(Intra-)Act 3

Liverpool ONE – Liverpool Too: A Therapeutic Tale of Two Cities

(Or)

The Accidental Death of the *Quiddital* Self: A Spatiotemporal Distribution of Environ(Mental) Health

A Rhizoanalysis in 2 Acts

☺

Programme[1]

'all thinking is interpretation. But that does not mean it isn't sometimes correct to be "against" interpretation.' (Sontag, 1990, p. 93)

'The function of criticism should be to show how it is what it is, even that it is what it is, rather than to show what it means […] In place of a hermeneutics we need an erotics of art.' (Sontag, 1969, p. 23)

'Thus the intention of this book is not to defend a thesis but to make a contribution' (Flusser, 1983, p. 7)

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[1] All citations within this script are referenced within the main thesis.

Becoming Brechtian

Deleuze (Deleuze & Parnet, 2007) asks us to, '[e]xperiment, never interpret' (p. 48) in order to promote or incite political change. The Brechtian play helps us do just this. Bertolt Brecht was a left-wing German playwright, poet and theatre practitioner who advocated that the audience were always aware that they were watching a play, which he termed the 'alienation' effect within his 'Dialectical Theatre' (Brecht, 1964). One of the most popular plays using a Brechtian approach was Dario Fo's (1970) *Accidental Death of an Anarchist*; hence the alternative title of these plays (the one you are currently reading as well as the wider PhD).

By primarily engaging in interpretation and then *framing* the interpretations (there may be many) as a Brechtian play within research, the reader is led to believe that it is not *the truth* that is *represented* before them but merely *a presentation of a possible truth*, thereby preventing the reader from further decalcomania. Never a definite article, always an indefinite article. In this sense, the Brechtian play problematizes the nature of *reality* and highlights the fallibility of (re)presentation and interpretation in research. 'It is most important that one of the main features of the ordinary theatre should be excluded from [epic theatre]: the engendering of illusion.' (Brecht, 1964, p. 122). Thus, this presentational style reveals the fallibility of *re*-search and puts the entire inquiry ~~under erasure~~ (*sous rature*) (without having to draw a line through the entire play, or even PhD). By consuming a

play in an academic manner, the play *becomes* Brechtian.

In her critique of post-qualitative inquiry, Greene (2013) asks 'But is there any defensible alternative to or escape from representation? How else can we communicate our experiences and what we have learned to *audiences who matter*?' (p. 754, emphasis added). I think her own words reveal a way out. *Audiences* literally *matter* as soon as they engage in the physical actions of watching/hearing/feeling/thinking with the play/book/song and by describing them thus, the Brechtian technique reveals the dreamworld of representation for what it is…a matrix, a cave (Plato's), a show and a play. It celebrates Barthes' *death of the author*, Faulkner's *Absalom Absalom* and Woolf's absence of *meaning*. It focuses the reader's attention on the frame that borders the painting…why was *that* frame used and not another? What does the framing *do*? Do we merely witness a tinted (re)flection of the world (a *Claude glass* or Debordian spectacle) and do we have a *choice* as to which looking glass/spectacle we might look through, especially if the *type* of lens we look through/with literally '*matters*'? This Brechtian play is *my* attempt at diffracting representation.

In her PhD thesis, Katja Frimberger (2013) develops a Brechtian research pedagogy for intercultural education:

> Based on an immanent ethics that emerges from and shapes within the relationships built in the research space, the researcher's

role is that of the facilitator and co-producer of data. A Brechtian research pedagogy is thus considered a mode of production; one that does not conceptually presuppose ethics and pedagogy, but considers them as 'becoming' and integrated within its methods. (Frimberger, 2013, p. 3)

You, the reader/examiner of this PhD are invited to be a part of this play, not merely someone who spectates or watches, but as someone *included* in and who *takes action* within the play, 'rendering the relationship between actor and spectator transitive, creating dialogue, activating the spectator and allowing him or her to be transformed into the 'spect-actor'' (Boal, 1998, p. 67). You have a role within this assemblage, although it's not been deciphered yet. As you read this play, you will become immersed in it, not just as a reader but mostly as a performer. 'It is the creativity of the performer that makes the beauty of the work of art emerge.' (Carbone, 2011, p. 167). Hopefully, you will find it challenging (as a new language always is) yet also rewarding (as a new language always is). So, your creative engagement with this play will ultimately define *how it becomes* and this play, on this page will change and co-emerge *with* you. Thus, the audience member/observer - the subjective, *quiddital* self - dies and the participatory performer - the a-centred, a-subjective, intra-relational, *haecceitical* self/assemblage - is born. This play *is* the stage.

Rhizoanalysis as a Brechtian play

> A traditional researcher will be inclined to put all the participant's narratives in a traditional story that is coherent around one plot with a beginning, middle, and end. She or he will present the story from a distance (the all seeing eye/I that sees and speaks about the "truth" of the other) as if she or he herself or himself is "outside the situation being described, hidden—an unobtrusive camera—reporting, even on self activities" (Denzin, 1997, p. 224). This presentation form creates for the reader the illusion that the presented story forms a mirror of the "true" self/personality or life of the other, a mirror in which the researcher remains absent. But what about the rhizome thinker? How can she or he present the self stories and the way in which these stories are co-constructed without lapsing into realist/traditional story writing? (Sermijn, Devlieger & Loots, 2008, p. 14)

'Buchanan (2000) cautions us that we should think of the two views, the linear and the rhizomatic, as dialogic.' (cited in Amorim & Ryan, 2005, p. 583). It is this *dialogue* between aborescent thinking and rhizomatic thinking that I allow the performance of in this play within the play. Thus, a suitable and ~~original~~ *no,*

diffractive—method of performing a rhizoanalysis would be an assemblage in the format of a Brechtian play, full of juxtapositions and appositions.

Although history is constantly in a state of (re)vision by the people/authors who (re)tell the story over time, questioning how we ultimately come to truth(s), there is a creative and productive version of the truth that may advise us on matters of concern, that we can achieve, by constantly highlighting the fact that it is only '*a*' version that is always already vulnerable to structural (political, social and ecological) and personal bias (through (re)construction and interpretation). These (re)constructions chime of Deleuze's *tracings* and the process of highlighting resembles Deleuze's *mapping*. But in order to 'map' (without falling into the trap of *interpretosis)*, we might include the various narratives (tracings) in order to highlight them (just as William Faulkner did in *Absalom Absalom*); to give them contours so that the various (historically and politically influenced) interpretations are exposed on a more-than two-dimensional plane. What might this diffractive and transgressive form of mapping *do*?

> Theatre has a unique potential to interpret, translate and disseminate research findings. This is especially true for medical and health-related knowledge, which often revolves around complex questions of the embodied human condition, and which is frequently confined to academic manuscripts and often fails to inform those outside academic settings (Gray et al.,

2000; Mienczakowski, Smith, & Morgan, 2002). (cited in Rossiter et al., 2008, p. 131)

Verbatim theatre

'What a verbatim play does is flash your research nakedly. It's like cooking a meal but the meat is left raw, like a steak tartar.' (Stafford-Clark, 2011, n. p.)

Denzin (1997) describes the scripting of field notes, focus group and interview transcripts as 'verbatim theatre' (p. 103). 'Instead of adapting or repackaging experiences or observations within a fictional dramatic situation, a verbatim play acknowledges, and often draws attention to, its roots in real life.' (Hammond & Steward, 2011, n. p.). Examples include Turner's (1982) theatrical ethnographies developed from field notes (including the performance of them), Smith's (1993, 1994) poetic monologues edited from interviews (performed as a solo act), and Rosenbaum, Ferguson and Herwaldt's (2005) performance text of their research on health (also see Rossiter, et al., 2008). In fact, this last example is particularly relevant to my own inquiry due to the subject matter (health and wellbeing) and the potential that this method of presentation might offer narratives of health. In their study, 'In their own words: Presenting the patient's perspective using research-based theatre', Rosenbaum, Ferguson and Herwaldt (2005) attempted to capture the often neglected

emotional dimensions of patient experiences in medical education. Saldaña (2005, 2010) also specialises in ethnotheatre and 'ethnodramas about health and illness' where the focus is on *providing a stage* (literally) for vulnerable people to encourage resilience. So we see that academic writing performed to an audience is not particularly uncommon but academic writing produced as a play script and then published as an academic article (a different type of performance) are few and far between (as far as I have found).

Unbeknownst to me, during the initial stages of reading for my PhD in 2010, Wyatt, Gale, Gannon and Davies (2010) published *Deleuzian Thought and Collaborative Writing: A Play in Four Acts*, in which they explored, 'the collective and multiple senses of how the thoughts of Deleuze can be brought to life in collaborative writing' (p. 730), in the format of an academic play script.

> We hoped that this mode of writing and speaking would best capture the embodied and performative dimensions of our project, the tender together/apartness of our writing. We wanted to "treat writing as a flow, not a code" (Deleuze, 1995, p. 7). The topics that seemed most salient in our discussions were reworked by each of us to form an act in the play. These were "Flows and the In-Between"; "Haecceities"; "Listening"; and "Writing." In keeping with Deleuze's resistance to striation and categorization,

these acts—and we—are not easily separable; they and we are felted together. (Wyatt, Gale, Gannon & Davies, 2010, p. 730)

Gale, Speedy and Wyatt (2010) produced another academic play script in the same year that explored 'the institutional and individual struggles surrounding the submission for examination of a jointly authored doctoral dissertation at a U.K. civic university.' (p. 21). I discovered these academic plays only after writing *this* play between 2014 and 2016, thinking it was an ~~original~~ format for rhizoanalysis. Had I uncovered them earlier, it would have saved me a lot of explanation and defensive articulation to my peers! Still, this process is not a case in law and just because it has or hasn't gone before, it doesn't mean I can't introduce it anew (and it helped me articulate my own onto-episte-methodological position a lot more clearly…*it helped me breathe*).

An academic theatrical script is useful, 'for different points of view to be offered and juxtaposed and for key issues to emerge and be explored.' (Gale, Speedy & Wyatt, 2010, p. 21). The positioning of the text is used as another tool for analysis and knowledge transfer due to the possibility of the narratives contrasting and speaking to each other (Rossiter, et al., 2008). By looking at the data in this way (as a play using *tracings*— narrators 1 and 2 in my play— and a *mapping*—the *ecotone* in my play—as characters), it is clear(er) to notice how other knowledge claims are produced. For

example, this extract (*syuzhet*) on the following page, from a WiC focus group conversation, highlights how stressful events/reactions are contextual and may be interpreted differently depending on the ontological and/or epistemological lens one sees with/through. The conversation had just turned to how some of us were getting stressed walking through a busy shopping centre in Liverpool.

Syuzhet

Bumble: […] we were all getting very stressed at that time and I think…you did brilliantly through there.

Dolly: See, it was very busy, and everything, but it was the opposite for me! I was so relaxed there rather than being here, home, even in a little town, when that's busy I panic, wherever I go I panic, erm, social anxiety is like, it's a weird one, it's somat I'm always gonna have, it's engrained in me now, but being there it wasn't there…It's weird.

Jamie: Was it being away, or being there in particular?

Dolly: I think it maybe being there an' being with the group, I'm not quite sure…

Jamie: 'Cause I remember before we went you had reservations about it but you didn't seem to react in that way at all, it was, it was, you seemed a bit happier.

Dolly: Yeah, it was a bit weird, usually I've got a nervous… in the pit of me stomach, it comes from something I can't get rid of and I've had therapy and everything and they've said, now it's just one of them things unfortunately but once, when I got there, even now when I go to [*community garden*] I know everyone and relax, but I'm still nervous but being *there* was…I dunno what it was.

Bumble: Because you were more anonymous?

Dolly: It could be, yeah.

Bumble: It's the same group of people here but nobody knows you…

Dolly: It could be because I didn't have to interact with anyone maybe, yeah.

Snippet 1: 'being with the group' (Dolly).

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An *internalist model* of the mind might say that the environment has an effect on Dolly perhaps due to exteroceptive stimulation where the brain then makes a decision and neurochemical substances are released, sending signals to her stomach muscles to tighten ready for her response! Carbone (2011) states '[t]he internalist model of the mind conceives our experience as nothing more than the brain's interpretation of incoming information' (p. 158), something we're taught at school, a unidirectional cause and effect sequence from the brain, or mind if you prefer, processing the information that comes in from the surrounding environment and then deciding what to do depending on the situation. This would be the view of *Narrator 1* in my play and so I could include this narrator's views in-between the co-participants/co-(re)searchers'. However, the *decision* could just have easily come from the neurons that line the stomach as 'there are over 100 million of these cells in your gut, as many as there are in the head of a cat.' (Mosley, 2012, para. 6). When you're hungry, it's your stomach that tells you. When you have a gut feeling, butterflies or tightness in your belly, it isn't your brain telling your stomach to do these things. Speaking from the heart, being heart broken or having it ache stems from the millions of neurons around it, not information from the brain. This more *embodied* perspective could be that of *Narrator 2*. But the 'information' can never simply *start* from those neurons either. There can never be a beginning, only ever a middle, influenced by myriad entanglements of matter. This would be the *Ecotone's* view. And speaking of the brain's interpretation of

information (information processing logic), Carbone (2011) also states that 'so far, no empirical confirmation of this model, which does not explain the fons et origo of the meaning associated with the information, has been provided' (p. 158). Michael Pollan (2003) suggests that 'consciousness needn't enter into it on either side, and the traditional distinction between subject and object is meaningless' (p. xii). Or put another way, 'If you happen to have read another book about Christopher Robin, you may remember that he once had a swan (*or the swan had Christopher Robin*, I don't know which), and that he used to call this swan Pooh' (Milne, 1926, p. ix, emphasis added). Within the play, Carbone, Pollan and Milne may be used as 'extras' or 'bit parts' from the world of literature to emphasise or support the views of the narrators/ecotone/co-participants/co-(re)searchers or vice versa.

Whilst the transcriptions of the events have not been changed (apart from the inclusion of written pauses, for example), the addition of multiple identity narrators acts as a voice of both academia and of personal insight that spans the gaps between the events of the time and the events of research and thought afterwards. This method *interferes* with the *fabula* of 'traditional' academic production techniques and forces the researcher and reader to engage with the data in a different way. It challenges many current assumptions about meaning making during analysis regarding interpretations and representational data. The play, as a creative product, is not an interpretation of co-participant meaning making, nor is it supposed to represent what happened, as those events have passed. The play

produces new implications whenever it is read by anyone different and also if read a second or third time (*ad infinitum*) by the same person (who is never the *same* person).

> [B]y explicitly pointing out to the reader that the text one presents (possibly together with the participant) is but one of the many possible presentations (or entrances), one can avoid the illusory idea of the existence of a true core self that can be "objectively" captured into written words. In addition, one can also (although always to a limited extent) address the other rhizomatic principles by allowing the multitude, the nonlinear connections, the contradictions, the ruptures and new linkages (in sum, the monster!) that occur in the stories to exist as much as possible and also to explicitly present these on paper. One can do this by using poststructuralist writing techniques such as writing from different "I" voices, writing in columns, writing multiple storylines, introducing multiple entrances and exits, and so on. Also, the idea that the researcher forms a part of the construction and presentation work can be manifested in the text. The researcher is not an "objective" narrator who stands outside or above the written text, she or he is present in the writing. By visibly reflecting on her or his own positions in the writing, as a

researcher she or he dismantles the illusion of direct representation and of the "detached" researcher with her or his "all seeing eye/I." (Sermijn, Devlieger & Loots, 2008, p. 15)

By first *Tracing* (the transcriptions and narrator interpretations) and then *Mapping* (creating a play), the method forces the reader to pull out alternative pathways that would be difficult to conceive had the tracings not been traced in the first place. Also, by tracing in this way, we may come to critique the tracings in a way that may have been unseen had we not mapped alternative, topological lines. It is important that the lines are topological *as well as* Euclidean so that the *relational* data are exposed as opposed to the pointillist data (the relations from one node to another, as with a more traditionally linear cause and effect model), creating the potential to form what Deleuze and Guattari (2004) would call a *Nomadic* 'smooth space'.

Narrators act as 'story*makers*' (not story*tellers*) that give yet another voice to the research(er). However, rather than being restricted to just one tone—the analyst as expert interpreter of data—it gives rise to multiple tones.

The play, as a medium for analysing data, also seems more fun, playful, creative and interesting than coding and theming or statistical data analysis due to the flow of information that may be more easily absorbed by the reader because it turns it into a different kind of academic story rather than seemingly abstract formations. It also holds potential for making it more

engaging for the researcher as a novel and stimulating academic exercise. On the flip side, not every researcher may feel comfortable with this alternative approach to data analysis for a variety of reasons, including the justification of validity, reliability, dependability, transferability and credibility (including trustworthiness), etc. that refer to objective and subjective measurements that were designed for identifying the 'real world', separate from human experience or the 'human world' of experience and meaning making, where the environment is a *tabula rasa*. However, if researchers are continually restricted to these tunnel vision terms, how may more creative findings be explored?

Jackson and Mazzei (2012) claim that 'working the same data chunks repeatedly to "deform [them], to make [them] groan and protest" (Foucault, 1980, p. 22-23) with an overabundance of meaning…not only creates new knowledge but also shows the *suppleness of each when plugged in'* (p. 5). This is precisely what I hoped for during the production of the Brechtian playwriting. By narrating the focus group discussions from three perspectives (that I had to pass through to emerge in a field of 'posts'), it highlights the narratives telling their one story in place of another and so reveals the machinic cogs of meaning making and knowledge production. So the process of the 'play' itself is the mapping. The ecotone narrator is just another tracing…a third space of knowledge to challenge the already dying onto-episte-methodologies that narrator's one and two (re)present.

But data analysis read as a Brechtian play is 'a move towards a place where research is not judged in relation to an external set of criteria' (Waterhouse, 2011, p.142). If the type of research that is being explored is posited as neither subjective nor objective but something else, perhaps a process, story or a rhizome, then the usual voices of academic validity or credibility become redundant as a measurement of rigour. How, then, do we assess this style of writing in academic terms? Rather, research may be assessed as a *generative product*, 'immanently according to its creative, affective powers' (Waterhouse, 2011, p.142). So rather than data read as evidence, it may be read as 'nonrepresentational, [and] transgressive' (St. Pierre, 1997, p.174), creative and productive. Instead of validity or credibility then, as a set of alternative guidelines, Waterhouse (2011) asks, 'What does research produce? What hitherto unthought-of lines of flight does it open? What does it make possible to think?' (p. 142) as 'thinking is an event that happens to us.' (p. 129).

Taking inspiration from these rarely adopted rhizoanalytic theatrical approaches to data analysis and presentation, I transcribed all the group meetings and slowly, as if by magic, the play co-emerged in a number of acts and scenes. Saldaña (2003) suggests dramatising data by employing actors to portray the research participants' roles but sometimes having the participants either play the roles themselves or be included as extras might benefit both the play as well as the participants (self-efficacy, etc.). I did neither. I want you to read it and for it to read you, to co-produce *you* in a way that only a script might. Why? Because it's always already

dramatised, and besides, it's easier to read anew in case you'd like to take your time with it and co-form the pictures it co-creates with you (involving more imagination?) rather than having the pictures produced/enacted for you[2]. After all, I wouldn't want to create apathy. I wouldn't want to add to the *spectacle* any more than I already have (which is quite a lot). I wouldn't want to add to the already *overcoded* drama of health.

> I understand Foucault's (1978) concept of biopower to refer to the practices of administration, therapeutics, and surveillance of bodies that discursively constitute, increase, and manage the forces of living organisms. He gives shape to his theoretical concept through delineating the nineteenth-century figures of the masturbating child, reproducing Malthusian couple, hysterical woman, and homosexual pervert. The temporality of these biopolitical figures is developmental. They are all involved in *dramas of health*, degeneration, and the organic efficiencies and pathologies and production and reproduction. (Haraway, 1997, pp. 11-12, emphasis added).

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[2] I realise that you would still co-create a different story had it been enacted but I *suspect* a slightly less creative one.

The following (post-qualitative) *drama of health* is my *attempt* at a rhizoanalysis, partly based on the thoughts, associations and ideas that the Liverpool experiences/events of the WiC inquiry produced. But it is also, perhaps mostly, an example of the thoughts, associations and ideas produced from the intra-actions of *becoming* in a small room, with a small group of people, discussing some video and journal material and other events. It does not represent the Liverpool experiences. It cannot. It is a different event. And whilst you, the reader, are reading it, this will be yet another event (where your own embodied memories will be intra-acting and merging with a plethora of other phenomena to create yet more events).

> How events are narrated matters. Traditional inquiry assumes that knowledge precedes being. Events, "things" exist, awaiting discovery and capture. If we continue to proceed as if knowledge precedes being, then we continue to produce practices, such as the typical qualitative interview, that arrest becoming, that perpetuate empirical oblivion, that treat time as temporally reversible. (Mazzei, 2016, p. 157)

So the idea is not *to attempt* to re-present or interpret, rather it is *to attempt* to stimulate novel and transgressive questions that open up lines of flight away from Romantic and Clinical Gaze's, possibilities that challenge popular methodological agendas in a more ~~erudite~~ fashion and may offer alternative paradigms to explore. The reason for this is because *we must* if we are to challenge the dominant normative archetypes that pervade the Western lens and frame our view of the world. I see this challenge as an (almost) ethical imperative. It is a tease to promote an immanent ethics as opposed to a transcendent one (if that is indeed even possible).

Main Characters

> You will be organized, you will be an organism, you will articulate your body-otherwise you're just depraved. You will be signifier and signified, interpreter and interpreted-otherwise you're just a deviant. You will be a subject, nailed down as one, a subject of the enunciation recoiled into a subject of the statement-otherwise you're just a tramp. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, pp. 176-177).

The character's socio-demographics (labels) are noted as '*Quiddity*', similar to *chess* pieces. 'Within their milieu

of interiority, chess pieces entertain biunique relations with one another, and with the adversary's pieces: their functioning is structural.' (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 3). The alternative description of themselves (how they wish to be described/seen) follows underneath as '*Haecceity*' (emailed/texted by the main characters, as requested by me, in August/September, 2015), similar to *Go* pieces. 'Go pieces are elements of a nonsubjectified machine assemblage with no intrinsic properties, but only situational ones.' (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 3). The reason for this is to juxtapose the obviousness of how labels (mental health codification) may alter a readers assumptions about a person and therefore physically change the associated pathways that the reader (*you*) ultimately takes within their (*your*) unique play. In *Thinking with Theory in Qualitative Research*, Jackson and Mazzei (2012) 'do not treat these categorical similarities and differences as comparative, correlational, or causal' as 'to do so would remain entrenched in liberal humanist identity-work of centering and stabilizing the subject in conventional qualitative research' (p. 4). Rather, as *haecceities* I believe we are *allowed* to express 'multiplicity, ambiguity, and incoherent subjectivity' (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012, p. 4) more intimately and (*perhaps*) ethically. And so we begin to think *with* the characters: those co-participants/co-(re)searchers already immersed in the play; the narrators who present to you some already established (and one emerging) paradigmatic viewpoints; and the introduced academic characters who

have been *forcibly* entrenched within it. It is *all* ~~empirical material~~[3].

1. **<u>BurnsBrightSilver (BBS)</u>**

Note 1: 'a fish out of water' (BBS).

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[3] I have placed William James'/Norman Denzin's 'empirical materials' under erasure, not to discard or critique it but simply to (re)mind you that 'there is no primary empirical depth we must defer to in post analyses' (St. Pierre, 2014, p. 12).

> There are black sheep in the field.
> I feel I am one of them now and no longer
> fit, was I once a white sheep.

Note 2: 'was I once a white sheep' (BBS).

Annotated Polaroid 1: 'was I once a white sheep?' (BBS). Photo by BBS.

Annotated Polaroid 2: 'Still no release' (BBS). Photo by Blondie.

Quiddity: 47 years old, early retired, mortgage holder, Buddist (Kaddampa), politically non-conformist/green, was a submarine engineer but had a serious head injury and as a consequence goes through a lot of therapy (CBT, EMDR), doesn't like being cooped up.

Haecceity: *'The man behind BBS: Burnsbrightsilver..... A man fighting a 2000 day war, a man lost in trauma of a "Traumatic brain injury" but he must be fine isn't he? There is no limp, wheel chair, he can walk, feed himself, work, yes but the catastrophic wake of a head injury is often silent and only real to the man behind the injury.*

Often alone, often feel alone, often feel watched, living the death of a person I once was is a constant reminder of life robbery, why does it have to be? Because it does that's why! I'm not looking for pay back, payback won't change things but I found something else, not available in any pill bottle or therapy chair, I discovered the outdoors, I found yoga, meditation and Buddhism, I'm no longer in that dark place chewing the skirting board staring into space seeing nothing of the world, I'm no longer cold, I am burnsbrightsilver, but once in a while I wish someone would hold me really tight, very tight, wipe away my tears and tell me I'm a good person, kiss me, stroke my hair, their reassuring touch. I have been the darkest place this planet can offer, I'm also discovering again how wonderful life can be and there is life, a life worth living.' (BBS, email)

2. **<u>Dolly</u>**



Annotated Polaroid 3: 'that's all folks' (Dolly).

Note 3: 'Things I remember' (Dolly).

Quiddity: 32 years old, unemployed, lives in a council flat, spiritual, non-political (but against all governments), has been diagnosed with bipolar and social anxiety disorder, believes 'the outdoors' to be beneficial.

Haecceity: *'I've wrote it on me phone, but it refuses to send it* 😒😒😤*'* (Dolly, mobile phone text). '*I'm Dolly, small wiv a big heart, love nature, happiest when I'm in love…saddest when I'm not, love listening to birds sing and staring at the moon and stars. Just starting to live and trust again after years of drink and drug abuse with many a tear shed, but up to now being sober seems to work* 😄 *love family and friends…and that's all folks.'* (Dolly, mobile phone text)

3. **Blondie**

I clean' no litter, not dirty change of

Note 4: 'no litter, not dirty' (Blondie).

Quiddity: 27 years old, unemployed, lives in council flat, Roman Catholic, non-political, struggles to get out and about, has Post Natal Stress Disorder (PNSD). Lived in Scotland, now lives in an impoverished town in Cumbria.

Haecceity: '*Hello, I am Blondie. I am a very caring person. I worry about others than myself, it makes me proud that I've helped someone every day.*' *(Blondie, mobile phone text)*

4. <u>Bumble</u>

Pseudonym: Bumble

Reason for joining — available time
— new interest, stimulating co-researcher

Being outdoors - all weathers - can be v. beneficial to your health wellbeing. Connects "real" world, nature, to self + your place in the world. How you 'fit' in world. Can be dependant on how self feels - how you relate to environment.

Note 5: 'How you 'fit' in the world' (Bumble).

Quiddity: 58 years old, unemployed, mortgage holder, immanent spiritualist, politically non-conformist/socialist (liberal democrat), needs structure

due to redundancy, something she's interested in, used to care for disaffected youth, would like to use 'scaling' to measure activities.

Haecceity: '*Caring, with life experience and willing to have a go at most things.' (Bumble, mobile phone text)*

5. **Jim**

Liverpool. 9th Sept.

Start - very uneasy & don't often visit cities,

Note 6: 'very uneasy' (Jim).

Quiddity: Suffers from claustrophobia in an office or city and on moorland, attacked last year, suffers PTSD, prefers woods to moorland for fear of attack from behind (open spaces)[4]. Worked in shipyard, model maker, joined army.

Haecceity: Nothing sent.

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[4] Note that Jim has claustrophobia AND agoraphobia for moorland specifically, highlighting the contextual and relative nature of what are generally labelled as 'abnormal' fears.

6. **<u>Pandora</u>**

Note 7: 'Found a lovely Oak leaf in the grounds'
(Pandora).

Quiddity: 47 years old, unemployed, renting, agnostic,
non-political.

Haecceity: Nothing sent.

7. **Jamie**

Note 8: 'Mr Messy and the Ghost in the Machine' (Bumble).

Quiddity: Atheist, politically left-wing (socialist/green), (self-) appointed research facilitator, university lecturer, renting accommodation, working class with middle class

access to social and epistemological capital – *Becoming Doctor*.

Haecceity: '*Mr Messy!' (see Mcphie, 2014a)*

Other cast members

8. **The Professional (Prof.)** – *Buddhist, needs to join WiC for 'counterbalance' to his own work (as an ecotherapist) and research.* [This character joined a couple of the focus group discussions but didn't undertake any of the outings].

9. **Narrator 1 –** *Natura Naturans (Tracing 1 – The Scientific Naturalist/Objective Determinist/Cartesian Cogito) – Positioned Stage Right – Masculine character.*

10. **Narrator 2 –** *Natura Naturata (Tracing 2 – The Cultural Relativist/Subjective Humanist-possibilist/occasional phenomenologist/Social Constructivist/Kantian representationalist) – Positioned Stage Left – Feminine character.*

11. *Ecotone (The intra-relational rhizomatic mapping that co-emerges) – Centre stage but able to wander nomadically unlike the narrators who are permanently fixed to their onto-episte-methodological sides of the stage. Ecotone is an*

a-sexual and *transgendered character, transgressive but still recognised as bias. The Ecotone is a 'Puck-like' character but able to metamorphose into many different characters depending on the situation.*

Note on the Narrators:

The roles of the narrators (including the 'ecotone') and academic walk-on parts are to highlight, question and explore some of the debates between structure and agency so that lines of flight away from the territorialised institutions of mental health epistemologies are more easily recognised.

The determinist narrator is noted here as masculine and the Social Constructivist narrator as feminine in order to disrupt the status quo and to encourage empathy with the intersubjective. It also exemplifies the Cartesian dualisms/binary oppositions in play between nature/culture and masculine/feminine divisions. The 'naturalist reductionism' of narrator 1 is labelled *natura naturans* ('nature naturing') and the 'semiological idealism' of narrator 2 is labelled *natura naturata* ('nature natured') after Spinoza's philosophy that distinguished between a 'source of absolute determination' (nature naturing) and 'the actualization of this determination in ways of being, thinking, and acting which can be studied independently from their supposed causal source' (Descola, 2013, p. 28). The ecotone both

problematizes and conciliates the polemical opposition of these extremes throughout the dialogue. These three positions/paradigms exemplify my own thought processes as I have journeyed through and along this PhD. The narrators highlight my internal dialogue as I transited from a naturalist reductionism in 2010, through the semiological idealism in 2012 to the immanent philosophy of 'the ontological turn' from 2014 onwards. *They were steps to an ecology of mind*.

The narrators are also a reminder that it is 'a play' (a Brechtian technique in theatre), a creative construction and not the event itself (or even a representation of the event).

> New materialism opposes the transcendental and humanist (dualist) traditions that are haunting cultural theory, standing on the brink of both the modern and the post-postmodern era. The transcendental and humanist traditions, which are manifold yet consistently predicated on dualist structures, continue to stir debates that are being opened up by new materialists… (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 48).

The ecotone is brought to life to emphasise neither an externality nor internality to 'reading reality', but rather an entanglement that we are 'of' (not a 'part' of). Both

externality and internality suggest an anthropocentric transcendence of some sort involving *parts* and *wholes* whereas the ecotone invokes a conception of immanence for the reader/participant to think *with—from the middle*—not over and against. As part of a diffractive post-qualitative methodology, the ecotone attempts to highlight patterns of difference 'that make a difference' (Bateson, 2000; Barad, 2007). In the forward to the University of Chicago edition of *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (Bateson, 2000), Mary Bateson asserted, '[e]ven with current progress in chaos and complexity theory, we remain less skilled at thinking about interactions than we are at thinking about entities, things.' (Bateson, 1999, p. vii). This play is a play on that very theme at the same time as 'allowing' the co-participants/co-researchers dialogue (tran)scriptions (from the focus group meetings) to be read 'in (con)text' as an attempt for an ethics of inclusion (not to give them a 'voice' as that would be contradictory to the underpinning onto-episte-methodology). So, the character of the ecotone has co-emerged out of thinking *with* authors, such as Bateson, Deleuze and Barad as well as co-participants/co-researchers but is not static in time and space and so will always already become a morphogenesis of other assemblages (that you, the reader/performer are enmeshed in as soon as you make contact with it…now!).

In the same manner of *choosing not to choose* between biological essentialism and social constructivism within the 'major historiographical tradition in gender studies […] which does not allow feminism or gender studies to move beyond a merely

reactionary stance' (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 138), the ecotone is written as both a-sexual *and* transgendered. This is in contrast to narrators one and two and yet the ecotone is always already gendered (and gendering) and open to multiple readings (and performances) by my-self/culture and you, the reader/performer. 'Women' and 'men' are *partially* 'discursively produced' (in and through feminism as well as anti or non-feminist actions) through 'sexual difference' (Scott, 1996).

> A *radical* feminism does not allow itself to exist as encapsulated by the political mainstream. […] (biological) essentialism and social constructivism are two discourses that feminism traverses, which implies a performative understanding of ontology. (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 138)

Of course by emphasising the transgendered character, I have already forced into (the) play an identity political issue. However, by 'highlighting' and 'juxtaposing' this attempt, I have also placed the bio-logical and social predeterminations under erasure as a sort of 'cease fire' and 'poke' combination. The ecotone plays the part of a 'performative ontology' which '[does] not seem to allow for nature and culture to be disentangled' (unlike the other two narrators) and 'implies diverting from the

major tradition in feminist historiography (a tradition predicated on dualism structured by negation)' (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 138).

Literary cast members (academic walk-on/bit parts/extras)

These players are but ghostly voices that are projected from the books on my shelves and echo around the stage of my mind, adding to the palimpsest of the play/reader's mind. Some of the 'quotes' from these literary figures are rather substantial and as such appear to pose a slight issue regarding the originality of my personal input. However, due to the nature of the usage and framing of these quotes, it reveals my own understanding in a way not too dissimilar to paraphrased content but without the *interpretosis*. Engaging in fictional/forced conversation with the various scholars without altering their wording in any way, as well as the placement of the quotations within the dialogue of the play, required me to attain a more nuanced epistemological grasp of the points they were making. Nevertheless, the lengthy quotes are compulsory for the dialogue to flow more effortlessly and efficiently within the structure of the play. This is to help you, the spect-actor, feel like you are *participating* in an academic *story* rather than *observing* an academic text. Their quotations are, at times, also necessarily lengthy due to the ethical nature of the play. The empirical nature of ~~primary~~ inquiry may just as well include ghostly voices from

other thinkers 'outside' of the WiC group (*and why not?*). Long Quotes are also an ethical responsibility. Just as vignettes of participant quotes from interviews are contextualised rather than coded, themed and categorised (interpreted), quotes from academic scripts are no different. They're still abstracted phenomena that present the world in linguistic fashion. Paraphrased material, while reducing word count, possibly making a point more concise, and 'proving' to the reader that you really do understand what the author originally intended, are simply bastardised interpretations of interpretations, which will then undergo another set of interpretations once the reader has joined the play. So, in this play, just as the co-participants/co-(re)searchers quotes are left naked and undisturbed, so are the academic players (with a little paraphrasing scattered here and there for posterity). Just as the co-participants/co-(re)searchers voices are allowed to be heard without reducing them to interpretations, representations or tracings by coding and theming (*Romano Interpretatio*), these academic voices are also set free from re-distribution and yet are still re-contextualised within the permeable boundaries of this play. Their labels are as follows:

- **Karen Barad** – Quantum physicist.
- **Ricardo Manzotti** – Externalist philosopher.
- **Fritjof Capra –** Physicist.
- **Mcphie -** The academic face of Jamie…me!
- **Vilém Flusser** – Philosopher.
- **Timothy Morton** – Ecotheorist.
- **Babette Rothschild** – Medical Clinician.

- **Gaston Bachelard** – Philosopher.
- **Gregory Bateson** – Cyberneticist and anthropologist.
- **Deleuze & Guattari** – Philosopher and schizoanalyst.
- **Paola Carbone** – Associate professor of English Literature.

And then there is *you*. You are the *spect-actor* and you will ultimately co-create very different stories once you are *plugged in*, each of which, 'depending on the entry that is taken' (Sermijn, Devlieger & Loots, 2008, p. 10), will lead to new articulations and constructions, new narratives of self and *other*.

> So each time the researcher asks a participant to tell about herself or himself, only one or a few possible and temporal entryways into the rhizomatic network are taken. Which entries are taken can depend on many factors, but will, among other things, be codetermined by the audience to whom the participant is speaking (in the first place, to the researcher), the context within which the speaking takes place (the social and cultural discourse context, the research context), the research question (the way the researcher presents the research and asks questions), the positions of participant and researcher (e.g., age,

gender, objectives, ideas and ideologies, etc.), and the "gaze"—both the reflecting or critical gaze of the other (in the first place, the researcher) and the controlling self-disciplining gaze (Davies et al., 2004) of the speaking participant herself or himself. Along with this, the researcher becomes part of the rhizome: "As soon as you're in, you're connected." As researchers, we cannot possibly remain outside the rhizomatic story as "objective observers": We are within the rhizomatic story as a part of the dynamic construction process. (Sermijn, Devlieger & Loots, 2008, pp. 7-8)

Prologue:

The group have already had a few meetings at 'the house' to set the scene and discuss the details of the research, have been on a number of different 'outings' (Coniston Water and Langdale) and a '~~pilot~~' study has also been conducted by Jamie, previous to this gathering (see Mcphie, 2015a). However, only two of the co-participants/co-(re)searchers, Jim and Jamie, were involved in the ~~pilot~~ study. So, although this play begins with 'Act One', the play had always already begun as we always enter in the middle.

Liverpool ONE – Liverpool Too: A Therapeutic Tale of Two Cities

(Or)

The Accidental Death of the *Quiddital* Self: A Spatiotemporal Distribution of Environ(Mental) Health

Act One

Scene One: '*I think filming has a change on your mood…*' (BBS)

[The scene is always already setting in a small enclosed room at a place where most of the volunteers know and come to on a regular basis (every Tuesday and Thursday) in order to, well, it would be hard to say. On the surface one might say that they come here to garden (as a place to engage in the therapeutic nature of horticulture) or to enjoy each other's company or to 'get therapy' from the process itself. However, who can say the myriad things that influence our decision making processes.

It is the 7th of October, 2013. The mood is academic. The air still and stale. The group have been talking for a while. Pandorra, Blondie, Jim and Dolly have been muted by the dominant voices of BBS, the Prof., and Jamie. The discussion has taken a turn to a video interview that Jamie (the interviewer) undertook with BBS (the interviewee) whilst walking (performing psychogeography) around the city of Liverpool on the 9th of September, 2013.

The group have just watched the video replay of the interview and are in mid conversation. BBS has just been explaining how the video interview made him feel and Jamie drew everyone's attention to a point in the interview when BBS and Jamie had been laughing but then Jamie had to look down at his notes for his next semi-structured question. In the video BBS's body language and facial expression immediately changed, no longer smiling, looking down and back to being serious. This was only evident due to the dual video feedback that Jamie had layered earlier, the week before this meeting! The conversation then turns to reflecting on the interview style and whether Jamie is being too controlling or leading with his questions and whether this is acceptable or not. Both the Prof. and Bumble expressed

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how it was Jamie's project and so a little control was perhaps necessary. BBS has a very different idea.]

The living Room.

Temple st. FCH 2.38 pm

a little Court yard in the Centre of hell
even the Courtyard is Hell, noise + warning signs.

Coffee 3.30pm

. . . . phew

I dont like the CCTV   Ang had no lunch, she has not money
Im being watched

its FAST here   hug from   beautiful colour   Ahhhh - Work
bad signs all over   Ang   of oranges   noise my
                                                                P.T.S.D

Liverpool   To much noise
(Rain)   So I take my
                                                           TRAMADOL

Cross from no
my world to
mans land   CCTV

Sun is out 8.45am

Im ok but rain   Survived

Note 9: 'I'm being watched' (BBS).

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BBS: I don't see it as your project, I see it as *my* project

Jamie: ok, great…it '*is*' your project

[Now the conversation turns to what the group were interested in, in a square square, with square trees]

Jim: Well I can tell you *I* was interested in what the building we were sat outside was, you know, was it some alcoholics hostel or something? You saw well dressed women, mainly, with ID cards round their necks going in, quite a few less fortunate looking types with robes coming out.

Jamie: Was that the place by the square trees?

Jim: Yeah, just past the street from the square trees

Note 10: 'conform to the grid pattern' (Jim).

· Square Trees
Neatening up nature
Unnatural : Artificial
Gardening ?

Note 11: 'Neatening up Nature' (Bumble).

Prof: Did you say with robes?

Jim: With, with robes, you know, cigarettes

Prof: Oh, roll ups

[Awkward silence]

Blondie: Yeah, me and [Dolly] were just fascinated by the trees and she made a face out of it didn't you? [*in a high pitched voice*] 'Look at that, the eyes and nose and mouth!'

[Inaudible joviality ensues. Freeze action. The Social Constructivist narrator appears stage left dressed in a large knitted jumper, brown chords and sandals]

Narrator 2: This is interesting because while Dolly and Blondie viewed the square trees as playful, BBS had an

altogether different encounter with them. In the video interview, BBS mentioned that he 'needed to see some green' and he liked the square trees but he said, 'the problem with them is I think they're a little bit deformed. I can't see them moving around in the wind.' (BBS)

[The Determinist narrator appears stage right dressed in a suit and tie]

Narrator 1: This is because the square green trees objectively determined the group's reactions to them based on their genetic disposition as a species. Orian's (1980) 'Savannah Theory' hypothesises that certain landscape features, such as green grass, open spaces with a few laterally dispersed trees (similar to a golf course or urban park) are preferable to all humans due to our shared evolutionary heritage as we adapted to the environment of East Africa. Hence the reactions from Jim, 'even they have to conform to the grid pattern' (Note 10), Bumble, 'Unnatural. Artificial' (Note 11), and BBS's comments about them being 'repressed'.

Narrator 2: But the group also put 'meaning' to the square green trees through their subjective personal biases and socio-cultural constructs. Otherwise, why would their reactions be so different? I'm sure from another culture, another time other people would see them even more differently.

[Appearing in the middle of the stage, the ecotone emerges]

Ecotone: Mapping these two narrators produces other contours – changing the shape of the perceptual and

conceptual map. The trees show order, neatness, cleanliness, 90 degree corners, in aesthetic partnership with the square architecture that surrounds them in the square 'square' that is the tuber space that we 'decided' to stop in. Why 'choose' to stop there? Or did the 'designed' space stop them? Or did the process of 'spacing' open up inside them as well as around them, changing from affect (becoming affected) to percept to concept and back to affect (affecting) again in myriad ways. How did this space co-emerge? As a palimpsest of material, architectural design and ideas of continual growth? Topiary has been around for some time now (the Romans practised it) and is still practised in post-picturesque gardens, gaining fervour in the Arts and Crafts movement (John Loudon took it forward from the 1840's) for the wealthy – again, affecting power through social capital and aesthetic hierarchy!!! Did the café (as both a structure and assemblage) want to exude an air of wealth to attract the right sort of customer? How may this affect us unconsciously? BBS wanted to have a drink there and (jokingly) leave the group. Did he unconsciously 'associate' wealth and therefore good mental health and wellbeing with the aesthetic design of the café? The square trees certainly had the opposite effect on him as evidenced in his video interview.

But what if they weren't square trees? What if, yet again, they were just a conception? Do they make us feel safe and secure (as opposed to graffiti and smashed windows depending on who you are?) or does it affect change as its lines of intersection and interaction co-emerge with our lines of embodied memory – for BBS the trees became a sign of repression (Annotated polaroid

4) and I'm tempted to say, following narrator 2's reasoning, that he was projecting but that would be interpreting!!! Does it depend on who you are, where you've come from, what class you associate yourself with? It certainly starts to seem that way when contrasted with other views.

Annotated Polaroid 4: Repressed Trees - 'they can't sway around in their limbs' (BBS). Photo by Blondie.

*In the video interview, BBS said, '*I think they've been like repressed and erm, somebody has, erm, like a dictator has come along and planted tyranny onto them and erm, has cut their limbs off and they can't, they can't sway around in their limbs'. *Rather than an innate genetic disposition or symbolic meaning making, as if we*

can somehow project an image to re-present the trees in a mediating space in our pineal glands (as Descartes would have us believe), why not explore the agential emergence co-produced from the intra-actions of the WiC group, the square space and the square trees? We may dislodge certain modes of thinking for this group of British individuals that have been dormant for quite some time (since at least the Roman invasion of Britain where we began the transition from a land of immanent thought and practice to a nation of transcendent belief and separations).

*In the video interview, BBS also mentioned that he was '*completely out of place' *in Liverpool because the first thing he saw was a sign that read, 'DANGER, DO NOT ENTER' and a courthouse that made him think, '*ooh, it doesn't sound like a very pleasing place to be […] although there's lots of places I like in Liverpool, but given a choice I'd rather be in a place where there was mountains and rivers.*'*

Annotated Polaroid 5: *'*ooh, it doesn't sound like a very pleasing place to be' (BBS). Photo by BBS.

*Narrator 2: BBS's phrase '*I'd rather be in a place where there was mountains and rivers*' is perhaps not surprising coming from BBS due to his socio-demographics. Nature as a romanticised social construction seems particularly prevalent among the middle-classes. Just look at Suckall, Fraser, Cooper and Quinn's (2009) study of visitor perceptions of the Peak District national park where they found '*that social class played a very strong role in shaping perceptions of this region with 'middle class' respondents reacting far more favourably to the park than people from more working class backgrounds*' (p. 1195) or Urry's (1990) notion of the 'Romantic Gaze', for example, based on an elitist,*

solitary and semi-spiritual appreciation of magnificent and undisturbed natural scenery.

Narrator 1: Nonsense! Nature is an objective reality and we can measure our implicit restorative reactions to it, reactions that have evolved genetically over thousands of years in the African savannah. There are a growing number of studies that testify to this healthy restorative reaction.

Narrator 2: Possibly but none of these studies have actually found any 'genetic' originatory evidence within the human body for any restorative benefits of the healing power of 'nature' have they?

Narrator 1: Well, no but that's not the point!

Narrator 2: Hmmm! Surely there are many 'natures' as there are many views of what nature actually is. Thereby, would it even be possible to isolate a single, identifiable variable that is 'nature'?

Narrator 1: Yes, it's that green stuff out there! You know, stuff that's not artificial human made stuff. And as a shallow ecologist I believe that we must conserve nature in order to support human wellbeing.

Narrator 2: As a deep ecologist I agree that human made artificial stuff is different from nature but we must conserve nature for its own sake and the way to do this is through re-connection to it.

Ecotone: Hang on a minute! I thought you said there were many natures to many people? I think you may have fallen into the Cartesian trap here. Don't forget, some

people don't even have a word for nature as they don't see themselves in any way separate from 'it'. As Timothy Morton (2007) says, either everything is nature or nothing is nature. He prefers to go with nothing whereas I prefer including everything as it warrants a much more nuanced conversation with perhaps a more progressive agenda as argued by Mcphie (2014b, 2015a), Clarke and Mcphie (2014, 2015) and Mcphie and Clarke (2015). Timothy…a word perhaps?

Morton: *'*Ecological writing keeps insisting that we are "embedded" in nature. Nature is a surrounding medium that sustains our being. Due to the properties of the rhetoric that evokes the idea of a surrounding medium, ecological writing can never properly establish that this is nature and thus provide a compelling and consistent aesthetic basis for the new worldview that is meant to change society. It is a small operation, like tipping over a domino...Putting something called Nature on a pedestal and admiring it from afar does for the environment what patriarchy does for the figure of Woman. It is a paradoxical act of sadistic admiration.' (Morton, 2007, pp. 4-5)

[The narrators vanish. Action continues. This happens each time the narrators appear]

Scene Two: '*I wonder if we change a little bit while we're filming*' (BBS)

BBS: I think filming has a change on your mood… I wonder if we change a little bit while we're filming…

Note 12: 'change while recording, faceal expresion's body language.' (Blondie).

Ecotone: So does the very act of filming change the nature of nature? If so, how? And if it does change our physical reality, can we even 'do research authentically' as filming whilst interviewing isn't something that we would 'normally' have done when walking around Liverpool. Also, depending on our embodied memories, we will all have different (re)actions to 'being filmed' so 'our moods' may not be generalised in this way due to the contextuality of our associations. We must 'change a little bit while we're filming*' (BBS) as filming is a physical, material process that we are entangled with and cannot disentangle from due to the knotted intra-actions involved. This is a very important conversation to have and we'll keep coming back to it but on a slightly different note: BBS, why would a courthouse make you think Liverpool wasn't a pleasing place?*

Annotated Polaroids 6 & 7: 'I was put under surveillance' (BBS). Photos by BBS.

BBS: …because, erm, [pause] some time ago, erm, [pause] I was put under surveillance, on [pause] four occasions that I know of…by, erm, by the defendants of the company that I was suing for my injury, erm, now I can know about that and erm, and afterwards they showed me I was quite disturbed and I needed a lot of extra therapy on top of the therapy I was getting erm, to deal with that because it kind of like set me off, it kind of derailed me and erm, so I, I erm, I thought I was going to struggle with this quite a lot but I almost think it's kind of like, because its, I have the power to, NO, erm, I think I quite like that power that I could almost stop you in your tracks and erm, and I think I'm able to continue probably erm, [pause] going higher and higher off the

diving board because erm, at any point, I'm in, I'm in control of what I say but when I was put under surveillance I was just, not that they found anything, cause they didn't, there was nothing to find, erm, on this I, I feel, I could be [pause], I, I'm, I am being truthful, but erm, [longer pause] I wonder if, if there's a slightness to me holding back, and erm, and I, and I, and I am almost, erm, not comparing the two but erm, I think I'm in erm, [pause] bit of a no man's land where I'm er, because all in this [referring to his journal], I've referred to CCTV, in the pictures that I've took it's CCTV but yet what we're doing is, is kind of TV work as well in a roundabout way erm, but, erm, I kind of, erm, getting, like I say, bit of, bit of, bit of a buzz because erm, [pause], erm, [longer pause] I don't like to say that erm, how I'm dealing with it, I'm, I'm, I've got myself in control that I can stop it at any moment but I won't, but I choose not to, and I choose to carry on whereas before when that surveillance was done to me that was quite damaging and erm, perhaps this is a way of me meeting my demons if you like, to erm, so I think, I think this actually, is helping me [pause] more, more, more than, I think, more than I let on'

Jamie: 'so you're kind of taking your control back…'

BBS: 'yes'

Jamie: '… into your own hands, the power's now up to you…'

BBS: 'yes, because initially I thought that, how dare they intrude in on, on my life, but, erm, with the therapy that

I got, over that, erm, I made it work for me, and er, and I think this is having the exact same, same thing but I think I'm controlling my anxiety, I'm controlling, to a degree, my panic attacks….

Narrator 1: Here I'd like to pause a while and look at 'to a degree' because BBS did take some pills during the walk to calm himself down…as you will discover in a moment. This seems like false self-praise to me.

*Narrator 2: There you go again, always thinking you can predict what's going to happen next. But **I** say he WAS 'in control' because he made the decision to self-administer at a time when the medical advice clearly instructed him not to. I say he took his power back! Agential intention!*

BBS: '…although when in Liverpool I did have a MINOR panic attack that I was able to control, as I suddenly had, erm, a relapse with work where I could, I could hear somebody grinding and I could smell it and smell the grinding and, that smell took me back five years…

Narrator 1: Smell! Research suggests that olfactory sense, above visual or auditory senses, can trigger emotional responses in the memory via the 'olfactory bulb', processed in the brain's limbic system. In fact, 'a growing body of evidence [indicates] that there is a privileged relationship between olfaction and emotion during recollection' *(Herz, 2004, p. 217). So the smell that was in the external environment determined the subject's reaction… cause and effect…*

Narrator 2: ...or that the subject's memory of the smell from his old workplace setting triggered the link to the smell in that moment and he made meaning from it that 'he brought with him'...cause and effect...

*Narrator 1: Well, I'm now going to put your mind at rest and introduce Babette Rothschild, M.S.W., L.C.S.W. She '*has worked as a clinician for over 35 years. She is the author of five acclaimed books on trauma treatment and related issues […] She is also editor of the Norton series *8 Keys to Mental Health.*' (Rothschild, 2000, back cover sleeve).

Rothschild: 'One of the difficulties of PTSD is the phenomena of *flashbacks*, which involve highly disturbing replays of implicit sensory memories of traumatic events sometimes with explicit recall, sometimes without. The sensations that accompany them are so intense that the suffering individual is unable to distinguish the current reality from the past. It *feels like* it is happening now.' (Rothschild, 2000, p. 45)

Ecotone: I think BBS was able to 'distinguish the current reality' of the walk 'from the past' even though it may have 'felt like' it was similar and 'brought back' those intense feelings of pain and suffering. Note 13 shows how BBS recognises his PTSD and distinguishes current reality from the past using the temporal terms 'old' and 'reminder'. Even though he states, 'where am I', this is not an indication of the inability to differentiate present from past, as that would read, 'when am I'! BBS recognises the past but like all of us, perceives it in and of the present. Le Poidevin (2011) acknowledges that

'…although we perceive the past, we do not perceive it as past, but as present' (*n.d.*). *And each time we do, we change (and change 'it') a little. I think, narrator 1, that your point is not yet made by Babette.*

handwritten note:
☹ P. T. S. D) – I can smell my old Work
I want to run, I cant think, where am I.
the group have no idea of my hell need Tramadol
A reminder of my prescription addiction to pain killer.
Ive taken 3 pills secretly ☺
2:24pm F**king bus noise+ fumes... do one will you!

Note 13: 'f**king bus noise' (BBS).

Narrator 1: Babette, if you would?

Rothschild: 'A flashback can be triggered through either or both exteroceptive and interoceptive systems. It might be something seen, heard, tasted, or smelled that serves as the reminder and sets the flashback in motion.' (Rothschild, 2000, p. 45)

Narrator 1: Thank you!

Rothschild: 'It can just as easily be a sensation arising from inside the body.' (Rothschild, 2000, p. 45)

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Narrator 1: Oh!

Narrator 2: This really exemplifies my point of BBS bringing the memory with him (in his mind) and making meaning from it.

Rothschild: 'Sensory messages from muscles and connective tissue that remember a particular position, action or intention can be the source of a trigger. ' (Rothschild, 2000, p. 45)

Ecotone: So the memory can also be embodied through tissue, muscle and sinew in relation to a position in action (rather than symbolic meaning making in the mind…if mind is taken to be 'brain'). However, this bodily 'position' is also in relation to a temporal and topological environment. But the relations of cause and effect do not have to be temporally or spatially linear…and there are other things in the affective domain that can emerge. How did an assemblage of sound, smell, proprioception and embodied memory help BBS to travel back in time? How can those particular lines of chemical, electrical and emotional scents at that moment in Liverpool, such as the chemicals that were in the air that travelled in through BBS's nostrils, possibly merge and become knotted with a constantly changing, negatively embodied memory (that BBS carries with him) to produce a miniscule slip in time where BBS was once more anxious about his accident? After Deleuze and Guattari, Braidotti (2011) sees 'memory as becoming' *and as such* 'raises methodological issues of how to account for a different notion of time…the dynamic and internally contradictory or circular time of

becoming. Thus, instead of deference to the authority of the past, we have the fleeting copresence of multiple time zones in a continuum that activates and deterritorializes stable identities' *(p. 228). So, fixed memories belong to* quiddital *'beings' and processual lines belong to* haecceitical *'becomings.'*

Deleuze & Guattari: 'The line-system (or block-system) of becoming is opposed to the point system of memory. Becoming is the movement by which the line frees itself from the point, and renders points indiscernible: the rhizome, the opposite of aborescence; breaks away from aborescence. *Becoming is an antimemory*. Doubtless, there exists a molecular memory, but as a factor of integration into a majoritarian or molar system.' (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 324)

Ecotone: This is very different from the classical physics of linear cause and effect trajectories isn't it Fritjof?

Capra: 'Our notions of space and time figure prominently in our map of reality. They serve to order things and events in our environment and are therefore of paramount importance […] Classical physics was based on the notion of an absolute, three-dimensional space, independent of the material objects it contains, and obeying the laws of Euclidean geometry, and of time as a separate dimension which again is absolute and flows at an even rate, independent of the material world.' (Capra, 1982, p. 177)

Ecotone: But where does this 'belief that geometry is inherent in nature, rather than part of the framework we

use to describe nature' *(Capra, 1982, pp. 177-178) originate?*

Capra: 'in Greek thought.' (Capra, 1982, p. 178)

Ecotone: So, if this is a Western phenomenon, do many Eastern philosophers and/or beliefs suggest that space and time only exist 'in relation' to our conscious constructions?

Capra: 'The refined notions of space and time resulting from their mystical experiences appear to be in many ways similar to the notions of modern physics, as exemplified by the theory of relativity.' (Capra, 1982, p. 177)

Ecotone: For example?

Capra: 'Einstein recognized that temporal specifications, too, are relative and depend on the observer […] Two events which are seen as occurring simultaneously by one observer may occur in different temporal sequences for others.' (p. 182) 'A distant event which takes place at some particular instant for one observer may happen earlier or later for another observer. It is therefore not possible to speak about 'the universe at a given instant' in an absolute way; there is no absolute space independent of the observer.' (Capra, 1982, p. 183)

Ecotone: Similar, then, to Manzotti's description of the rainbow phenomenon. Physicist Mendel Sachs stated that 'relativity theory implies that the space and time coordinates are only the elements of a language that is

used by an observer to describe his environment.' *(cited in Capra, 1982, p. 183). Must we look to the more dynamic onto-epistemologies of Hinduism, Buddhism or more modern forms of Western physics if we wish to explore the temporal nature of mental health? Perhaps we may update Capra's revelations with a look at post-modern physics. Astrid Schrader, who was a PhD student of the quantum physicist, Karen Barad, argues that '*memory is not a matter of the past, but recreates the past each time it is invoked' *(Barad interview by Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p.67).*

Deleuze & Guattari: 'From this point of view, one may contrast a *childhood block*, or a becoming-child, with the *childhood memory*: "a" molecular child is produced … "a" child coexists with us, in a zone of proximity or a block of becoming, on a line of deterritorialization that carries us both off-as opposed to the child we once were, whom we remember or phantasize, the molar child whose future is the adult. "This will be childhood, but it must not be my childhood," writes Virginia Woolf. (*Orlando* already does not operate by memories, but by blocks, blocks of ages, block of epochs, blocks of the kingdoms of nature, blocks of sexes, forming so many becomings between things, or so many lines of deterritorialization.) Wherever we used the word "memories" in the preceding pages, we were wrong to do so; we meant to say "becoming," we were saying becoming.' (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 324)

Ecotone: To qualify this statement I would now like to invite to the stage distinguished professor of quantum physics and feminist new materialisms, Karen Barad,

who will attempt to explain to us mere mortals the results of a recent addition to the double slit experiment…

Barad: 'So there is an amazing and really astonishing experiment that physicists have only been able to do in the past decade or so since previously it was not technologically possible.*' (Barad, 2012b, p. 63)

Ecotone: Here Karen goes on to explain the experiment which we don't need to know (you can read the interview yourself in Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 63 onwards). Let's fast-forward a little shall we? And Karen, could you put it in to laypersons terms please?

Barad: '…In other words, after it has already hit the screen and gone through the apparatus, I am able to determine its ontology, afterwards […] The way physicists interpret this is by saying that we have the ability to change the past […] I think this is a very seductive fantasy. Perhaps at one time or another all of us wish that we could change the past and *the marks left on bodies*, and change the ways in which we materialized the world, especially when we are not being careful, that we would like to undo what has been done, that we would like to go back and do it differently.' (Barad, 2012b, p. 65, emphasis added)

*Ecotone: I'm sorry for interrupting Karen but it was me that emphasised the '*marks left on bodies*' as particularly important to WiC due to the emergence of tataus (mentioned in an assemblage in the 'real' world of this PhD (see Assemblage ~~Two~~)), especially marks of 'self-harm' on the skin (or as graffiti on a wall). For if*

the body encompasses the mind (or vice versa) and the mind is extended into our environments (not too dissimilar from Merleau-Ponty's (1968) 'flesh of the earth' conceptions), even self-harm becomes an altogether different discussion that incorporates a political materiality. Sorry Karen, please continue.

Barad: 'But is this really what this experiment is telling us about what is possible? It turns out that if we look at this experiment more carefully […] the original diffraction pattern is not being restored whatsoever and there is no complete erasure going on here at all. What is happening here is that the experiment is not about engaging a past that already was. See, we assume that time is a given externality, just a parameter that marches forward, and that the past already happened and the present, that moment "now" just slipped away into the past, and that the future is yet to come. But if we examine this carefully, again using the insights from feminist theory, from post-structuralist theory, and things that Cultural Studies has been telling us, and so on, and bring them into the physics here, what we can see is that what is going on actually is the making of temporality. There are questions of temporality that are coming to the fore here. What we are seeing here is that time is not given, it is not universally given, but rather that time is articulated and re-synchronized through various material practices. In other words, just like position, momentum, wave and particle, *time itself only makes sense in the context of particular phenomena*. So what is going on here is that physicists are actually making time in marking time, and that there is a certain way in which what we take to be the "past" and what we take to be the "present" and the

"future" are entangled with one another. What we have learned from this experiment is that what exists are intra-active entanglements. That is the only reason we get a diffraction pattern again, by the way. And importantly, the original diffraction pattern doesn't return, a new one is created, one in which the diffraction (that is, entanglement effects) is a bit challenging to trace. So, the issue is not one of erasure and return. What is at issue is an entanglement, intra-activity. The "past" was never simply there to begin with, and the "future" is not what will unfold, but "past" and "future" are iteratively reconfigured and enfolded through the world's ongoing intra-activity. There is no inherently determinate relationship between past, present, and future. In rethinking causality as intra-activity and not as this kind of billiard-ball causality—cause followed by an effect—the fantasy of erasure is not possible, but *possibilities for reparation exist*. That "changing the past" in the sense of undoing certain discrete moments in time is an illusion.' (2012b, p. 66, emphasis added)

Ecotone: Whoops, there I go again, adding emphasis. My point here is to promote Deleuze and Guattari's (2004) 'lines of flight' and narrative therapy's 'becoming other' if, as you say Karen, 'possibilities for reparation exist'.

Barad: 'The past, like the future though, is not closed. But "erasure" is not what is at issue. In an important sense, the "past" is open to change. It can be redeemed, productively reconfigured in an iterative unfolding of spacetimematter. But its sedimenting effects, its trace, cannot be erased. *The memory of its materializing effects*

is written into the world. So changing the past is never without costs, or responsibility.' (Barad, 2012b, p. 67, emphasis added)

Ecotone: Karen, I believe a PhD student of yours named Astrid Schrader (2010) has shown that 'memory is not a matter of the past, but recreates the past each time it is invoked.' *(Barad, 2012b, p. 67). If memory (re)creates the past each time it is invoked, this has both beneficial and serious consequences for research (e.g. what happened with BBS and Blondie here, in this inquiry), psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, especially if traumatic events are re-lived. Babette, I believe you have something to say on this matter?*

Rothschild: 'The dangers inherent in the therapeutic treatment of trauma are not new […] In 1932, psychoanalyst Sándor Ferenczi […] admitted to his colleagues that psychoanalysis could be retraumatizing' (pp. 77-78) 'Onno van der Hart and Kathy Steele (1997) remind us that directly addressing traumatic memories is not always helpful and can sometimes be damaging to our clients […] A client is most at risk for becoming overwhelmed, possibly retraumatized, as a result of treatment when the therapy process accelerates faster than he can contain. This often happens when more memories are pressed or elicited into consciousness-images, facts, and/or body sensations-than can be integrated at one time […] It is like an automobile speeding out of control, the driver unable to find and/or apply the brakes.' (Rothschild, 2000, p. 78).

Ecotone: Just as a (re)minder of what Deleuze and Guattari (2004) said: 'It is well known that although psychoanalysts have ceased to speak, they interpret even more, or better yet, fuel interpretation on the part of the subject, who jumps from one circle of hell to the next. In truth, significance and interpretosis are the two diseases of the earth or the skin, in other words, humankind's fundamental neurosis.*' (p. 127). Sorry Karen, if you wouldn't mind continuing?*

Barad: 'So this is an example of what I learned from my diffractive engagements with physics: what responsibility entails in our active engagement of sedimenting out the world in certain kinds of ways and not others. Being attentive to ways in which we are re-doing, with each intra-action materially re-doing the material configurings of spacetimemattering. The past and the present and the future are always being reworked. And so that says that the phenomena are diffracted and temporally and spatially distributed across multiple times and spaces, and that our responsibility to questions of social justice have to be thought about in terms of a different kind of causality.*' (Barad, 2012b, p. 68)

Ecotone: Italian philosopher, Ricardo Manzotti's work has already unpacked this 'can we change the past' conundrum using the example of a lottery ticket!!! Therefore, I have the great pleasure of introducing the great Ricardo Manzotti to the stage…

Manzotti*:* 'Information is a process, a physical process that takes place in time and space spanning both of them.

Information is not at a x,y,z,t, information is spread over a temporally and spatially extended causal process…' *(Manzotti, 2011d, n.p.)*

Ecotone: Now replace the word 'information' with 'mental health and wellbeing' and it reads:

'Mental health is a process, a physical process that takes place in time and space spanning both of them. Mental health is not at a x,y,z,t, mental health is spread over a temporally and spatially extended causal process'. Therefore, a productive question to ask would be 'where and when is mental health'?

Manzotti*: '…we may thus step away from a world where entities exist autonomously to a world where entities are mutually constituted and emerge out of causal relations […] In short, a relational view of objects and wholes suggests that an object does not exist in virtue of any intrinsic reason. The object is the result of a causal entanglement between different portions of the physical continuum […] this means that neither objects nor their properties exist in isolation. Everything we know is the result of a causal interaction […] So, we should not ask whether objects exist but rather where and when do they take place?' (Manzotti, 2012, n.p.)*

Ecotone: and the example of the lottery ticket please Ricardo? We are pushed for time!

Manzotti*: '…the present changes the past…' (Manzotti, 2012, n.p.)*

Ecotone: Yes, but only in *and* for *the present, we've already been through this Ricardo!*

Manzotti: '… the ticket you bought was not the winner until the extraction, but afterwards it became the winner since the time you bought it. After 31 Dec the ticket was the winner and that it has been so as far back as Oct 30 […] An object takes place only when it produces an effect, but when it does it was there since the beginning […] objects do not exist, rather they take place.' *(Manzotti, 2012, n.p.)*

*Ecotone: So, the past is open to change, not 'for' the past, but through us in the 'now'! But what does this mean for mental health? If '*memory is not a matter of the past, but recreates the past each time it is invoked*' (Schrader, 2010, paraphrased by Barad, in Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 67) then BBS's experiences in Liverpool have profound ethical consequences, especially for psychoanalysts and therapists who might wish to (re)engage a 'patient' with their past in order to try to 'fix' them (not to mention what we are doing here…now). The noise and fumes invoking, (re)engaging and (re)emerging the memory from BBS's accident led to BBS popping a pill. From this event, new memories of it will be formed. A morphegenesis will take place.*

Barad: 'Memory is not a record of a fixed past that can ever be fully or simply erased, written over, or recovered (that is taken away or taken back into one's possession, as if it were a thing that can be owned). And remembering is not a reply of a string of moments, but

an enlivening and reconfiguring of past and future that is larger than any individual.' (Barad, 2007, p. ix)

Ecotone: This opens the door for other materials of the world to be incorporated into what we think of as 'memory' or 'the mind' rather than merely 'what's in the head'. It also shifts our thinking about what memory is from being merely a recall of past events to our present Euclidean temporal position to memory as 'of the present'. Paola Carbone examined the writings of Virginia Woolf in order to emphasise this temporal distribution of memory.

Carbone: 'Influenced by Henri Bergson, Virginia Woolf writes *Mrs Dalloway* (previously called *The Hours*) in which the two protagonists live through an ordinary day while Big Ben strikes the hours. The novel begins with 50-year-old Clarissa who perceives the fresh air in the morning in London only to find herself, in her mind, back at the family's summerhouse at Bourton, when she was young and desirous of love. While Woolf introduces the woman suggesting images of her present actions, she also lets the character experience her-*self* in relation to past and present experiences. Past experiences are vividly called up by present external reality to highlight the woman's being. However, the past is not a source of knowledge as it was for Tristam Shandy, nor is it forever over, just as Clarissa is not *simply* remembering her past youth. On the contrary, we can say that her past is still having an effect on her (Manzotti, 2006). Clarissa's environment is extended spatially and temporally to all those events that are causally responsible for her bodily states. The fresh air in today's

London is no more causally efficacious than the family's summerhouse at Bourton. The fresh air comes to the fore for the character and the reader not only because it is a physical occurrence in present time, but because it is the effect of a reminiscence. Otherwise it would have never been perceived or emphasized by the author. Thus memory is the literary and physical cause of the presence of a window at Bourton in the past.' (Carbone, 2011, pp. 162-163)

Deleuze: In the same way that we do not perceive things in ourselves, but at the place where they are, we only grasp the past at the place where it is in itself, and not in ourselves, in our present. There is therefore a "past in general" that is not the particular past of a particular present but that is like an ontological element, a past that is eternal and for all time, the condition of the "passage" of every particular present. It is the past in general that makes possible all pasts. According to Bergson, we first put ourselves back in the past in general: He describes in this way the leap into ontology. (Deleuze, 1991, pp. 56-57)

Ecotone: Similar to Woolf's, Bergson's, Deleuze's and Carbone's points, in the Kate Bush song Cloudbusting, *past experiences are also called up by present external reality:*

'But every time it rains

You're here in my head

Like the sun coming out' *(Bush, 1985)*

*As it happens, in the same song Bush also illustrates another point made by Karen Barad regarding the notion of matter mattering: '*But just saying it could even make it happen*' (Bush, 1985). BBS's time travelling experience (as well as Kate Bush's lyrics) really exemplifies Barad's, Manzotti's, and Carbone's points. As does the Cree of Whapmagoostui 's understandings of 'health' (or of 'being Cree') as it '*cannot be understood outside the context of colonial and neo-colonial relations in Canada' *(Adelson, 2000, p. 91), for it is spatially and temporally distributed. It seems that Narrative therapy, a therapy that focuses on becoming other, may have hit a sweet spot. If only they'd include other-than-human materiality too!*

Barad: 'Re-membering and re-cognizing do not take care of, or satisfy, or in any other way reduce one's responsibilities; rather, like all intra-actions, they extend the entanglements and responsibilities of which one is a part. The past is never finished. It cannot be wrapped up like a package, or a scrapbook, or an acknowledgement; we never leave it and it never leaves us behind.' (Barad, 2007, p. ix)

Ecotone: So, an attempt to 'become other' through a narrative (re)ordering of one's life may not be possible without taking the past with us (in the film Memento, *even Leonard who has anterograde amnesia takes a certain amount of past with him through his tattoos, annotated Polaroids and notes). However, it doesn't imply that we can't co-create new configurations, possibilities or lines of flight. We may just have to*

(re)mould those embodied/enminded memories to a less forceful or intense shape.

[Like a bang that resonates in the air and ear, gradually fading to a faint hum or hiss, the initial shock of the smell|memory begins to fade as BBS is transported again forward through time to the present and it takes a little while for that resonance to fade away]

Bachelard: 'Memory-what a strange thing it is!-does not record concrete duration, in the Bergsonian sense of the word. We are unable to relive duration that has been destroyed. We can only think of it, in the line of an abstract time that is deprived of all thickness.' (Bachelard, 1994, p. 9)

Ecotone: However, by (re)counting this story here, now, it has altered it once again (as are you by reading this). Medication may prevent this resonance from the time travel, may dampen the chemical|embodied memory pathway so that the journey may not be experienced in such a sensually exposed manner. The force BBS encountered may become less intense like a sponge dampens a symbol. But my question is this…what else does this blockage do on the path to becoming well? But for now…this topological mapping of space and time has begun to free us from various tracings: the linear object to subject or subject to object (to subject) and the notion of time as a linear sequence of events…'clock time'! Instead it has followed a line that is not easily traced in a Euclidean-Newtonian space-time paradigm. The Syuzhet *and* Fabula *become muddled. This part of the*

play superimposes the temporal aspects of the topological distribution of mental health.

[Narrators and Ecotone exit. Action returns]

Scene Three: '*I had to er, pop a couple of pills*' (BBS)

BBS: [Probably flustered from being frozen so many times]…and erm, erm, because I'm, I'm still being treated for, for, erm, er, for an addiction to certain, erm, a certain prescription pain killer and it's proving quite difficult to get off at the moment, but erm, and at that point when we were in Liverpool, I, I had to er, pop a couple of pills …to erm, not that I think that I needed them physically but my head [gestures his head] needed them and er, when we got away I was, that was, I was able to supress a panic but if I didn't have my pills with me I, I would've, I might have embarrassed myself.

Narrator 1: Aha! Let's examine the words. All these erm's and ers obviously mean that he's embarrassed to talk about his addiction. Oh, how about we count up how many times he says 'erm' and 'er' and interpret the resulting stats?

Narrator 2: Have you noticed the structural composition of what BBS's saying? If I were to analyse the discourse here, through coding and theming, rather than attempting to analyse the meaning of his words, such as all the erms, I would say, following Silverman's (1997)

coining of the concept 'Turbulance', that he was just pre-empting a difficult and delicate topic about to come up...

Ecotone: Or, following your line of interpretation, he's just having difficulty remembering the event? After all, this moment 'here' is not the experience of the event, as that moment has passed. What we are doing is creating new memories of the event by looking at a video and discussing it. This is not a representation...it's a completely new event in itself. Yet we are still interpreting. Perhaps a more relevant question would be, 'does this (re)enforce those previous memories?' Does it change the past for the better? These new memories are merged with many other events that have happened since the Liverpool event. Yet you narrators are still interpreting...making meaning from the 'data'! See how this method changes the conceptual significance...you experts! What about if we tried not to interpret, not to assume there are already data, variables, codes and themes in existence for us experts to prize out of the research data, material...the world? What happens if we just ask questions of the so called re-search instead? Such as, how does this re-flection change the initial event? How do the tools of re-flection, the materiality of the video, the photos, the journals, act upon the changing mental realms of 'the group' (as opposed to the individual)? For example, right now, how does 'reading' this group re-flection on paper (or perhaps on a computer screen or watching it as a film) differ and change meaning from when it is 'performed' or 'read out' by someone else or some-'thing' else (if animated perhaps)? How does the tone change it? How

does the action change it? How does watching, listening to it in this room change it? How does it alter after you've eaten a bacon sandwich, in a dimly or brightly lit room where the temperature and smell is stifling? What about if we include other voices…as narrators…? Instead of asking 'how does' questions, what does it do when we change to asking 'what does it do' questions? What does calling it '(re)search' do? We could contextualise it even further…

Jamie: At what point did you take the pills, was it just before or after the square trees or…

BBS: ..oh, it was after the trees… it was half way through, yeh…erm, it was [pause], we were on a really busy road and there was, you took a picture of people getting on a bus and, erm, there was, there was a bit of a worky bit going on and you could smell the smell of somebody…

**Annotated Polaroid 8:** 'a worky bit going on' (BBS). Photo by Jamie.

Bumble: Was that just as we came through the shopping centre?

Annotated Polaroid 9: 'we came through the shopping centre' (Bumble). Photo by Jamie.

BBS: erm, no, no, no, it was after that [Bumble]

Bumble: 'Just as we went out and there was a shopping centre and a really busy road….we were all getting, all getting…

Inside shopping Centre - Smelly + dirty + awful music.
back outside in Concrete hell, multi Culture!

Note 14: 'awful music' (BBS).

[Now chaos ensues and what's being spoken is muddled]

Jamie: It was just past the railway station wasn't it? The railway station was on the right and it was just coming down from there and the bus scared you (Dolly), remember that Tsss of the bus and you went whoaaoa, like that. I remember that because I was feeling particularly stressed at that point…

Bumble: we all were weren't we?

Jamie: I think we all were, yeah…as well as the shopping centre.

Annotated Polaroid 10: 'as well as the shopping centre' (Jamie). Photo by Jamie.

Narrator 1: Aha! So the busy and built environment determined the stress of the group, probably because it was grabbing their attention and not in a restorative way. There are theories about this effect of place on us! For example, 'Attention Restoration Theory' (ART) by the Kaplans or Jules Pretty's study that influenced the charity MIND…you know, the one where they compared a walk through a shopping centre with a walk through a park and found the park to be much more restorative?

Narrator 2: What an assumption! What if the people already had a bias view of this particular environment that influenced how they made meaning from it? They

may have constructed this meaning from their lived experience, media representation of differences between romanticised environments and demonised urban ones. I too have the theories to support my argument……….What if it is merely an embodied placebo response (Mcphie, 2015a)?

Ecotone: Just wait….

Jim: It's strange because round about St. George's square, the big building, I felt really relaxed there…I felt most relaxed because I just didn't feel like an intruder, everywhere else I felt we were in a big gang…and going on all these side streets where people don't normally go in the day, people were probably thinking what were we up to, but down there, nobody notices you.

Jamie: So you felt more comfortable where there were more people because you felt more part of it?

Jim: Yeah.

Narrator 2: Aha! The determinist assumption has been rumbled! Everyone is different and makes subjective meaning from each situation. Jim prefers more people, Bumble prefers less and so the environment is merely symbolic and serves as a backdrop to our meaning making. We carry place with us. I declare that the city is an unhealthy social construct that humans have created.

Ecotone: Just wait…

Jamie: That's interesting isn't it, we're all different aren't we? That's what makes it so interesting.

Narrator 2: You see! Even Jamie agrees.

Ecotone: Just wait…

Blondie: I probably don't have any feelings because I quite enjoyed myself

Jamie: All the time?

Blondie: yeh.

Jamie: This is interesting.

Blondie: Yeah I was just dead happy and excited to be in a new place and …

Ecotone: Now I invoke 'the right of Syuzhet'[5] and transplant a future event here…

Syuzhet 1: (From the future: 03-02-14)

Dolly: It depends on the situation, if it said love everywhere and you'd just come out of a relationship and your heart's broken…you wouldn't be happy would you? You wouldn't want to see it everywhere would you?

Jamie: it depends on the context

Bumble: But you'd have different, different images wouldn't you, if there's lots around, different

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[5] The *syuzhet* influences the reader's perception of cause and effect (Torrence, 2014) and disrupts the linearity of the illusion of chronology (the *fabula*).

images…around, to just ignore that one and move on to the next one, a funny one perhaps'

[Many 'yeah's' in agreement]

Jamie: So if I'd have just broken up from my love, the love of my life…

BBS: Our mood reflects a lot doesn't it?

Dolly: Course it does, yeah

BBS: yeah, what we could be thinkin' about that time or what we'd just been through for example…

Jamie: So, what you're taking around with you internally, has an impact on what the external environment does to you…or says to you?

BBS: yeah cause you can see things all different, I remember one of my old girlfriends, erm, she had a silver car, an' it was a Beetle, and er, every time I see a silver Beetle I always think about her, even now, and that was, oh god, years ago… It's just like a permanent reminder isn't it? Because, she had, er, er, a grey, silver Beetle.

Jamie: So, it's like a jump back in time? Suddenly.

[End of Syuzhet 1]

Ecotone: …so, as we can see here, both Narrator 1 and Narrator 2 hold only part of the clues to how an individual's mental health is influenced. But isn't it co-produced…just as it is here...in this room? There are always 'other' environments that we are constantly 'in'

or 'of' but don't always register as particularly significant 'places'. For this group, the minibus was always a significant environment, where much time was spent, yet it was 'on the way' to a place rather than a place itself. The minibus frames the cinema-like 'outside' scenery, a landscape to view, to observe but not participate in (even though we are physically participating by 'viewing' it). The scenery becomes a backdrop on the stage that is the environment. So the environment becomes an aesthetic spectacle. We are audience members in the minibus as well as performers. And yet the metal and glass of the bus is also a skin, an outer layer of dermatological protection from the world. The flesh of the minibus is an armoured extension of our bodies and yet we cannot 'feel' the wind rushing into us like the shell can travelling at 60 miles per hour. It deadens us. We are but a ghost in a shell.

Perhaps one of the most significant environments the group has spent time in is 'here', in the 'room of reflection'. Even the event that triggered BBS's pill popping in Liverpool can be transported here, to this room. This extract from BBS's journal was written as we were watching the video of Pandora being interviewed by Jamie. BBS can hear a 'grinding' sound on the video that prompts an 'emoji' (Note 15) that is a mixture of anxiety 😣 and perhaps anger 😫. He (re)gains control that the sound of the grinding left him in doubt of momentarily. An affective residue co-produced by the 'video-laptop-BBS-journal' assemblage created a moment of panic for BBS. His mental health and wellbeing were spread in that assemblage at that time. If you were to take any of those four components away, it

would alter the outcome. Of course we could take the BBS assemblage away from the other components and it would still be possible for BBS to have a similar reaction if he were (re)minded through olfactory or auditory stimulation but the other three components would not. However, all four are needed in an intra-relational capacity to produce the feelings and 'empirical materials' (the journal entry) that emerged from BBS at that time. It is through this assemblage that BBS's mental health is extended and spread in the environment of this room and not 'solely' within the bounds of his cranium or body (unless we extend our conceptions of where we think our bodies end and the rest of the world begins). This makes our skin 'permeable'.

Note 15: 'I can hear grinding' (BBS, Pseudonym added).

The mental health of the co-participants is spread in the room in the form of journals, phones, Jamie's laptop and speaker. But because the laptop and speaker 'belong' to 'Jamie', as the facilitator, does it change the reflective event because of the power-laden run-off from the materiality of the laptop itself? How

much it cost? How much each co-participant perceived it cost depending on their own life experiences? The agential power of Jamie's laptop?

Narrator 1 & 2: Oh come on!

Ecotone: ...or does the agency emerge not from the object itself but from the relational capacity 'between' what we think of as objects (the co-emergent lines between the points)? Excuse me Mr. Bateson but can Jamie's laptop have agency?

Bateson: 'Now, let us consider for a moment the question of whether a computer thinks. I would state that it does not. What "thinks" and engages in "trial and error" is the man *plus* the computer *plus* the environment. And the lines between man, computer, and environment are purely artificial, fictitious lines. They are lines *across* the pathways along which information or difference is transmitted. They are not boundaries of the thinking system. What thinks is the total system which engages in trial and error, which is man plus environment.' (Bateson, 2000, pp. 490-491)

Ecotone: (Or even 'woman' plus environment! But as I say this, I separate the gender binary even further, yet perhaps in a more ethical direction...positive binary discrimination!). Annalee Newitz (2011) acknowledges that her laptop computer is 'practically a brain prosthesis' *and that* 'it doesn't just belong to [her]; [she] also belong[s] to it' *(p. 88). Newitz (2011) fell in love with someone online and so admits that her affection for this bodiless apparition determined her relationship with*

her computer so that 'every time [she] boot[s] up [her] machine, [she could] see a shadow of him flicker past' (p. 90). This association is embodied within the computer-Newitz assemblage just as myriad associations and relations of power co-emerge in this room along the lines between Jamie, Jamie's laptop and the perceivers (in different ways). Vilém Flusser (1996) examined the human relationship to the computer and concluded that, 'we distrust these worlds because we distrust all things artificial' *yet* 'either then alternative worlds are as real as the given one, or the given reality is as ghostly as the alternative ones' (p. 242). *In fact, Vilém, if you wouldn't mind saying a few words on this?*

Flusser: 'Ultimately, computers demonstrate that we cannot only project and win back this one universe, but that we can do the same with as many as we want. In short: our epistemological problem, and therefore also our existential problem, is whether everything, including ourselves, may have to be understood as a digital apparition.' (Flusser, 1996, p. 243)

Narrator 2: But what remains of 'us', our agency, our sense of self?

Flusser: 'What remains is that everything is digital […] This imposes on us not only a new ontology, but also a new anthropology. We have to understand ourselves – our "self" – as such a "digital distribution," as a realization of possibilities thanks to dense distribution. We have to understand ourselves as curvatures and convexities in the field of criss-crossing, especially human, relations […] It is not enough to acknowledge

that the "self" is a node of criss-crossing virtualities, an iceberg swimming in the sea of the unconscious, or a computation that leaps across neuro-synapses: we also have to act accordingly. The alternative worlds emerging from the computers are a transformation of this understanding into agency […] Computers are apparatuses for the realization of inner-human, inter-human, and trans-human possibilities, thanks to exact calculatory thought […] We are no longer the objects of a given objective world, but projects of alternative worlds. From the submissive position of subjection we have arisen into projection. We grow up. We know that we dream.' (Flusser, 1996, p. 244)

Narrator 2: But it is 'us', the subjective self, who is the decision maker: free will! We designed the computers in the first place.

Flusser: 'The existential transformation from subject into project is clearly not the result of a "free decision." We are forced into it, just as our distant ancestors found themselves forced to stand up on two legs because the ecological catastrophe of the period compelled them somehow to cross the spaces between the more widely scattered trees. We, on the other hand, have to learn to perceive the objects around us, as well as our own "self," which was formerly called "mind," "soul," or simply "identity," as computations of points. We can longer be subjects, because there are no more objects whose subjects we might be, and no hard kernel which might be the subject of some object. The subjective attitude and therefore also any subjective insight have become untenable. We have to leave all that behind as a childish

illusion and dare to step into the wide-open field of possibilities. With us, the adventure of becoming human has entered a new phase.' (Flusser, 1996, pp. 244-245)

Ecotone: Possibly, yet it may be wiser to perceive the objects around us as 'lines of becoming' rather than 'computations of points' (see Tim Imgold's (2011) When SPIDER Meets ANT *for a superb rendition of this point)!*

Narrator 1: Hang on, what about the role of the objective scientist in all this?

Flusser: 'The scientists are computer artists *avant la lettre*, and the results of science are not some "objective insights," but models for handling the computed. Understanding that science is a form of art does not debase it.' (Flusser, 1996, p. 245)

Narrator 1: Poppycock! We must have a shared scientific, objective insight in order to make sense of the world. Art is mere subjective interpretation of the world. Validity and reliability are our only salvation to rigorous research to discover the truth.

Narrator 2: 'Truths'!

Flusser: 'When the childish desire for "objective insight" is abandoned, then insights will be judged according to aesthetical criteria […] from now on we will have to embrace beauty as the only acceptable criterion of truth: "art is better than truth."' (Flusser, 1996, p. 245)

Ecotone: What about this room itself (the one in this play AND the one you, the audience member, are in right now), the position of the chairs, table, circle formation, the tea and coffee, etc.? The co-participants/co-(re)searchers memories were/are partly embedded and embodied in these 'things' and events. These 'things' form a part of our mental cognition. Some of these things are mobile memories (the photos on our phones, the journals, etc.) but some may only develop at this time, in this place and merge with the other memories, both externally and internally stored. New, more collective memories are forming to inform our future mental health as a sort of entangled conglomeration of cognitive medication that includes 'things', events and phenomena situated outside the body. How does the action of Jamie, as facilitator, change the affective domain, the mood of the certain members of the group, or the group itself (as they're different), when he plays the video back for reflection as opposed to 'letting' one of the other group members show their own footage, in their journals, or photos? Would the original event change if they were more empowered to show their own 'data', or if they themselves chose to lead the group reflection?

So, these collective reflection events, change the actual events themselves…as memories are renewed and associated with other memories (internal and external) in a co-created/co-produced manner. This has profound implications for the nature of mental health and indeed research itself.

Yet again, I invoke 'the right of Syuzhet' and transplant another future focus group event here…

Syuzhet 2: Bay Horse Hotel, Ulverston (13-01-13)

Jamie: What do you think has been the most effective method of answering our group question: How can we learn from/use the experiences we have to understand ourselves better and enhance our moods?

Dolly: More group discussions like this where we can feed off each other.'

[End of Syuzhet 2]

Ecotone: This 'feeding off each other' changes the individuals to form new, different perceptions, memories and behaviours. The research process itself becomes part of the research. Therefore 'the subject' cannot be re-presented and/or studied from 'the outside' as researchers are always already enmeshed in the phenomena that is under scrutiny. Undertaking the research itself (the actions involved through diffractive exploration individually and as a group) seems to foster some sort of positive feeling for everyone in the group. Therefore, as well as asking questions such as, how do environments influence our mental health and how do perceptions of environments influence our mental health, another (perhaps more appropriate) question may be how does 'performing' research influence mental health (and vice versa)?

Blondie had already mentioned the effectiveness of her photo's. BBS had already mentioned the effectiveness of the video interviews as well as the dual

video feedback as a source of healthy transgression (in terms of both empowerment and self-exploration). This seems to be morphing into something new! Maybe we can start to make sense of the question 'where' is mental health by including another complimentary question…'when' is mental health? Similar to Manzotti's (2012) insistence that 'we should not ask whether objects exist but rather where and when do they take place?' *(n.p.) we could provoke the response,* 'only when it produces an effect *(n.p.), but when it does produce an effect (in a non-linear manner), Manzotti (re)minds us that it* 'was there since the beginning' *(n.p.). Thus, re-membering (re-limbing) and re-minding become implausible, if not impossible and so the 'temporal' boundaries of mental health also become topological just as the spatial boundaries do.*

Act Two

Scene One: '*That camera is looking at me*' (BBS)

Jamie: So, you know the video interview we were just talkin' about before then, erm, so you said, you, you, you didn't mind too much about this, er, that, our relationship during that, you said, about me asking the questions in that way and having that slight, erm, you didn't see it as such a big issue of a power relationship or anything? Erm, so that was, was that alright to you, I mean, now?

BBS: I can give you another example. That camera [*he refers to the camera that is recording the conversation*] is looking at me and erm, I erm,..

Ecotone: How can a camera 'look at me'? We may acknowledge (visual) reciprocity with another human or animal but an inert material object? Somehow it becomes engaged in a sort of dialogue with the self, not as a separate static object over and against a living being but within a cognitive process itself. Why should the material of the metal, glass and plastic of the camera be set aside from the neurons or electro-chemicals that we normally think of as enabling cognition 'within' a brain? Why separate them in such a manner when they are all directly involved in the physical, material process of cognising?

Then there's the 'concept' of a 'camera'. For BBS the camera obviously enacts very differently within

the assemblage that is 'BBS-camera (concept)-camera (percept)' than for the others in this room. The physically embodied memories that BBS has associated with the 'concept' camera will weave themselves together with the 'percept' (as well as the initial unconscious 'affective' stimuli) camera to co-produce an entanglement of conation that will ultimately define his (re)actions to/with it.

[Jamie moves camera to face in a different direction]

BBS: [Smiling]…yeah, and I saw you fiddlin' with it before then I, I was thinking 'is he part of the defendants who I was suing?'

[laughs all round]

Annotated Polaroids 11 & 12: 'is he part of the defendants who I was suing?' (BBS). Photos by BBS.

Ecotone: No wonder BBS took these photos!

Narrator 2: Yes, you can see the symbolism in the picture that may hold a great deal of meaning for BBS. The lion with the crown, king of the jungle (well, England at least) and the unicorn representing Scotland. These heraldic symbols obviously remind BBS of his trouble in court, not to mention the deeper unconscious effects of the power and control of the state over him.

Ecotone: There may well be contextual associations here that are co-produced by the BBS-camera-accident assemblage but just labelling and putting this meaning-making down to 'symbolism' seems to me to be an easy get-out clause so that you don't really have to explore in any greater depth what this assemblage here actually 'does'. But as the photos were never shown to BBS and discussed in any way, we cannot know, it would merely be an interpretation. But we can explore what the camera (or more properly, what is understood as 'Jamie's' camera) does here within this play…

Jamie: [laughing nervously] Oh right…[flusters] I'm recording the sound, I'm not recording the, taking the…

BBS: And erm, but then, but then

Jamie: Yeah, well, but I'm not, yeah, I'm only using the sound for it, so I'm not going to use any of this for video footage

Blondie: You're still recording it though

BBS: Well that came over [whispers] '*I've got nothing to hide*'…

Blondie: Yeah, '*I'm not guilty, so*'…

BBS: …he can, he can, if, if he, if he is the Third Reich, what I call them…

Jamie: Crikey

Dolly: You're getting a bit paranoid now

BBS: *Really* paranoid

Jamie: D'you think they'd allow me in the Third Reich with this hat?

Annotated Polaroid 13: 'he is the Third Reich' (BBS). Photo by BBS.

[BBS laughs]

Jamie: …'cause I'm not gonna take it off..

[laughs all round]

Jamie: I think I'm too stubborn to be in any Reich or army or anything like that whatsoever….erm, with, yes, so, with all these sessions all I'm doing again, I mean I think I've mentioned it previously a few times that erm, I'm recording the sound and what I'm going to do is erm, er, transcribe it, erm, what we talk about, as well, but I'm not using the video images from this or any pictorial images at all, erm, but I've just put a new 16 gigabyte memory in this [referring to the camera] so it allows me to video the sound continuously 'cause I don't have a tape recorder, so this'll do as a tape recorder I think and it gets sounds really well this one does so, but if you prefer for it to face that way then…

Ecotone: Here, the camera/video recorder/tape recorder, that is associated with Jamie, has squeezed itself into the conversation. It is beginning to have a narrative and voice of its own, an 'agential' affect (if we are allowed to use this word…Mr. Ingold?), just like the autotelic stones in Rautio's study. It has a presence that is sometimes unnerving for some people in this room. The camera sits and waits quietly in the corner of the room, patiently and diligently staring at the accused. It imposes an air of authority and control over some members of the group, depending on their memories etched into their bodies (or vice versa). For others, it

may appear as just an object! Again, the contextuality of the moments/events of time and space here are making themselves known more evidently. The camera does not necessarily exert agential power alone without the intra-relation it has with other material processes, such as the haecceity *that is Jamie. Only by association with Jamie, does the camera become 'alive' (in the Ingoldian sense). Thus, a 'correspondance' takes place over and above an interaction. Indeed a dance of animacy is perhaps the most apt description of this assemblage. A dance of animacy (Ingold, 2013a, p. 103) is generated in a similar fashion to the Deleuzian man-horse-bow assemblage or even the relational animisms brought alive by animist verbal names. In this case, the BBS-camera-Jamie assemblage must also include the room, the other co-participants/co-(re)searchers and the nature of the inquiry itself (among many other phenomena).*

Power is also spread out along the lines of intra-action of this assemblage that would not have the same impact without certain crucial knots within this assemblage. For example, Jamie is the group facilitator and co-ordinator for these sessions. He is also the founder and will ultimately write up the inquiry as a professional activity. Therefore, he already exerts power by his very presence. The camera serves as an extension of this power but in very different ways to each person in the room depending on their embodied memories, life experiences and other material forces at play within the room (materially, socially, energetically, etc.). For BBS, the memory continually enacts on his current state and the camera, drenched in another type of power, performs accordingly. This works the other way around too. The

memory of the events of his past are also being morphed and changed into something new…literally. Manzotti (2012) and Barad (2012b) (re)mind us that the past can actually be changed for the present, physically, by events taking place in the present. This was also evident when Blondie mentioned that her photographs of the moments we spent together as a group helped her to (re)member and actually change the past to a better prospect, at the same time as changing herself (her own storied life). This can only be accomplished up to a point though as societal, political structural policies and normative taboos still excerpt a powerful hold over her, reducing her chances for any escape by following lines of flight that are always already more accessible (affectively or epistemologically, for example) to richer, white, middle-class men.

BBS: I, I, I don't mind, erm, because I'm, I'm, I'm using it as a tool that erm, because I used to have quite a few problems with my speech, erm, after my accident, and er, and it's good to hear me on it 'cause I think I'm getting really quite fluid now to..erm, almost where I used to be really. And erm, [clears throat] I can hear it slightly now 'cause I'm just a little bit anxious about sp, speaking out in the group but when, when we're together I, I was quite pleased to see that I was much more fluid and er, I've kind of like, I've given myself a little smiley face for it.

Note 16: 'I'm at peace with the filming' (BBS).

[This smiley face is the habit of drawing emoji's and emoticons in the journals that a few of the group members seem to have started up and is spreading as we discuss earlier/later in one of the assemblages within the wider assemblage of this PhD thesis]

Jamie: Oh good

Blondie: Yeah 'cause I've, I've noticed like when, when you get a bit nervous when you're talkin' you start stuttering a lot

BBS: Yeah, I do

Blondie: Yeah, it's a bit like [inaudible], yeah, I've noticed that

Jamie: So, so it's almost a therapeutic, erm, something else that's therapeutic, the video…

BBS: Yeah

Jamie: …interviews, it is for me as well because I don't notice how I am most of the time and when I play this back in interview I can see those things that we noticed just then …

Narrator 1: So the video is a reflective and possibly therapeutic tool for aiding a person's mental health and wellbeing.

Narrator 2: And reflexive tool too.

Ecotone: But it's much more than a symbolic device that we use as an aid to meaning making. A sense of agency somehow seems to have emerged from the intra-actions of an assemblage that incorporates the entire WiC group (as they all played a part in the discussion), the laptop and the video interview played on the laptop (that then merges with newly formed embodied memories to produce novel associations and conceptions of/with the original events). The capacity to act, then, in this particular case, emerged only as an assemblage of these intra-relational encounters.

BBS: Well, I think this is what it's all about because when I, when I said I, no disrespect, but I see this is all for *me*.

Note 17: 'I'm calling this project mine' (BBS).

Jamie: Right

BBS: And what, this, this is just part of, part of, we're all on a journey in life nowadays aren't we? And erm, this is, this is part of mine and erm, [Dolly] will have her reasons and [Jim] will have his reasons and so on and so on, you know, you know. This is what I'm getting out of it but again, mine'll be completely different to [Dolly's] and [Jim's] and so on and er, that's, that's, that's what makes it so damn interesting I think.

 [Silence]

Blondie: There is a saying that erm, everybody says that 'who drives your bus'…that means who's in control of you.

BBS: That's a nice little phrase

Blondie: Who drives your bus?

Jamie: [Singing] 'This is my bus, I'm the boss of the bus' ♫

Blondie: Exactly, so you drive your bus…

Jamie: [Aside] That's from a musical

Blondie: …so, you're in control and whatever happens…

BBS: Well I think I am driving my bus now, I wasn't for a few years but I am now.

[A few laughs]

Jamie: Has anyone seen 'Our Day Out' by Willy Russell? The musical?...

[Silence]

…And there's a bus driver on it that sings a song, [in an Elvis voice] ♫ 'This is my bus, I'm the boss of the bus, I've been driving it for 16 years'♫

[Laughs all round]

Blondie: Exactly, yeah, who drives your bus?

Narrator 1: The road pre-determines where my bus takes me and as the driver I will react accordingly.

Narrator 2: I drive my bus from within but am also influenced by the passengers.

Ecotone: The bus, the road and I are not ontologically separate and therefore I cannot drive my bus and my bus cannot drive me in any linear, unidirectional cause-and-effect trajectory. But it's interesting how BBS mentioned that he wasn't the driver of his bus for a few years, I imagine due to his accident at work. I wonder where 'he' was?

Mcphie: '…there are also disembodied and hyperembodied senses of self that have emerged seemingly as a direct result of the modernist dilemma. For example, schizophrenia patients often experience a split between mind and body (disembodiment) whereas melancholic depression has the potential to separate the body from its surroundings (hyperembodiment) as phenomenal space is no longer embodied (Fuchs & Schlimme, 2009). Fuchs and Schlimme (2009) emphasise that confined to the present state of bodily restriction, patients suffering depression cannot transcend their body anymore and so plunge into the spatial boundaries of their own material bodies which is experienced as an object among others. This has implications concerning a person's sense of self, identity and of being (becoming) alive.' (Mcphie, 2014a, para. 40)

Ecotone: Because I 'look' at the world through my eyes it sometimes feels like the 'me' to me resides in my head. The relational space between myself and my iPhone allow me to be a species at once hyperembodied (within my phone, shutting out my immediate environment) and yet topologically and socially distributed with the intra-relational meshwork of the world, a sort of topo-embodiment. This, effectively, expands my body (and my conception of my body) outwards to encompass other material relations of the world (if we take sight, sound, taste, smell and other forms of haptic sensing to be a part of our embodied selves). This extended 'cyborg me' (after Haraway, 1997) allows our 'bodies' (not just what we think of as our 'minds') to become topologically integrated with the world (even through space as the

signals are transported via satellites). But are we not always already spread of the world. Aren't our skins and skulls permeable rather than merely porous?

Jamie: Alright, shall we watch the next video?

[Phone ring tone goes off]

BBS: Yes

Jamie: Erm,

Pandora: Sorry [about the ring tone]…HELLO

Jamie: [Whispers] *We're all listening*

Blondie: You can go in the kitchen

Prof: Put the kettle on

[*Interméde*…Refreshments anyone?]

Epilogue (*the middle*)

Ecotone: This play has exposed mental health and wellbeing as extended, gendered, enclassed, encultured, historicised, invented and re-invented, contextual, territorialised and re-territorialised, accepted and resisted, distributed in space and time, always already becoming ... just as nature is, as they cannot be disentangled. Similar to Niels Bohr's notion that 'human concepts play a productive (though not determining) role in the outcome of measurements' *(Barad, 2007, p. 143), it seems that the human concepts of 'nature', 'mental health and wellbeing' and a host of others certainly played very big roles throughout this production.*

Where and when are mental health and wellbeing?

> *Maybe it would be helpful to begin formulating an idea of* where *and* when *mental health and wellbeing is. This implicates notions of empiricism and idealism.*

> An empiricist argues that there is an experience of sequence – such as 'a' following 'b' – and that this sequence *eventually produces the idea of causality*. Ideas are reflections of experience, formed from experience. The subject is not the

author of these ideas. Rather, experience takes place in the mind, and from a series of experiences a subject is formed. The mind is nothing more than the 'site' where experience takes place (and we need to remember that there are other sites, such as non-mental experiences). The mind receives the impression of 'a' then 'b'. It connects or synthesises these impressions or images, but the point for Deleuze is that there is no subject *who* connects. Rather, there is connection and the mind is nothing more than the site where connection takes place. (Colebrook, 2002, p. 80)

These connections (although I would rather say intra-relations…so I will), also take place outside *of what we think of as the human organic body, therefore, the* mind *that Deleuze refers to may also be distributed in this same extended topological space. As can mental health. BBS's experience of (re)membering his accident in Liverpool, where he 'jumped back in time' (creating a* syuzhet *timeline), exampled 'when' mental health can be located with the help of Capra, Manzotti and Barad. The external-internal entanglements of olfactory and auditory stimulation (among many others) intertwined with BBS's internal-external entanglements of embodied (and extended) memory to co-produce an 'event'. The affective material topology of space and time 'became' the mental event that influenced the production of*

Tramadol, which then set off another entanglement. BBS's skin became permeable.

Distributed Agency?

'When I think of what I already lived through it seems to me I was shedding my bodies along the paths.' (Lispector, 2014, p. 66)

The affective capacity of the smell and noise 'influenced'—and was 'influenced by'—BBS's embodied memory. What I perceive of as 'mind' and 'agency', in this case, co-emerged from the mental health assemblage of BBS-Pneumatic drill-accident that had the capacity to 'affect' and 'be affected.' This is what 're-minded' (re-limbed) BBS of the traumatic events that led to his change of circumstances. The event of his accident is still embodied but not solely contained in the body within his epidermis. The Pneumatic drill, when 'plugged in' to this assemblage, also became a new process within this embodied multiplicity, this story. It became a part of BBS's mental haecceity. *The Pneumatic drill was embodied within the ecotone of BBS-Liverpool. It became an extended, inorganic self. We could say that BBS's epidermis was extended in that moment to encapsulate the Pneumatic drill as it became part of his embodied and extended self. The flesh of the city became entangled with the flesh of BBS. This was also true of the rest of us in the WiC group.*

> Character is not a single unified ground or body which then has certain distinguishing features; characters are collections or 'assemblages' of randomly gathered affects […] Characters are the diverse events and histories that compose them, and the same applies to any self. We are nothing more than our contracted habits and contemplations; we are events of life – and a life that is nothing outside all these singular expressions. (Colebrook, 2002, p. 83)

Reading from Deleuze's 'transcendental empiricism', Claire Colebrook (2002) emphasises that literature 'is not the *representation* of a human life that we all share and recognise; it is the creation of affects that open other worlds. In the case of the novel these affects are opened up from the possible world of another character' (p. 83). *The play that has just unfolded to you contains these other-worldly affects. And now so do* you.