than how I have compiled them here. Your own memories have now merged with these pictures and combine to (fleetingly) co-create a unique story that only your current multiplicity (a temporal assemblage of your memories-pictures-computer screen/page) has ‘full’¹²⁰ access to. As well as the visual feast of associations and affordances in Lancaster that BBS could adopt for his mental health story (as a capacity to affect and be affected), his journal and the photos that BBS took on the day were also a (re)minder of serving his sentence (his insinuation+my interpretation). The photos from Liverpool followed a similar melody of re/de-pression. The environment is not a passive surface on which BBS inscribes his will but then BBS is not a passive surface for the environment to shape

¹²⁰ I highlight ‘full’ due to the possibility of others having partial access to your haecceity via shared intra-actions with your memories that are topologically spread on your mobile phone, computer, address book, diary, publications, art works, etc.
either (as highlighted in the Brechtian play, *Liverpool ONE-Liverpool Too*). ‘We have relations which are proper to our physiology, to our environment, and to our aspirations to talk, to work, to love, to reason or whatever. Humans develop broad (and highly individualised) capacities to affect and be affected by these myriad relations.’ (Fox, 2011, p. 362). In this case, at this time, the Lancaster mental health assemblage consisted of, at least, BBS-Lancaster castle/prison-head injury. In other words, ‘the assemblage will vary from person to person, contingent on the precise relations that exist as a consequence of experience, beliefs and attitudes, or from bodily predispositions.’ (Fox, 2011, p. 363).

A visitor’s capacity to be affected by heritage is qualified by the experiences inevitably and already encoded in their person, as well as their responses to its already circulating representations. These, in turn, will trigger a range of kinaesthetic senses and flows that act as entry points for the retrieval or (re)emergence of memories in a cycle of affective contagion. (Waterton, 2014, p. 12)

These *affective contagions* were contextual for each member of the WiC group.

Note 29: ‘felt much more relaxed’ (Jim)

Note 30: ‘Felt easier here’ (Jim)

The ‘old street’ and ‘old buildings’ in Liverpool were ‘more interesting’ and relaxing for Jim. It ‘felt easier’ in these spaces. These ‘feelings’ may have already been ‘encoded’ in Jim due to the palimpsest of embodied memories *tataud* in his flesh. As Ahmed (2004, p. 10) points out, ‘[t]he moods we arrive with do affect what happens: which is not to say we always keep our moods’ (cited in Waterton, 2014, p. 9). The
spaces we engage with are not separate phenomena from us, they are not blank canvases that we may inscribe our thoughts and feelings onto or into without the spaces pushing back or pushing forward. Pushing back is a re-action to what we bring with us but pushing forward is what the spaces may bring with them. And as we are relational phenomena, we cannot help but intermingle along a path of becoming as opposed to any linear action-reaction sequence ‘in a place’. Therefore, our mental health co-emerges along a path of becoming and as such is never fixed in any place, including a place within us. These ‘places’ of heritage, often preserved in street names, protected buildings and fenced off landscapes are concepts as well as percepts. Yet, when regarded as a whole category, they are disguised as a concept.

\[Note 31: \text{‘street’ (Bumble)}\]
Bumble’s ‘feeling of history’ appeared in her journal quite a lot in different contexts. But how can a building of (mostly) stone emit a ‘feeling of history’? In an *animistic cosmology* this would make sense as ‘there are no objects as such’:

Things are alive and active *not because they are possessed of spirit* – whether in or of matter – but because the substances of which they are comprised continue to be swept up in circulations of the surrounding media that alternately portend their dissolution or – characteristically with animate beings – ensure their regeneration. (Ingold, 2011, p. 29, emphasis added)
Similarly, Christopher Alexander (1979) suggests that buildings themselves ‘are alive’ (p. 8) ‘and what strikes to the heart, they live.’ (p. 9). Alexander doesn’t mean ‘alive’ in the bio-logi-cal sense. He renounces the definition of current scientific orthodoxy that considers ‘an organism any carbon-oxygen-hydrogen-nitrogen system capable of reproducing itself, healing itself, and remaining stable for some particular lifetime.’ (Alexander, 2002, p. 30) as it runs into boundary issues such as: ‘Is a virus alive? Is a forest alive (as a whole, and over and above the life of the component species taken as individuals)? Are carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen necessary to what we shall define as life?’ (Alexander, 2002, p. 30). Alexander (2002) suggests a broader conception of life, ‘in which each thing—regardless of what it is—has some degree of life.’ (p. 31). ‘Life is not something stored in biological creatures; hybrids or bastards can be more alive than the purified versions, naturally, because they are imperfect, wild and radically picturesque.’ (Spuybroek, 2011, p. 331). Organic life, firstly in reference to ‘bodily organs’ and then in reference to ‘living beings’, is a product of essentialist thinking. Therefore, ‘the organism is that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself, and there is a life all the more intense, all the more powerful for being inorganic.’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 503). I would say that Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) concept of ‘inorganic’ life or ‘Body without Organs’ (BwO) is perhaps more consistent with a truly animistic understanding of life for as ‘a haecceity, we can no longer measure ourselves as if objects of the same genetic species.’ (Mcphie & Clarke, 2015, p. 241).

The authors of A Thousand Plateaus are proposing an ontological theory in which everything is inorganically alive, everything is assembled. When a person walks into a room, when a new fabric touches a finger, when a star wobbles, when a molecule falls apart, when a mayor feels threatened, when a recipe approaches a critical threshold: in all cases the laws of assembling are operating and are universally applied. If we want to know more about how inorganic life works, the next step is to learn more about the mechanisms of assembling. (Dema, 2007, para. 20)

The life of a stone is not some abstract, symbolic or immaterial essence ‘in’ the stone. But the stone is of the flow of life itself. Opposed to the idea of ‘materiality’ (as for Ingold this suggests a symbolic abstraction rather than focusing on the materials themselves) or on things having ‘agency’ (such as stones…or even humans), Tim Ingold
(2011) explains that ‘things are in life rather than life in things’ (Ingold, 2011, p. 29), including stones with (intra-)agency:

They have us pick them up, feel them, close them in our fist (if particularly smooth and rounded) or hold them between our thumb and forefinger (if small and edgy). They condition our walking […] we exist as a consequence of stones: the event of carrying stones makes us in the moment […] we become stone-carrying with carrying stones. (Rautio, 2013, p. 11)

I have previously intimated at the life of inorganic agency (see Mcphie & Clarke, 2015, pp. 242-243) and in this respect mountains are no different (p. 243), nor plastic bags for that matter (p. 244). This ‘vital materiality’ may ‘sound’ like symbolism but this is most certainly not how it is meant by many new materialists such as Barad, Bennet or Malafouris. To them, materiality is physical matter itself and not, as Ingold implies, symbolic abstraction.

**Scene two: Inhuman agency**

Inhuman agency undermines our fantasies of sovereign relation to environment, a domination that renders nature “out there,” a resource for recreation, consumption, and exploitation. (Cohen, 2015, p. 9)

Cohen’s (2015, p. 19) ‘ecology of the inhuman’ (*Geophilia*), invites the earth proper in to our thoughts, our philosophy (see Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) *geophilosophy*), and therefore must invade our mental health. Metal (earth-stone), stone (earth), bone (calcium-earth-metal-stone), plastic (sun-plant-animal-gas-carbon-earth-oil), paint (egg-plant-beetle-sand-soil-oil) and ‘all’ their derivatives are nature. Some formations of these properties may have trophic consequences for ‘organic life’ but, as Deleuze and Dema reminds us, ‘life can be articulated in all things’. This is radically different to the romanticized perception of a bio-logical (green) nature.

Nature and heritage are ideas, you can’t touch them but you may certainly feel them. There is, then, a difference here between percept and affect. We can’t outwardly physically touch (as a percept) the concepts heritage or nature (as they are not really real) but we can feel (as an affect) them or at least feel the traces, effects and physical
impacts of them that becomes perceptual. Is the idea that we may ‘touch nature’ or ‘go out into it’ a semiotic category mistake then? That would assume ‘categories’ exist in the world in the first place. It is an abstract concept that we associate with/to percepts (such as the sight of a green meadow or the feel of the wind on your skin). But nature is not a percept in itself, at least not one that we can outwardly touch with sight, sound, smell or our skin. However, as soon as the word is uttered (or even thought), it becomes a physical property, for example as a sound wave that enters us and intertwines with our embodied memories and selves to (co)produce varyingly intensive feelings, feelings that may enhance health effects or even detract from them (depending on a variety of socio-cultural equities and inequities). Like nature, heritage is historicised and as such has political and social affiliations. In this way, it is always already taxonomised, gendered, racialized and enclassed. It is territorialised through its aesthetics and enacts a play of posterity that has physical consequences for our mental health and wellbeing.

Our cultural conceptions of heritage are bound up with nationality and influence our physical perceptions through/via our affective actions. These perceptions, in turn, affect our mental health. Through the play of concept-affect-percept, the imaginary becomes really real but only through its consequences. So, like nature (or wilderness), the idea of heritage is rather like an embodied placebo response (Thompson, Ritenbaugh & Nichter, 2009; Mcphie, 2011, 2012, 2015a) and as such may have healing qualities depending on the socio-cultural persuasiveness on a person’s embodied memories (as well as their definitions of ‘healing’).

But epistemological access is also embroiled in this mesh of enaction. This means that not everyone has the opportunity to benefit from the healing power of heritage, just as not everyone has the fortune of benefitting from the healing power of the concept nature because ‘narratives of heritage are mediated in affective worlds that shape their reception, tapping into everyday emotional resonances and circulations of feelings of inclusion and exclusion’ (Waterton, 2014, pp. 2-3). Heritage and nature are dripping in power, the materiality of which becomes phenomenal when it is felt. For example, the sculpted landscapes of the Lake District are viewed in many different ways by many different people at many different times. We could group certain people together (as Urry (1990) does in the ‘Collective Gaze’, ‘Romantic Gaze’ and ‘Tourist Gaze’) and say that the upper and middle classes of Britain have (topological) epistemological access to the (previously unromanticised) mountainscapes that were made popular during the 18th Century, whereas the ‘lower’ or working classes may not
(at least not the ‘same’ type of access, as exampled in Suckall, Fraser and Quinn’s (2009) study of the Peak District school leavers). A Study by Ayamba and Rotherham (2003) found ‘Ninety-nine per cent of respondents, many with rural roots, were interested in using the outdoors, but felt excluded. Parks advocate equal opportunities policies but these are often ineffective.’ (p.1) (cited in Mcphie, 2014b, n.p.). This, as argued previously, is also true of the accessibility to the concept of ‘nature’ but is perhaps more obvious, apparent and evident in the historical material structures of urban environments (such as the appearance of green spaces). These urban social spaces are divided into hierarchies of materials, from architecture and public spaces, to privately owned public spaces and ‘green’ spaces.

The categories of “privileged” and “oppressed” are not fixed categories, as they vary with time and place and with situational and cultural contexts, such that any one individual might experience different roles. In this privilege/oppression dialectic, each expression not only relies upon the other to exist, but also defines the other: There is no privilege without oppression, just as oppression cannot exist in any of its multiple forms without commensurate privilege. This dialectic affords no neutrality; one’s position and one’s response to any social order is never neutral. (Rose & Paisley, 2012, p.140).

If we are to put aside the evolutionary assumptions regarding restorative landscapes (which I will), only a privileged group have ‘access’ to these ‘healing’ spaces where ‘associations’ are made with impoverished or well-off environments. ‘Social capital, like physical capital and human capital, is a critical source for health and overall well-being.’ (Mitchell & LaGory, 2002, p. 201). Bourdieu’s theories of Cultural and Social Capital exemplify this ‘accessibility’ but I would add that these are perfectly natural material progressions and productions. This power division is evident in landscapes. There is an ecology of the oppressed just as there is an ecology of the colour green as it ‘dominates our thinking about ecology like no other, as if the color were the only organic hue, a blazon for nature itself’ (Cohen, 2013, p. xix). Yet green is perceived differently according to culture and history. For example, Berlin and Kay’s (1969) study into ‘basic colour terms’ suggest that many cultures (historically and presently) don’t make a distinction between blue and green and as such the colours brown, purple, pink,
orange and grey will not emerge in those cultures. Therefore, it is the natural-sociocultural-material structures that are responsible for our reactions to green.

**Scene three: Green space=Striated space**

Jamie: [Blondie], your view of green, for example, and the heron, and things like this are very different I thought, from a few other people at least, I don’t know...erm, everyone’s, erm, you preferred Liverpool?

Blondie: Mmmh.

Jamie: Nice and calm and relaxing. And did everyone find that about Liverpool, that it was nice, calm and relaxing?

Dolly and Jim (together): No!

Jamie: And it was nice not to see any green in Liverpool you were talkin’ about?

Blondie: Yep.

Jamie: And then, you mentioned ‘green, green, green is boring’?

Blondie: Mmmmm

Jamie: I thought that was interesting 'cause you, do you not like green in general or?

Blondie: No!

Jamie: The colour or the trees or do you associate it with...

Blondie: I just don’t like the colour green.

Jamie: The colour itself?

Blondie: Mmmmm

Jamie: Right, ok. D’you know why?

Blondie: I’ve always hated it, I don’t know why. Since, even when I was younger. I’ve always hated it.

**Snippet 13: Lancaster reflections**
For Blondie, green is perceived as dirty. But in Liverpool ONE she ‘didn’t see any green, didn’t see any dirt’ (Blondie). There was green there of course and she took pictures of green spaces so she may ‘mean’ something different to not ‘seeing’ green. As a concept, green takes on many different meanings to many different people and it would be hard (if not impossible) to disentangle each of these anthropocentric understandings of the concept (which would therefore include the percepts of green as they too are entangled within the concept itself). Rather than look for ‘meanings’ then, I will try to explore what the concept green may produce, i.e. what does it do?

| Jamie: And then you found, was it the mud you found dirty in the estuary bit and the river? |
| Blondie: Yeah, it was just everything ‘cause it was like, it was all polluted and everything. So it’s just all disgusting for all the birds that are in there. |
| Jamie: Right, ok. What about the heron? You called it dead. |
| Blondie: *(laughs)* It was just stood there. |
| BBS: I think ‘cause it’s tidal, it does generally look a bit muddy when the tide’s out doesn’t it? |
| Blondie: I don’t know, I didn’t actually see… |
| BBS: because an estuary that comes in… |
| Blondie: I thought it was just stood on some sort of stone waiting for some time. An’ I thought, you know, I thought it was just like stuffed or some sort. you know. I mean, what’s goin’ on? |
| BBS: Yeah, it looked lifeless, it looked dead. |
| Pandora: A random stuffed heron. |

*(laughs all round)*

**Snippet 14: ‘it looked dead’ (BBS)**

Blondie’s actual words from the video interview were, ‘that thing down there. It looks a bit dead to me […] I didn’t know what it was. There’s just no life in it at all’ (Blondie). The heron being ‘the most natural thing’ (Prof.) now seems contextual and relative to the space it’s in and the human (or other than human) perceiving it. Also, the ‘pollution’ that Blondie mentioned was, as BBS suggested, the tidal silts and muds that are deposited when the tide retreats. I suppose this is certainly pollution to *something.*
Annotated Polaroid 32: ‘it was all polluted and everything. So it’s just all disgusting for all the birds that are in there’ (Blondie)

Transfer 33: Gummer’s How

For Blondie, the ‘countryside’ (as a concept) contains too much green. When on top of Gummer’s How, Blondie explained, ‘For me it’s too much green round here […] I’m loving the view but it’s just too green’ (Blondie).
‘Regarding your mental health, what do you make of it?’ (Jamie)
‘Well I’m not really liking this part of it […] I’d rather see boats and houses and things like that’ (Blondie).
When explaining why she preferred Liverpool ONE to the Gummer’s How hill top view, Blondie said that in Liverpool she, ‘didn’t see any green, didn’t see any dirt […] it was very clean, I didn’t see any rubbish on the floor’ and regarding the air quality in Liverpool, ‘I felt that it was clean and pure’ (Blondie). She relates and merges the concepts green and dirty together to co-produce (with the surrounding environments and embodied memories) an affective reaction. This is not difficult to associate. Grass is often green. Grass grows in soil and mud. Mud is dirty. Green is dirty. But that is my interpretation and something here is lost in translation.

The cultural concept ‘rubbish’ is also included within this assemblage as in Liverpool ONE Blondie ‘didn’t see any rubbish on the floor’ (Blondie) and so it was clean. However, on Gummer’s How she perceived the cow dung that was scattered randomly over the landscape as dirty as well as (or intra-related to) the green. Of course the concepts litter or rubbish are problematic in their mere existence. For example, throwing away the newspaper that contained your chips is not too dissimilar to a bird discarding a snail shell (a difference being the anthropocentric concept of time regarding how long it takes to biodegrade). Anthropocentric aesthetics also plays a role in this as human litter may be considered unsightly compared to a discarded snail shell (a birds litter). Thinking from a flat ecological perspective, the newspaper and shell have equal value. Again, it depends on who or what is doing the perceiving. For Blondie, cow dung is not perceived as clean. Green is perceived as dirty.

If we jump to where she lives, the environment outside her flat (Annotated Polaroids 33, 40, 41, 42) is not managed in the same way as Liverpool ONE or indeed the countryside of Gummer’s How. Environmental associations with wealth are stark in comparison. Outside her flat, green grass is allowed to grow between the cracks in the pavement, something that would never be allowed to happen in the ‘well-managed’ and ‘weeded’ (the weeding of plants, pigeons and certain unwanted elements) Liverpool ONE environment.

In this Blondie-street-grass assemblage the grass (or rather how the grass reveals itself; where and when it is located) plays an important role for Blondie’s mental health. In trying to survive, and being left to survive, the grass reveals itself as related to an impoverished environment and community, topologically intra-related to Blondie’s mental health, not as a symbol, but as a physical, ecological association with wealth, poverty, social capital, etc. In a different location and perceived by a different person, it would be perceived differently again and so would not necessarily form part of that
unique assemblage. So it is contextual to who, where, when and what. As the who and the what are currently under erasure in this dissertation (as they are conceived as haecceitical multiplicities within this production), where and when become more weighty, especially when the photos we took are placed in relation to the comments:

**Annotated Polaroid 33**: ‘*didn’t see any green, didn’t see any dirt*’ (Blondie). (Photo by Jamie)

**Annotated Polaroid 34**: ‘*I’m loving the view but it’s just too green*’ (Blondie). (Photo by BBS)

**Annotated Polaroid 35**: ‘*too much green round here*’ (Blondie). (Photo by BBS)
Annotated Polaroid 36: ‘it was all polluted and everything. So it’s just all disgusting for all the birds that are in there’ (Blondie). (Photo by Jamie).

Annotated Polaroid 37: ‘it was very clean’ (Blondie) (Photo by Blondie)

Annotated Polaroid 38: ‘I felt that it was clean and pure’ (Blondie). (Photo by Bumble)

Annotated Polaroid 39: ‘loving cleanliness of area and new/old buildings’ (Bumble). (Photo by Bumble)
The varied reactions to landscape were emphasised in my initial study in 2011, where I began to question the dominance of linear causation regarding ‘the healing power of nature’. ‘Gideon was recovering from drug addiction and so ‘structure’ was particularly important to him with statements such as, “You need to keep on weeding, it’s a never ending journey” and “…has kept me focused, gave me some structure to my week”.’ (Mcphie, 2015a, p. 560). Concepts such as, neat, tidy, structured, ordered and clean began to disrupt the theory I had read, from genetic theories to social constructivism. This is the moment in my writing when the penny dropped (see Mcphie, 2015a, p. 564). By this time, the ecotheory that relied upon innate theories (e.g. Wilson, Ulrich and the Kaplan’s), deep ecological perspectives (e.g. Naess) or both (e.g. Ecopsychology, environmental psychology and their corresponding therapeutic allies) had well and truly been laid to rest.

Yet green is not merely a colour. It is a concept, percept and affect and as such has many empirical permutations. As a political statement it implies a concern for the survival of biodiversity but also the preservation of a romanticised concept of nature for the cultural hegemony that would enforce it. But it also changes meaning depending on the situation and environment a person is in/of at the time. At a political rally on climate change, green has a completely different intensity than it does standing in Liverpool ONE. But then it would also have a completely different intensity at the same political rally if it were raining, at a different time of day/month/year, in a different historical period, in a different part of the world, for a different age group, zeitgeist, species and even element (for example see Mcphie, 2015a, pp. 560-561).

During that initial study, I witnessed alternative reasons for these attractions to green or blue than the current explanations derived from the genetic theories suggested. Depending on a person’s social circumstances, each environment will be perceived differently ‘which emphasises the point that there cannot be a generalizable response to a singular idea of ‘nature’ (as with the evolutionary claims)” (Mcphie, 2015a, p. 560).

Not everyone will – or can – be open to the same affective transfers: different bodies, differently imagined, will have certain affective responses already mapped onto them, defined by social expectations and structures of feelings that have built up around issues of gender, class, race, and so forth (see Tolia-Kelly 2007, 2012). (Waterton, 2014, p. 13)
Scene four: The Golden Arches

Annotated Polaroids 40-41: Repression and liberation: ‘there’s nothing. I’m always living in fear’ (Blondie)

The CCTV cameras where Dolly and Blondie live (Annotated Polaroid 40) ‘do’ something very different to the ones in Liverpool ONE. The signs perform differently depending on the person-environment assemblage. If these signs were viewed in a wealthy, neat, policed environment, the atmosphere that is co-produced would be felt differently, just as it would if the perceiver were rich, white, male, middle class, mentally healthy and Western (a majoritarian perspective) compared to a poor, black, female, subaltern with mental ill-health. The many possible combinations of assemblages this insinuates creates a contextual complexity too entangled to straighten out in the way that the majority of current research paradigms attempt. In reality, Mr. Neat and Mr. Tidy would never be able to draw boundaries as they do in the children’s story. They would never be able to striate the smooth space of Mr. Messy, though they try and try and try.
Annotated Polaroid 42: The Golden Arches

The golden arches looms over the council estate that dominates the skyline where Blondie and Dolly live as a sort of consumer panopticon (as it feeds you it also enslaves you). This was the site of our (impromptu) final visit to an environment in the minibus (although Blondie and Dolly met us there), after we thought that the trips had come to an end. I took this photo believing it to be especially significant to influencing the mental health of people who live in this area (due to socio-cultural associations that I’ve invented based on my own socio-cultural demographics, which I think from). I framed the photo to influence the viewer to link the golden arches to the types of houses foregrounded. However, in the moment I pressed the camera button, (similar to the words on this page) I died and you, the spec-actor have been born. As it’s not a static piece of ‘data’, it is itself, on the page, a very large part of the inquiry process and changes the findings dramatically, depending on the contexts co-created by the PhD assemblage (you-me-the page-the concepts-the other authors I’ve written with).

Whether you choose to accept it as a piece of ‘evidence’ (due to being a photo that ‘I’ took and not one of the co-participants/co-(re)searchers) is largely based on your own socio-demographics (including wellbeing, current mood, area of interest, creative ability, transgressive intent, ethical interests and political affiliations).

Hence, the golden arches presented here becomes something entirely different from both ‘my’ initial affective response to it as well as whatever the people who live in that environment make of it. It also lets us in to glimpsing a previously hidden world of ‘us’ as multiplicities of human-environment assemblages (that includes the imbrication of various materialisms such as paper and picture or concepts such as the golden arches and council estates) that produces what we generally think of as mental health outcomes.

When asked the question, ‘Did you have any preconceived preferences of any particular environments before joining WiC?’, Blondie replied (speaking about the town where she lives):
There’s a juxtaposition between repression and liberation that seems counter intuitive when I compare Blondie’s comments about her home town where she lives, ‘there’s nothing. I’m always living in fear’ with her favourable comments about Liverpool ONE, ‘didn’t see any green, didn’t see any dirt’ (Blondie). So, for Blondie, at those particular times, Liverpool ONE was clean and safe, Gummers How was green and dirty and her home was a place of fear.

As emphasised in Gehlert et al.’s, (2008) research, where breast cancer in black women was linked to living in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, ‘[m]any studies have found direct and indirect relationships between individual levels of mental and physical health and neighbourhood characteristics (Brewster, 1994; Cohen et al., 2000; LaGory and Fitzpatrick, 1992; Ross et al., 2000; Schulz et al., 2000)’ (cited in Mitchell & LaGory, 2002, p. 200). This is because mental health is a physical, ecological process and as such is affected by political cascades.

**Spaces of fear**

Trophic cascades are well known in ecology but less so in sociology. There are no studies, as far as I’m aware, that discuss mental health as a trophic cascade.

When the wolves were (re)introduced to Yellowstone Park in the US, it altered the shape of the rivers. The wolves created spaces of fear, areas where the deer or Elk would not venture for fear of being eaten. This allowed the flora to flourish, in turn providing Beavers with materials for building their dams. The dams would then alter the rivers course, changing the shape of the land. So the physical morphogenesis of the landscape came about partly due to an emotional response. Thus, affect is capable of landscaping without prior intention or independent agency.

Blondie goes ‘down the back streets’ because of fear; felt atmospheres and forces of encounter (affect). Her physical presence in one area and lack of presence in
another area, over time, physically changes the environment (in ways that I cannot possibly list here). This, in turn, will physically change Blondie. The paths that co-emerge for us to tread take us along routes that morph our very physicality. If certain processes of the environment are repressed, as shown in these photos, then ‘we’ become repressed because ‘we’ are the environment. For example, if your home is a homogenised or sanitised space (or at least you conceive-perceive it as such), isolated from symbiotic relationships of diversity, preventing social relations from blooming, you may become as homogenised as your house.

The developers of cheap, mass produced accommodation born out of neo-liberal capitalist democracies may indeed promote spaces of fear, leading to mental ill-health: a (non-linear) trophic cascade. But this is not a unidirectional and linear cause-and-effect trajectory. It is an assemblage and can operate in multidirectional flows. Mental ill-health may also feed a neo-liberal capitalist democracy. For example, if we agree that hyper-consumption is a disease or perhaps a sign (and symptom) of environ(mental) ill-health, then we can observe (and participate in) the feeding of this disorder by a neo-liberal capitalist democracy as well as the feeding of a neo-liberal capitalist democracy by the disease hyper-consumption. Liverpool ONE is a mental (dis)order yet it co-creates a symbiotic relationship with the creatures (biotic and abiotic) that feed it. Others who do not feed it are not allowed in it. Is this not also true of green spaces? National parks? Rural countryside? The homogenised spaces of many housing estates built for cheap accommodation also build inorganic relationships. For example, gated communities promote what Mike Davis (1998) calls an ‘ecology of fear’ as the physical barriers enact physical cascades.

The options available exist only relative to the specific affordances when ‘plugged in’ to particular emergent assemblages. They are contextual. For example, a ‘romantic gaze’ upon a specific environment type (such as the romanticised nature of ‘England’s green and pleasant land’) may only be afforded to certain socio-demographics at certain historical junctures. Hence the reactions from some of the WiC group when visiting a private permaculture plot (not to mention Blondie’s reactions to the ‘green’ of the countryside). The general consensus from the WiC group was that it was a privileged (and slightly ‘hippie’) middle-class endeavour that was not particularly accessible to many from other groups. This was certainly understandable when comparing the amount of private land we were joyously shown around to the fact that Blondie and Dolly’s flats didn’t even have potential for a window box.
We do not all have *access* (specifically ‘epistemological’ access) to the restorative and healing environments espoused by ecopsychology, etc. Therefore, it is an ethico-political dilemma that we find ourselves in. Even if we are *all* allowed epistemological access to certain romanticized restorative environments, it doesn’t mean that we *should*, as there may be dire social and environmental consequences. Just look at the exportation of the romantic gaze from England to America and Australia. When a non-native species is quickly introduced to a new environment (and climate) that it did not evolve in, it tends to have consequences, some of which are harmful. As we can’t help but *take place with us* wherever we go, if forceful enough (through number or wealth) we will almost always end up destroying that environment (by disrupting the diverse heterogeneous relations that support that environment).

Our engagements with heritage are thus vulnerable, changing, contested and, ultimately, *contingent* – upon our histories, memories, the nuances of our personalities, our social positions, cultural affiliations, ethnic backgrounds and the discursive realms within which we operate and to which we respond (see Staiff et al. 2013). But they are contingent not only on the human. Think for a moment about the affective capacities of a heritage site that pushes forward a narrative of the past that is almost entirely *white* and based on the privileged classes. If these narratives are being consumed by an overwhelmingly white audience who have the capacity to be affected, we then need to think politically. (Waterton, 2014, p. 16)

Thus the *concept* ‘green’ becomes a tool or strategy of/for power relations and very much associated with social class depending on its relational context (i.e. how it is ‘used’ and what it is used *for*). But what does this ‘do’? Well, in this case it allows epistemological access to privileged environments, just as the hegemonic middle-upper classes of the romantic era (re)developed/invented the concepts of wilderness, sublime and nature to gain a semi-spiritual sense of wellbeing whilst forbidding the working classes such *enlightened* access (e.g. the privileged protests that stopped the train from carrying the working classes on to Ambleside from Windermere, something that still exists and is quite evident today).
The very idea of heritage mobilized here plays a key role, differentially enabling some citizens to feel connected while others cannot. As Crang and Tolia-Kelly (2010, p. 2316) point out, this ‘privileging of one form of affective response as universal has been the hallmark of exclusive heritages.’ (Waterton, 2014, p. 17).

The Lake District (as well as all the other national parks) is a boundaried site of privileged epistemological access (see Mcphie, 2014b, n.p.). This is evident in the housing situation. A report by the charity ‘Shelter’ (2013) highlighted how houses in the South Lake District national park cost more than nine times the average household income. Where Dolly and Blondie live, just outside that invented border, it costs a third of the average. This is highlighted in a journal extract by Jim:

Note 32: ‘We’re from the lake district and we’ve come to gloat’ (Jim)

Scene five: Abstract space … Little Arnolds…and a hill…

Lefebvre (1991) understood the hegemony of ‘abstract space’ as having arisen with capitalism and is ‘socially produced under particular universalizing social relations’ (Mitchell, 2003, p. 29). It is the ‘arrangement of space that makes capitalism possible’ (Mitchell, 2003, p. 29) and ‘it is struggle alone which prevents abstract space from taking over the whole planet and papering over all differences’ in order to produce a more healthy ‘differentiated space’ (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 55, cited in Mitchell, 2003, p. 29).

For myself, this abstract space is not only visible in the city but perhaps even more visible in the countryside with the invention of nature and wilderness. The Kinder
trespass worked for the English middle classes but Yellowstone is still off limits to the Shoshone Sheep Eaters. And in some respect the English national parks are still off limits to many people today in the form of *epistemological inaccessibility* (just like this language!). There is also an issue of rural homogeneity in ‘England’s green and pleasant land’, one that is exported to colonise other lands and minds as all cultural hegemonies take place with them. Although Lefebvre was from the countryside, he shared with Marx a disdain for the idiocy […] the essential privacy – and therefore isolation and homogeneity – of rural life. In contrast, cities were necessarily public – and therefore places of social interaction and exchange with people who were necessarily different. Publicity demands heterogeneity and the space of the city – with its density and its constant attraction of new immigrants – assured a thick fabric of heterogeneity, one in which encounters with difference are guaranteed. But for the encounter with difference to really succeed, then […] the right to inhabit the city – by different people and different groups – had always to be struggled for. (Mitchell, 2003, p. 18)

Our (WiC’s) attempt to walk a circle in *the countryside* was impeded by the fences of privatised land. Hence, the line that led us was forcibly pushed by the fence itself, pushed by the land laws governing it, pushed by the aesthetics of a Teletubby landscape, pushed by a historicisation of materiality. It was much easier to walk in the city centre than in the countryside (in terms of topographical and epistemological access), even in the privatised public space of Liverpool ONE. The English countryside was taken and privatised so long ago (mostly by the Normans) that I (among many) often forget that I have less freedom or control than in the city (and some cities more than others). Yet it is now in the city that some of us protest for more freedom and control. The countryside was always already the new urban and the urban is quickly becoming the new countryside.

**Little Arnolds**

Matthew Arnold’s (1993) response to the 1866 Hyde Park working class demonstrations for the right to vote was to reign in their ‘rights’ and assert ‘firmer
control over public space’ (Williams, 1997, paraphrased in Mitchell, 2003, p. 14). This next quote is Mitchell’s response to Arnold’s response:

But, just as it is always necessary “to go again to Hyde Park” – for people to take control of public space in defiance of the order, control, and contempt imposed upon them in the name of vouchsafing the vested interests of the few – so too in response do there arise legions of little Matthew Arnold imitators. “Our own little Arnolds,” Williams (1997 [1980], 8) called them, who claim they are promoting “excellence and humane values on the one hand; discipline and where necessary repression on the other.” It is not just spectacular protests, riots, or mass demonstrations that draw out these “little Arnolds.” In the contemporary United States, these “little Arnolds” have multiplied most rapidly around the perceived disordering of city streets that has come with the persistent growth of homelessness, with the growing numbers of the un- and underemployed, the mentally ill, and the drug-addicted who have no other recourse than to live their lives in full view of the urban public. For the homeless “to go to Hyde Park” is often a matter of survival; for their detractors this “occupation” of public space by homeless people is seen as a clear affront to the order, dignity, and the civilisation of the city. (Mitchell, 2003, pp. 14-15, emphasis added)

Order and control are part of the territorialisation of environments (including spaces, places and everything within their conceptual borders). This ranges from weeds, wolves, minority groups and topography to countries, planets and even as far out as concepts and topological space.

**Smooth and striated space**
These pictures (Transfers 34-37) taken by Henry Shaftoe show the implementation of a policy (made somewhere other than where these photographs were taken) that was developed from research (performed somewhere other than where these photographs were taken) that stated that green spaces were necessary to reduce antisocial behaviour (although it could easily be argued that the anti-social behaviour of a ‘gang’ is actually a good example of ‘social’ behaviour!) and increase mental health and well-being (a generalised ‘mental health and well-being’ that was conceived by a group of people other than the people in these photographs). The green spaces were built (by a group of people other than the people in these photographs) and then left for the people in these photographs. Unfortunately, yet not particularly surprisingly, these green spaces didn’t achieve the desired effects (I’m sure I don’t have to spell out the obvious in these pictures). Interestingly, some of the problems I’ve just highlighted were brought up at a conference at Bristol University by Henry Shaftoe and yet when I asked the question, ‘but why aren’t the people in these photographs, who this conference is ultimately ‘about’ and ‘for’, here, at this conference?’ there was an embarrassed silence and nobody would give an answer. The economic, socio-cultural and epistemological capital needed to access this conference about community inclusion is

not on the agenda of this conference and so is simply not discussed. In fact, I don’t know of any conference where this has been the main (or any other) topic of the conference!

For the first time a new architecture, which in all previous epochs had been reserved for the satisfaction of the ruling classes, is directly aimed at the poor [...]. Authoritarian decision, which abstractly organizes territory into territory of abstraction, is obviously at the heart of these modern conditions of construction. (Debord, 1983, para. 173)

As exemplified in Henry Shafte’s photos (Transfers 50-53) many green spaces in places of poverty become territories of abstraction when they are abstractly organised. What this does is sends a clear message to those who live next to these spaces: ‘we don’t really care’! Those who have epistemological and social access to a sublime rural nature as opposed to this specific type of urban green space seem to do rather well out of this deal, they call it the healing power of nature. Of course, this is Nature 3, not Nature 4 or 5. The grass that seeps through the pavement is reserved for the poor, not the romanticised mountain legacy of Thomas Burnett.

Agency, mind and mental health can only ever be articulated through prismatic intra-relations within temporal assemblages. They/it can never be articulated independently or in any fixed or static state. Just as agency and mind are shared and co-produced, so is mental health. This is why such concepts are better described as haecceities rather than quiddities as we attempt to diffract and make a move away from striation.

Striated space produces ‘the measurable’, such as longitude and latitude, and creates homogeneity whereas nomadic smooth space is both formless and non-formal
(Hubert, n.d.). Deleuze and Guattari (2004) ask the nomad researcher to occupy and then hold smooth space.

On Gummer’s How we (WiC) came up against striated AND abstract space. The ready formed footpaths and fences prevented us from walking our much prized circle either by leading us to follow a path of least resistance or by damming up the previously free-flowing water to lead us down a striated canal where we can be more easily contained.

![Annotated Polaroid 43: Striated space](image1)

![Annotated Polaroid 44: Striated space](image2)

This wasn’t so different from the striated space when we visited a Buddhist temple:
Annotated Polaroids 45-49: Striated spaces with an attempt to smooth them out, causing further striation. (Photos by Jamie)

Donaldo Macedo (2000, p. 12) asserted that Paulo Freire's view offered him:

—and all of those who experience subordination through an imposed assimilation policy—a path through which we come to understand what it means to come to cultural voice. It is a process that always involves pain
and hope; a process through which, as forced cultural jugglers, we can come to subjectivity, transcending our object position in a society that hosts us yet is alien.

Yet what can the body do to achieve this transformation? Is it a will-to-power (following Nietzsche), a form of psychological resilience that we must enact? Is it the responsibility of the ecologically oppressed to enforce their own forms of resilience and resistance to enable so-called subjectivities to appear? Isn’t this just another way to control or manage possible rebellions to hegemonic power structures that already control the striated green (and yellow: see assemblage three) space? Or is this transformation out-of-our-hands as is implied by a resistance to the belief in the Cartesian soul or Freudian ego? In other words, how can we come to a healthily co-produced distributed agency that suggests neither environmental determinism nor free will derived from an anthropocentrically invented subjective self? There may not be any model for a frame of reference to develop these healthy spaces but there may just be temporal directions that lines of flight are co-produced by, like moving trains that we might be able to jump on as they pass by, occasionally diffracting the trains course by nudging the railroad switches out of the carriage window as we fly past them.

Maybe I should make use of diffraction rather than transgression then, as my normally reactive nature quite possibly produces a similar epistemological inaccessibility to (potentially) more healthy lines of flight. Maybe Deleuze and Guattari were right. Maybe my transgressive actions (thought) reduces the creative potential for positive desire.

Only by exercising this positive desire could humans be creative rather than reactive, to meet their (real, not symbolic) needs and become free from capitalist oppression (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 254). (Fox & Ward, 2008, p. 1008)

Summing up the middle…

Spuybroek (2011, p. 182) notes that ‘we are not recipients but participants.’ ‘[A]ffect is not confined to the individual body or people at all: it is transmitted, moves,
circulates, flows outside and between bodies, incorporating a range of things, places and technologies (Lorimer 2008).’ (Waterton, 2014, p. 13) … like mental health!!!

All this means, indeed the transmission of affect means, that we are not self-contained in terms of our energies. There is no secure distinction between the “individual” and the “environment.” (Brennan, 2004, p. 6)

The concepts mind, affect, percept, cognition and memory are all material, physiological processes that don’t merely ‘bridge’ body-environment distinctions (as we have explored, there is no river dividing them) but are the very ecotones of embodiment, the epidermis of our true bodies that continuously flow in and out of the haecceity that is ‘us’. They are perhaps better thought of as different tributaries of the same river and have no ‘distinct’ boundaries, only confluences or confluxes (where rivers merge). And if these concepts partly make up what we think of as mental health, then mental health is also such a convergence of force, matter and energy. Also, as they are all concepts of some sort, we must also include concepts into the mental health assemblage. Therefore, mental health must be influenced (physically) by concepts such as, social hierarchy, territorialisation, nature, happiness, space, place and time. For psychotherapists, this means treating the person as an ecologically spread and a centred haecceity as well as a physically distributed intra-relational assemblage. We cannot afford to omit the political, social, ecological, spatial, temporal, perceptual, conceptual and affective structures (all material) that are contextual to mental health and wellbeing. Also, I believe there is an imperative to begin conceiving of mental health and wellbeing as not merely contained within an anthropocentric dialogue. We must begin discussing the mental health of the environment, just as Gregory Bateson and many animists emphasise/d. This is not anthropomorphism, if we think immanently rather than transcendentally. Remember Green’s (1997) words, the Celtic god Taranis was not the god ‘of’ thunder, it ‘was’ thunder! This is extended embodiment, a type of ecomorphism rather than anthropomorphism. The psychoanalysts ‘patient’ is not a self-contained vessel to be fixed. They are of the couch, the room, the hierarchical social divide between the analyst and themselves, the land, their culture, their body, the topology of the internet, the sun, and…and…and…
Epilogue=Prologue: From Observation to Participation

‘things – and not their representations – are said to flow through the mind’ (Brinkley, 1992, p. 247)

**Scene one: HAT’s and QAT’s**

Deleuze’s purpose in writing *Difference and Repetition*, was ‘not an intellectual search for meaning, but an affective encounter, a turning on’ (Protevi, 2010, p. 36).

‘You don’t understand music: you hear it. So hear me with your whole body.’ (Lispector, 2014, p. 4). So, at this moment, I do hope we have arrived ‘at a perfect and unformed expression, a materially intense expression’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 19)...like jazz!

There is a ‘usual way’ to research mental health and wellbeing (privileging *transcendence*) and a ‘transgressive-diffractive’ way (privileging *immanence*). The usual way involves looking at the individual psyche (*a quiddity*) either in isolation (*pointillism*) as a psychological discipline or *in relation* to their immediate social and environmental topography as a striated geographical discipline. A transgressive-diffractive way does not simplify the mental realm (*a haecceity*) to that of the brain/mind, genes or immediate Euclidean environment. The physical realm of the ‘mental’ is spread in the environment. Therefore, a transgressive-diffractive way explores these physical *topological intra-relations*. Mental health and wellbeing is much more complex than traditional Western models currently suggest. A transgressive-diffractive way involves a much flatter ontological approach to exploring this area than any one discipline may reveal. Therefore, multidisciplinary transgressive-diffractive research that explores more emergent lines/paths of topological intra-relations may prove to be more useful (and ethical) than simply ‘sticking to the rules’.

---

121 As I found both transgression and diffraction useful concepts to think with, I combined them here as a useful partnership. I placed transgression before diffraction on purpose in order to remind myself to be transgressively diffractive (diffraction is ultimately *rooted* in transgression as a political ploy) rather than diffractively transgressive (diffraction dissipates or diffuses transgression). However, since writing this I have changed my mind and will now be attentive to my habitually reactive nature in order to co-produce further affirmative-critical/diffractive-creative becomings rather than transgressive ones.
of any one bounded subject area or even method of analysis that boasts representational outcomes or conclusions.

A transgressive-diffractive approach to research can also make use of temporal *Haecceitical* Analysis Techniques (HAT’s) as an alternative to staid *Quiddital* Arborescent Techniques (QAT’s). When thinking with Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizoanalysis, for example, I was provoked into attending to the flat ecological topology of intensities and rhythms of spatiotemporal intra-relations as opposed to bounding, tracing and hierarchizing data into codes, categories or statistical *significance*.

A very obvious example of this more open topological approach to analysis would be to map/create a new (yet flat) path when following the words of Blondie. She found Liverpool ONE to have a positive influence on her mental health and wellbeing (even when compared to the ‘dirty’, green landscape of Gummers How in the Lake District). A flatter path takes us into new territories (without presuming they are more important), it forces us to explore the palimpsest of influential phenomena such as the historisisation and politicisation that shapes/d the physical-mental architecture of the concept-percept-affect that is Liverpool ONE. It takes us there because the Euclidean geography and representational ideologies are simply not enough to understand *not* how the whole is other than the sum of its parts but how there are never static or fixed wholes or parts to begin with. So we can *also* explore the palimpsest of our experience in Liverpool. This could involve how certain streets came to be there; their shapes, textures, depths, lengths, proportions, styles, resemblances, etc. It could involve who/what owns them and *their* socio-demographics, revealing a political trophic cascade (their voting preference may relate to their reasons for co-designing a shopping centre in a particular style which may influence how a person feels when experiencing it, consciously or unconsciously, etc.). Exploring what these things *do*, has been perhaps more politically and ethically revealing than other lines of questioning. Also, exposing what we might usually think of as ‘cultural’ or ‘artificial’ (Annotated Polaroids 50 & 51) using a properly *ecological* inquiry method (exposing ‘all’ objects of study as intra-relations), has been most fruitful.
Annotated Polaroid 50: ‘The power of man-made beauty’ (BBS). (Photo by BBS).

Note 33: ‘in shock and awe’ (BBS)

Note 34: ‘a traffic cone 😄’ (BBS)
The *tataus*, the graffiti and the emoji are all inscriptions in the flesh of the earth, ways of memorialising the past and resisting the present. ‘The memory of its materializing effects is written into the world.’ (Barad, 2012b, p. 67). The consequences of the concepts become perceptually pronounced. The photos, written documents, video interviews and focus group meetings are all transfers, tracings of the original *marks* engraved into the flow of spacetim(ing). Yet even the *tataus* become transfers as soon as they are re-presented, interpreted, analysed, re-searched, etc. And, as they become transfers, their very materiality changes and morphs into something new, something of a Debordian spectacle. It dramatises it. This questions the very logic and possibility of ‘doing research’. However, I believe I have exemplified a way out of this conundrum through the play, *Liverpool ONE - Liverpool Too*, as it highlights, juxtaposes and places the ‘event assemblage’ (the focus group meetings *as well as* the WiC outings) under erasure and by doing so enables an enactment of diffraction.

I’m not sure that I agree with Sontag (1990) that ‘all thinking is interpretation’ (p. 93). After this exploration I would most certainly place interpretation itself under erasure. By performing it in this way, it makes clear that it is an issue, which is hopefully
enough to counterbalance the contradictions of ‘doing research’. It does this by changing the very fabric of the ecological thought processes that go through the reader’s ‘mind’ as they engage with the text. Therefore, the Brechtian play co-operates with the reader (you) to open up the mere possibility of productive change (lines of flight). The research assemblage that is this PhD is also placed sous rature through the constant attempts at (re)minding as well as the titled composition of a play format. It is the ‘attempt’ that seems to do the trick.

**Scene two: Re-searching re-search.**

What did the co-participants/co-(re)searchers rumination, regarding enhancing their moods, ‘do’? If they had not asked this question before visiting many of the environments we travelled to, would the same behaviours have been produced? I think not. The same can be said of the rumination ‘how is mental health and wellbeing spread in the environment’? So what does research itself produce?

The research process itself, became a therapeutic process as well as something else. Whilst undertaking research on mental health and wellbeing, all of the co-participants/co-(re)searchers reported becoming ‘healthier’ (from at least one definition of the concept), as a co-emergent process. This process involved the social, ecological, political, etc. The emoji, the paper in the journals, the pens/pencils, the ordered lines on the page to keep words in their place, the words, the locations (topographical and topological), the people, the weather, the embodied memories, the stone, the phone, the tone…all played a part in this (Brechtian) play. Each player wandered in and out of character (Deleuze would call this ‘plugging in’ and ‘plugging out’ of the temporal assemblages) as they continually morphed into major and minor roles depending on the context of the temporal events.
Dolly: The only person I’ll offload onto is my mum. You know what I mean, she’s like nana nana, ‘do one’.

Jim: Yeah, she told me.

[laughs all round]

Jamie: Do you talk to her about these outings?

Dolly: Oh yeah, yeah, she knows about them. She thinks they’re doin’ me good, she thinks they’re doin’ me good like. She can probably see it more than I can.

Pandora: It must just be your better mood, a better mood when you get back.

Dolly: Yeah, when I get back I’m like weeeeee.

Pandora: I’m always in a better mood when I get back from our little jaunts.

Jamie: Are you?

Pandora: I’m always in a good mood yeah.

Dolly: It’s good in’ it?

Pandora: Yeah, yeah.

Jim: I think I find the outings more helpful than talking about it. But that’s me. I’m a quiet sort of person, I don’t talk a lot. I might not be saying much but I’m thinkin’ plenty.

Snippet 16: ‘I’m like weeeeee’ (Dolly)

Everyone’s different. This has implications for ‘where’ therapy is ‘performed’. It really is dependent on the temporal person-place assemblage. So, rather than having a set place to undertake psychotherapy or psychiatry, such as the clinical indoor (natural) setting or the romanticised outdoor (natural) setting, perhaps the stage for ‘therapy’ needs to be negotiated and experimented with on a person-by-person-by-assemblage basis, or even a person-by-group-by-assemblage basis (and if we include time, as people-place assemblages constantly change, then we must also be adaptable to these changing assemblages). Even though we (WiC) were not ‘doing’ therapy, more than half of our process was very physically mobile, in a variety of settings.

---

122 I realise that even by sitting in a room one is still ‘mobile’ as time moves us (onward) wherever we are, yet there is a difference in speed, rhythm, tempo, energy
‘Leavy suggests we all could benefit from challenging our own comfort zones and begin to see that we can all learn from our colleagues regardless of the method being utilized’ (Chenail, 2008, p. 8). There are many possibilities that emerge from diffraction but if we attempt to co-create these lines of flight more diffractively, from a flatter ontology, I wager more productive paths will emerge.

Healthy (re)search?

I would like to introduce-depart with some evaluative comments from the WiC assemblage that highlight what this style of inquiry has the possibility to produce:

Note 35: ‘in a good mood’ (BBS).

Note 36: ‘Thanks’ (BBS)

and force between slower events (sat in a room) and faster events (walking through a city or up a hill).
Evaluation.

This, ‘Walking in Circles’ project, has been, for me, a very positive experience in a number of different ways.

It has enabled me to visit a number of different places - some familiar, others new – with a new group of people and with a different emphasis for me.

The whole experience has given me a focus and time to reflect on my place in given situations. It has raised my awareness of social, physical and emotional aspects and their relative importance to physical & mental well-being.

It has enabled me to clarify my strengths and weaknesses, both in my relationships with other people and, perhaps more importantly, my relationship with myself. This has been integral to a growth in confidence. Although it is important to note that WiC has only been one of many influences to this increase in confidence.

I have also enjoyed some background, theoretical reading which, together with the practical experiences, has been important to my growth in well-being and determining my identity.

Looking back on the original reasons for joining WiC it has been very successful & partly due to its success, I now have less available time to devote to the project.

I would like to say a big “Thank You” to everyone who took part and made the experience such an enjoyable and worthwhile project.

Note 45: ‘a very positive experience’ (Bumble)
One year on from beginning this journal. Another year of my personal journey (life!!)

Been a good year... personal growth... increased confidence.

importance of choice, control, friends, family, support,
importance of knowing self, being open to change,
being in the Now - using opportunities.

Many factors contributing to this tapestry, these layers, this messy ball of wool that's my life, your life, all our lives.

Mr. Messy - story - Jamie McPhie.

Note 38: ‘Been good year’ (Bumble)

Note 39: ‘I’m a lot more confident’ (Jim).
One of the outings that the WiC assemblage took was particularly healthful for BBS where even ‘noise’ was not considered stressful, emphasising a certain resilience.

BBS: I think when you read my journal, em, when I em, when I wrote the circle, I wrote lots of words, happiness words, and er, for various times, although I did that at home, and I knew I felt like that all the day.

**Snippet 27:** ‘happiness words’ (BBS)
Note 40: ‘I like myself’ (BBS)
Notes 41-43: ‘I’m so happy’ (BBS)

Annotated Polaroids 94-95: BBS’s marks in the sand. (Photos by BBS)

At first glance, these admissions might seem like lines of flight, taking off in various healthful rhizomatic directions. Yet the (re)search process may have been a victim of its own success as the second (re)search rumination that the group introduced may have suffered as a result of the efficacy of the (re)search process itself. The improved ‘mood’ and ‘happiness’ that Dolly and Blondie reported during the outings seemed short lived on their return to their home existence. This reported happiness suddenly seems rather shallow.
Note 44: ‘I wouldn’t be able to do it on my own without all you. I haven’t felt anxious all day, but when I go back to [home] I look over my shoulder, I hate it.’ (Blondie)
Maybe the minibus discouraged resilience for Dolly and Blondie due to the reliance on its mobility to gain (physical) access to previously inaccessible varied environments.

Maybe the materials we were working with, the video recorder, the cameras, the minibus, the journals, my laptop, the emoji, all played a part in their invitations to accessibility, including epistemological accessibility.

This elementary principle of prosthesis and prosthetic projection animates the whole technological universe [...] the human organic mass, the body, is the first manufacturer of technology in that it seeks for organic extension of itself first through tools, weapons, and artifacts, then through language, the ultimate prosthesis. (Braidotti, 1994, p. 44).

Maybe the after-effects of the research events conjured up a prosthetic ghost due to the over reliance of technology as extended selves. Put another way, the materials that I (and the University of Cumbria) provided for the ‘data’ collection may have inadvertently produced a sense of dis-embodiment/enmindment as their extended tool-selves (the minibus, cameras, etc.) were left behind (with me, until the next outing).
The agential capacities of the social assemblage that was the WiC group itself seemed to play a dominant role for Blondie and Dolly and as such the affective-social aspects of the WiC events may well have been a key component in their sense of relational loss and resumed anxiety.

Maybe I, as the main facilitator, discouraged resilience by passively taking the lead so many times regarding organising meetings, writing up the academic verse and presenting it at expensive academic conferences designed to keep out those who may never accrue monetary, social and epistemological access to such elitist, hegemonic events. ‘Power resides in the affective flows between relations in assemblages, the aggregations and singularities these flows produce, and the capacities or constraints upon capacities produced in some – and not other – bodies, collectivities and non-human formations.’ (Fox & Alldred, 2014, pp. 4-5).

Maybe I allowed epistemological access (through my own espousing of the theories that I had read) as well as an epistemological restriction through my (sometimes) inaccessible academic language (evident in my first focus group encounter where I reeled off the theory on co-operative action research to a room of blank faces).

Maybe a (re)search process that is designed to encourage such personal and social effectiveness as collaboration, self-efficacy, internal locus of control, etc. was actually the main culprit itself. Research with rather than on people sounds ethically responsible and yet I can’t help but wonder what the performance of ‘with’ does? I suppose it depends on multiple possibilities, including who is doing the facilitating and who is being facilitated. I imagine it would make quite a big difference if the facilitator were a trained therapist and/or the facilitated were a white middle-class Western male with no history of mental ill-health and an ample supply of self-efficacy.

‘Marginalized people, including people diagnosed with mental health problems, must, despite their starting point of epistemic disadvantage, enact their own forms of resistance.’ (Fisher & Freshwater, 2013, p.6, emphasis added). Paulo Freire (1996, p. 64) proposed that ‘people develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which they find themselves’. Would it be better to remove the therapist? By continuing to support the professional-patient dichotomy of power relations to find a ‘cure’, are they complicit in the formation of striated space? I do not have the inclination to suggest we do this but it’s worth a look at what this role does. Just as a philanthropist is complicit in reifying a capitalist ideology, is the therapist also? If we are to enact a ‘prevention’ rather than ‘cure’ philosophy, then maybe this
suggestion would be logical. However, a prevention and cure philosophy does something different yet again. If this is indeed possible, then I imagine it may look a bit like the irony inherent in Jonathan’s Wyatt’s (2013) description of becoming-(non-)counsellor. Either way, we need a different sort of ethico-onto-epistemological engagement if we wish to become healthy haecceities (human-environments).

This may sound cynical or even nihilistic, but maybe Blondie and Dolly are fighting a losing battle. It sometimes seems like a futile attempt to persevere at developing healthful and/or resilient becomings just to be beaten down again when you return home to an environment that is not only unsupportive, but is also perhaps part of the ‘cause’ of mental ill-health in the first place. The political infrastructure doesn’t seem to allow them (and many other people without an appropriate amount of social capital, economic prosperity or epistemological accessibility to privileged environments) any sort of respite or escape. In other words, how can lines of flight be co-produced if you are chained to a tree (Plato’s)? Perhaps the key to healthy assemblages is to diffract the arborescent ideology at its roots: the modern, Western, humanist, neo-liberal capitalist ethico-onto-epistemology.

Spatial environments are one of the primary ways by which we have socially extended our organs and minds. Today, we need to re-conceive of what we understand by nature, and what we understand as our relationship to it. We need to propose new formations and new metabolisms of country and city, we need to re-theorise alienation, health and well-being, as part of a bigger attempt to, as Fuller suggested, make existing models obsolete. (Goodbun, n.d., p. 46)

Mulling over recent literature has led me to believe that a variety of diversities (e.g. bio-, geo-, socio-, eco-, ethico-, linguistic, conceptual, artistic, etc.) are important for mental health and wellbeing (human and other-than-human). I suppose an ideal strategy would be to mix a classless, non-romanticised ecotherapy (perhaps exchanging Wordsworth’s poetry for Norman Nicholson’s) with art and narrative therapy…and then get rid of the therapists. In order to tackle the ethico-onto-epistemological structures that permeate the Western neo-liberal capitalist democracy we cannot continue to just keep fixing and curing as if mental health were a transcendent quiddity. We must rally to prevention at
the same time. This means attending to the mental health of the environment. It means attending to the *haecceitical* immanence of ‘environ(mental) health.’

**Scene three: ‘Environ(Mental) Health’: The immanent spatio-temporal distribution of mental health and well-being**

I repeat: Nietzsche (1967/1887) stated, ‘[i]f we were to remove all the relationships and actions of a thing, the thing does not remain.’ (p. 302). ‘Thus, there cannot be a fixed point from which a fixed individuation can observe another fixed individuation at another fixed point […] everything is entangled and always already overlapping, dynamic, contested, multiple, antagonistic, becoming, in process.’ (St. Pierre, 2011, p. 619). Perhaps, then, we are simply-complexly the relations themselves?

The mind (*noosphere*), and thus mental health also, is spread throughout the biosphere, lithosphere and hydrosphere. Indeed, some (including Tim Ingold) would go as far as to say that our mind is also spread in the troposphere (and perhaps beyond), just as the ‘weather’ or ‘climate’ can often influence our mood (Ingold, 2015). In fact, if we think topologically rather than topographically, there are no bound or separate *spheres* to begin with as we contain traces of all of these so called spheres, we are made of them. Therefore, I would also add that the mind, and thus mental health, is spread *temporally*, as evidenced by BBS in Liverpool when he encountered a momentary lapse in composure due to the auditory and chemical stimulation that allowed him (involuntarily) to travel back in time to his unfortunate accident that co-produced his PTSD and change it, once again (see Liverpool ONE – Liverpool Too play script supplement). Price-Robertson and Duff (2015) purport that ‘[a] more comprehensive and useful account of PTSD ought to commence with the assemblage itself as the basic unit of analysis’ (p. 15) ‘which move[s] beyond the “individual,” “discourse,” or “institutions” to enable far more comprehensive studies of the ways psychological problems are experienced’ (p. 14). This way of working holds many potentials for creating lines of flight to more healthy futures. ‘The goal must be to transform the ways different actors, entities, and/or forces affect one another in the event of their association, such that the production of PTSD may be reduced within a given social field (Duff, 2014).’ (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, p. 16).

As Gregory Bateson (2000) put forward in his example of the blind man with a stick, our conscious experience is extended and spread in the environment and to chop
a part of that assemblage out (such as the stick or the street) in order to *reduce the variables* may produce unintended and questionable ethical consequences. These integrated (un)conscious experiences also involve what we think of as memory. ‘Memory, too, requires a physical and causal continuity with past events. Thus, memory is another kind of postponed perception’ (Manzotti, 2008, n.p.). Postponed perception merges with current events and may become particularly emphasised if there are physical traces of association that (re)mind us of the original event that is stored in a constantly changing/becoming embodied memory, like that of the BBS-pneumatic drill assemblage.

Commenting on Gregory Bateson’s blind man-stick-street assemblage, Malafouris (2013) suggests

> [t]his extension in the “body schema” also means that the brain treats the stick as part of the body. One could see in this emergent coalition between the blind man and the stick, which enables the making of vision out of touch, a powerful metaphor for what it means to be human. (p. 5)

In other words, ‘what we often see as a fixed human nature is more a flexible process of ongoing human becoming’ (Malafouris, 2013, p. 5). Malafouris’ Material Engagement Theory (2004) is ‘the zone in which brains, bodies, and things conflate, mutually catalyzing and constituting one another’. This zone, I call the ecotone. Just as an ecotone bridges the inorganic skin of the human ‘internal’ environment with the illusory ‘external’ environment, the ‘mental world—the mind’, as Gregory Bateson points out, ‘is not limited by the skin’ (2000, p. 460) or, I would add, by time. Malafouris (2013) points out that this is why Bateson was able to recognise the blind man’s stick as a *pathway* rather than a *boundary*; ‘*the mental characteristics of the system are immanent, not in some part, but in the system as a whole*’ (Bateson, 2000, p. 316) and so ‘skillfull experience with a cane can actually extend the body beyond its strictly biological limits’ (Noë, 2009, p. 79). Therefore, the stick, to a human, is similar to Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) wasp to an orchid in that it forms part of the ‘make-up’ of the (non-)organism (*process/haecceity/knot*). The wasp is a (detachable) mobile sexual organ of the orchid and the stick is a (detachable) extended sensory limb for the blind person, just as the orchid is an orgasm for the wasp and the human is a torso for the stick. Alva Noë (2009) reports that monkeys using a rake exhibit enlarged cortical
representations of the hand and arm and eventually treat the rake extension as a part of their body. The mind, ‘is a leaky organ, forever escaping its ‘natural’ confines and mingling shamelessly with body and with world’ (Clark, 1997, p.53). ‘Beginning in early childhood, we constantly think through things, actively engaging our surrounding material environment, but we rarely become explicitly aware of the action potential of this engagement in the shaping of our minds and brains.’ (Malafouris, 2013, p. 7).

So my computerised calendar ‘is’ my memory. The plastic and metal materials, for example, of the computerised calendar are actually of my mental processing and body schema. They are, literally, of ‘me’. Fortunately, unlike more vital organs that make up ‘me’, they are, to a large degree, expendable. But then, to a lesser degree, my fingers are also expendable in that I can still function without them, just in a different way. However, I would still find it extremely distressing if I were to lose my calendar, as an assemblage of my memory. The experience may not be as sharply painful as losing a finger, yet the stress it may invoke has just as much a physical consequence as the loss of a digit, just to different degrees and intensities.

So what are the implications of this for the relationship between mental health and our environments? This extensive research and relatively new body of philosophy contests that we can latch onto what we think of as ‘external objects’ and incorporate them into our becoming, not just mentally (as a non-material concoction), but physically. In other words, the mental and the mind are just as physical and alive as the biological. Also, the biological is not so easily determined from the lithological, topological, tropological, hydrological or even cosmological. If this is the case, and the body-mind extends beyond the confines of the organic skin, then it has many implications for how we think about mental health. It also has implications for how we treat our environments if we are of them.

It should not be thought that a haecceity consists simply of a décor or backdrop that situates subjects, or of appendages that hold things and people to the ground. It is the entire assemblage in its individuated aggregate that is a haecceity; it is this assemblage that is defined by a longitude and a latitude, by speeds and affects, independently of forms and subjects, which belong to another plane. It is the wolf itself, and the horse, and the child, that cease to be subjects to become events, in assemblages that are inseparable from an hour, a season, an atmosphere, an air, a life. The street
enters into composition with the horse, just as the dying rat enters into composition with the air, and the beast and the full moon enter into composition with each other. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 289)

Annotated Polaroids 54-55: Haecceities at different intensities of becoming.
(Photos by Jamie)

This should be read without a pause: the animal-stalks-at-five-o’clock. The becoming-evening, becoming-night of an animal, blood nuptials. Five o’clock is this animal! This animal is this place! “The thin dog is running in the road, this dog is the road,” cries Virginia Woolf. That is how we need to feel. Spatiotemporal relations, determinations, are not predicates of the thing but dimensions of multiplicities. The street is as much a part of the omnibus-horse assemblage as the Hand assemblage the becoming-horse of which it initiates. We are all five o’clock in the evening, or another hour, or rather two hours simultaneously, the optimal and the pessimal, noon-midnight, but distributed in a variable fashion. The plane of consistency contains only haecceities, along intersecting lines. Forms and subjects are not of that world. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 290)

Ansell-Pearson (1999) suggests that human behaviour (and I would add ‘mental health’) ‘can no longer be localized in individuals …; but has to be treated … as a function of complex material systems which cut across individuals (assemblages) and which transverse … organismic boundaries (rhizomes)’ which requires ‘the articulation of a distributed conception of agency.’ (p. 171, cited in Tiessen, 2011, p. 137). This dynamic and specific propensity or arrangement of things (forces, materials and energy) is an
incipient form of agency (Hale, 2015; Bennett, 2010), one that seems apparent within the assemblages of this PhD and as produced from the inquiry itself. The emergent agencies produced as a result of the particular temporal assemblages of WiC’s inquiry process were/are a distinguishing phenomena of the mental health and wellbeing of the co-participants/co-(re)searchers. If we see ourselves, as Tiessen (2011, p. 132) examples,

as consisting of the elements of various relationships rather than as discrete individuals, or as collective enunciations or expressions of environments, then our actions-our expressions of agency-become not so much instances of our own picking and choosing, but rather examples of our propensity to act and react in accordance with both our inherent capacities to act and be acted upon and our environment’s capacity to act and, more importantly, to act upon us.

If this transversal approach to mental health and wellbeing extends the mind or the self into the environment, then it also extends the environment into the self. It brings the outdoors in.

Jamie: Ern, the best bit for me, in that, what I found the most interesting was when you said, ‘it brings the outdoors into your memory’.

BBS: Right

Bumble: Can I just, erm, I had cranial osteopathy a few years ago ‘cause I had er, a jaw that, like twenty odd years since I had the ear accident, and that’s really interesting ‘cause once you get to this cranial osteopathy on me she said ‘think of, think of a view, think of somewhere you’ve been, that’s pleasant for you, that you’ve enjoyed, and you list the same sort of things, top of a mountain, in Wales, in the snow, and I see it in my mind now, like you were saying bring the outside in, an’ she could feel it, I dunno, it was weird, but she could feel it in my head, the difference it made, just holding my head, and she could feel the difference that made and she said how relaxed and it’s helped my jaw and things as well, and that’s, it’s incredibly strong, incredibly important that, it’s really erm, that comment. A really strong comment.

Snippet 18: ‘bring the outside in’ (Bumble)
We have explored together the idea that percepts, concepts and affects are very much ecological processes that are spread in a variety of ways in a variety of environments, both topographical (e.g. Liverpool ONE) and topological (e.g. the fifth Duke of Westminster). Therefore, we need to *conceive of mental health as an ecologically distributed process*. We also need an accompanying *pragmatics and practice of mental health as an ecologically distributed process*. This is not of the same conception, pragmatics or practice as ecopsychology and ecotherapy though, as I have argued, due to different beliefs about immanence, nature and socio-political structure. I envision an ecologically distributed process as encompassing the material, energy and force of ‘everything’, not simply a ‘green and pleasant land’ (*Nature* 2/*Nature* 3). There is no generalizable topographical good or bad environment for our mental health and wellbeing that is set over and against us. There are only co-created temporal assemblages of environments that are contextualised and co-produced through embodied/enminded associations and material topological intra-relations. Therefore, mental health and wellbeing becomes ‘environ(mental) health and well-becoming’.

Things, as *haecceities*, are only *perceived* as empirically and conceptually separate under the post-enlightenment paradigm but we are not ontologically separate. This means that I cannot provide an answer to the question of where or when mental health and wellbeing is as it is continuously morphing into something new. However, it is still perhaps one of the most apt ruminations to explore as it pulls us closer to an ethics of immanence.

We are left then with environments, entities, and individuals that express and are expressions of a profound reciprocity. Taking this reciprocity seriously, in turn, might compel us to cling less vigorously to anthropocentric perspectives about what is and is not an agent, or what does or does not merit ethical consideration. (Tiessen, 2011, pp. 137-138).

Clock time forces a *fabula* of all things but it’s never made up of a *fabula*. It’s constructed from a *syuzhet*. BBS’s embodied memory in Liverpool wasn’t a linear cause-and-effect *fabula*. It jumped through time, sequencing events sporadically dependent on contextual circumstances and co-emergent processes. For BBS the process of *becoming anxious* was in the form of a *syuzhet*. The most relevant therapy that might attend to this form of narrative is narrative therapy but it is currently thinking
with the fabula model. I suggest the inclusion of people-environment’s syuzhet’s as a beneficial addition. This would then include the non-linear temporal elements as well as the distributed material agency of the spatial elements.

Relational adaptation.

Environ(mental) health and well-becoming is a matter of the adaptability of temporal relations of assemblages. For example, the amount of energy an old growth forest utilises is minimal due to the adapted relations between things over (usually) long periods of time. Introduce a species that hasn't evolved in that space and see the energy levels shoot up due to the extra effort it takes to fit in. Time creates relational adaptations, the small things that then require less energy to affect and be affected. This is evident in entropy and trophic cascades. Humans may interfere with that relational adaptation but then so do volcanic action, tornadoes and bacteria. So it’s really not as simple as nature versus culture and it’s definitely not as simple as reconnecting to a romanticised imaginary hegemonic ideal!

The capitalist production and appropriation of both space and subjectivity seems to increase the entropy levels of the relations, thereby increasing stress and tension in the temporality of the things themselves. Therefore, I firmly believe that the modern Western practice of neo-liberal capitalism is both the producer and product of environ(mental) ill-health.

Scene four: There is no such thing as mental health

Suman Fernando (1991) emphasised the point that various cultural concepts about mental health are contextual yet ‘Western thinking about [it] is dominated by psychiatry and propagated throughout the world as a ‘scientific’ approach’ (p. 69). Therefore, parity must be placed under erasure. A homogenised one-size-fits-all definition and model of mental health and wellbeing would always be oppressive as the dominating culture, class, gender, species, etc. would be the one that enforces it based on their own ethico-onto-epistemologies and agendas. Fernando (1991) suggests that a ‘relativistic approach to (Western) conceptions about ‘mental’ illness would be the first step towards opening it up and improving communication with other ways of thinking,’ as it would ‘lead to a fluidity of thought (about illness) that is culture-sensitive and
flexible – and free of racist ideology.’ (pp. 70-71). I would add a class, gender, age and environment-sensitive to the list.

Fernando (1991) continues, ‘[i]t is not biochemical causes but the balances of biochemical influences that are significant’ (p. 70, emphasis added). The underlying issues of mental health may be politically, socially, materially and environmentally relational as opposed to a pathologised ‘disorder/disability/disease/illness’ that is then treated with a drug-based intervention or cognitive psychoanalytic/psychotherapeutic cure that was primarily developed in response to the assumption that what is treatable is a malfunction of an isolated subject or psyche within a wider world. Utilising ideas from ‘the extended mind hypothesis’ (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) or enactivism stemming from ‘the embodied mind’ (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991), for example, challenges the ‘equating of the boundaries of the physical body with those of the mind’ as they all tend to agree that ‘although the mind must be physically realized, it extends in substantive ways into the environment, its boundaries subject to constant negotiation and re-negotiation.’ (Parthemore & Whitby, 2013, p. 4). Parthemore and Whitby (2013) suggest there is an ‘increasingly vocal group’ of ‘brand new’ and ‘cutting edge’ scholarly work ‘within the extended-mind/enactive community’ in ‘the field of mental health’ (p. 4). They are referring to the conference Re-conceptualizing Mental Illness: The View from Enactive Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Exeter where academics are beginning to move away from a model based on physical illness toward one that emphasizes each person’s history and embedding in a social context: such identified conditions as Asperger Syndrome and high-functioning autism may be better understood as instances of cognitive diversity rather than impairment: while conditions such as schizophrenia or manic-depressive disorder must be understood, and treated, as problems of the patient’s immediate community and not just the patient herself. Furthermore, they must be understood, and treated, in light of the patient’s history of interaction with her environment and not just the presenting symptoms. The risk of much contemporary treatment is that, like aspirin, it treats the symptoms and does not address the underlying issues. (Parthemore & Whitby, 2013, p. 4)
Perhaps a stark realisation is necessary in order to break the Cartesian mind-body illusion that has so dominated Western notions of mental health, one that McGann and Cummins (2013, p. 1) put so straightforwardly: ‘there is no coherent domain of mental health. There is health: the health of cells, of bodies, of families, of football teams, and of nations.’ McGann and Cummins ‘believe that the enactive framework that is emerging may be the best of the current stock of theoretical approaches to develop arguments that are free of the mental-physical dichotomy’ (2013, p. 1). ‘If the concept of “mind” does not stand in opposition to the concept of “body”, then there is little justification for distinguishing between “mental” and “physical” health.’ (McGann & Cummins, 2013, p. 2). In their concluding remarks, McGann and Cummins state ‘[t]here is thus no domain of mental health. There are questions of health, period.’ (2013, p. 4). If McGann and Cummins were to expand their reading to include the already-mentioned immanent process-relational philosophies of new materialisms and contemporary animisms in order to escape the anthropocentric humanist boundaries, I believe they would add these extra two ontologies of immanence to ‘develop arguments that are free of the mental-physical dichotomy’. Therefore, ‘the mind’ and ‘mental health’ may be better placed in our literature and practice as an extended body that may include an assortment of material processes to contribute to its agential assemblage.

A Troika of Ontologies of Immanence

- As de Vega clearly spells out, extended mind theories are fully compatible with Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblages.
- Deleuze and Guattari’s examples of wolfing are well-matched to many animist beliefs such as the Koyukon of Alaska’s notions of Owling.
- Animist ideas of being of the world fit well with extended mind theories.
- All three have a shared philosophy of immanence rather than transcendence and as such share ideas of intra-relational becoming.
- Both animist and new materialist (especially feminist new materialist) discourse can add to externalist discourse by injecting a course of immanent ethics.
- All three diffract modernist conceptions and perceptions of how mental health and wellbeing are understood and practiced in Western neoliberal democracies.
in such a way that can open up lines of flight to aid more equitable ways of being (becoming) of the world.

Mixing the troika of immanent philosophies with what I have gleaned from the WiC group outings, meetings, assemblages and play, one could say something like this:

Mental health and wellbeing is an ecologically distributed physical process. It is spread perceptually, conceptually, affectively, politically, socially, materially, topologically, spatio-temporally and through the research itself (including the intra-actions with you, the spect-actor). Mental health is an idea of the body which, in turn, is physically extended and topologically distributed in the environment, merging with a variety of other physical phenomena to co-produce a sense of agency and wellbeing and/or illbeing. And, as the politicised body is encultured, gendered and enclassed, mental health is physically influenced by any temporal material processes and phenomena that happen to be within the topological vicinity of the permeable body’s extended inorganic dermatological layer, such as newspapers, mobile phones, architecture, language, political decisions, concepts and space. Examples of this from the WiC project include POPS (producing subjectivities influenced by the capitalist production of space), tataus and graffiti (enacting forms of resistance, appropriation and LOVE), photos (co-producing topological memories to aid healing as a ‘quick fix’), emoji (expressing emotion, promoting inequity but supporting social comprehension), video cameras and laptops (revealing multi-directional power relations), and concepts such as nature and green (playing on socio-economic status, hegemonic zeitgeists and temporal place-based contextuality). These are not conclusions. They are diffractive ruminations.

I have a tendency to agree with Georges Perec. When exploring the ‘infra-ordinary’ and the ‘endotic’, Perec (1973, cited in Highmore, 2002, p.178) insisted:

What we need to question is bricks, concrete, glass, our table manners, our utensils, our tools, the way we spend our time, our rhythms. To question that which seems to have ceased forever to astonish us. […] Question your tea spoons.
So, ‘things – and not their representations – are said to flow through the mind’ (Brinkley, 1992, p. 247), from Lispector’s bulge of sparrows to Pereg’s tea spoons, for they all form the DNA of your mental health and wellbeing.

**Scene six: A crisis of conception**

As discussed in (Intra-)Act 4, it has been suggested that we are undergoing a significant crisis of perception. After travelling along the streams and tributaries of this PhD thesis, I tend to disagree. It is a crisis of conception that we have administered. In the very same way that sexual conception brings forth other forms of life, so does mental conception. This has become more obvious as I have thought with philosophies of immanence. Mental conception, like sexual conception, co-produces (and is co-produced by) physical phenomena. Once we accept that the Cartesian dualism of mind and body is simply illusory, so it becomes more evident that mental health is actually physical health. And if ‘mental health’ (and by association ‘the mind’) were to be considered ‘physical health’, what might be the repercussions? Firstly, the treatment would have to look more seriously at what we (in the West) think of as the external environment, politics, class and gender inequities, etc. as would prevention, as opposed to some inward looking psyche purely as a deterministic response to some innate genetic malfunction or innate genetic response to some environmental aesthetic. The ‘fix’ may be political rather than subjective. Secondly, the money distributed by the government would be more non-discriminatory, as currently there is a gaping mismatch in spending and allocation between mental and physical health prevention and cure.

‘We are living in a space that is beyond the future. What strategies will the collective organism follow in order to escape this fabric of unhappiness?’

(Berardi, 2012a, p. 84)

Those people who have the time or ‘leisure to develop and express’ their capacity for healthful notions of ‘nature’ or ‘the wilderness experience’ will be those people whose needs (economic, emotional, epistemological, etc.) have been more fully satisfied than those people who may be from a much more impoverished socio-economic background. In order to go for a countryside jaunt or a brisk stroll up a mountain (of one’s own volition) one first has to have a certain access to that type of perception and behaviour,
one that requires a certain privileging of one sort or another. Therefore, access issues, such as physiological (regarding mobility), economic, epistemological, topographical, racial, sexual, political, etc., may be of interest when considering any sort of therapeutic or mental health benefits of certain environments. However, just as a reminder, the impression that increasing access to countryside and mountains will benefit one’s mental health generally, is not a/the finding of this thesis.

And Back to the middle…

I am a compost-ist, not a posthuman-ist: we are all compost, not posthuman […] Perhaps the Dithering is a more apt name than either the Anthropocene or Capitalocene! The Dithering will be written into earth’s rocky strata, indeed already is written into earth’s mineralized layers. (Haraway, 2015, p. 161)

The modernist world of transcendent reasoning needs to be placed sous rature. Anthropocentric ontologies have fallen into the Cartesian trap and have spread like a homogenising virus. One monocultural narrative seems to have infected the ecological thought and practice of such a large proportion of the world’s haecceities that we have entered ‘the Dithering’ (Haraway, 2015), perhaps never to emerge.

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) would describe such anthropocentric ontologies as reflecting a commitment to “top down” reasoning that restricts the proliferation of emergent and “bottom up” understandings of the world; they would suggest that these “top down” ontologies prefer to reason according to constraining systems of reified abstractions and representation rather than according to the Spinozist understanding of the world as a field of forces that affect and are affected on a plane of immanence. (Tiessen, 2007, para. 8)

Yet, for me, the ‘bottom up’ ontological approach does more of the same as it is born out of the same arborescent lineage as the ‘top down’ approach. A rhizomatic, immanent conception doesn’t travel in perpendicular directions, as I have explained previously (see Mcphie, 2016); it’s flat.
No species, not even our own arrogant one pretending to be good individuals in so-called modern Western scripts, acts alone; assemblages of organic species and of abiotic actors make history, the evolutionary kind and the other kinds too. (Haraway, 2015, p. 159)

It might be more beneficial to think with the term Capitalocene (Moore, 2014) due to its call to arms that the anthropocene doesn’t seem to emit in the same way. Plus, the Capitalocene is perhaps more easily conceived as an assemblage of forces and intensities that are malleable and as such may not seem so speciesist and therefore objectionable. In this way, finding lines of flight out of the Capitalocene might just stand a chance of survival. I will leave the penultimate words to Donna Haraway as she, among many others on this vast, vast, vast PhD journey, was an absolute challenge and pleasure to think with.

The Anthropocene marks severe discontinuities; what comes after will not be like what came before. I think our job is to make the Anthropocene as short/thin as possible and to cultivate with each other in every way imaginable epochs to come that can replenish refuge. […] It matters which stories tell stories, which concepts think concepts. Mathematically, visually, and narratively, it matters which figures figure figures, which systems systematize systems. (Haraway, 2015, p. 160)

Even nihilism matters.
Cast


Cooley, G. H. (1902). Human nature and the social order. New York: Scribners


Gibson, 1979 - it is ‘nature’ that is the dominant therapeutic component in outdoor interventions


Guattari’s molecular revolutions (1984), (see Richardson


Seminars at UC Davis, Indigenous Cosmopolis: Dialogues about the Reconstitution of Worlds, convenes an interdisciplinary, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZSqCwA5Mc-4


IPCC. (2007). Summary for policymakers. In S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K. B. Averyt & H. L. Miller (Eds.), Climate change 2007: The physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to the fourth
assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.


LaDuke, W. (2014). “Keystone XL: We are not Protestors, We are Protectors” (Chair: Renae Watchman), Keynote address at *Under Western Skies 3: Intersections of Environments, Technologies and Communities*. Mount Royal University Calgary, Alberta, Canada September 9 - 12, 2014.


Masny, D. (2016). Problematizing Qualitative Research Reading a Data Assemblage With Rhizoanalysis. *Qualitative Inquiry*, Published online before print April 4, 2016, doi: 10.1177/1532708616636744


Mcphie, J. (2016). Walking in Circles: We are of the world, not connected to it. EarthLines, 15, 49-51.


*Cultural Studies <= Critical Methodologies*, 13(4), 293-298.


*Please note: Extra information, such as participant information sheets, is available on request.